ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
ONTARIO MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY COUNCIL (“OMVIC”)
Appellant
— AND —
ROBERT GEORGE
Respondent
Before Justice Peter R. Maund
Heard on April 24, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on July 20, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION
Jose Alvarez-de-Lugo.................................................................. counsel for the Appellant
Michael Burokas........................................... counsel for the respondent Robert George
1.0: Introduction
1This is an appeal of Robert George’s acquittal after a trial. Mr. George faced charges of unlawfully acting as a motor vehicle dealer, contrary to section 4(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act (MVDA).1 The allegations were that he sold ten motor vehicles to a car dealership in Oakville despite not being registered as a dealer under the Act.
2His trial took place on August 12, 2025, before Justice of the Peace K. Morin. At trial, Mr. George admitted selling these vehicles, but claimed that the vehicles he sold were owned for his own personal use. This is a statutory exception to the law.
3J.P. Morin found Mr. George not guilty.2 She was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the vehicles sold were, in fact, his own personal vehicles. Accordingly, the statutory exception applied.
4OMVIC appeals Mr. George’s acquittal. They submit the trial justice committed numerous errors in her assessment of the evidence, all of which relate to how she assessed Mr. George’s evidence that the vehicles were for his personal use before he sold them. They submit her judgment was unreasonable on its face.
5Mr. George submits that the trial justice’s factual findings are entitled to deference, subject to a finding of palpable and overriding error, which is not present here. She did not misapprehend the evidence or improperly assess it. The verdict was reasonable and supported by the record. Mr. George submits the appeal should be dismissed, and costs should be awarded in his favour.
6For reasons that follow, I dismiss both the appeal and Mr. George’s request for costs. The trial justice did not err by failing to consider the implications of a pattern of Mr. George’s vehicle sales, nor did she commit any palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of the facts. The verdict itself was reasonable and well-supported by the evidence. Mr. George has not satisfied me that I should depart from the ordinary rule that costs are not ordered in Provincial Offences Act appeal matters.
2.0: Evidence and Judgment at Trial
7The prosecutor called two witnesses at trial: Janan Jarjees and Bruce Mitchell. Mr. George testified on his own behalf, and called Michael Intowan as a defence witness.
2.1: Evidence of Janan Jarjees
8Mr. Jarjees is the manager of Jaz Auto Inc., a car dealership in Oakville. Their main sources of vehicle inventory come from car auctions, buying from the public, or through trade-ins. Approximately 15 to 20% of their inventory comes from purchases from the public. Jaz Auto has signs outside of the dealership saying: “We Buy Cars”. They have similar comments on their website. Buying cars from members of the public and re-selling them is lucrative for this company.
9Mr. Jarjees had known Mr. George for years and has bought approximately 20 vehicles from him. He knows Mr. George as someone who knows a lot about cars. He liked to drive nice cars and frequently changed them. He would sometimes find cars that are not readily available in the market.
10When Mr. George would approach Jaz Auto with a car he would like to sell, Mr. Jarjees would compare it to a market guide to see if they could make a profit from re-selling the car. If they could, they would buy it and sell it for a profit. Some of the cars Mr. George sold were older, while others were almost new. Many of the vehicles Mr. George sold were unique or rare.
11Mr. Jarjees agreed that in 2023, in the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a shortage of new vehicles on the market. Buying a vehicle from a franchise dealership often required an advance order and many months of waiting. If a dealership did not have a vehicle in stock, it would not be possible for a prospective buyer to test drive that particular vehicle.
2.2: Evidence of Bruce Mitchell
12Bruce Mitchell is a sworn Provincial Offences Officer employed by OMVIC, the agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting infractions of the MVDA. He commenced an investigation of Mr. George following a complaint from another dealer who believed Mr. George was purchasing cars for the purpose of reselling them.
