ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ANGELE TYAGI
Before Justice R. Tomovski
Heard on October 21, 22, 2025 and April 7, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on July 9, 2026
Mashal Khan counsel for the Crown
Navdeep Sahai counsel for the defendant Angele Tyagi
I. INTRODUCTION
1On May 4, 2024, Ms. Tyagi attracted the attention of a concerned motorist after repeatedly driving erratically. Among other things, she crossed into oncoming traffic, drove on the wrong side of the road, mounted a curb and sidewalk, and appeared to fall asleep while stopped in an intersection. The motorist contacted police, who located and stopped Ms. Tyagi's vehicle. During their brief roadside interaction, the officers formed the belief that her ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol. When directed to exit the vehicle, Ms. Tyagi refused. An officer subsequently removed her from the vehicle, causing her to fall onto the roadway. Following her arrest, police made a demand for a breath sample. Ms. Tyagi refused, resulting in charges of impaired operation and refusing to comply with a breath demand, contrary to ss. 320.14(1)(a) and 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.
2The Defence argues that the Crown has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Tyagi's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. It submits that bad driving, even when coupled with an odour of alcohol, is insufficient in the circumstances of this case to establish impairment. Although the Defence concedes the essential elements of the refusal charge, it contends that breaches of Ms. Tyagi's rights under ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter warrant either a stay of proceedings or the exclusion of evidence, including evidence of the refusal. The alleged s. 7 breach arises from the force used during the arrest; the alleged s. 10(b) breach concerns the failure to facilitate access to counsel and the absence of a waiver of the right to counsel.
3The Crown submits that the totality of the evidence establishes that Ms. Tyagi's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. It relies principally on the evidence of significant bad driving and the strong odour of alcohol observed by both a civilian witness and police officers. The Crown further submits that Ms. Tyagi intentionally refused to comply with a lawful breath demand and that neither of her Charter rights was breached. In the Crown's view, the force used during the arrest was justified and Ms. Tyagi never indicated a desire to speak with counsel.
4The Crown called five witnesses: the civilian motorist who observed Ms. Tyagi's driving and four police officers involved in the investigation and arrest. The officer who physically removed Ms. Tyagi from the vehicle did not testify. Ms. Tyagi exercised her constitutional right not to testify and called no evidence. I must assess the credibility and reliability of the witnesses and determine what weight, if any, to give their evidence.
5I find that Ms. Tyagi's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was not breached. Although I conclude that the police used excessive force in effecting her arrest and thereby infringed her rights under s. 7 of the Charter, this is not one of the clearest of cases warranting a stay of proceedings. In the circumstances, a sentence reduction is the appropriate remedy.
6For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Tyagi is guilty of both offences. I find that her ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that she intentionally refused to comply with a lawful demand to provide a breath sample.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Was Ms. Tyagi’s Ability to Drive Impaired by Alcohol?
7I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Tyagi’s ability to operate a conveyance was impaired by alcohol.
8Section 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to operate a conveyance while one’s ability to do so is impaired by alcohol, even to a slight degree: R. v. Stellato, . In determining whether impairment has been established, the whole of the evidence must be considered including all evidence tending to establish or negate impairment: R. v. Andrew, 1996 ABCA 23 at para. 30.
9Evidence of impairment may include, among other things, poor driving, difficulties with motor functioning, and the presence of an odour of alcohol. The indicia of impairment must be assessed cumulatively rather than in isolation: R. v. Ramroop, 2021 ONCA 642 at para. 16. While some indicia may be consistent with causes other than alcohol consumption, findings must be grounded in the evidence and not in speculation. For example, an inference that poor driving was caused by mere inattention, or that bloodshot eyes resulted from fatigue, is speculative unless supported by evidence: R. v. Walton, 2011 BCCA 535 at para. 15. The court must also consider evidence that tends to negate impairment, including evidence of normal driving or the absence of physical indicia commonly associated with impairment.
10The ultimate question is whether, viewed as a whole, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. Put differently, is impairment the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.
