Reid v. Fortune, 2026 ONCJ 371
COURT FILE NO. D11552/17
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
SAMANTHA ALICIA REID
EFUA COBBINA, for the APPLICANT
APPLICANT
- and -
OMAR KAREEM FORTUNE
ACTING IN PERSON
RESPONDENT
HEARD: JUNE 12, 2026
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
REASONS FOR DECISION
Part One – Introduction
1The applicant (the mother) has brought a motion to change the parenting and child support terms in two final orders regarding the parties’ ten-year-old son (the child).
2The father did not file a response to motion to change despite being given several extensions to do so. He did not file a financial statement. He also did not comply with financial disclosure orders.
3The father is in default. However, the court granted him extensive rights of participation at this hearing. He was permitted to give oral evidence and make submissions. He was also given the opportunity to cross-examine the mother. He chose not to do so.
4The court relied on the mother’s motion to change and trial affidavits, together with exhibits introduced by her at the hearing. Her counsel cross-examined the father and made submissions.
5For oral reasons given after the hearing on June 12, 2026, the court changed the existing parenting order on the terms requested by the mother.
6The main focus of this hearing was on the support issues.
7On January 7, 2020, the court made a final support order after a trial (the existing order. See: Reid v. Fortune, 2020 ONCJ 10. The court ordered the father to pay child support to the mother of $530 each month, starting on October 1, 2019.
8The mother seeks to increase child support retroactive to January 1, 2022. She asks to impute income to the father for the purpose of this analysis. If the terms sought by the mother are granted, this would result in the father owing additional child support of $52,665 to the mother as of May 31, 2026.
9On an ongoing basis, the mother asks that the father pay her child support based on an imputed annual income to him of $152,710. She also asks that the father pay $716 each month towards the child’s special and extraordinary expenses (section 7 expenses) under section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines).
10The mother also seeks to enforce terms in the existing order that the father shall designate the child as a beneficiary for no less than 20% of the value of his life insurance coverage; that he shall designate the mother as the trustee of the child’s interest in the insurance coverage, and that he deliver these designations to his employer (the insurance terms). The father claims he has done this. However, he has never provided proof of this to the mother. The mother asks that the court fine the father $20 each day until he provides proof that he has complied with the insurance terms.
11The father asks that the mother’s motion to change be dismissed.
12The issues for this court to determine are:
a) Has there been a change in circumstances that warrants changing the child support ordered in the existing order?
b) If so, what is the presumptive start date for child support to change?
c) Should the court depart from the presumptive start date, and if so, what should be the start date for support to change?
d) What, if any, income should be imputed to the father in any year that child support is changed?
e) What are the eligible section 7 expenses that the mother can claim for the child?
f) What amount should the father be required to contribute to the child’s section 7 expenses from the date the support order is changed?
g) How should any child support arrears be paid?
h) What remedy should be ordered for the father’s breach of the insurance terms?
Part Two – Background facts
13The father is 46 years old. He presently works as a baggage system operator at Pearson Airport. He has a second job with a business called Pure and Simple, and also has done subcontracting work through a numbered company he owns.
14The mother is 40 years old. She is presently unemployed and in receipt of Employment Insurance. She previously worked as a Quality Loyalty Manager.
15The child has always lived with the mother. She has final decision-making responsibility for him. The father has chosen not to see the child since August 2024.
16On June 12, 2026, the court ordered that the father’s parenting time shall be in the mother’s discretion, such discretion to be exercised reasonably.
17The father has three other children. One child, who is 21 years old, lives with him. That child is graduating this month from university. The father’s other two children live with his ex-wife, and are ages 9 and 19.
18The father testified he has been involved in a court case with his ex-wife. He was required to provide a copy of any court order for child support in that case. He did not do this. He said he believed he was ordered to pay over $1,000 each month for child support but was unsure what happened in the case.
19The parties had their first trial regarding the child on July 18, 2018. The court made the following findings of fact:1
a) The father earned annual income of $72,514.
b) The father owned his home. It had equity of $170,000. He also had a locked-in RRSP of $40,000. He had other assets of $12,000 and debts of about $2,300.
c) The father met the legal test for undue hardship pursuant to subsection 10 (2) of the guidelines. He had a lower standard of living at the time than the mother.
20The court ordered that the father shall pay child support to the mother of $450 each month. This was approximately a one-third discount of the guidelines table amount due to his undue hardship claim.
21The mother issued a motion to change the existing order on February 7, 2019. The court made the existing order increasing child support to $530 each month and made the following findings of fact:
a) The salaries of the parties were the same as they were in 2018.
b) The mother was incurring new childcare expenses.
c) The father’s eldest child had come to live with him.
d) Both parties continued to struggle financially. The father’s struggles were primarily the result of having children he couldn’t afford and his financial mismanagement. The court suggested that the father sell his home if he could not afford it. The mother’s struggles were more attributable to the lack of financial support from the father.