13Mr. Mitchell queried Mr. George’s Registered Identification Number (RIN) in the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario (MTO) database. The RIN allows him to see a chronological history of all vehicles registered in Mr. George’s name, as well as when the vehicles are no longer registered under his name. Mr. George had numerous vehicles going in and out of his RIN since 2021, many of which were brand new vehicles. Based on this pattern, Mr. Mitchell decided to investigate the ten most-recent vehicle transactions. These ten transactions are the basis for the ten counts on the information.
14Certified MTO records for these ten vehicles were filed as exhibits. The records list the dates each of the ten vehicles were registered to Mr. George, and the dates they were re-registered to Jaz Auto. All the vehicles were brand new when purchased by Mr. George:
Vehicle
Date registered to Mr. George
Date registered to Jaz Auto
Mileage Difference Between Dates
2023 black Volkswagen VIN ending 0880
February 15, 2023
February 27, 2023
700 km
2023 white Toyota VIN ending 8017
March 27, 2023
April 18, 2023
None listed
2023 Volkswagen VIN ending 9475
April 18, 2023
May 02, 2023
None listed
2022 blue Subaru VIN ending 6216
June 5, 2023
June 9, 2023
450 km
2023 blue Volkswagen VIN ending 0117
June 5, 2023
June 21, 2023
590 km
2023 BMW VIN ending 1012
June 15, 2023
June 28, 2023
608 km
2023 yellow Volkswagen VIN ending 3063
June 21, 2023
July 19, 2023
None listed
2023 Toyota VIN ending 5785
August 24, 2023
October 11, 2023
515 km
2024 white Volkswagen VIN ending 6297
September 29, 2023
October 3, 2023
89 km
2024 white Volkswagen VIN ending 5557
October 20, 2023
November 20, 2023
98 km
15Certified OMVIC records also established that Mr. George was not a registered dealer under the MVDA, a fact which Mr. George conceded.
16Following these inquiries, Mr. Mitchell obtained the bills of sale for each vehicle when it was purchased by Mr. George, as well as the bills of sale from when he sold each vehicle. In all but one case, he found that Mr. George sold the vehicle for more than he paid for it.
17Mr. Mitchell also testified that around this time in 2023, vehicle inventory levels were stressed. Vehicles were not available for purchase. Because of the reduced inventory, dealers could sell vehicles at an increased cost, particularly unique and rare vehicles.
18Mr. Mitchell could not provide any evidence about what Mr. George was doing when he put additional mileage on the vehicles. He could not say whether Mr. George was using the vehicle for things such as going to work, school, buying necessities of life, things that he viewed as using a vehicle for personal use. There was no evidence of Mr. George advertising vehicles for sale to the public, nor does he have a brick-and-mortar location where he sells vehicles. OMVIC had not received any complaints from members of the public who had purchased a vehicle from Mr. George.
2.3: Evidence of Michael Intowan
19Mr. Intowan has been friends with Mr. George since elementary school. He described Mr. George as a significant automotive enthusiast who frequently follows automotive news and developments and has a particular interest in unique and distinctive vehicles. Mr. Intowan shares a similar interest in motor vehicles.
20Over the years, Mr. George owned numerous vehicles. Mr. Intowan testified that he would sometimes own a vehicle for several years and at other times for only a month or two. Mr. Intowan explained that if Mr. George purchased a vehicle and later found that it did not meet his expectations or drive as anticipated, he would sometimes sell it and move on to a different vehicle.
21Mr. Intowan testified that from approximately 2020 to 2023, many new vehicles, particularly specialty vehicles, were difficult to test drive before purchase due to limited inventory and widespread vehicle shortages. As a result, purchasers often had to order vehicles before having any opportunity to experience how they performed on the road.
22Mr. Intowan personally observed Mr. George using several of the vehicles that are the subject of these charges. He recalled Mr. George driving him to social gatherings, coffee outings, and other personal activities in various vehicles, including a Volkswagen ID.4, a Subaru WRX, a Volkswagen Golf, and a Toyota Corolla hatchback. He also recalled Mr. George using a Toyota Tundra pickup truck while towing a boat that he owned.