11Helen Fowler testified that, on May 4, 2024, in the late morning, she was driving in Mississauga when she observed Ms. Tyagi operating her vehicle in a manner that caused her significant concern and prompted her to contact police. Ms. Fowler observed Ms. Tyagi repeatedly cross into oncoming traffic, narrowly miss another vehicle, drive on the wrong side of the road, strike the curb several times, mount the curb and sidewalk before re-entering the roadway, remain stopped at a green light despite other motorists honking their horns, and ultimately stop and appear to fall asleep in the middle of an intersection.
12I accept Ms. Fowler’s evidence. She was a credible and reliable witness whose testimony was not undermined in cross-examination. Her observations provide compelling evidence of sustained and objectively bad driving.
13Acting on the description of the vehicle and licence plate provided by Ms. Fowler, Police Constable Cassidy Thurston located Ms. Tyagi's vehicle. PC Thurston also observed Ms. Tyagi driving on the wrong side of the road. She activated her emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. Ms. Tyagi responded by abruptly braking and jerking her vehicle toward the curb. When PC Thurston approached the driver's side window, she detected an odour of alcohol coming from Ms. Tyagi. Within moments, PC Daniel Hammond arrived to assist. After joining PC Thurston at the driver's door, he was advised that alcohol had been detected.
14Both officers testified that Ms. Tyagi was belligerent and confrontational from the outset of the interaction. They described her as slow and deliberate in both her movements and responses and unwilling to comply with simple directions, including requests to turn off the engine and remove her seatbelt. They also observed watery eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odour of alcohol on her breath. In their opinion, Ms. Tyagi was impaired by alcohol. I accept the evidence of both officers. Like Ms. Fowler, they were credible and reliable witnesses whose testimony was not undermined in cross-examination.
15The roadside interaction was captured on body-worn camera, which was entered into evidence. The footage is broadly consistent with the officers' testimony. It depicts Ms. Tyagi as slow and deliberate in her speech, delayed in her responses and movements, and persistently non-compliant, including refusing to turn off the engine, remove her seatbelt, and exit the vehicle.
16The Crown bears the burden of proving every essential element of the offence of impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Degiorgio, 2011 ONCA 527 at para. 43. Having considered the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that impairment by alcohol is the only reasonable inference available.
17The evidence establishes a pattern of prolonged and highly dangerous driving, including entering oncoming traffic, driving on the wrong side of the road, mounting the curb and sidewalk, and appearing to fall asleep while operating a motor vehicle. This evidence is accompanied by a strong odour of alcohol, delayed responses, slowed movements, and persistent non-compliance with straightforward directions. Considered collectively, these indicia support the conclusion that Ms. Tyagi's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.
18I have considered whether any alternative explanation arises from the evidence. None does. To attribute the driving and behaviour to some other cause would require speculation unsupported by the evidence. While the odour of alcohol alone would be insufficient to establish impairment, and while any single indicator may be equivocal when viewed in isolation, the totality of the evidence points overwhelmingly to impairment. The finding of impairment is also based entirely on evidence obtained before any alleged Charter breach occurred.
19Accordingly, I find Ms. Tyagi guilty of impaired operation.
B. Did Ms. Tyagi Refuse a Lawful Breath Demand without Reasonable Excuse?
20Ms. Tyagi’s defence to the refusal charge rests entirely on her Charter applications. Apart from the alleged Charter breaches, the Defence does not challenge the lawfulness of the breath demand, the officer’s grounds to make it, or any of the essential elements of the offence.
21It was expressly admitted that, on May 4, 2024, in Mississauga, PC Hammond had reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Tyagi was operating a conveyance while her ability to do so was impaired by alcohol; that he made a lawful demand for a breath sample; that Ms. Tyagi refused to comply with the demand; and that she had no reasonable excuse for doing so.
22The admissions are consistent with the evidence. Video footage was entered from both the roadside and the police station. The latter, in particular, clearly captures Ms. Tyagi’s unequivocal refusal to provide a breath sample.
