ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
SUKHMANPREET SINGH
Before Justice Allison Dellandrea
Heard on December 15 – 18, 2025; May 25 – 26, June 15-16, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on July 28, 2026
Ms. J. Vlacic counsel for the Crown
Ms. K. Schofield and Ms. R. Singh counsel for the Sukhmanpreet Singh
DELLANDREA J.:
Introduction and Overview
1Sukhmanpreet Singh is charged with thirteen (13) counts of Dangerous Operation causing bodily harm and one count of Dangerous Operation causing death resulting from a multi-vehicle collision just after midnight in the city of Brampton on August 27, 2022 during which his transport truck collided with the rear of several vehicles stopped at an intersection. Thirteen people were seriously injured in the crash: Elvis Enountvi, Germaine Mbai, Njinkeng Nkemgu, Amyi Nkemngu, Aka Nkemngu, Brenden McCreight, Bibi Kellowan, Surinder Singh Banwait, Ramona Smith, Margaret Ezekiel, Ifase-Anthony Ihaza, Arjun Singh Sandhu and O’Neil Samuels. One victim, Ms. Nyaradzo Zvidsayi succumbed to her injuries at the scene.
2The facts of this tragic case are largely undisputed. While operating a Volvo tractor trailer loaded with gravel which he had picked up in Quebec the previous day, Mr. Singh departed the 400 series highway and was travelling westbound along Queen Street approaching the intersection of Gore Road where the light was red. Ten westbound vehicles were stopped at the intersection, waiting for the light to turn green. It is not disputed that Mr. Singh drove his transport into these vehicles, causing a catastrophic collision which resulted in the destruction or extensive damage of numerous vehicles which were part of the chain reaction caused by the defendant’s conduct.
3An Agreed Statement of Facts was filed pursuant to s. 655 of the Criminal Code, in which Mr. Singh conceded that his conduct caused the collision which inflicted bodily harm to thirteen occupants of the various vehicles struck, as well as the death of Ms. Zvidsayi.
4Likewise, the defendant’s employment records and daily Vehicle Inspection Logs with Automan Express were filed on consent, as were the Event Data Records (“EDR”) findings contained in the Volvo Imaging Report and in the accident reconstruction sketch. The evidence provided by these admissions and Exhibits substantially reduced the length of this trial.
5There is no suggestion whatsoever that Mr. Singh intended to cause the collision, or the tragic harm which followed.
6The single contested issue at this trial was the sufficiency of the Crown’s evidence in establishing that the defendant’s driving was dangerous to the public, with the principal issue being the mens rea of the offence.
Applicable Legal Principles
7To fix the defendant with criminal responsibility, the Crown must prove each of the two elements of the offence of dangerous operation (Criminal Code s. 320.13) beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That the defendant’s conduct, viewed objectively and having regard to all of the circumstances was dangerous to the public;
(2) That the defendant’s conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances.
8The onus is on the Crown to establish beyond a reasonable doubt “how and in what way” the accused’s driving went beyond carelessness and reached the level of a marked departure from the standard of care, in light of all of the evidence: R. v. Laverdure, 2018 ONCA 614, at para 26.
9In R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, the test to be applied was summarized at para. 28:
The actus reus of the offence is driving in a manner dangerous to the public, having regard to all of the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle was being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time was or might reasonably have been expected to be at that place (s.249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code). The mens rea is that the degree of care exercised by the accused was a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances (Beatty, at para. 43). The care exhibited by the accused is assessed against the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent driver in the circumstances. The offence will only be made out if the care exhibited by the accused is a marked departure from the norm. While the distinction between a mere departure from the standard of care, which would justify civil liability, and a marked departure justifying criminal punishment is a matter of degree, the lack of care must be serious enough to merit punishment.
10The court in Roy emphasizes that the focus of the actus reus inquiry is on the risks created by the manner of driving, and not the consequences of a subsequent accident, however tragic they may be.
11As Justice Goldstein stated in R. v. He, 2021 ONSC 7253 at para. 8: “[m]uch criminally dangerous driving obviously happens without consequences” and “some merely negligent driving has horrible consequences”.
12In conducting the inquiry into the manner of driving, it is also necessary to acknowledge that driving is an inherently dangerous activity which is both legal and of social value: Roy, at para. 34. Not every deviation from the standard of care will trigger criminal consequences.
13The trier of fact must also be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s objectively dangerous conduct was accompanied by the required mens rea. In making this assessment the trier of fact must consider whether on the basis of all of the evidence, including any evidence about the accused’s state of mind, whether the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances: Beatty, 2008 SCC 6 at para. 43.
