CITATION: Ontario (Ministry of Public and Business Services Delivery and Procurement) v. Will Lead Enterprises Inc., 2026 ONCJ 467
DATE: July 16, 2026
ONTARIO COURT OF Justice
Central West Region
Rex (Ministry of Public and Business Services Delivery and Procurement)
-and-
Will Lead Enterprises Inc o/a Canada’s Green Home Solutions, and
Welid Abdulkader (amended to Welid Abdulkadir)
Trial on 29 January 2026 and 21 May 2026
Decision and Reasons issued July 16, 2026
In absentia
Appearances:
Chiang, T for the Prosecutor
Abu-Jalil, S Articling Student for the Crown
Statutes Considered or Cited:
Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A (“CPA”)
Overview
1. As noted above, this trial is in relation to a Corporate defendant and its sole Director.
2. The Information sets out sixteen counts, eight each against the Corporate defendant and its sole Director, the personal defendant. The first eight counts relate to one complainant, Marsha Renzo, and the remaining eight relate to another complainant Edith Hermann.
3. The eight counts run in parallel for the two consumers. They are:
a. Entering into agreements without being invited into the home for this purpose (counts 1, 2, 9 and 10, being against the corporate defendant and personal defendant in turn).
b. Failing to provide compliant purchase agreements (counts 3, 4, 11 and 12, being against the Corporate defendant and personal defendant in turn).
c. Engaging in an unfair practice pursuant to s, 17(1) of the CPA (counts 5, 6, 13 and 14, being against the Corporate defendant and personal defendant in turn).
d. Failing to provide a refund pursuant to the statutory requirements (counts 8, 8, 15 and 16, being against the Corporate defendant and personal defendant in turn).
4. This proceeding commences in the absence of the defendant(s). The Court records indicate that the defendant(s) have never attended Court to address these charges.
Preliminary Issue
5. At the outset of the proceedings, the Court raised an issue with regard to the identity of the personal defendant.
6. The standard Information document was used to bring charges. This relates to events said to have occurred on or about 6 January 2023 and 20 July 2023. At the top of the document, it is routine to name the defendant(s). Curiously, the name of the personal defendant was not typed on the document, however, his name was handwritten in, in red ink. No initials were recorded in connection with that supposed amendment, raising a question as to how and when that writing was made.
7. There is a limitation period set out in s. 116(5) of the CPA. This limits commencement of proceedings to no later than two years from the date the facts upon which the prosecution relies came to the knowledge of the Director. The evidence does not establish when the Director first came to learn of the underlying facts.
8. The Information was sworn 16 April 2025.
9. Further, in the course of the proceedings, prosecution noted that the name of the personal defendant was in fact incorrect as set out in the multiple counts Before me, the prosecution sought an amendment to the Information.
10. Further, evidence revealed that the informant attended at an Intake Court in the City of Toronto, and sought a section 24 Summons pursuant to the POA, now using the name of a defendant as believed to be the correct name. A Summons was issued on 13 January, 2026. An affidavit of service of this Summons was provided to the Court.
11. There is evidence before the Court that no new Information was sworn to reflect the name of the defendant to align with the name believed by the Prosecution to be correct.
12. I am troubled by several aspects of the prosecution request for amendment to the name of the personal defendant.
13. The prosecutor seeks to amend the Information to reflect a different name. The amended name the prosecutor seeks to have shown is the name as set out in the Certified Business Record obtained by the prosecution and submitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. That document reflects multiple dates, but clearly shows the name as sought to be amended on a document printed on September 28, 2023. It is a reasonable inference that investigators and prosecution knew the correct name as of that date.
14. As noted, the informant swore the Information other than in the Court where the proceeding would take place. After the Information was sworn, the evidence indicates that the affiant then transmitted the Information to the Brantford Court, rather than leave it to the Court to transmit the Information. This creates an environment which permits, among other things which writing in this case actually appeared on the Information, the source of which cannot be determined.
15. There may be an issue of the limitation period set out in the governing statute. Given that I cannot definitively determine when the facts underpinning this case came to the attention of the Director, I cannot make a definitive finding.
16. The amendment was sought when the issue of the unexplained writing on the Information was identified by the Court.
17. In its submissions on the issue of the requested amendment, the prosecution adverted to other Courts not being troubled by the same issue. This introduced an allegation of similar prosecutions against this personal defendant, perhaps by inadvertence.
18. The amendment could and should have been done far earlier, perhaps following the date when the issue may have been addressed in that other Court.
19. I am not aware of any authority to request (and for a Justice) to grant a s. 24 Summons absent an Information relating to that defendant.
20. The prosecutor prevailed upon the Court favour justice over form, which is a well-established legal principle. However, the Court needs to be mindful to avoid sanctioning steps that are, at best, sloppy and fail to hew to the facts known to the prosecution.