23Subject to the disposition of the Charter applications, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Tyagi refused to comply with a lawful breath demand without reasonable excuse. The remaining issues are whether the alleged s. 7 Charter breach warrants a stay of proceedings and, if not, whether the refusal evidence should be excluded as a result of the alleged ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter breaches.
C. Did Police Breach Ms. Tyagi’s. 10(b) Charter Rights?
24The Defence acknowledges that Ms. Tyagi was advised of her right to counsel, thereby satisfying the informational component of s. 10(b). The Defence submits, however, that police failed to facilitate access to duty counsel before she refused to provide a breath sample and that she never waived her right to counsel.
25I find that Ms. Tyagi has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that her rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter were breached.
26Section 10(b) guarantees the right, upon arrest or detention, to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right. The informational component requires police to advise an accused of that right. The implementational component requires police to provide a reasonable opportunity to exercise it: R. v. LaFrance, 2022 SCC 32 at para. 72.
27Once police have fulfilled the informational component, they are not required to take additional steps to ensure the accused understands the right to counsel: R. v. Baig, at para. 6. The implementational duty does not arise unless the accused indicates a desire to exercise the right: R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at para. 27; R. v. Owens, 2015 ONCA 652 at para. 19. The burden rests on the Defence to establish that the right was invoked. Only if invocation is established does the question of waiver arise: Owens at paras. 3, 26-27.
28PC Hammond arrested Ms. Tyagi at 10:57 a.m. She was handcuffed and placed in police custody. At 10:59 a.m., PC Avery Unruh assumed responsibility for transporting her to the station for breath testing. Following a search incident to arrest, Ms. Tyagi was placed in the police cruiser.
29At 11:02 a.m., PC Unruh advised Ms. Tyagi of her rights under s. 10(b) by reading the standard questions verbatim. Throughout the interaction, Ms. Tyagi was argumentative, yelling profanities and making unfounded racial accusations, repeatedly interrupted the officer, and demanded that a non-white officer provide the caution. PC Unruh nevertheless remained patient and continued her efforts to explain Ms. Tyagi's rights.
30On two occasions, Ms. Tyagi stated that she did not understand a question. Each time, PC Unruh immediately offered to explain the question further. Ms. Tyagi declined those offers and instead returned to her demand that another officer read the questions. Ms. Tyagi was advised that she was not entitled to choose the officer who informed her of her rights.
31During the drive to the station, PC Unruh repeatedly asked Ms. Tyagi whether she wished to speak with a lawyer, including duty counsel, upon arrival. The officer raised the issue at least five times. Ms. Tyagi's responses included "no" and "I don't care", following which she redirected the conversation to matters unrelated to her right to counsel.
32The entirety of the interaction was captured on PC Unruh's body-worn camera and entered into evidence. The recording provides a complete account of the rights-to-counsel discussion from shortly after the arrest until arrival at the police station.
33I am satisfied that the police complied with the informational component of s. 10(b). I am also satisfied that Ms. Tyagi understood the substance of the right being explained to her. There is no evidence of a language barrier, cognitive impairment, or genuine confusion. Ms. Tyagi communicated in English throughout her dealings with police and demonstrated an ability to understand and respond appropriately to questions.
34The two occasions on which Ms. Tyagi indicated that she did not understand do not, in the context of the evidence as a whole, suggest an inability to comprehend her rights. When offered an explanation, she declined. Her conduct throughout the interaction reflected a deliberate unwillingness to engage with the process rather than an inability to understand it.
35Most significantly, despite being asked repeatedly whether she wished to speak with counsel, including duty counsel, Ms. Tyagi never indicated a desire to do so. On the contrary, her responses and overall conduct consistently conveyed the opposite. I therefore find that Ms. Tyagi was properly advised of her right to counsel, understood that right, and chose not to exercise it.
36In any event, the Defence expressly acknowledged in its written application dated October 6, 2025, that Ms. Tyagi “was provided with the informational component of her rights to counsel”. That concession substantially undermines the argument advanced on this issue.