22The mother deposed she rekindled her relationship with the father after the existing order was made. She said he was sleeping at her residence around four days each week. She said they were a couple until the end of December 2023, and in a transition period until March 2024, where they unsuccessfully tried to make the relationship work.
23On September 9, 2024, the mother’s counsel sent the father a letter seeking an increase in child support. The father did not respond.
24The mother issued her motion to change on January 16, 2025.
25The father avoided service of the motion to change. On March 3, 2025, the court made an order for substituted service.
26The father attended First Appearance Court on March 5, 2025 and acknowledged service of the motion to change. The matter was adjourned for him to file responding materials.
27On April 16, 2025, on consent, the father was given an extension until April 23, 2023 to serve and file his responding materials.
28The first case conference was held on June 13, 2025. The father had not filed responding materials. He was given another 30-day extension to serve and file them and provide proof that he had filed his last three income tax returns. He was ordered to pay costs of $1,500 to the mother within 30 days. He has not paid those costs.
29The second case conference was held on August 26, 2025. The father had still not filed his responding material. The court scheduled the hearing of the motion to change to take place on December 19, 2025, and ordered the father to serve the mother with specified financial disclosure.
30On December 2, 2025, the mother asked to adjourn the hearing so she could bring third party disclosure motions. This request was granted.
31On January 14, 2026, the court heard the mother’s third-party disclosure motions and granted the relief she sought.
32On January 15, 2026, the court released its costs endorsement and ordered the father to pay the mother’s costs of those motions in the amount of $6,675, by March 1, 2026. See: Reid v. Fortune, 2026 ONCJ 19. None of those costs have been paid. The court found that the father had acted unreasonably as follows:
a) He had provided incomplete financial disclosure.
b) He had breached financial disclosure orders.
c) He had ignored multiple requests by the mother to provide the disclosure she required to properly assess his income.
33The court wrote at paragraph 27 of its decision:
The father is an experienced litigant. The parties have been before the court since 2017. They have had two previous trials regarding the father’s child support obligations. He knows or ought to know his disclosure obligations and the importance of complying with court orders.
34The court concluded at paragraph 39 of its decision:
This decision is intended to send the following messages to the father:
a) He must provide complete and transparent disclosure about his income – particularly his business income.
b) He is expected to comply with court orders.
c) If he fails to provide complete and transparent financial disclosure and does not comply with court orders the financial consequences will be significant.
d) If his strategy in this case is obstruction, this is a poor strategy that is not working. It is time to change his approach.
35The father did not heed this warning. He did not serve or file any further financial information for this hearing.
36The father’s child support payments under the existing order are in good standing.
Part Three – Retroactive support
3.1 The Colucci framework
37The court’s authority to make retroactive support orders is contained in clause 34 (1) (f) of the Family Law Act (the Act). This clause reads as follows:
Powers of court
34 (1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,
…….(f) requiring that support be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order;
38Any support claimed after an application is issued is prospective support, not retroactive support and is presumptively payable. See: Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.); Balian v. Balian, 2025 ONSC 4128.
39In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, the court set out the framework that should be applied for retroactive applications to increase support in paragraph 114 as follows:
a) The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.
b) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.
c) Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.
d) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors2 continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel.3 If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.
e) Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.
40Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations. See: Michel, par. 25.
41Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. See: D.B.S., par. 97.
3.2 Has there been a material change in circumstances since the existing order?
42The first step in the Colucci framework is to ask whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the existing order was made. The answer here is yes because of the significant increase in the father’s annual income since the existing order was made.
3.3 What is the presumptive start date when child support should start?
43The second step in the Colucci analysis is to determine the presumptive start date when child support should change. This is the date of effective notice, provided it is no more than three years before the date of formal notice.
44Often, formal notice is the date when an application is issued (here, it was January 16, 2026). However, formal notice can take the form of written correspondence from the support recipient or counsel to the payor seeking increased support. See: Vandenberghe v Dittrick, 2024 ABKB 58; Wilson v. Johnson, 2024 ONCJ 6; Crightney v. Garcia, 2024 ONCJ 431. Here, the mother’s counsel sent the father a letter seeking increased support on September 9, 2024. This is the date of formal notice.
45Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair (See: D.B.S. - par. 121).
46In McMaster-Pereira v. Pereira, 2021 ONCA 547, at paragraph 23, the court wrote that effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of a possible increase in child support with the payor.
47Where no effective notice was given before proceedings were commenced, the start date of the variation will generally be the date of formal notice. See: Colucci, paragraph 95.
