WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(2.1) of the Criminal Code. These subsections and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(2.1), read as follows:
486.4 (2.1) Victim under 18 — Other offences — Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
(2.2) Mandatory order on application — In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order; and
(c) if an order is made, as soon as feasible, inform the victim of the existence of the order and of their right to apply to revoke or vary it.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
CITATION: R. v. A.S., 2026 ONCJ 366
DATE: May 14, 2026
Information No. 4810-998-25-50019323-00
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
v.
A.S.
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE B. BROWN
on May 14, 2026 at TORONTO, Ontario
APPEARANCES:
A. Moser Counsel for the Crown
S. Jaffer Counsel for A.S.
J. Mann
THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2026
Ms. A.S., on May 5th, 2025, entered pleas of guilt to charges of assault with a weapon on her two-year-old son, Z.S., using a toy fire truck to hit him in the face between January 5, 2021 and November 19, 2023, and also failing to provide the necessities of life for her three children who were under 16 years, being Am.S., Z.S., and I.S., between December 10, 2020, and November 19th, 2023.
An agreed statement of fact was filed, and those facts were read into the record, and she was found guilty of those charges on that date. The case went over for the preparation of a pre-sentence report, and for sentence to be imposed on July 15, 2025. That did not happen as outlined in the chronology below.
A.S. failed to attend court on various occasions and a warrant for her arrest was finally issued. Finally, today with the new defence counsel, submissions were made by counsel, and the Court will impose sentence today. The Crown seeks a term of incarceration, and the defence seeks a conditional sentence.
Chronology of proceedings:
Following the guilty plea on May 5th, 2025, on July 15th of 2025, A.S. was to have appeared in court for sentence to be imposed. She did not attend in court that day and her counsel was unable to reach her. The court issued a discretionary bench warrant for her arrest, putting the case over to August 29th, 2025, to allow her some time and another opportunity to attend in court. She did not attend court on that date, making it two dates in a row she failed to attend.
Defence counsel advised the court that she was at that point in Quebec, seeking a place to live for a potential imposition of a conditional sentence. The court nonetheless did not order the execution of the warrant but rather extended the discretionary bench warrant with the return date of September 5, 2025, to allow A.S. additional time to return to Ontario and to attend court for sentence.
On September 5, 2025, she again did not appear in court. Defence counsel had sent her an e-mail following the previous date of August 29, and she did not respond to her defence counsel. Defence counsel had no update as to her whereabouts. The court then ordered that the bench warrant be executed for her arrest.
Following that date, she was arrested and released on a surety bail order. Following various appearances in other courts, she eventually returned before this Court on December 5 and December 9 of 2025. On the second of those dates, new defence counsel went on the record. The court updated defence counsel as to the prior guilty plea, particularly for ordering a transcript, and the fact that a pre-sentence report had been obtained together with other information. The case was then remanded from time to time until today when it was again scheduled for sentence to be imposed.
The Facts:
A) Circumstances of the offence.
As noted, an agreed statement of fact was read and put in evidence. Those facts are as follows.
The accused in this matter is 24-year-old A.S. She has three children with V.S.: Am.S., six years old, Z.S., two years old, and I.S., one year old, at the time of the allegations. Mr. V.S. has minimal involvement in the care and upbringing of their children. He was currently in custody at the Toronto East Detention Centre. At present, there were no custody orders in place. Ms. A.S. has a well-documented history with the Toronto Police Service as a victim of domestic violence while in an intimate relationship with Mr. V.S. She had no prior involvement in any child abuse or neglect incidents.
On Saturday, November 18th of 2023, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Ms. A.S. left her residence to “chill for a bit” with an unknown friend, leaving all three children unsupervised in her apartment. During the night, Am.S., the eldest child, who the Court would note was six years old, realized her mother was not home, and she decided to leave the apartment with her two younger brothers to go search for her. At 11:45 a.m., which the Court would note was almost 10 hours later, the building superintendent found the three children wandering near their apartment. The superintendent called Ms. A.S. at 12:14 p.m. to inform her that the children were unattended. Ms. A.S. did not return home until 1:30 p.m. When Ms. A.S. finally returned home, police officers were waiting with her three children. Ms. A.S. displayed little concern for leaving all three of her children unattended overnight.