37I also reject the Defence’s submission regarding waiver. Waiver becomes relevant only where an accused has first invoked the right to counsel. Ms. Tyagi never did so. Because the implementational component was never engaged, there was no need for the Crown to establish waiver.
38Accordingly, Ms. Tyagi’s s. 10(b) application is dismissed.
D. Did Police use Excessive Force in Arresting Ms. Tyagi?
39The Defence submits that police used excessive force in arresting Ms. Tyagi, thereby infringing her s. 7 Charter rights. This issue is a very close call. Ultimately, however, I conclude that PC Jason Sandilands used excessive force when, after securing one of Ms. Tyagi’s hands in handcuffs, he forcibly extracted her from the vehicle, causing her to fall onto the roadway.
40Section 7 of the Charter states that “every person has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”.
41The application of force by police engages the security of the person interest protected by s. 7 of the Charter: Singh v. Ministry of Employment and Immigration, ; R. v. Morgentaler, .
42Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code permits police to use as much force as is necessary to effect a lawful arrest. An officer’s subjective belief that the force used was necessary must be objectively reasonable. An officer’s actions cannot be held to a standard of perfection or measured to a nicety. All the circumstances that existed or were reasonably perceived at the time the force was used must be examined to determine whether the force was reasonable or excessive: R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at paras. 34-35; R. v. Jarrett, 2021 ONCA 758 at para. 68; R. v. Marincic, 2023 ONSC 3162 at para. 24.
43PC Thurston, PC Hammond, and PC Cachiano testified about the arrest. I find they were credible witnesses and I accept their evidence, which was reliable. PC Sandilands was not called as a witness. Ms. Tyagi’s arrest is fully captured on body-worn camera.
44Ms. Tyagi refused PC Thurston and PC Hammond’s repeated demands to turn off the engine, remove her seatbelt, and exit the vehicle. PC Hammond tried to open the door by the outside handle but the door was locked. He advised Ms. Tyagi she was under arrest as he placed his hand into the vehicle to try to unlock the door and turn off the engine. Ms. Tyagi physically prevented PC Hammond from unlocking the door by using her hand to keep the officer away from the lock. PC Hammond restrained Ms. Tyagi’s hand by grabbing her wrist, as he unlocked the door with his other hand. PC Hammond let go of Ms. Tyagi’s hand to open the door, after which he turned off the engine and unbuckled Ms. Tyagi’s seatbelt. He demanded again that Ms. Tyagi exit the vehicle because she was under arrest for impaired driving. PC Hammond grabbed Ms. Tyagi by her arm and tried to pull her out of the vehicle. This proved futile. Ms. Tyagi resisted by grabbing the steering wheel and planting herself firmly in her chair. She said “I will not” come out. PC Hammond let go and he and PC Thurston tried to negotiate with Ms. Tyagi to get out of the vehicle but to no avail.
45Other officers who were responding to the original call approached the driver’s door and were informed of Ms. Tyagi’s refusal to exit the vehicle. PC Cachiano testified that in his view, the ongoing refusal of a potential impaired driver to exit the vehicle raised legitimate concerns for officer and public safety. PC Cachiano testified that the objective was to remove Ms. Tyagi from the vehicle to eliminate the ongoing safety risk. He positioned himself on the passenger side of the vehicle. PC Sandilands, a more experienced officer, took over the arrest and approached the driver’s side.
46As a precautionary measure, with his right hand, PC Sandilands placed a taser into the centre of Ms. Tyagi’s back. With his left hand, PC Sandilands took control of Ms. Tyagi’s left hand and placed it behind her back. PC Sandilands re-holstered the taser. It was never deployed. PC Sandilands took out his handcuffs and placed one of the cuffs around Ms. Tyagi’s left hand and dragged her out of the vehicle by her left hand using both of his hands. Described another way, PC Sandilands yanked Ms. Tyagi out of the vehicle. She fell onto the road on her left hip and thigh. PC Sandilands did not appear to brace Ms. Tyagi’s impact other than to ensure her head was not at risk of striking the ground. Once on the ground, he dragged Ms. Tyagi a few inches further in order to extend her body fully. PC Sandilands rolled Ms. Tyagi onto her stomach and placed the other cuff around Ms. Tyagi’s right hand. She was lifted up and escorted to a cruiser.