23Mr. Intowan further testified that he regularly saw a number of the vehicles parked at Mr. George’s residence and recognized them from his personal interactions with Mr. George during the relevant period. He maintained in cross-examination that his evidence was based on his own observations and not on any recent discussions with Mr. George about the charges before the court.
2.4: Evidence of Robert George
24Mr. George testified that he has been an automotive enthusiast since obtaining his driver’s licence. He has owned numerous vehicles over the years, follows developments in the automotive industry, and enjoys researching, purchasing, driving, and experiencing unique and specialty vehicles. He filed photographs of a number of vehicles he had previously owned, as well as photographs and videos relating to several of the vehicles that are the subject of these charges.
25In 2023, Mr. George was employed in private equity and earned approximately $400,000 USD annually. He testified that he worked long hours and split his time between Ontario and Florida. He also testified that vehicle inventory during this period was severely constrained and that many specialty vehicles had to be ordered months in advance, often without an opportunity to see or test drive them before purchase.
26Mr. George testified in detail about each of the ten vehicles in question. He stated that he purchased the vehicles because he wanted to own and drive them for his own enjoyment as an automotive enthusiast. He testified that many of the vehicles had been specially ordered months in advance, were rare or unique models, or had desirable features, colours, or specifications. He filed insurance documents, photographs, and videos relating to many of the vehicles, and stated that he insured and drove all of them while they were in his possession.
27Mr. George explained his reasons for selling each vehicle. In some cases, he became dissatisfied with the vehicle after using it. In other instances, he obtained the opportunity to purchase a different vehicle that he considered more desirable. He also testified that particular vehicles were sold because they were no longer needed for purposes such as towing a boat, completing renovations, or because business circumstances changed. With respect to one vehicle, he testified that reports of engine failures caused him to lose confidence in the vehicle.
28Mr. George testified that he commonly sold vehicles to Jaz Auto because it was a nearby dealership that offered competitive prices. He denied buying and selling vehicles as a business and testified that he purchased them for his own personal enjoyment, not for profit. He also stated that he incurred expenses associated with ownership, including insurance, deposits, storage costs, vehicle security products, and other operating expenses.
2.5: Trial Judgment
29Mr. George conceded the facts related to the vehicle transactions and that he was not a registered dealer. Accordingly, the judgment focused on whether Mr. George had established on a balance of probabilities that each vehicle was owned for his personal use. J.P. Morin specifically noted this burden on multiple occasions.
30The trial justice summarized all evidence led in the case. She went through each count and relevant vehicle individually, considering relevant documentary evidence such as the bill of sale, proof of insurance, difference in mileage between purchase and sale, relevant photos or videos, the evidence of Mr. Intowan, and Mr. George’s specific evidence of the reasons why he purchased each vehicle, how he used it, and the reason why he sold it. After each individual review, she concluded that in each instance, the vehicle was owned for personal use purposes.
31Following this analysis, she summarized her conclusions that all vehicles that were subject to the charges were owned by Mr. George for his personal use. This was based, in part, on the fact that Mr. George was a ‘car enthusiast’ who had the financial means to frequently buy and sell luxury cars, and that vehicle inventory was constrained due to the pandemic. She also noted the lack of evidence of a clear profit motive or any evidence that these sales harmed the public.
32After considering all the evidence and arguments of the parties, J.P. Morin found Mr. George had established on a balance of probabilities that he owned each of these vehicles for his own personal use. As such, the statutory exception applied. She found Mr. George not guilty of all counts.
3.0: Arguments on Appeal
33OMVIC submits J.P. Morin committed numerous errors in her assessment of whether the vehicles were for personal use or not. While the Appellant’s factum divides these errors into ten separate grounds, most of these grounds restate the same complaint in different manners. The alleged errors can be distilled into the following three arguments:
The trial justice assessed whether each vehicle was owned for personal use in isolation from one another, rather than looking at the pattern of conduct as a whole.