48The mother provided no evidence about the date of effective notice in her trial affidavit. The court asked her at the hearing when she first raised the issue of renegotiating child support with the father. She answered it wasn’t until her lawyer sent the letter to the father on September 9, 2024. She testified that she stopped communicating with the father after their relationship fully ended in March 2024.
49The mother testified that she never asked the father for his income tax information. She also never provided him with her own income tax returns, as required in the existing order. However, she said she wanted to have a serious financial conversation with him because they were thinking of buying a house together.
50The mother said that while they were a couple she had asked the father to contribute to activities for the child. However, this request did not rise to the level of effective notice as set out in the case law. She was just inquiring if the father could make additional contributions as specific expenses arose for the child.
51The court finds that the date of effective notice is the same as the date of formal notice – September 9, 2024.
3.4 Should the court depart from the presumptive start date?
52The third step in the Colucci analysis is whether to depart from the presumptive start date.
53The mother asks to depart from the presumptive start date to January 1, 2022.
54The court will consider the departure factors set out in D.B.S., as modified by Michel, below.
3.4.1 Reasons for delay
55In considering delay in applying for increased support, courts should look at whether the reason for delay is understandable, not whether there was a reasonable excuse for the delay. The latter consideration works to implicitly attribute blame onto parents who delay applications for child support. See: Michel, par. 121.
56A delay, in itself, is not inherently unreasonable and the mere fact of a delay does not prejudice an application, as not all factors need to be present for a retroactive award to be granted. See: Michel, par. 113.
57Rather, a delay will be prejudicial only if it is deemed to be unreasonable, taking into account a generous appreciation of the social context in which the claimant’s decision to seek child support was made. See: Michel, par. 86.
58The mother did not provide a reason for her delay in coming to court in her trial affidavit, although some reasons were provided in her motion to change. The court asked her this question at the hearing. This is when she first told the court that she had been in a relationship with the father. She testified that she considered the father and her to be a couple. She said that he was spending more than 50% of overnights at her home.4 This is why she did not come to court earlier.
59This important information was not disclosed in the mother’s motion to change or in her trial affidavit. It was highly relevant to determining the start date for changing child support and should have been disclosed.
60The continuation of a relationship after a support order is made does not automatically preclude retroactive support being ordered.
61In Lewis v. Willis, 2022 ONCJ 421, this court did not depart from the presumptive start date of support ( the child’s date of birth) when the parties continued a romantic relationship for one year after it. The father’s blameworthy conduct was significant and he deceived the mother as she did not know he was married with children. This contributed to her delay in coming to court.
62In Mpamugo v. Nyeche-Wolochur, 2022 ONCJ 488, this court took a similar approach when the parties were still having sexual relations two years after the presumptive date of support. The father had paid no child support and was involved in a relationship with another woman in Nigeria. The circumstances of the child had been seriously disadvantaged due to lack of any support and the father had been significantly advantaged. The court found that the continuation of the relationship would have been a factor if the mother had asked to depart from the presumptive date of support for a larger retroactive support order.
63The father’s conduct prior to 2024 did not approach the poor conduct by the payors in those two cases. No deception was involved. He was in a relationship with the mother and paid the court-ordered support.
64The mother said she was reluctant to re-engage with the father after they finally separated as a couple. She was aware, after two prior trials, that the father would be resistant to any claim for increased child support. She also said she could not afford a lawyer. These are understandable reasons for her short delay in coming to court after January 1, 2024.
3.4.2 Blameworthy conduct
65Courts should apply an expansive definition of blameworthy conduct. See: D.B.S., par. 106.
66Blameworthy conduct is anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over his or her children’s right to an appropriate amount of support. See: D.B.S., par. 106.
67The court considered that the father has paid the child support ordered in the existing order.
68However, the father has exercised blameworthy conduct as follows:
a) He did not provide the mother with annual financial disclosure, as required in the existing order.
b) He did not disclose to the mother his increases in annual income.
c) He did not adjust his child support payments in accordance with his annual income.
3.4.3 Circumstances of the child
69There are plenty of circumstances where a parent will absorb the hardship that accompanies a dearth of child support to prioritize their child’s well-being. There is absolutely no principled reason why this parent should receive any less support as a result of choices that protect the child. See: Michel, par. 123.
70The child has some special needs. The mother has struggled to fund the services and activities the child needs, such as therapy, because of the lack of financial support from the father.
71The mother has gone into debt to meet the child’s needs and had to file a consumer debt proposal.
72The court finds that the child’s circumstances have been disadvantaged due to the father’s failure to pay adequate support.