21. All those considerations in mind, I am granting the prosecution request for the amendment. I urge prosecution to be far more scrupulous in ensuring defendants are properly named.
Evidence
22. The Court heard evidence from the two complainant consumers.
23. Their evidence is similar and, as this is a proceeding I absentia, not contested.
24. Each recounts meeting with representatives of the defendants, under the name of the operating Business Name.
25. The meetings were prompted by inquiries each made regarding available energy efficiency rebates. For this purpose, the defendants were invited into the consumers’ homes.
26. In each case, the consumers agreed to and entered into agreements to purchase replacement and/or additional equipment (Exhibits 2 and 7). The purchasers both gave evidence that the understanding was that the equipment would be provided almost immediately.
27. The description of the equipment can only be described as generic, and fails to detail make, model or year of the proposed equipment. No specifications were made available.
28. Both consumers stated they were told they would enjoy benefits from government subsidies related to energy efficiency. No audits ever took place.
29. Both consumers had some equipment that was provided by Reliance Home Comfort. The consumers had lease agreements with respect to this equipment the equipment provided by Reliance, and would, on discontinuation of the lease, trigger buy out amounts. The consumers understood that the defendants would cover any such amounts.
30. Notwithstanding that, both consumers were required to pay amounts to Reliance Home Comfort, to fulfill their obligations under agreements in relation to equipment previously installed in their home.
31. The agreements were both funded by loan agreements with third party lenders. There is no evidence that any funds were paid directly to the defendants.
32. The documents tendered through the witnesses are said to represent the “agreements”. (Exhibits 2 and 7). These do not include statutorily mandated language regarding cancellation rights nor other rights set out in the CPA and its regulations.
33. Existing equipment in the homes of both consumers was removed by the defendants, and left at the consumers’ homes.
34. Some but not all of the new equipment was installed by the defendants. A short while later the consumers decided they were unhappy with the purchases. One received advice that the equipment was inadequate for the applications.
35. The consumers sought to connect with the defendants to address, first of all, for installation of missing equipment, and, to ensure that equipment performed satisfactorily.
36. In spite of these efforts, they got no satisfaction.
37. In turn, both advised the defendants of their desire to cancel their agreements (Exhibits 5 and 11), and sought to have the installed equipment removed. This never came to pass.
38. Both witnesses succeeded in having the loan agreements related to these transactions cancelled. There is no evidence before the Court as to whether, or how much the consumers may have paid or whether they suffered any losses as a result.
Issues and Submissions
39. The Court sought clarification by the prosecution in regard to a number of elements.
40. Specifically, the Court inquired what evidence there is that the defendants failed to provide refunds, once notified by the defendants decided to rescind the agreements. In particular, noting the absence of evidence that the complainants paid any funds to the defendants.
41. The starting point for the prosecution was that the defendants had decided to rescind their agreements, and that the defendants failed to refund any moneys paid. The Court questioned this, as there was no evidence that the consumers had paid any moneys to the defendants.
42. The Prosecution position further relied on payments that were eventually required to be paid by both consumers to satisfy the related lease agreements with Reliance Home Comfort.
43. The Court sought to clarify whether the meaning of the term “refund”, and whether that contemplated payments made to the defendant or other entities as well. Prosecution held that the term applies to any payments made by the consumers, whether to the defendants or other parties.
44. The Court notes that s. 43.1(6) of the CPA provides:
If a supplier supplies goods or services to a consumer under a direct agreement that is void and the consumer incurs charges from a third party that are related to the agreement, including, but not limited to, charges in respect of the removal or return of any goods that the consumer is liable to return to the third party, the supplier is liable to reimburse the consumer for the amount of all those charges.
45. This is a separate offence section under the statute from that under which the defendants are charged.
Decision
46. I accept that the prosecution has proven the charges of failing to provide a consumer agreement that complies with the statute and its regulations, in relation to both defendants and both consumers. As such, I enter convictions on counts 3,4 10 and 11.
47. I find that both defendants committed the offence of unfair business practice in relation to both consumers. As such, I enter convictions on counts 5, 6, 12 and 13, and 14.
48. I find that the prosecution has failed to provide the counts of failing to provide a refund, given that there is express statutory language in relation to reimbursements as opposed to refunds. In my view, the term refund must contemplate repayment of funds paid by the consumer to the defendant(s), for which there is no evidence in this case. What the prosecution tried to do is conflate these two provisions, with which I do not agree. As such, I dismiss counts 7, 8, 15 and 16.
Issued at City of Brantford, Ontario,
Original Signed
_____________________________
His Worship Donald Dudar
Justice of the Peace