WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
A.J.R.B.
Before Justice of the Peace K. Valentine
Heard on July 14, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on July 15, 2026
S. Furnell counsel for the Crown
A. Shahid counsel for the accused A.J.R.B.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE VALENTINE (Orally):
1Mr. B.’s bail hearing was held on July 14, 2026. I adjourned my judgment to July 15, 2026.
2On consent of counsel, I received the Crown’s bail package as Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 includes the police synopses, the information relating to the alleged breach, Mr. B.’s release order, the trial disposition, and the pre-sentence report.
3By way of brief background, Mr. B. was convicted following a Superior Court trial of sexual interference, luring a child under the age of 16 years old, and sexual assault. The complainant was 13 years old at the time of the offences. Following his conviction on January 23, 2026, the trial judge declined the Crown's request to vacate his release and adjourned the matter for sentencing. Mr. B. is scheduled to be sentenced on August 5, 2026.
4The present allegation is that, between October 3, 2025 and June 21, 2026, while subject to a release condition prohibiting him from being in the company of persons under the age of 16 years, he was regularly in the company of the 12-year-old daughter and 9-year-old son of his girlfriend. It is alleged that he was in their company on numerous occasions, including overnight stays, and on at least one occasion was left alone with one of the children.
5He is before the court on a reverse onus because of this alleged breach of his bail. The Crown seeks his detention on all three grounds.
Primary Ground
6Based on my review of the bail materials beforehand, I advised the parties at the onset of the bail hearing that I had little concern on the primary ground despite his ties to western Canada. Although Mr. B. has been convicted and awaits sentencing on serious offences, he has been on a release order since November 2022. He attended his trial, remained before the court process for several years, and appeared for all required court appearances. While the Crown points to the fact that he left Ontario shortly after the original allegations came to light in 2022, the evidence before me suggests that he was unaware that charges had been laid or that a warrant would issue at the time he left the province. Since his arrest and release in November 2022, there has been no allegation that he attempted to abscond. I am therefore not satisfied that detention is necessary on the primary ground.
Secondary Ground
7I turn now to the secondary ground.
8The Crown's secondary ground concern is valid, and, absent a meaningful plan of supervision, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. B. will commit a criminal offence, if released. The allegation before me is not a technical or momentary breach. It concerns an alleged ongoing relationship with a woman who had two young children, notwithstanding a release condition prohibiting him from being in the company of persons under the age of sixteen. The allegation spans several months and, if proven, reflects conduct directly connected to the public safety concern that gave rise to the original no-contact with persons under the age of 16 condition.
9Notwithstanding that finding, the issue is whether the proposed release plan can adequately attenuate that risk. In this case, I find that it can.
10The substantive offences before the Superior Court were Mr. B.’s first criminal charges. At the time those charges were laid in 2022, he was not facing any other outstanding charges. There is no evidence that he contacted the original complainant, any member of her family, or otherwise attempted to revisit the circumstances underlying the original offences during the lengthy period that he was on a release awaiting his trial and sentencing.
11I found the proposed surety, his uncle, to be a credible and sufficient surety. Although he has not acted as a surety before, he demonstrated an understanding of his obligations as a surety, including his duty to contact the police if Mr. B. fails to comply with the court's order. He is retired and available to supervise. The proposed residence contains no children. The proposed plan includes house arrest and removal from where the alleged breach occurred. I accept that this plan substantially reduces the risk that Mr. B. will come into contact with young persons under the age of 16 years old.
12While I remain concerned about the nature of the alleged breach, I am satisfied that the combination of strict conditions and direct supervision by the proposed surety adequately attenuates Mr. B.’s risk to public safety.
Tertiary Ground
13I next turn to the tertiary ground, which requires a different legal framework and analysis.
14I acknowledge there are significant factors favouring release on this ground. Mr. B. has no criminal record. He remained on a release order for an extended period following his arrest in 2022 and attended and participated in the court process through to the completion of his Superior Court trial. There is no evidence before me that he contacted the original complainant or her family during that period.
15I also recognize that he is presumed innocent of the new breach allegation, that a proposed surety has been presented, and that he identifies as Métis, engaging the restraint principles reflected in s. 493.2(a) of the Criminal Code. The sentencing was previously adjourned to permit the preparation of Gladue-related information. The information contained in the pre-sentence report does not identify any particular Gladue factors. I have nevertheless considered his Métis heritage as a factor favouring restraint.