3.4.4 Hardship
73If there is the potential for hardship to the payor, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of hardship. In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment. See: Michel, par. 124.
74While the focus is on hardship to the payor, that hardship can only be assessed after taking into account the hardship which would be caused to the child and the recipient parent from not ordering the payment of sums owing but unpaid. See: Michel, par. 125.
75The father focused on his own perceived financial hardship during the hearing. He spent no time discussing the child’s needs or the difficulty the mother has faced to meet them. He was dismissive of the mother’s request for increased support. He claimed he didn’t even read her trial materials.
76The court recognizes that a retroactive child support order might cause the father some hardship. His adult child lives with him, although he is graduating from university this month and will likely soon start working. He has a support obligation for two other children, although the amount of that obligation and the level of his compliance with it are unknown.
77The mother will suffer hardship if the court does not make a retroactive support order. She has been caring for a special needs child without much assistance from the father.
78The court also considered that the father still owns his home. The mother is a renter.
3.4.5 The start date for support
79The court finds it is fair in these circumstances to depart from the presumptive start date for support. Support will be readjusted starting on January 1, 2024. This is when the mother says she ended her relationship with the father, although there was a three-month transition before she knew the relationship was fully over.
80The final step in the Colucci framework is to recalculate support from January 1, 2024. This will be done below.
Part Four – The father’s income
4.1 The parties’ positions
81The mother asks to impute the father’s annual income at $138,000 for 2024 and at $152,710 starting on January 1, 2025.
82The father filed what he claimed was a copy of his personal 2024 income tax return. It showed an income of $11,861. The father admitted this was wrong. He claimed he re-filed his 2024 income tax return. He did not serve or file a copy of it. Nor did he serve and file a 2024 notice of assessment.
83The father has been an employee as a baggage system operator at Pearson Airport since 2023. He has also worked part-time at Pure and Simple.
84The father has also been the sole owner and director of a numbered company since 2021. He testified that he has worked as an independent contractor through that business. The mother deposed that this business cleaned studios, provided escorting for cleaners, escorting for construction jobs and security. The father said that he also has done construction and renovation jobs through this business. He said he went back to school and obtained a certificate in 2021 as a renovator.
85The father testified that he closed his corporation in early 2025 and his only income comes through his job at the airport.
86The court finds the father to be neither credible nor reliable in respect of his income, for the following reasons:
a) He was defensive and evasive when cross-examined about the financial issues. His answers were often inconsistent and contradicted by documentation.
b) He did not comply with financial disclosure orders.
c) He failed to file a financial statement.
d) He provided no proof of other child support orders, despite being ordered to do so.
e) He filed no financial information, either personal or corporate, for 2025 or 2026.
f) He did not adequately explain the income flow through his bank accounts.
g) It is questionable whether the corporate or personal income tax returns he filed with the court from 2020 to 2023 were ever filed with the CRA. He filed no notices of assessments. His corporate returns were marked on the bottom, “Retain on file. Do not submit to the CRA”.
h) The copies of the income tax returns he filed with the court did not include income he had earned from other sources, such as his work at Pure and Simple.
i) The mother only learned about his other income sources through third party disclosure motions.
j) He closed his business account once he was served with the mother’s motion to change. The court finds this was not a coincidence.
4.2 Legal considerations for imputing income
87The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, set out the following three questions which should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:
i) Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
ii) If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?
iii) If not, what income is appropriately imputed?
88The case law for imputation of income in these circumstances sets out the following:
a) Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed. See: Drygala v. Pauli 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731(Ont. C.A.).
b) A court must consider whether the under-employment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse. If the court is satisfied that one of these reasons has been established, it cannot impute income to the party. See: Lavie v. Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10, at para. 28.
c) The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made. See: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, [2009] O.J. No. 1552. (Ont. C.A.). However, in Graham v. Bruto, 2008 ONCA 260, the court inferred that the failure of the payor to properly disclose would mitigate the obligation of the recipient to provide an evidentiary basis to impute income.
d) Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking. See: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719.
e) A self-employed person has the onus of clearly demonstrating the basis of his or her net income. This includes demonstrating that the deductions from gross income should be taken into account in the calculation of income for support purposes. See Whelan v. O’Connor, 2006 CanLII 13554 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 1660, (Ont. Fam. Ct.). This principle also applies where the person’s employment income is derived from a corporation that he or she fully controls. See: MacKenzie v. Flynn, 2010 ONCJ 184; Yocheva v. Hristov, 2019 ONSC 1007; Poulin v. Poulin, 2017 ONSC 64.