Sometime between January 5th, 2021, and November 19th, 2023, Ms. A.S. consumed a quantity of alcohol and was intoxicated. She was upset with the messiness of her apartment and she blamed Z.S., who the Court would note was two years old, for causing the mess. She then picked up a toy fire truck and threw it at his head, causing a laceration above his eye. The injury caused bleeding and to this day there remains a scar just above his left eye.
B) Circumstances of the Offender:
The Court ordered a pre-sentence report, which was available at the time the sentence was to be imposed. At this time, given the delay from Ms. A.S. failing to attend court for her sentence, it is now almost a year out of date.
Currently, Ms. A.S. is 26 years of age, having a date of birth of August 24th, 1999. At the time of the pre-sentence report, she resided in an apartment, although more recently the Court has been advised she has lost housing and has been living in a hotel. She is single and has three children. She is a Canadian citizen. She has no prior criminal record. She did not have an indigenous background. She did not have any substance dependency issues according to the pre-sentence report. Although today in court, defence counsel advised the Court that she has had both alcohol and drug dependencies in the past. Counsel also advised the Court that she benefited from counselling and therapy in 2024 for a three-month program as offered by Ontario Works, although no material has been provided to the Court in that regard.
In any event, the Court would note the following from the pre-sentence report. In terms of her personal and family information, Ms. A.S.’s parents were never married nor did they raise her. She reported that children's services were involved and she was removed from her mother's care at birth. She indicated that her mother was homeless at the time and her father was abusive toward her mother. The subject was raised by her grandparents and according to the subject, both passed away several years ago. She described her grandfather as a violent person when he was drinking and indicated he would start arguments with her grandmother. She indicated her grandmother would scream at her and at times would hit her. She would then telephone her mother and tell her that her grandmother would beat her with a belt or a shoe. However, the Court notes that she did recall some positive family experiences with her grandparents, such as going to the park, going out to eat and celebrating holidays together. She fondly recalled putting up her grandfather's Christmas tree.
She reported having three siblings. However, she does not have contact with any of them. She has three young children who are currently in foster care. At the time, the subject who was Ms. A.S. had regular supervised access visits with them. This has been updated today in terms of submissions from counsel. The Court has been advised that Ms. A.S. no longer has contact with her two sons, who were one and two years old at the time of the facts of the offence. They are currently residing with their paternal grandparents, and she does not have access to them. Her daughter is in foster care, but defence counsel advises that Ms. A.S. has telephone calls with her once per week. Her daughter is expected to be adopted in the future, and defence counsel advises the Court would probably terminate her contact with her daughter.
She reported having an on-again, off-again relationship with the children's father and reported that he would be physically abusive towards her. He was eventually arrested and placed in detention.
In terms of her education and employment, Ms. A.S. attended elementary and high school in the greater Toronto area. She was part of the choir and music group and played the trumpet. In addition, she enjoyed and played basketball, and excelled in track and field at school. It seems from the pre-sentence report that grade 10 was the highest level of education achieved. She shared that she felt bullied while she was in school and responded to her peers' behaviours with her own negative behaviours. She indicated she was alone a lot, so she left the school.
A year ago, when the report was done, she was unemployed and appeared to have never had gainful employment. She was on Ontario Works, bringing in approximately $600 a month. She shared that she was, at the time, in quite a bit of debt, behind on her rent, and facing eviction. As is indicated today, she is living in a hotel. She obviously lost her apartment.
It was indicated, as the Court stated earlier in the report, that she does not have any issues related to substance abuse, and that was according to Ms. A.S. She stated to the author of the pre-sentence report, she may have the occasional alcoholic drink on special occasions, but that she does not partake in the use of illicit drugs. Again, that is very contrary to what has been indicated to the Court today.
In terms of her character, behaviour and attitude, she indicates that when dealing with stress, frustration and anger, she will go for walks with her dog, listen to music, or watch movies. She further indicated that when faced with these emotions, she will react in a strong manner by yelling or screaming. She indicated she would like to be better in life and be in a better situation with her children in her care.