The trial justice erred in concluding that vehicles Mr. George traded were for personal use without sufficient evidence of that fact, and without properly considering evidence to the contrary, which includes the pattern mentioned above.
Related to the above, the trial justice’s conclusion that the vehicles were personal-use vehicles was unreasonable.
4.0: Analysis
4.1: The Motor Vehicle Dealers Act
34The Motor Vehicle Dealers Act is an important piece of consumer protection legislation.
35The Act protects the public by placing numerous obligations on registered motor vehicle dealers. For example, there are rules requiring deposits for vehicles to be kept in trust accounts pending the completion of transactions. There are rules against providing false or deceptive information to prospective buyers about the vehicles that are being sold, and positive disclosure obligations to the buyer about the vehicles. Dealers who fall short of these obligations may be subject to prosecution. Furthermore, there are statutory remedies available to buyers who are victimized by unscrupulous dealers.
36Section 4(1)(a) of the Act states: “No person shall act as a motor vehicle dealer unless the person is registered as a motor vehicle dealer.”
37Under Section 1, a “motor vehicle dealer” is “a person who trades in motor vehicles, whether for the person’s own account or the account of any other person, or who holds himself, herself or itself out as trading in motor vehicles.”
38Under the same section, “trade” includes “buying, selling, leasing, advertising, or exchanging an interest in a motor vehicle or negotiating or inducing or attempting to induce the buying, selling, leasing or exchanging of an interest in a motor vehicle…”
39A person who violates subsection 4(1)(a) of the Act is subject to a minimum fine of $5,000 and a maximum fine of $50,000 or imprisonment for up to two years less a day, or both.
40Notwithstanding the above restriction, members of the public are allowed to sell their own (or a family member’s) personal vehicles without violating the Act. Section 5 states: “An individual who trades in a motor vehicle on his or her own account or on the account of a member of the individual’s family is exempt from the registration requirement under section 4, if the motor vehicle is used primarily for the personal use of the individual or a member of his or her family.”
41There is no statutory definition of what constitutes “personal use.” Whether the sold vehicle was used primarily for the personal use of the individual is a question of mixed fact and law for the trier of fact to determine based on all the evidence.
42One need only look to the facts of OMVIC v. Jover3 to understand the public interest served by this legislative scheme. In that case, Mr. Jover advertised recently-purchased faulty vehicles for sale back to the public, told demonstrable lies or omitted important information to prospective buyers about the history and quality of the vehicles, and left buyers without recourse when faults or defects in those vehicles were inevitably discovered. Mr. Jover attempted to claim that these vehicles were his personal-use vehicles to avoid liability under the Act. He was unsuccessful in doing so.
43Jover illustrates the importance of the onus being on an accused to establish the personal use exception on a balance of probabilities. The personal use exception prevents the Act from capturing those who sell their own vehicles for non-commercial purposes. However, if trial justices were to blithely and uncritically accept an accused person’s cynical and facile claim that vehicles were owned for their personal use, this exception could easily become the refuge of a scoundrel, and thereby undermine the important public interest served by the Act.
44The general tenor of OMVIC’s various arguments is that the trial justice was insufficiently critical of Mr. George’s claim that the personal use exception applied.
4.2: The Trial Justice Did Not Improperly Ignore the Pattern of Evidence
45I do not accept OMVIC’s argument that the trial justice ignored the pattern of transactions which suggested a commercial intent. The record is not clear as to whether she was permitted to consider the pattern which emerged from the evidence. Even assuming that she was so permitted, I do not believe it would have made a difference to the outcome.
4.2.1: Count to Count Admissibility of Each Offence
46OMVIC alleges that the trial justice erred by not considering the pattern of vehicle sales. They argue that she: “…compartmentalized individual explanations … without grappling with the combined effect of repeated rapid acquisitions and dispositions, minimal holding periods, resale almost exclusively to a single dealer, and evidence of profit or profit-seeking behaviour.”
47Respectfully, it is not clear on this evidentiary record whether the trial justice was even permitted to consider that pattern.