14In considering mens rea, the court in Roy recommends breaking the analysis into two questions, at para. 36:
(1) Whether on all the relevant evidence, a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible; and if so;
(2) Whether the accused’s failure to foresee and take steps to evade the risk was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the accused’s circumstances.
15It is important as well for courts to recall that simple carelessness, to which even the most prudent drivers may occasionally succumb, is generally not criminal. Were every departure from the civil norm to be criminalized regardless of the degree of risk, the court would cast the net too widely and brandish as criminal persons who are not morally blameworthy: Beatty, at para. 71.
16Our law recognizes that a momentary lapse in attention and judgment will not usually trigger criminal liability unless the underlying conduct, when assessed in totality against a reasonable person standard, is a marked departure from the norm: R .v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8 at para. 26.
17The duration and nature of the accused’s conduct are only some of the factors to be considered among the circumstances included in the mens rea analysis. They are not factors that can be taken out of context. Conduct that occurs over a brief period of time that creates foreseeable and immediate risks of serious consequences may still be a marked departure from the norm: Chung, at para. 22: R. v. Willock,(2006) 2006 CanLII 20679 (ON CA), 212 O.A.C. 82.
Positions of the Parties
18On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Vlacic submits that the defendant’s failure to observe the red light at Gore Road along with the illuminated brake lights of the stationary vehicles positioned there while and his late application of his brakes in the final 1.75-1.50 seconds before the crash was conduct which posed a danger to the public satisfying the actus reus of dangerous driving.
19Ms. Vlacic further submits that the mens rea of dangerous driving is satisfied by the evidence that Mr. Singh continued driving despite obvious symptoms of fatigue, overtly distracted driving, persistent inattention and failure to respond to visible hazards. The Crown submits that Mr. Singh’s conduct was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable professional truck driver and that he is guilty of dangerous operation.
20The defence accepts that the collision was Mr. Singh’s fault, and that he failed to stop his vehicle on time to avoid causing it. However, Ms. Schofield argues that the Crown’s evidence demonstrates no more than a momentary lapse of Mr. Singh’s attention in the seconds before the collision, which is insufficient to attach criminal liability. Pointing to the evidence of the defendant’s pattern of compliance in completing his logbooks, navigating traffic as well as construction hazards, the defence submits that the evidence as a whole establishes that Mr. Singh was a largely attentive driver whose momentary lapse of attention is akin to the reflexive action described in Beatty and Roy as evidence of carelessness, and not criminality. They submit that Mr. Singh should be found not guilty.
21I turn now to review the evidence and make findings with respect to each of the elements of the offence.
I. Actus reus: Did Mr. Singh drive in a manner that was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle was being operated, and the traffic at the time?
22Mr. Singh obtained his AZ license on February 9, 2022. He began his employment with Automan Express as a licensed (AZ) truck driver on July 20, 2022. Mr. Singh had been a driver of good standing with no traffic of employment violations prior to the collision on August 27, 2022.
23The Volvo which the accused was operating was equipped with both a forward-facing dash camera, and a rear facing camera within the interior of the vehicle. Video recordings of both perspectives from approximately ten (10) minutes before the collision were introduced into evidence. I rely on the video recordings to make the following findings.
24At approximately 11:51:41 p.m., the defendant was driving on Highway 427 approaching Finch Avenue. The roadway was clear and dry. Traffic was reasonably heavy and there were signs and pylons indicative of upcoming construction.
25Mr. Singh was steering the vehicle with his left hand. His cellphone was in his right hand. It was clearly powered on. Mr. Singh interacted frequently with his phone while driving, both to look at the screen and scroll repeatedly with this thumb. The extent, frequency and impact of this activity will be discussed in greater detail under the analysis of mens rea.
26Mr. Singh merged with other vehicles and proceeded with the flow of traffic which is at times congested and later became quite light.
27Mr. Singh continued north on the 427 where he exits on Hwy 7 at 11:58:16 p.m., waits at a red light, then proceeded to make a left onto Hwy 7. The posted speed limit was 80 km/hr. He drove west along Hwy 7 (which becomes Queen Street) through two intersections (two amber/red, one green) towards the intersection with the Gore Road. His speed was accelerating.
28At 12:01:16 a.m. red lights are visible on the dashcam video in the direction of Gore Road. The defendant’s speed at the time was approximately 81 km/hr.