f) The court may impute income where it finds that a party has hidden or misrepresented relevant information respecting their income to the other party or to the authorities. This includes cases where the evidence indicates that a party earns cash income that they do not declare for income tax purposes. See: Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785; Sobiegraj v. Sobiegraj, 2014 ONSC 2030 (S.C.J.); Lu v. Zhao, 2012 ONSC 5354 (S.C.J.), at para. 26, aff’d 2014 ONCA 12 (C.A.), at para. 5.
g) The court can also impute income where the evidence respecting income is not credible for any other reason. See: Heard v. Heard, 2014 ONCA 196 (C.A.), at paras. 33-35; Gostevskikh v. Gostevskikh, 2018 BCSC 1441 (S.C.); M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207.
h) A person’s lifestyle can provide the basis for imputing income. See: Aitken v. Aitken [2003] O.J. No. 2780 (SCJ); Jonas v. Jonas [2002] O.J. No. 2117 (SCJ); Price v. Reid, 2013 ONCJ 373; Prillo v. Homer, 2023 ONCJ 8.
4.3 Analysis of the father’s income
4.3.1 2024
89The father’s T4 from his job at the airport showed an income of $98,668.74 in 2024. His T4 from Pure and Simple showed an income of $11,861.20. His total employment income was $110,529.94. The father did not dispute this employment income.
90The mother was able to obtain third party disclosure of the father’s corporate bank account statements. The father testified that his business did subcontracting work for a business called Airsides starting in 2022. He claimed to have wound down this work by early 2024 and that he only earned $5,000 from Airsides that year. However, his corporate bank accounts showed deposits in 2024 of close to $27,000. When confronted with this discrepancy, the father testified that he also earned revenue through his corporation for renovation jobs he did that year. He did not dispute the amount of the revenue earned, as reflected in his business account.
91The court will add $20,000 to the father’s income for 2024. The deposits in his business bank account reflect gross revenue. He had expenses he could legitimately deduct from this revenue. Without financial disclosure, it is not possible to make a precise estimate of those expenses. In his draft corporate tax returns for 2022 and 2023 he describes a net loss of income for the business.
92An adverse inference is drawn against the father for his failure to provide meaningful documentation explaining his business’ revenue sources and expenses. The court also considered that any business expenses unreasonably deducted should be grossed up.5 The amount being added by the court to the father’s income is inclusive of any gross-up.
93The court finds that the father’s 2024 income was $130,530 for support purposes. The guidelines table amount for one child at that income is $1,150 each month.
4.3.2 2025 and 2026
94The father earned $90,395 from his job at the airport in 2025. He also earned $31,545 from Pure and Simple. His employment income totaled $121,940.
95The father deposited $1,272 into his business account in February 2025. He deposited no further money into this account after that.
96If the father is no longer earning income through his corporation, the court finds that he is deliberately underemployed without excuse. However, it is likely that he is still earning undisclosed income. The father is not a credible witness. The court agrees with the mother that the timing of the business closing after being served with her motion to change was not a coincidence.
97This leads to how much income should be imputed to the father starting in 2025. The mother seeks to impute an additional annual income of $30,769 to him. This is the average of the gross deposits into his corporate account in 2023 and 2024.
98The court finds this amount to be too high. The mother’s calculation does not take into account business expenses. Further, the father is working full-time at the airport. He also worked many more hours in 2025 at Pure and Simple than he had before. This would have left him with less time to do subcontracting work through his business.
99The court will impute an additional $12,000 income to the father (inclusive of any gross-up) starting in 2025. In doing so, the court again draws an adverse inference against him due to his failure to provide meaningful financial disclosure.
100The court finds that the father’s annual income starting on January 1, 2025 is $133,940. The guidelines table amount for one child at this income is $1,201 each month.
Part Five – Section 7 expenses
5.1 Legal considerations
101The mother seeks an order that the father contribute towards the child’s retroactive and prospective section 7 expenses in proportion to the parties’ incomes.
102The relevant provisions of the guidelines regarding section 7 expenses are as follows:
7 (1) In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation:
(a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the custodial parent’s employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment;
(b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;
(c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses;
(d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs;
(e) expenses for post-secondary education; and
(f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities.
7 (1.1) For the purposes of paragraphs (1)(d) and (f), the term “extraordinary expenses” means
(a) expenses that exceed those that the spouse requesting an amount for the extraordinary expenses can reasonably cover, taking into account that spouse’s income and the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate; or
(b) where paragraph (a) is not applicable, expenses that the court considers are extraordinary taking into account
(i) the amount of the expense in relation to the income of the spouse requesting the amount, including the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate,
(ii) the nature and number of the educational programs and extracurricular activities,
(iii) any special needs and talents of the child or children,
(iv) the overall cost of the programs and activities, and
(v) any other similar factor that the court considers relevant.