The Court has been provided with a certificate from Strikes Toronto indicating that Ms. A.S. has participated in the Beyond the Basics parenting group from April 3rd to May 22nd, 2024. The Court has also been provided with a letter from Ms. Mackenzie Bray, the Transitional Housing Expansion worker from Nellie's-Women's Hostels Inc. This letter indicates that she is assisting Ms. A.S. seeking to obtain safe and affordable housing. The Court was advised by defence counsel that she is currently living in a hotel until Ms. Bray can find more suitable housing for Ms. A.S.
This letter, however, goes on to state that Ms. A.S. has told this worker that she has been a victim and survivor of human trafficking. There is no confirmation of this statement as far as any criminal charges having been laid, nor any police investigation in this regard. It does not seem that the program for human trafficking in assisting victims, which is located at 40 College Street in Toronto, has worked with Ms. A.S. as a client, whether in an actual investigation or prosecution, nor outside the scope of any police investigation or prosecution. At best, it was indicated that this organization might have referred her to Nellie’s for housing.
The situation seemed rather vague to the Court. It seems that she has indicated to her counsel as well that her former domestic partner, the father of two of her children, was involved in this. The defence did not call Ms. Bray to give evidence nor Ms. A.S. to give evidence. The Crown was able to confirm through police investigation today that Ms. A.S. has her picture in an ad for sexual services. Defence counsel submitted that she has worked in the sex industry. Obviously, that doesn't necessarily mean that she was a victim of human trafficking.
Defence counsel indicated that she is interested in doing hair, makeup, and nails, and may pursue education or training in that field for future employment. To this point, she has not worked and has received funds as indicated from Ontario Works. She did indicate her remorse to the Court, indicating she is remorseful and sorry for the pain she caused to her children.
C) Impact on Victim and/or Community:
The Criminal Code directs the Court to take into account the portions of the victim impact statement that the Court consider relevant to the physical or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offence, and the impact of the offence on the victim. See Section 722(1), (4), and (8) of the Criminal Code.
The two younger victims in this case are too young to provide a victim impact statement in the Court's view. However, her oldest child, her daughter, has provided a victim impact statement. She was, as indicated, six years of age at the time of the fail to provide necessaries charge, and she is the one who was the oldest of the three left behind, and who left the house after some time, which was their apartment, wandering around the streets of Toronto looking for her mother.
She stated the following in her victim impact statement:
It made me feel sad what happened, and it just made me feel not right. And they made me feel not happy either. That’s all my feelings. And well, I just didn’t feel right, and I just didn’t feel happy. I didn’t feel. I just felt all the emotions at once. I just didn’t feel right and I just didn’t — yeah, I was feeling all about Moshi. That might hit him — hit me, sorry. That’s the only thing I know at the time. I’ll say this, even if my mom did something wrong, I always believed she needs a little second chance. She needed to see what she'd done was very wrong. But I would say she she did something wrong. Of course, I'm not – I’m not saying she — she didn’t do anything wrong, but she always deserves a second chance. Everybody always deserves a second chance. That’s all I wanted to say. And of course, I don’t feel happy because I'm going to miss my mom a lot and I still miss her. But life has to be like that. So that’s all I would like to say.
The Court would note the words expressed by the victim, which the Court has read word for word to the best that it can, expresses a degree of maturity beyond what one would expect from a six-year-old and perhaps driven by the nature of her experience with her mother.
It is a statutorily aggravating circumstance where there is a significant impact on a victim considering their age and other personal circumstances. See Section 728.2(a)(iii.1) of the Criminal Code.
Legal Parameters:
The Crown proceeded summarily on the charges. The maximum penalty for the offence of assault with a weapon contrary to Section 267(a) is governed by Section 787, and provides that where the Crown proceeds summarily, the maximum punishment is two years less a day in jail.