29At approximately 12:01:29 a.m. the interior camera of the Volvo depicts Mr. Singh sitting up, leaning forward, and appearing to take notice of the vehicles up ahead. This action corresponds with his hurried application of the brakes.
30At 12:01:33 a.m. Mr. Singh collided into the rear of the stationary vehicles at the red light at Gore Road, while steering sharply to the right. His vehicle came to a stop on the corner of the intersection. His transport caused the demolition and extensive damage to ten vehicles with which he struck.
31The court received the Volvo Imaging Report which contained Event Data Records (“EDR”) for multiple data points related to the operation of the Volvo in the fifteen seconds preceding the collision. The report detailed the vehicle’s speed as well as any inputs to the accelerator, brakes and steering instruments on 0.25 second intervals.
32The Volvo Imaging report established the following facts:
(1) 15 seconds prior to the collision, the Volvo was travelling at 78 km/hr with the accelerator position at 59.6 (input is recorded as any value over zero);
(2) 5 seconds prior to the collision, the Volvo was travelling at 85 km/hr with the accelerator position at 50.8;
(3) 4 seconds prior to the collision, the Volvo was travelling at 84 km/hr with the accelerator position at 0;
(4) Between 1.75 and 1.50 seconds prior to the collision, the Volvo was travelling at 82 km/hr and the brakes were applied;
(5) The brakes remained applied for the 1.75-1.50 seconds until impact
(6) At the moment of impact, the Volvo was travelling at 67 km/hr.
33On these facts there can be little doubt that the actus reus of dangerous driving has been proven by the Crown. Mr. Singh’s counsel did not strenuously suggest otherwise.
34The dashboard camera on the defendant’s truck offers a bird’s eye view of what was Mr. Singh’s perspective while operating his tractor trailer on Hwy 7 / Queen Street on the approach to the Gore Road.
35Upon taking the Hwy 7 exit off Hwy 427 approximately three (3) minutes before the collision, the traffic was very light and the roadway was completely straight. There were no turns in the road or visual obstructions (ie: sun glare, fog) which would have made it difficult for the defendant to properly assess his surroundings or to see or anticipate an upcoming traffic signal.
36Beyond the obvious warning offered by the earlier traffic signals at the intersections themselves – Mr. Singh passed a static road sign warning up the upcoming traffic signal he was approaching.
37Rather than slow down in the face of these indicators, Mr. Singh continued to accelerate at a speed in excess of the posted limit (85 km/hr) on the straightaway toward the intersection.
38The light was red. He applied his brakes only 1.75-1.50 seconds before impacting the rear of the first of ten vehicles which were stopped at the intersection. Viewed objectively, Mr. Singh’s conduct was dangerous to the public.
II. Mens Rea: Was Mr. Singh’s conduct a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in his circumstances?
39Beatty invites me to break down the analysis of mens rea into these two issues:
(1) In light of all the relevant evidence, would a reasonable person have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible?
(2) If so, was the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it, if possible, a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances of the accused?
40In response to the first question, the Crown points to a combination of risks which Ms. Vlacic suggests a reasonable person would have foreseen and taken steps to avoid in Mr. Singh’s circumstances. These alleged risks include:
(1) The risk of continuing to drive when experiencing obvious symptoms of fatigue;
(2) The risk created by a pattern of distracted and inattentive driving culminating in the failure to safely stop the vehicle at a clearly marked red light.
41On the question of the criminal standard of care, the Crown submits that the totality of evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Singh’s misconduct was not a “momentary lapse” but rather was a prolonged pattern of inattention which amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable professional driver would have exercised in the same circumstances.
42The dashcam videos (both exterior and interior) figured prominently in both the Crown and the defence submissions.
43In the Crown’s submission, the video captures Mr. Singh yawning and ‘head-bobbing’ repeatedly during the ten minutes before the collision – on the basis of which she suggests I may make a finding that the defendant was clearly fatigued, and that he continued to drive in the face of the obvious risk he posed. Ms. Vlacic argues that in addition to being a clear violation of the terms of his employment contract and professional standards, that this conduct represents a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable truck driver.
44Further, the Crown relies on the defendant’s repeated use of his cellphone while driving as further evidence of the defendant’s prolonged and dangerous inattention to the responsibility of safe operation of his vehicle. She submits that the combination of his fatigue and inattention resulted in Mr. Singh ‘drifting’ across lanes of traffic, proceeding unlawfully through two intersections, and ultimately failing to perceive and take reasonable steps to respond to the obvious risk of stopped traffic at the oncoming light.