7 (2) The guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1) is that the expense is shared by the parents or spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child.
7 (3) Subject to subsection (4), in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the court must take into account any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit relating to the expense.
103Unlike section 3 of the guidelines, which presumptively provides for the table amount of child support, an order for section 7 expenses involves the exercise of judicial discretion. See: Park v. Thompson, 2005 CanLII 14132 (ON CA), 77 O.R. (3d) 601, (Ont. C.A.).
104In Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, the court set out the following framework for determining a party’s contribution to a child’s section 7 expenses:
a) Calculate each party’s income for child support purposes.
b) Determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of section 7 of the guidelines.
c) Determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary “in relation to the child’s best interests” and are reasonable “in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation.”
d) If the expenses fall under paragraphs 7 (1) (d) or (f) of the guidelines, determine whether the expenses are “extraordinary” as defined by subsection 7 (1.1) of the guidelines.
e) The court considers what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then applies any tax deductions or credits.6
f) The court determines the proportions that each party should contribute to the expenses, with the guiding principle being that the expenses will be shared in proportion to their incomes.
105The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of the categories under section 7 and that the expenses are necessary and reasonable, having regard to the parental financial circumstances. See: Park v. Thompson, supra.
106Subsection 7 (2) of the guidelines provides that in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the expense is shared by the parents or spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. The court has discretion to deviate from this. See: Zhao v. Xiao, 2023 ONCA 453.
107The court has the discretion to apportion the section 7 expense in a different manner than pro-rata to the parties’ incomes, depending on the circumstances of the case. See: Hamilton v. Salmon, 2023 ONCJ 343, per Justice Danielle Szandtner; Salvadori v. Salvadori, 2010 ONCJ 462, [2010] O.J. No. 4425 (OCJ); Buckley v. Blackwood, 2019 ONSC 6918.
108The court may consider the parties’ capital assets, income distribution, debts, third party resources, access costs, support obligations, receipt of support and any other relevant factor in determining each parties’ contribution to section 7 expenses. See: Delichte v. Rogers, 2013 MBCA 106; T.R. v. S.G., 2025 ONCJ 224
5.2 The child’s eligible section 7 expenses and the parties’ proportionate contributions
5.2.1 2024
109The mother incurred childcare expenses of $7,351 in 2024. These are eligible section 7 expenses. They were reasonable and necessary, as the mother required childcare while she was working.
110The mother claimed $452 for soccer and basketball expenses in 2024. The court finds these were ordinary and not extraordinary extracurricular activity expenses for the child – similar to the court’s denial of the mother’s claim for karate expenses in her prior motion to change. They are not eligible section 7 expenses.
111The father’s imputed income in 2024 was $130,530. The mother’s income was $97,529.7 The father’s proportionate share of the child’s section 7 expenses was 57.2%.
112The mother received tax benefits and credits for the childcare expenses. It is the net amount of the expense that is subject to contribution by the father.
113The software analysis attached shows that the father’s share of the child’s net section 7 expenses in 2024 was $2,436 ($203 x 12 months).
5.2.2 2025
114The mother incurred childcare expenses of $7,120 for the child in 2025. Again, the net amount of these expenses are eligible section 7 expenses.
115In 2023, the child was diagnosed as ADHD Combined. The child is hyperactive and impulsive. He struggles with emotional regulation and focus. He also has challenges with grammar, complete sentences and punctuation. His pediatrician recommended that he be enrolled in therapy and tutoring as additional support. In 2025, most of the child’s therapy and tutoring expenses were covered through the mother’s work benefits. However, she lost these benefits when she lost her position at work. The mother incurred tutoring expenses of $659 in 2025. The court finds these expenses are reasonable and necessary and eligible section 7 expenses.
116In 2025, the child played house league soccer at a cost of $452. This was an ordinary and not an extraordinary extra-curricular activity expense and was not an eligible section 7 expense.
117The child played at an advanced level in basketball in 2025. This cost $5,077. This was a reasonable and necessary expense. The expense is more than the mother can reasonably afford based on her income and the amount of table child support she will receive. The court finds it is an extraordinary extracurricular activity expense as defined by subsection 7 (1.1) of the guidelines and an eligible section 7 expense.
118The father’s imputed income in 2025 was $133,940. The mother’s income was $112,340. The father’s proportionate share of the child’s net section 7 expenses was 54.4%.
119The software analysis attached shows that the father’s share of the child’s net section 7 expenses in 2025 was $5,280 ($440 x 12 months).
5.2.3 2026
120The mother was laid off from her employment in March 2025. She received severance for 50 weeks and is now on Employment Insurance. That runs out in December 2026. She said she is actively seeking work.