48Evidence of an accused person’s other discreditable conduct is presumptively inadmissible, unless that conduct is the subject-matter of the charge in question. Where evidence is already admissible on one count and is sought to be used to prove a separate count, the evidentiary rule operates as a rule of restricted admissibility: the admitted evidence can be used only on the count to which it relates. This rule will not apply where the prosecutor successfully applies to admit such evidence in relation to the other counts.4
49The reason the rule against discreditable conduct evidence exists is not because such evidence lacks relevance. It exists because of the risk that officers may target and a trier of fact might convict someone on the basis that the person is of poor character or engaged in other discreditable acts, rather than because the offence has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a policy basis to impose a presumption of inadmissibility.5 However, where the prosecution can show the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, the evidence may be admitted.
50I have reservations about whether the rule against discreditable conduct evidence applies in this context, where the proposed evidence is of other vehicle sales. Other discreditable conduct evidence is evidence that:
(1) Tends to show either:
(a) that the accused has committed an offence that is not the subject matter of the charge or charges before the court; or
(b) behaviour on the part of the accused, either through prior or subsequent acts, records statements or possessions; and which, in the opinion of the court, would be viewed with disapproval by a reasonable person.6
51During submissions on the appeal, Respondent counsel conceded that an individual instance of selling a vehicle is not inherently discreditable. I agree. It is relatively common for non-dealers to lawfully and legitimately sell their own personal-use vehicles. Jaz Auto’s business model relies on it. This is precisely what is captured by the MVDA’s personal use exception.
52The ‘discreditable’ nature of the conduct, or proof that such a transaction was in violation of s. 4(1)(a), typically only arises once a pattern emerges from which it can be argued a person is acting as a commercial dealer rather than selling their personal-use vehicles. However, the emergence of a pattern does not automatically convert such evidence into discreditable conduct evidence ex post facto.
53This is not to say that extraneous instances of a non-dealer selling a motor vehicle will always be admissible. As with all evidence, the admissibility of such evidence depends on its relevance to a material issue, and the trial justice’s ultimate discretion to determine whether the probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Evidence of extraneous dealing may have low probative value but carry significant prejudice in the form of additional court time and creating a distracting side-issue. In a case like this, where other transactions are proven by simply filing business records, such prejudice is fairly low.
54I do not mean to suggest that extraneous evidence of dealing is always admissible, though I expect it usually would be. My point is merely that I find it difficult to accept the proposition that the rule of presumptive inadmissibility applies in this context.
55Those comments aside, in this trial, all parties proceeded on the basis that the presumptive rule against other discreditable conduct did apply to evidence of extraneous motor vehicle dealing.
56Early in Mr. Mitchell’s evidence, the prosecutor attempted to elicit evidence of Mr. George’s motor vehicle dealing which fell outside the ten particularized counts. His counsel objected to that evidence being led, as it was other discreditable conduct. The prosecutor did not oppose the objection and refocused the questions. In her judgment, J.P. Morin noted that she ruled: “no weight would be allotted to any information pertaining to other cars besides the 10 motor vehicles subject to the 10 counts before the court.”7
57If all parties proceeded on the basis that extraneous motor vehicle dealing was other discreditable conduct to which the rule of presumptive inadmissibility applied, then that rule would also necessarily apply to the admissibility of count-to-count other discreditable conduct. The legal presumption was that the evidence of each offence only applied to each count.
58At trial, the prosecutor did not seek a ruling allowing evidence of each count to apply to the other counts. That being the case, the trial justice cannot be faulted for properly applying the law. Put another way, OMVIC cannot complain that the trial justice did not look at the pattern when such a pattern was presumptively inadmissible and they did not apply for it to be admissible.
4.2.2: Evidence that Mr. George was a Car Enthusiast
59However, even if OMVIC did make a successful application at trial, I do not believe it would have made a difference to the outcome.