45The defence characterized the video evidence entirely differently.
46Ms. Schofield characterized the dashcam as establishing “evidence of attention” as opposed to evidence of inattention. Pointing to the extensive construction lights, signs and pylons on the highway which Mr. Singh successfully navigated without incident or difficulty, counsel submitted that the evidence as a whole established largely compliant driving with the occasional, inconsequential distraction not rising to the level of any criminal liability.
47While Ms. Schofield acknowledged that her client’s phone use amounted to a contravention of the HTA, she emphasized that any observed episodes of Mr. Singh’s distraction by the phone were irrelevant to what she suggested should be the focal point of the analysis: the final moments before the crash when Mr. Singh was not actively looking at his phone screen.
48As for Mr. Singh’s behaviour in putting his leg up on the dash, or glancing out the window just before the accident, defence counsel characterized these actions as “the little things that happen in the course of the reflexive act which is driving”.
49I turn now to consider the evidence and make findings on the issue of mens rea.
Fatigue and Inattention
50The Logbook maintained by the defendant as per the requirements of the trucking regulations was entered as an exhibit. The entries in the logbook indicate the duration or driving, delivery, sleep and other non-sleep intervals. It was agreed that the vehicle which the defendant was operating was in good working order, and that the Logbook was complete and accurate.
51According to the logbook, Mr. Singh departed from Brampton on August 25th at 3:30 p.m. for his destination of Montreal. He took a break from 8:00-9:00 p.m. in Cornwall and resumed driving from 9:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. when he reached his destination an dropped off his load.
52From 1:30 – 2:30 a.m. Mr. Singh was off duty, and not sleeping. He resumed driving at 2:30 am through 4:00 a.m. when he attended at his pickup location in Riviere-Ouelle, Quebec. He then remained in the sleeping berth for 9 hours, from 4:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on August 26th.
53After a 30 minute vehicle inspection, Mr. Singh resumed driving back westbound towards Brampton at 1:30 p.m. The distance travelled in between the time of the inspection and the location of the crash at 12:01:32 a.m. was 953 kilometers. There is no evidence one way or another of any breaks having been taken during those 10 hours and 31 minutes.
54Among the terms of the defendant’s his employment contract were the requirements that he obey all traffic laws, drive defensively, and cease operating the vehicle immediately if fatigued or when his “ability to operate or alertness is likely to be impaired through fatigue”.1
55Findings of prolonged inattention or fatigue while driving can rise to the level of posing a risk which the reasonable person would be aware of and would take steps to avoid if possible: R. v. Tabanao, 2024 ONCA 85; R. v. Whone, [2007] Carswell Ont. 5986; R. v. Delac, 2014 ONSC 6619 at para.25; R. v. Poisson, 2019 ONSC 1462.
56The following table captures the most relevant occurrences on which I rely in evaluating the issues of Mr. Singh’s degree of attention, alertness and the foreseeability of risk.
| Video Timestamp | Occurrence |
|---|---|
| 11:51:40 | Defendant is operating Volvo Tractor Trailer on Hwy 427 North. His left hand is on the steering wheel. His cellphone is in his right hand, on his lap. He is wearing a tshirt, reflective vest, shorts and a turban. |
| 11:51:46 – 11:51:55 | Long yawn |
| 11:52:08 | Lifts his cellphone with his right hand; he looks down toward the screen; is scrolling repeatedly with his thumb |
| 11:52:35 – 11:52:41 | Continues scrolling on the phone and yawns |
| 11:53:01 | Speed increases from approximately 7 km/h to 14 km/h. Continues scrolling while other vehicles are accelerating past him & merging on both sides. |
| 11:53:26 | Continuously looking down at the phone while scrolling |
| 11:53:28 | Rubs his eyes |
| 11:53:37 | Long yawn while looking down at the phone. Travelling at approximately 14 km/h with other vehicles overtaking him. |
| 11:54:29 | Continues to look down at phone/ scrolling while speeding up slightly (30km/hr) |
| 11:55:36 | The phone remains in the right hand; continues scrolling while travelling at approximately 33 km/h. Several vehicles pass from the right. |
| 11:56:01 | Prolonged yawn. The phone remains in his right hand. |
| 11:56:23 | The phone is on and positioned in the lap, many glances downward throughout. Driving at 80km/hr. |
| 11:56:38 | Shakes his head, blinking. |
| 11:56:45 | Picks up the phone from the lap with the right hand and continues scrolling and looking down. |
| 11:57:23 | Returns phone to his lap; picks up a water bottle with his right hand. |
| 11:57:45 | Glances several times at the phone while it is in the lap. |