For the offence of fail to provide the necessaries of life to her three children, contrary to Section 215(2)(a)(i), where the Crown proceeded summarily, the sentence is again governed by Section 787 of the Criminal Code, and accordingly the maximum punishment is two years less a day. It is important to note, as mentioned below, that Parliament has increased the penalty for fail to provide the necessaries of life where the Crown proceeds by indictment from a maximum of two years imprisonment to a maximum of five years imprisonment.
Positions of Crown and Defence on Sentence: The Crown seeks a sentence of six months jail, which the Court understands to be less pre-sentence custody credit, together with three years probation and a Section 110 Weapons Prohibition Order for five years.
The defence seeks a conditional sentence of no particular length. The defence does not appear to be opposed to a period of probation.
Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances: Mitigating:
The most important mitigating factor in this case is the entry of a guilty plea, saving the victims the need to testify in court. Having noted that, the Court would note that as it relates to the charge of failure to provide the necessaries, that it was, as indicated by the Crown, an overwhelming case. The Superintendent of the building where the children lived intervened to call the police, and when the police arrived, Ms. A.S. still had not returned home to her children.
Ms. A.S. is also a youthful first offender. She has made a statement as to her remorse. The Court takes into account her difficult circumstances as a child and during her upbringing. She had no parental involvement, and her grandparents did not treat her well. She has also been the victim of domestic violence at the hands of the father of her children.
Aggravating:
Statutorily Aggravating Factors:
It is statutorily aggravating that the victim of the assault was her two-year-old son. See Section 718.2(a)(ii). The offence of fail to provide necessaries of life by definition in this case relates to the situation of her children. It is also statutorily aggravating that the offence relates to the abuse of a person under the age of 18 years, Section 718.2(a)(ii.1), that relates to the charge of assault with a weapon and the two-year-old son.
When the Court considers the victim impact statement of her daughter Am.S., and the circumstances of the scar to the face of her two-year-old son, the Court finds that the offences have had a significant impact on the victims considering their age and other personal circumstances. In particular, the three children subsequently were in the Children's Aid system, with her daughter still remaining with foster parents, and her sons now being in the care of their grandparents after being in foster care as well. See Section 728.2(a)(iii.1).
There is no doubt that there is also the statutorily aggravating circumstance of the offence of assault with a weapon to her young son being one that was committed in circumstances of breach of trust. See section 718.2(a)(iii).
Sentencing Principles Analysis:
The Court bears in mind the guiding comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] S.C.J. No. 64. In that judgment, the Court stated that sentencing ranges are primarily guidelines, not hard and fast rules. Even if an appellate court has established a range, it may be that a fact pattern may arise which is sufficiently dissimilar to past decisions that the range must be expanded. Sentencing ranges are nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives. However, they should not be considered averages, let alone straitjackets, but it should instead be seen as historical portraits for the use of sentencing judges who must still exercise their discretion in each case. Accordingly, a sentencing range is not a straitjacket to the exercise of discretion of a sentencing judge. Each crime is committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile. Everything depends on the gravity of the offence, the offender's degree of responsibility, and the specific circumstances of each case. Sentencing ranges must in all cases remain only one tool among others that are intended to aid trial judges in their work. The court specifically considers paragraph 73 of that judgment.
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Regina v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R 206, at paragraph 43 that,
No one sentencing objective trumps the others, and it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which objective, or objectives merit the greatest weight, given the particulars of the case.
Sentencing is highly individualized, see Regina. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, in particular at paragraph 4.
In 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] SCJ No. 46, in the majority judgment at paragraph 10, stated that proportionality is the organizing principle for the court in imposing a fair fit and principled sentence. Proportionality is the fundamental principle. Sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender, and the unique circumstances of each case. Parity and individualization are important yet secondary principles. The demands of proportionality must be calibrated by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases. Individualization is central to the assessment of proportionality in that it demands consideration of the individual circumstances of each offender as set out in paragraph 12.
The principle of proportionality is also codified in the Criminal Code, which states that the sentence opposed by the court must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. See section 718.1 of the Criminal Code.
Further, the court bears in mind that the fundamental purpose in sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law in the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the objectives of denunciation, deterrence, both generally and specifically for the offender, separation of the offenders from society where necessary, rehabilitation to provide reparation for harm done to victims or to the community, and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of harm done to victims or to the community. See Section 718 of the Criminal Code.