47Twelve seconds elapsed between the taser being put into Ms. Tyagi’s back and the taser being re-holstered. It took three seconds for PC Sandilands to handcuff Ms. Tyagi’s left hand. The yanking and dragging was extremely brief, lasting one second. The drop between the driver’s seat and the ground was approximately 2 to 3 feet. The surface of the road was asphalt.
48As mentioned, PC Sandilands was not called as a witness. No explanation was given. As such, I do not have his perspective on whether he believed the force used was necessary in the circumstances. Further, no evidence was called to explain under what circumstances police are justified in using their taser, even if not deployed, to effect an arrest.
49Although Ms. Tyagi was non-compliant and repeatedly refused lawful directions to exit the vehicle, I find that the force ultimately used by PC Sandilands was not justified in the circumstances. There was no evidence explaining why it was necessary to draw a taser and place it against the middle of Ms. Tyagi’s back in order to gain control of her left arm and place it behind her back. Nor was there evidence that her left hand could not have been secured in handcuffs without resort to the taser. In addition, once Ms. Tyagi’s left hand had been handcuffed behind her back, the evidence does not establish that she continued to pose a meaningful physical threat to the officers or public safety.
50In my view, the force used became excessive when PC Sandilands forcibly extracted Ms. Tyagi from the driver’s seat by pulling her headfirst from the vehicle and onto the roadway below. Ms. Tyagi was removed from an elevated position and fell approximately two to three feet onto an asphalt surface, landing on her left hip and thigh. Although PC Sandilands appeared to take some care to prevent her head from striking the ground, he did not otherwise control or support her descent. The fact that Ms. Tyagi did not suffer injury does not retrospectively render the force reasonable.
51At the time Ms. Tyagi was removed from the vehicle, the engine had been turned off, one of her hands was secured behind her back in handcuffs, and she was effectively contained by a number of officers. While she remained resistant and unwilling to cooperate, the evidence does not satisfy me that it was necessary to extract her in a manner that caused her to fall directly onto the roadway. On the evidence before me, she could have been removed from the vehicle in a more controlled fashion.
52Considering all of the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time, and recognizing that police officers are not held to a standard of perfection when making split-second decisions, I am nevertheless not satisfied that the force used by PC Sandilands was necessary for the lawful execution of the arrest. The Crown has therefore failed to establish that the degree of force employed was justified under s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, I find that Ms. Tyagi’s right to security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter was infringed.
E. Does the Excessive Force Finding Warrant a Stay of Proceedings?
53Although I have found that PC Sandilands used excessive force in arresting Ms. Tyagi, I am not satisfied that this is one of the clearest of cases warranting a stay of proceedings.
54A stay of proceedings is an exceptional remedy, reserved for the clearest of cases: R. v. O’Connor, at para. 68; R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16 at paras. 30-31.
55The appropriateness of a stay is assessed in three parts. First, there must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome. Second, there must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the prejudice. Third, where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted, the court is required to balance the interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and preserving the integrity of the justice system, against the interest that society has in having a final decision on the merits: Babos at paras. 30-33, 44.
56Whether a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy is a fact and context-driven analysis. The following are examples of the types of cases in which excessive force used by police officers during and following an arrest necessitated a stay of proceedings: R. v. Korkis, 2023 ONSC 174 (while handcuffed, the accused was held down and slapped three times across the face by police); R. v. Tran, 2010 ONCA 471 (at the police station, the accused was beaten and suffered a broken jaw and injured rib); R. v. Cheddie, [2006] O.J. No. 1585 (Ont. S.C.J.) (while handcuffed and on the ground, police kicked and punched the accused in the head and body); and R. v. S.T., [1997] O.J. No. 5579 (Ont. C.J.) (while on the ground, police beat the accused).