121The mother had spent $780 in 2026 for tutoring as of May 12, 2026. The court will fix that amount at $1,000 to the end of June 2026. This continues to be an eligible section 7 expense.
122The child’s pediatrician has recommended therapy and tutoring for him. The mother hopes to take the child to therapy and obtain more tutoring for him if she receives more support from the father.
123The mother asks the father to contribute to the following section 7 expenses on an ongoing basis:
Childcare
$7,235
Soccer
$3,200
Therapy
$4,200
Tutoring
$2,340
124The court finds that the childcare, therapy and tutoring expenses are all eligible section 7 expenses. They are reasonable and necessary for the child. The mother will receive tax credits and benefits for the therapy and childcare expenses, so it is the net amount of those expenses that must be allocated between the parties.
125The court agrees with the mother that the soccer expenses for the child are reasonable and necessary. However, they are not extraordinary based on the mother’s income and the table support she will now receive from the father. They are not eligible section 7 expenses.
126The father’s imputed annual income is $133,940. The mother has very reasonably proposed imputing her annual income at $82,000 for the purpose of the section 7 analysis, starting in 2026. The father’s share of the child’s section 7 expenses starting in 2026 and going forward is 62%.
127The father shall pay $620 towards the child’s tutoring expense to the end of June 2026.
128Starting on July 1, 2026, the software analysis attached shows that the father’s share of the child’s eligible section 7 expenses is $497 each month.
5.3 Should the court adjust the proportionate shares of the child’s section 7 expenses?
129The court has discretion to adjust the parties’ contributions to the child’s section 7 expenses.
130The court considered that the father has an adult child living with him and that he has an undetermined child support obligation for two other children. It is unknown if he is compliant with this obligation. If he was compliant with this obligation, this might be a reason to reduce his section 7 obligations for the child.
131This is where the father’s conduct in this case hurts him. He gave the court no reason to exercise its discretion in his favour. He has not complied with court orders. He has ignored costs orders. He did not file a financial statement or provide meaningful financial disclosure. He obfuscated his income. He has delayed this process and created additional expense and aggravation for the mother.
132The mother also reasonably proposed to impute a higher income to herself on an ongoing basis to reduce the father’s contribution to the child’s section 7 expenses. She has acted reasonably. The father has not.
133The father still owns a home – likely with much more equity than he represented to the court.8 The court wrote in 2020 that he should consider selling this home to meet his child support obligations. He still has the choice of doing that now. The court will not exercise its discretion to reduce his proportionate contributions to the child’s section 7 expenses. The child needs meaningful financial assistance now from the father. It is time he steps up and meets his obligations to the child.
Part Six – Calculation of and payment of arrears
134Child support has accrued in the amount of $27,854 since January 1, 2024, calculated as follows:
2024
Table amount – 12 months x $1,150
$13,800
Section 7 expense contribution
$2,436
Total: $16,236
2025
Table amount – 12 months x $1,201
$14,412
Section 7 expense contribution
$5,280
Total: $19,692
2026
Table amount – 6 months x $1,201
$7,206
Section 7 expense contribution
$620
Total: $7,826
135The father has paid child support of $530 each month since the start of 2024 for a total of $15,900 ($530 x 30 months).
136The balance of arrears is now $27,854 ($16,236 + $19,692 + $7,826 - $15,900).
137The court will permit the father to pay the arrears at $500 each month, starting on July 1, 2026. However, if he is more than 30 days late in making any ongoing support payments after July 1, 2026, or any arrears payments, the entire amount then owing shall immediately become due and payable.
Part Seven – Enforcement of life insurance terms
138In the existing order, the court ordered that the father provide the mother with proof of life insurance coverage designating the child as beneficiary of no less than 20% of the value of the coverage and designating the mother as trustee of the child’s interest in the insurance coverage. It also ordered him to provide proof that notice has been given to his insurer of these designations.
139The mother claims that the father has done none of this and seeks a daily fine of $20, until he brings himself into compliance with the order.
140The applicant’s claim is brought under subrule 1 (8) of the Family Law Rules. This reads as follows:
1(8) If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,
(a) an order for costs;
(a.1) an order to pay an amount to a party or into court as a penalty or fine;
(b) an order dismissing a claim;
(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;
(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;
(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;
(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and
(g) a contempt order, if sought under rule 31.
141There is a three-part test in considering whether to make an order under subrule 1 (8):
a) First, the court must ask whether there has been a triggering event that would allow it to consider the application of subrule 1(8). That triggering event would be non-compliance with a court order “in the case or a related case”.
b) Second, are there exceptional circumstances that justify the court not exercising its discretion to sanction the party?
c) And third, if not, what is the appropriate remedy under sub-rule 1 (8)?