The court bears in mind any applicable sentencing principles as set out in section 718.2, and as well the principles of parity, totality, and judicial restraint in considering a sentence of deprivation of liberty or imprisonment as set out in section 718.2(b) through (e). The emphasis of the Court in considering those various objectives depends on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of an offender. The Court considers the nature of the offence together with the circumstances of the offender.
Nature of Offence:
Offences committed in relation to children:
The Supreme Court of Canada in Regina. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, considered relevant principles to consider in sentencing for sexual offences and in particular related to children. In that case, sexual offences were what the Court was considering. However, the Court also considered the nature of sentences for other criminal offences in relation to children. The court stated the following, at paragraph 101:
Parliament's decision to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for offences that involve the abuse of children by enacting 718.01 of the Criminal Code confirms the need for courts to impose more severe sanctions for sexual offences against children. In 2005, Parliament added Section 718.01 to the Criminal Code by enacting Bill C-2. In cases that involve the abuse of a person under the age of 18, Section 718.01 requires the court to give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct when imposing sentences.
[102.] The text of Section 718.01 indicates that Parliament intended to focus the attention of sentencing judges on the relative importance of sentencing objectives for cases involving the abuse of children. The words ‘primary consideration’ in section 718.01 prescribe a relative ordering of sentencing objectives that is absent from the general list of six objectives in Section 718(a) through (f) of the Criminal Code. As Kasirer J.A. reasoned in Rayo, the word ‘primary’ in the English text of Section 718.01 ‘evokes an ordering of the objectives that is relevant in the judge's exercise of discretion.’ This ordering of the sentencing objectives reflects Parliament's intention for sentences to better reflect the seriousness of the offence. As Saunders J.A. recognized in D.R.W., Parliament thus attempted to ‘re-set the approach of the criminal justice system to offences against children’ by enacting Section 718.01.
Following Friesen, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Regina. v. Lis, 2020 ONCA 551, considered the sentencing regime for offences where children are victims, and the statements made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen. In that case, the court was considering sentence for the offence of fail to provide necessaries of life. In that case, as set out in paragraphs 24 and 25, Ms. Lis also had a difficult childhood, fraught with abuse and dropped out of school. She also had been involved in an abusive relationship, including one with the father of the child who was the victim in that case. She had also taken some life skills sessions and a methadone program.
Speaking for the court, Justice Watt stated in paragraph 47:
By enacting section 718.01, Parliament prioritized denunciation and deterrence for offences that involve abuse of children. The words ‘primary consideration’ prescribe a relative ordering of sentencing objectives, a feature that does not appear in their listing in Section 718. This ordering reflects Parliament's intention that sentences better reflect the seriousness of the offence. Friesen at paragraphs 101 to 102.
Then paragraph 48:
The enactment of Section 718.01 also qualifies the previous direction of the Supreme Court that it falls to the sentencing judge to determine which sentencing objectives are to be prioritized. Section 718.01 confines the sentencing judge's discretion from elevating other sentencing objectives to an equal or higher priority. However, the sentencing judge retains the discretion to assign significant weight to other factors, such as rehabilitation, in giving effect to the fundamental principle of proportionality. Friesen at paragraph 104, Rayo at paragraphs 103, 107, and 108.
The Court also considered the effect of an increase in the maximum punishment for failure to provide necessaries where the Crown proceeded by indictment from the maximum of two years to a maximum of five years. The Court stated at paragraph 49:
Maximum sentences determine the objective gravity of an offence by indicating its relative severity. Parliament's decision to increase the maximum sentence for a crime demonstrates its intention that the offence be punished more harshly. This shifts the distribution of proportionate sentences for the offence. Lacasse, at para. 7, Friesen, at paras 96 to 97, to respect Parliament's decision to increase maximum sentences, courts should generally impose higher sentences than those imposed in cases that preceded the increase in the maximum sentence. Friesen at paragraph 100.
The primary sentencing principles are denunciation and deterrence. However, rehabilitation is still a factor for Ms. A.S. as a first time relatively youthful offender.