60Many of OMVIC’s complaints relate to how the trial justice treated evidence that Mr. George was a car enthusiast. They argue the trial justice simply accepted this self-serving explanation for his behaviour to account for the compelling and cumulative indicia of commercial trading, without adequately reconciling the evidence. Rather than looking at the evidence as a whole, OMVIC suggests the trial justice considered the finding that Mr. George was a car enthusiast as being determinative of whether these vehicles were owned for personal use.
61I reject OMVIC’s argument. OMVIC explicitly relies on evidence of a pattern of Mr. George’s behaviour in support of their position that these vehicles were not for personal use: repeated short periods of vehicle ownership, reselling the vehicles to the same dealership, and evidence of profit-seeking behaviour. Such evidence is circumstantial evidence of his intentions in purchasing and selling the vehicles.
62Given that the onus was on Mr. George to establish on a balance of probabilities that these vehicles were for his own personal use, OMVIC’s argument depended on convincing the trial justice that Mr. George’s evidence should be rejected because his pattern of behaviour was not consistent with someone selling a personal-use vehicle. Most people own and use a single vehicle for years at a time and sell them at a loss.
63To that end, Mr. George’s evidence that he was a car enthusiast who had the interest and financial means to buy and sell vehicles in quick succession provided a reasonable alternate explanation to the unusual pattern OMVIC relied on.
64The trial justice found as a fact that the inventory of motor vehicles for sale was significantly impacted by the pandemic, which meant prospective purchasers were required to buy vehicles sight unseen and without a test drive.8 She also accepted Mr. George’s evidence that he had the financial means and interest in motor vehicles, which explained his reasons for purchasing the ten vehicles at issue.9
65The trial justice never explicitly referred to this pattern as being evidence of Mr. George’s intent. However, following her review of the transactions individually, she repeatedly referred to the purchases of the ten vehicles globally. She also referred to Mr. George’s “habit” of purchasing and selling luxury vehicles to try them out and sell them when he had no further interest in them, which explained the short ownership periods and frequent purchases and sales.
66Given the above, even if OMVIC had made a successful count-to-count other discreditable conduct application, I do not believe it would have had any material impact on the result. The trial justice implicitly considered the pattern of behaviour OMVIC relied on. She found it to be explained by Mr. George’s interest in, and ability and willingness to pay for, luxury vehicles.
4.3: The Trial Justice Did Not Err in Finding the Vehicles Were for Personal Use
67OMVIC makes a number of complaints about the trial justice’s factual findings. Apart from the arguments related to the pattern of behaviour discussed above, they argue that the trial justice found personal use without sufficient objective corroboration; improperly discounted objective indicators of commercial intent; misapprehended the evidentiary threshold for ‘personal use;’ and inappropriately relied upon anecdotal evidence of personal use.
68I reject these arguments. The trial justice properly considered all the evidence and made reasonable factual findings. None of OMVIC’s complaints warrant appellate intervention.
4.3.1: OMVIC’s Reliance on R. v. Francis
69Much of OMVIC’s argument relies on the Summary Conviction Appeal decision of R. v. Francis.10 That case involved two Indigenous men charged with unlawful possession of timber cut from Crown lands, contrary to the Crown Lands and Forests Act. The accused men claimed they were entitled to possess timber for personal or domestic use, as was permitted by virtue of the Miramichi Treaty with the Crown. Neither accused testified at trial.
70In acquitting both men, the trial judge did not ask whether they had established domestic use of the timber, as was their onus. Rather, the trial judge asked whether the province had followed his earlier recommendations to regulate the possession of Crown timber. Furthermore, he found the personal use exception applied based on a self-serving statement made by one of the accused men to a forest services officer which was equivocal as to whether the timber was possessed for domestic or commercial use. This finding was made without regard to significant circumstantial evidence suggesting commercial intent.