| 11:57:59 | Rubs eyes. Adjusts turban. |
| 11:58:05 | Some drifting of the vehicle while approaching exit to Highway 7. |
| 11:58:18 | Takes the exit toward Highway 7. The phone remains on and in the lap. |
| 11:58:40 | Yawns. Shakes his head. |
| 11:59:26 | Holds the phone with right hand, looking down at it. |
| 11:59:51 | Traffic light ahead turns amber |
| 11:59:54 | Proceeds through a yellow traffic light while holding the phone in the right hand. |
| 12:00:12 – 12:00:22 | Prolonged yawn |
| 12:00:28 | Approaches green traffic light. Proceeds through green while looking repeatedly at phone. |
| 12:00:35 | Raises the left leg onto the dash area, rubs his face |
| 12:01:11 | Proceeds through a second yellow traffic light as it turns red. Left leg remains raised. Speed of 74km/hr. Volume of traffic approaching from opposite direction is increasing; area is well lit. |
| 12:01:16 | Travelling at approximately 81 km/h with the left leg raised. A group of vehicles with brake lights illuminated are visible ahead. |
| 12:01:22 | Looks out the left window/ away from the stopped traffic ahead. |
| 12:01:25 | Continues looking left while lowering the left leg. Accelerating to 82 km/hr |
| 12:01:29 | Sits up, looks forward. |
| 12:01:32 | Moment of impact |
57The defendant’s daily inspection logs confirm that his periods of driving and of sleep were within the industry standards. There is likewise no evidence of impairment, extreme speeding, reckless or erratic driving.
58Were it not for the existence of the video, I agree that findings of inattention or fatigue would not be available to make.
59However, I conclude that the video evidence supports inferences of both fatigue and a pattern of inattention which created a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person in Mr. Singh’s circumstances would have taken steps to avoid.
60In the ten minutes preceding the collision, Mr. Singh yawned six times. I reject the submission that the defendant’s facial actions could be consistent with his “stretching his jaw”. The reflexive, universally shared and notoriously recognizable human behaviour of yawning is what Mr. Singh was doing. It is beyond debate that people yawn when they are tired. Yawning is a reminder of fatigue. Mr. Singh should have known that his fatigue gave rise to a risk to which he had a duty to respond.
61The video also supports a finding of prolonged distraction and related inattention through Mr. Singh’s repeated observation of his cellphone, instead of the road.
62To be clear, I am not conflating a finding of distracted driving under the Highway Traffic Act with a finding of dangerous operation under the Criminal Code. Contravention of the regulatory regime does not establish the degree of fault necessary for liability under the Criminal Code. The defendant’s persistent distraction while driving is yet relevant evidence as it relates to the nature and degree of the foreseeable risk posed by his conduct and the assessment of whether it amounts to marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in his circumstances.
63Mr. Singh’s engagement with his phone while driving was not just a quick glance here or there. But for a few occasions when he put the phone down on his lap, it remained in his hand and often within his gaze for the majority of the trip. The risk posed by his repeated self-distraction became more pronounced once he was off the 427 and travelling west on Queen Street. It was there that the city of Brampton was approaching, with obvious signs of upcoming intersections, multi-directional traffic and the increased risk of the potential need to slow down or stop.
64I conclude that Mr. Singh’s inattention due to his fatigue and distraction by his handheld device were clearly apparent on the two occasions that he proceeded through amber and red signals along Queen Street. A reasonable person would have foreseen the risks created by fatigue and inattention and would have taken steps to mitigate such risks, such as controlling their speed, putting down their phone, and paying close attention to the foreseeable risk of other vehicles within city limits at approaching intersections.
65In addressing the alleged risk created by Mr. Singh’s use of his phone, counsel argued that a reasonable inference available on the evidence was that Mr. Singh might have been using his phone as a GPS to navigate his directions given the absence of a GPS navigation system within the vehicle itself. Given the limits of the video evidence, I accept that this is a possibility which I cannot exclude. However, the impact of repeated distraction is the same, regardless of the purpose behind repeated engagement with a handheld device. Mr. Singh’s attention should have been on the road at all times, not on his phone.
66The Volvo Imaging report confirms that the defendant’s accelerator remained engaged up until 4.75 seconds before the collision, at which time he reached a maximum speed of 85 km/hr (5 km/hr over the legal limit).