See: Zolnai v. Zolnai, 2026 ONSC 2808 (Divisional Court)
142The father has not complied with the court order. The mother produced a letter from the father’s insurer that he has made no beneficiary designations on his life insurance policy. This refuted the father’s claim at the hearing that he had made them. There are no exceptional circumstances that justify the court not exercising its discretion to sanction him.
143The court agrees with the mother that a daily fine is the most appropriate remedy in this case. The case is over, so case-related sanctions, such as striking a response to motion to change, or preventing the father from taking further steps in the case, are not useful. The mother did not seek to find the father in contempt.
144The mother asked the court to order the Director of the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) to collect any fine as an incident of support. The court will want further submissions on its authority to make such an order if the father does not comply with this order and fines accrue. FRO will have an interest in this ruling, so it should be put on notice and have the opportunity to make submissions.
145The father is cautioned that if he continues to breach the insurance terms, the court may take more aggressive enforcement actions.
Part Eight – Conclusion
146A final order shall go changing the existing order on the following terms:
a) The father’s child support arrears are fixed at $27,854, as calculated in this decision.
b) The father may pay these arrears at the rate of $500 each month, starting on July 1, 2026. However, if he is more than 30 days late in making any ongoing child support payment, or arrears payment, the entire amount of arrears then owing shall immediately become due and payable.
c) Nothing in this order precludes FRO from collecting arrears from any government source, lottery or prize winnings, or inheritances the father receives.
d) Starting on July 1, 2026, the father shall pay the mother child support of $1,698 each month. This is comprised of the guidelines table amount of $1,201 each month, based on the father’s imputed annual income of $133,940, and his contribution of $497 each month to the child’s section 7 expenses. The father’s proportionate share of the child’s section 7 expenses is 62%. Based on her imputed annual income of $82,000, the mother’s proportionate share of the child’s section 7 expenses is 38%.
e) A support deduction order shall issue.
f) Starting in 2027, the parties shall exchange their income tax returns and notices of assessment and the mother shall provide the father with proof of the child’s section 7 expenses by June 30th each year.
g) FRO is requested to amend its records in accordance with the terms of this order.
147Final orders shall also go as follows:
a) The father shall provide proof by June 30, 2026 that he has designated the child as a beneficiary for no less than 20% of the value of his life insurance coverage that he has designated the mother as the trustee of the child’s interest in the insurance coverage and that he has delivered these designations to his employer.
b) The father shall pay a fine of $20 each day to the mother, starting on July 1, 2026, until he has complied with clause a) above.
c) If fines accrue because the father has not complied with this order, the mother’s counsel shall arrange a date through the trial coordinator’s office for submissions to be made about whether the court has the authority to order FRO to enforce the fines as an incident of support. Notice of the return date shall be given to the father and to the FRO Legal Department, so they can attend and make submissions.
d) If either party believes there has been a mathematical or software inputting error in this decision they shall make written submissions by June 24, 2026, in a Form 14B motion, on notice to the other, setting out those errors. The other party will then have until July 2, 2026 to make any written response.
e) The mother is the successful party on her motion to change and is entitled to her costs. She submitted a bill of costs at the hearing. However, the court wishes to receive further written submissions from the parties on the costs issue. The court will want to see any offer to settle made. The mother is to serve and file written submissions by July 16, 2026. The father shall serve and file his written response by July 30, 2026.
f) The costs submissions should not exceed 3 pages, not including any offer to settle or bill of costs.
Released: June 17, 2026
_____________________ Justice S.B. Sherr
Whether the recipient spouse has provided a reasonable excuse for his or her delay in applying for support.
The conduct of the payor parent.
The circumstances of the child.
The hardship that the retroactive award may entail.
Footnotes
- See: Reid v. Fortune, 2018 ONCJ 486.
- See: D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; Laura Jean W. v. Tracy Alfred R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37. These factors are:
- See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 25.
- The father was defensive and argumentative when cross-examined at the hearing. As a result, he failed to appreciate that the existence of the relationship assisted him on the retroactive support issue. He spent much of his oral evidence trying to refute that he had been in a relationship with the mother. Fortunately, for him, the mother was a much more credible witness than him.
- It is appropriate to gross-up a payor’s income, as the payor is declaring and paying tax on substantially less income than the payor is actually earning. This is done to ensure consistency of treatment where a party is found to have arranged his affairs to pay less tax on income. See: Sarafinchin v. Sarafinchin, 2000 CanLII 22639 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 2855 (Ont. S.C.); Prillo v. Homer, 2023 ONCJ 8.
- This step is not relevant in this case.
- The mother’s annual income is taken from her filed notices of assessment.
- He claimed the home only has $100,000 equity.