71As explained by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, the approach of the trial judge yielded two related errors. First, he incorrectly framed the onus of proof. As a result, it was open to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge to properly frame the question and apply the facts as determined by the trial judge. Second, by relying on an equivocal self-serving admission to an officer without regard to significant contradictory evidence, the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact, which warranted appellate intervention. These findings of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court were upheld upon further appeal.11
72The appeal in Francis did not modify the law in any way, nor did it create any new standards that trial judges are obliged to follow. It merely restated the basic principles that judges must correctly define and apply the onus in regulatory proceedings, and that factual findings may be reviewed and overturned where there is a palpable and overriding error.
4.3.2: Deference to Findings of Fact and Mixed Fact and Law
73Findings of fact or mixed fact and law are not to be reversed unless it can be established that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error.12 A palpable and overriding error is a highly deferential standard of review. “Palpable” means an error that is obvious. “Overriding” means an error that goes to the very core of the outcome of the case.13 To repeat the oft-cited metaphor, it is not enough for an appellant asserting palpable and overriding error to pull at the leaves and branches while leaving the tree standing; the entire tree must fall.14
74When applying the palpable and overriding error standard to credibility and reliability assessments of testimonial evidence, appellate courts must determine whether the trial judge’s findings on credibility and reliability are the product of an evidence-based and context-specific assessment of the witness’s testimony.15
4.3.3: The Findings in this Case are Entitled to Deference
75The trial justice did not misapprehend the evidentiary threshold to be met in this case. She repeatedly stated the same standard of proof that all parties agreed should be applied: that it was Mr. George’s burden to establish on a balance of probabilities that the vehicles were for his personal use.
76The justice’s factual findings that Mr. George’s ownership of each vehicle was for personal use were based on the following categories of evidence:
(1) Mr. George’s direct evidence of the use of each vehicle individually while he owned it, and the specific reasons why he sold each vehicle;
(2) Mr. George insured each vehicle;
(3) Mr. George rarely owned more than one of the subject vehicles at a time;
(4) Mr. Intowan’s direct evidence of Mr. George’s personal use of some of the vehicles while he owned them. The trial justice accepted Mr. Intowan’s evidence as credible and reliable, and noted that he was unshaken in cross-examination;
(5) Where applicable, the mileage added to each car during the period Mr. George owned it, which was reasonable and consistent with each vehicle being owned and driven for personal use purposes during the respective ownership periods;
(6) Mr. George’s excited demeanour when testifying about the cars he purchased and the reasons for purchasing them;
(7) Photographs and videos Mr. George took of some of the vehicles while he owned them, some of which showed him proudly posing with or unwrapping new vehicles16;
(8) The fact that Mr. George did not send messages to multiple dealers or post public advertisements for them, as one might expect of someone trying to sell a car to the highest bidder. Rather, Mr. George went to the same dealership that offered the best price for the vehicle after the dealership did their proper due diligence17; and,
(9) Mr. George’s habit of buying and selling luxury cars at a time when vehicle inventory was severely limited due to the pandemic, and there was no other way to test drive vehicles.
77The trial justice did not blindly accept Mr. George’s testimony regarding the use of each vehicle at face-value in the absence of corroboration. Mr. George provided detailed evidence regarding each vehicle, most of which was supported by confirmatory evidence in numerous respects.
78The trial justice also found the evidence did not establish that Mr. George was motivated by profit when selling these vehicles. While Mr. Mitchell noted a significant profit between purchase and sale of most motor vehicles, he did not testify about what those respective purchase and sale prices were. Nor did he account for insurance, registration, and other operating costs of those vehicles which may have reduced or eliminated any profit from the sales.
79Finally, the trial justice noted that Mr. George caused no harm to the public by selling these vehicles. While she did not have the benefit of Jover at the time of her decision, this case was clearly not the same as Jover, in which the accused harmed the public by using deceit and subterfuge to sell faulty or malfunctioning vehicles to the public to profit himself.
80All the evidence was relevant, properly considered, and led the trial justice to the reasonable conclusion that Mr. George possessed these vehicles for personal use. There is no demonstrated palpable and overriding error in her factual determinations that warrants appellate intervention.