67The red traffic signal and collection of stopped vehicles at Gore Road were not unexpected hazards. Mr. Singh had just driven through three similarly marked, standard city intersections, albeit with his attention to each one having been diverted to his phone. This was not a case of sudden, reflexive or momentary reaction to a sudden hazard or poor driving conditions. This was a failure to anticipate and foresee an obvious risk of a red light at the upcoming intersection, and to take any steps to avoid it.
68I turn to consider the second of Beatty’s questions: whether the accused’s failure to foresee the risk and take steps to avoid it a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.
69On this issue I am guided by the principle outlined in the case law that professional truck drivers are required to exercise more care and vigilance, especially when a larger and heavier vehicle is involved: see R. v. Ernst, [2006] A.J. No. 949 (Q.B.), at paras. 7 and 23; Rai, 2018 ONCA 623 at para.31.
70In assessing the mens rea of allegations of dangerous operation by commercial operators, courts necessarily consider the regulatory standards applicable to professional drivers – not as a proxy for the assessment of the much more rigorous criminal standard – but as one factor to be considered in the evaluation of the accused’s conduct, and determination of the standard of care: see R. v. Du Jardin (2009), 82 M.V.R. (5th) 300 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 26; R. v. Parmar, [2018] O.J. No. 5645 (C.J.), at paras. 76-77; R. v. Tabanao, 2020 ONSC 3501, at para. 551; R. v. Saini, 2023 ONCA 445.
71In R. v. Rai, 2018 ONCA 623, at para. 31, our Court of Appeal confirmed that the defendant’s status as a professional driver and consequentially “additional responsibilities versus an ordinary motor vehicle” are important circumstances to be considered in the analysis of mens rea in dangerous driving cases.
72When Mr. Singh took the exit off Hwy 427 at 11:58 p.m., his driving environment changed. He had exited the continuous flow of a major highway and embarked on the more controlled roadway of Queen Street – on which traffic lights and other vehicles could reasonably be anticipated.
73In the three minutes preceding the collision, the nature of the roadway itself informed Mr. Singh of the presence of the risk of intersections: he drove through three sequential reminders that lights were a regular feature of this straight, flat suburban road.
74I find that marked intersection at Gore Road, red stop signal and long line of stopped vehicles with brake lights illuminated were plainly there to be seen and responded to by Mr. Singh. They were visible on the Bus shelter video taken from approximately 450 m away from the intersection when he passed it. The first red tail lights were visible to my observation on the dashcam video as early as 12:01:04 a.m., some 29 seconds before impact. By 12:01:10 a.m., as Mr. Singh proceeded through the second amber / red light, the number of discernible red tail lights ahead were several. By 12:01:15 a.m., the red traffic signal at the intersection is visible.
75Despite the obvious significant and impending risk, Mr. Singh’s inattention persisted, and was most notably demonstrated by his looking away from the roadway out his left window for a period of several seconds while continuing to accelerate towards the stopped vehicles in a heavy commercial vehicle. He failed to remain alert to the full picture of his surroundings, as a reasonably prudent truck driver would have done.
76Due to his apparent inattention to the obvious hazard approaching over a period of between 15-29 seconds and failure to brake in response, I conclude that this was not a case of a momentary lapse of attention, but constituted a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable professional driver would have exercised in the same circumstances.
77Mr. Singh’s persistent inattention, likely exacerbated by fatigue, over a prolonged period were not akin to the “momentary mistakes that may be made by any reasonable driver” such as the mistimed turn on a highway in Roy, or the momentary loss of awareness in Beatty, or the sudden loss of control in Willock: see Chung at para. 21.
78By the time the defendant’s attention returned to the road, there was insufficient time for him to take any meaningful evasive action in the final 1.75-1.50 seconds before impact. I find that the duration of the defendant’s inattention was longer than the time he need to stop, particularly due to the nature of the large commercial vehicle he was operating.
79It is acknowledged that Mr. Singh had no subjective intention of causing the accident. However, in applying the modified objective test, I conclude that a reasonable person would have appreciated the risks involved in repeated instances of inattention while operating such a vehicle on a municipal roadway controlled by regular intersections and would have done something to mitigate the risks. Mr. Singh did not. His conduct was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver in the circumstances.
80I find Mr. Singh guilty of the charges of Dangerous Operation Cause Bodily harm and Dangerous operation cause death.
Released: July 28, 2026
Signed: Justice A. Dellandrea