Strength of the Crown’s Case
16The Crown's case on the alleged breach appears strong based on the information before me, although I am mindful that the allegations are yet to be tested at trial. The information before me suggests that Mr. B. engaged in a relationship with his girlfriend for approximately eleven months and had regular contact with her 12-year-old daughter and 9-year-old son for approximately 8 months during that period despite being subject to a release condition prohibiting him from being in the company of persons under the age of 16 years old.
17I would not characterize the Crown's case as overwhelming, and I suspect Mr. B. will challenge this breach charge through the criminal trial process.
Gravity of the Offence
18The breach allegation itself is less serious than the offences for which Mr. B. now awaits sentencing. However, the tertiary ground requires consideration of all the circumstances. Mr. B. stands convicted following a Superior Court trial of sexual interference, luring a child under the age of 16, and sexual assault. The Crown proceeded by indictment and he faces a realistic prospect of a custodial sentence. This factor weighs significantly in favour of detention.
Circumstances Surrounding the Commission of the Offence
19There are factors within this category that favour both release and detention. On one hand, there is no allegation of violence, threats, weapons, or sexually inappropriate conduct involving the children connected to the present breach allegation. On the other hand, the allegations are not of a brief, inadvertent, or technical breach. Rather, the alleged conduct occurred over an extended period and involved regular contact with young children.
20I am also unaware of any application having been brought to vary the condition prohibiting Mr. B. from being in the company of persons under the age of sixteen. Based on what is before me, that condition remained in full force and effect. If Mr. B. wished to place himself in circumstances where regular contact with young children would occur, the proper course would have been to seek a variation of the condition.
Liability for a Potentially Lengthy Term of Imprisonment
21The breach allegation alone would not expose Mr. B. to a particularly lengthy custodial sentence. However, Mr. B. is awaiting sentence on indictable convictions for sexual interference, luring a child, and sexual assault. Sentencing is scheduled to occur in approximately three weeks. There is a real chance that he may receive a custodial sentence in the near future. This factor weighs in favour of detention.
22Having considered the four statutory factors, I must still consider and balance all of the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable member of the public who is informed of the circumstances of the case and the fundamental values of our criminal justice system.
23These additional circumstances include Mr. B.’s presumption of innocence on the breach allegation, the fact that he has no criminal record, his lengthy period on release since 2022, his proposed surety, and the restraint principles including those arising from his Métis heritage. I have also considered that the trial judge did not revoke his bail immediately following conviction.
24Mr. B.'s sentencing hearing is scheduled for August 5, 2026, approximately three weeks from now. He faces a realistic prospect of a custodial sentence following his convictions. This is not a case where trial remains months or years away. Rather, the court is approaching the final stage of the proceedings. In those circumstances, a reasonable and informed member of the public would be entitled to expect strict compliance with court-ordered release conditions pending the imposition of sentence.
25The timing of the alleged breach aggravates the concern. The allegations arise not before conviction, but after findings of guilt have been entered and while Mr. B. awaits sentencing. The alleged conduct therefore occurred at a time when he was fully aware of both the conditions of his release and the serious findings made against him by the Superior Court trial judge.
26What is also concerning is the connection between the alleged breach and the underlying convictions. The condition prohibiting contact with young persons was imposed because of the nature of the offences before the Superior Court. The allegations giving rise to the present charge engage the very risk that the condition was designed to address. This is therefore not a case where the alleged breach is unrelated to the original charges or disconnected from the public safety concerns that underpinned the release order.
27I find that a reasonable and informed member of the public could conclude that a person convicted of sexual offences against a child, who is awaiting sentence for those offences, should not be repeatedly placing himself in the company of young children while subject to a court order expressly prohibiting such conduct.
28Viewed from the perspective of a reasonable member of the public who is informed of all of the circumstances, including the presumption of innocence, the seriousness of the convictions, the apparent strength of the Crown's case on the breach, the length of and nature of the alleged conduct, its direct connection to the underlying offences, the fact that no variation of the no-children condition was sought or obtained, and the fact that sentencing is only weeks away, I am satisfied that confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by Mr. B.’s release.
29Accordingly, I find that Mr. B.’s detention is necessary on the tertiary ground.
Delivered: July 15, 2026
Justice of the Peace Karen Valentine