4.3.4: The Verdict was Not Unreasonable
81For the above reasons, I also reject OMVIC’s argument that the verdict was unreasonable. The test for an unreasonable verdict is whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed judge, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.18
82This is not a case, like Francis, where the trial justice relied on equivocal and self-serving hearsay admissions by an accused in finding they met their onus of proving the exception to the regulation applied. In finding that Mr. George met his onus, the trial justice relied on his own testimony, which was subject to cross-examination. His testimony was also confirmed by photographs and videos, the credible and reliable testimony of his friend, and circumstantial evidence regarding vehicle use. She also relied on the lack of evidence of any nefarious conduct, harm caused to the public, or clear profit-motivated behaviour.
83Based on that evidence, she came to a reasonable verdict that Mr. George had established on a balance of probabilities that each of these vehicles was owned for personal use.
84As a result, OMVIC’s appeal is dismissed.
4.4: The Respondent’s Request for Costs is Denied
85Mr. George asked that I order OMVIC to pay the legal fees associated with responding to this appeal. He submits the appeal was improper, as it ignored the trial justice’s extensive analysis, raises overlapping and repetitious issues for appeal, relies heavily on Francis despite obvious and material factual distinctions, and invokes a plainly unavailable ground of appeal.
86I decline to order costs against OMVIC.
87Under s. 129(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, I may make any order with respect to costs that I consider “just and reasonable.” The general rule is that no costs are awarded in a Provincial Offences Act proceeding such as this.19
88I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs are not awarded. A significant ground of OMVIC’s appeal related to the trial justice’s failure to rely on the count-to-count pattern of behaviour. In response, Mr. George noted that no similar fact application had been made by the prosecutor at trial. As I noted above, I am skeptical about whether that rule should even apply in this case. I am unaware of any prior appellate authority on this issue in this context.
89In any event, I do not believe OMVIC’s conduct rises to the level of abusive or vexatious conduct that should warrant costs. There is a strong public policy rationale against awarding costs against the prosecution absent exceptional circumstances. Costs orders risk deterring the prosecution from fully discharging its public-interest duties.20
90I recognize that Mr. George has been required to devote additional time and resources to responding to this appeal. Nonetheless, that is an inherent feature of a system that provides for appellate review. The availability of appeals promotes the fair and consistent administration of justice, even where the appeal is ultimately unsuccessful.21
5.0: Conclusion
91The appeal is dismissed. The respondent’s request for costs is denied.
Released: July 20, 2026
Signed: Justice Peter R. Maund
Footnotes
- Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30.
- R. v. George, [2025] O.J. No. 3895.
- OMVIC v. Jover, 2026 ONCJ 45
- R. v. Tsigarlash, 2019 ONCA 650, at para. 23
- R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, at paras. 37-40.
- R. v. J.W., 2022 ONCA 306, at para. 15.
- R. v. George, ibid, at para. 13.
- R. v. George, supra, at paras. 38 and 95.
- R. v. George, supra, at paras. 92-96
- R. v. Francis, 2008 NBQB 161
- R. v. Francis, 2009 NBCA 75
- Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, at para. 10.
- Benjamin v. St-Germain, 2016 SCC 48, at para. 39
- R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, at para. 90.
- R. v. Kruk, ibid, at para. 85.
- Unwrapping a new vehicle suggests a non-commercial intent in purchasing the vehicle, as this would immediately lower the value of the vehicle for resale.
- Jaz Auto was then itself able to sell the vehicle to the public for their own profit, suggesting Mr. George was not interested in getting the maximum value for the vehicles. Otherwise, he could have sold the vehicles to the public directly.
- Corbett v. The Queen, 1973 CanLII 199 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 275, at p. 282; and R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, at paras. 36-37.
- R. v. Kazemi, 2013 ONCA 585, at para. 18; and R. v. Felderhof, 2003 CanLII 37346 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 4819, at para. 100
- R. v. Taylor, 2008 NSCA 5, at para. 43.
- R. v. Iacono, 2015 ONCJ 609, at para. 51.