The Court also considers the case of Regina. v. Nguyen, 2001 CarswellOnt 485, [2001] O.J. No. 647, 49 W.C.B. (2d) 229, the sentence imposed by Justice Kastner of the Ontario Court of Justice on February 21, 2001. This case, of course, predated the increase to the penalties for the offence of failure to provide necessaries of life for children, and as well the changes in section 718.01 of the Criminal Code.
This Court specifically considers the principle of judicial restraint, currently as codified in section 718.2. The Court considers it as it relates to this accused being a youthful first offender. The Court considers the combination of Regina. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, together with the prior Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Regina. v. Priest, 1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA), [1996], O.J. No. 3369.
Priest predated the availability of conditional sentences. While the Priest judgment related to property offences, the principle which has emerged from its consideration of the case is that the court should explore all other dispositions before imposing a custodial sentence. The principle followed the court's earlier case of Regina. v. Stein (1974) 1974 CanLII 1615 (ON CA), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 376 (O.C.A.) at page 377, a judgment authored by Justice Martin. The Court also considers Regina. v. Vandale and Maciejewski (1974), 1974 CanLII 1610 (ON CA), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 250 (O.C.A.), and Regina. v. Hayman, 1999 CanLII 3710 (ON CA).
The Court also held that for a first term of imprisonment, the length should be as short as possible. Proulx has made it clear that a sentence of incarceration should only be imposed if a conditional sentence is not appropriate.
This Court considers the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Regina. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, 93 OR (3d) 643, and in particular paragraphs 32 to 34. The principle of restraint for a first offender requires a sentencing judge to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration and where incarceration is imposed to impose a term as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused following Priest. Secondly, it requires the sentencing judge to consider rehabilitation. Thirdly, where the case is serious and involves violence, general deterrence and denunciation are also significant factors to be considered.
In this case, Ms. A.S. has had a period of 19 days, real days, of pre-sentence custody. Applying the Summers credit, this would give rise to a period of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 39 days. The defence has not sought any additional enhanced pre-sentence custody credit arising from any lockdown conditions or terms of bail. Neither party has submitted that the Court should apply the approach suggested by Justice Doherty in Regina. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344.
Ms. A.S. currently does not have custody or access to any of her children. So accordingly, there are no collateral consequences that might arise from a term of incarceration as contemplated by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Regina. v. B., 2025 ONCA 577.
Conditional Sentence:
The defence has submitted that a conditional sentence would be appropriate for this offender and these offences. The Court must consider the provision for this type of sentence as set out in section 742.1 of the Criminal Code. The sentence in this case would not exceed two years. It is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment. The Court does have some concerns, notwithstanding the absence of breach of bail charges recently, regarding Ms. A.S.’s failure to attend court on numerous dates in terms of her past behaviour to comply with conditions.
The key issue, however, is whether a conditional sentence would satisfy the fundamental purpose, principles, and objectives of sentencing as set out in section 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. For these offences and this offender, the case law is clear that the paramount principles and primary sentencing objectives in a case of this nature are denunciation and deterrence. Courts have been clear that in some cases, a conditional sentence may satisfy the principles of denunciation and deterrence. Regina. v. Proulx, at paragraphs 102 and 107, Regina. v. Wismayer, (1997), 1997 CanLII 3294 (ON CA), 33 O.R. (3d) 225 (C.A.), as noted, however, by Justice Doherty in Regina. v. Killam, 1999 CanLII 2489 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 4289 (C.A.], a conditional sentence does not, generally speaking, have the same denunciatory effect as a period of imprisonment. Incarceration remains the most formidable denunciatory weapon in the sentencing arsenal.
In Proulx at paragraph 96, the Supreme Court specifically considered the principle and objective of judicial restraint pursuant to Section 718.2(d), that is to say that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances. However, the Court stated that this principle is of course not solely determinative but involves a more comprehensive consideration. As stated in that paragraph:
A determination of when less restrictive sanctions are appropriate and alternatives to incarceration “reasonable” in the circumstances requires a consideration of the other principles of sentencing set out in section 718 to 718.2.