57A remedy short of a stay of proceedings could include a sentence reduction: Nasogaluak at paras. 6, 64; R. v. Claros, 2019 ONCA 626 at para. 71; R. v. Sabiston, 2025 SKCA 3 at para. 21.
58Despite my finding that PC Sandilands used excessive force in effecting Ms. Tyagi’s arrest, I do not find a stay of proceedings is an appropriate remedy.
59In assessing the appropriateness of a stay, it is important to consider the circumstances as a whole, including the events preceding PC Sandilands' involvement. Prior to his intervention, PC Thurston and PC Hammond conducted themselves professionally and in a Charter-compliant manner. They remained respectful throughout their interactions with Ms. Tyagi. The force used by PC Hammond was brief, measured, and necessary to carry out a lawful arrest. At that stage, the officers were attempting to secure an impaired-driving suspect who refused repeated demands to turn off her engine and exit her vehicle, thereby creating ongoing officer and public safety concerns.
60The Charter breach arises from the manner in which PC Sandilands completed the arrest. While I have found that the force he used exceeded what was reasonably necessary, several features of the breach mitigate its seriousness for remedial purposes. The force was neither egregious nor malicious. It was brief, at the lower end of the spectrum of excessive force cases and did not result in any physical injury. The position of the arm pulled ensured that Ms. Tyagi’s head was not at risk of striking the ground.
61Ms. Tyagi's arrest was lawful. Although initially non-compliant and resistant to police efforts to remove her from the vehicle, she was not subjected to the deployment of the taser. The excessive component of the force consisted primarily of the manner in which she was extracted from the vehicle. The physical contact was brief, lasting only seconds.
62Applying the framework set out in Babos, I am not persuaded that proceeding with the trial would compromise the integrity of the justice system or create prejudice that would be manifested, perpetuated, or aggravated by the continuation of the proceedings. On the contrary, there is a significant societal interest in having allegations of impaired driving determined on their merits. I am also satisfied that a remedy short of a stay remains available, that is, consideration of a sentence reduction in light of the Charter breach.
63I therefore find that a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) is not appropriate.
64I will briefly address the Defence’s request in the alternative for the exclusion of evidence, specifically, the refusal, pursuant to s. 24(2). I do not find that the exclusion of evidence is warranted.
65Applying the factors set out in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, I conclude that the admission of the impugned evidence, including the alleged refusal, would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Both the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the impact of the breach on Ms. Tyagi’s Charter-protected interests do not weigh strongly in favour of exclusion. Although the force used was excessive, the breach was brief, not egregious, non-intrusive, occurred in the course of a lawful arrest, and resulted in no injury. There is also an absence of bad faith. By contrast, the third Grant factor weighs strongly in favour of admission. The evidence including the refusal is highly reliable and central to the Crown’s case and its exclusion would undermine the truth‑seeking function of the trial. Society has a strong interest in seeing drinking and driving allegations resolved on their merits, particularly where the evidence in question is reliable and central to the charge.
III. CONCLUSION
66I am satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the essential elements of the offence of impaired operation. I find that on May 4, 2024, in Mississauga, Ms. Tyagi operated a conveyance while her ability to do so was impaired by alcohol.
67I am also satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of the essential elements of the offence of refusing to comply with a lawful demand. On the same date and at the same location, PC Hammond made a lawful demand for a breath sample. Ms. Tyagi intentionally refused to comply with that demand and had no reasonable excuse for doing so.
68I find that the police did not infringe Ms. Tyagi’s rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter. She was informed of her right to counsel and, after being so advised, chose not to exercise that right.
69While Ms. Tyagi’s s. 7 Charter rights were breached by the use of excessive force during her arrest, the breach does not warrant a stay of proceedings. Rather, the appropriate remedy is a sentence reduction.
70Accordingly, I find Ms. Tyagi guilty of impaired operation and of refusing to comply with a lawful demand for a breath sample.
Released: July 9, 2026
Signed: Justice R. Tomovski