So this is but one of the principles and objectives to consider. The Court must have regard to both the seriousness of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility. The Chief Justice in Proulx went on to state at paragraph 106:
There may be certain circumstances in which the need for denunciation is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society's condemnation of the offender's conduct.
As stated by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Regina. v. McGregor, [2008] O.J. 4939 (C.A), “the nature of the offence or the circumstances of the offender may require a term of incarceration to adequately express society's condemnation of the conduct at issue or to achieve the required deterrent effect.”
In this case, notwithstanding the principles of rehabilitation and judicial restraint for her as a youthful first offender, the Court finds that the need for denunciation is so pressing that incarceration is the only suitable way in which to express society's condemnation of the offender's conduct, or to achieve the required deterrent effect. Parliament has sent a clear message by increasing the maximum punishment where the Crown proceeds by indictment for failure to provide the necessaries of life to children. Parliament has essentially indicated that sentences prior to that time were too lenient.
Further, the circumstances in this case relate to very young children who were left alone a long time, and it did not appear that Ms. A.S. was concerned when she finally returned home to them. Moreover, the circumstances of her striking her two-year-old son with a toy he would have used for play, transforming it into a weapon, to cause a laceration above his eye and leaving a scar, calls out for a sentence to properly reflect the nature of these offences.
The Court has not lost sight of the mitigating circumstances and her unfortunate background. Nonetheless, the Court finds that a conditional sentence would not be proportionate and would not be appropriate.
The Court is mindful of the Crown's position that there be a six-month sentence. The Court nonetheless finds that a sentence of four months incarceration, less enhanced pre-sentence custody is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court imposes a sentence of 120 days jail, less 39 days enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a sentence of 81 days jail. This sentence is a global sentence. It will be imposed first on the fail to provide necessaries, with a concurrent similar sentence on the charge of assault with a weapon. There will also be concurrent enhanced credit of 39 days on the assault with the weapon.
On the warrant of committal, the Court is going to make an endorsement that the accused not be considered for temporary absence. The Court makes this recommendation based upon the nature of these serious offences, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence. The Court also makes this recommendation in light of the fact that Ms. A.S. does not have a residence in the community.
This term of incarceration will be followed by a period of three years probation, which will also be concurrent on the second charge. It will have the following conditions: Report within three days after release from custody and thereafter as directed. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Appear before court when required to do so. Notify as to any change of name, address, employment, or occupation. Attend for counselling as directed by the probation officer for anger management, substance dependency — I've changed that, Mr. Clerk, and parenting. You’re also to sign releases so your probation officer can monitor your attendance at those appointments. You're also to have no direct or indirect contact with Am.S. and Z.S. and I.S., except pursuant to a court order made after today's date, or except through direct and continuous supervision by the Children's Aid Society. You're not to be within 100 metres of Am.S., Z.S., and I.S. except pursuant to a court order made after today's date, or except through direct and continuous supervision by the Children's Aid Society. You're also not to possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code. And this term, Mr. Clerk, you're also to take job training or seek employment as directed by your probation officer. Do you understand those terms of your probation order?
A.S.: Yes.
THE COURT: Can you comply — can you obey all those terms?
A.S.: Yes.
THE COURT: It is very important that you do, because if you do not, you could be charged with failure to comply with probation. And if you're brought back before the Court and found guilty, a sentence could be imposed for that, which could include jail. There will also be an order for a Section 110 Weapons Prohibition Order for five years, and the Court is going to waive the victim fine surcharge. Is the Crown withdrawing the other counts on the information?
A. MOSER: Yes, Your Honour, the Crown is requesting those counts be withdrawn.
THE COURT: All right. Are there any questions? And I don't know, Ms. Jaffer, I know you're on Zoom, I know Mr. Mann is here in person with your client. I don't know if you'd like the opportunity to meet with her, maybe through Mr. Mann. I can give you a bit of a break to see if she has any questions or if there's anything further.
S. JAFFER: Thank you, Your Honour. I would appreciate that. I do have a question for Your Honour to consider in terms of one of the terms of probation.
THE COURT: Can you hold on one second? Mr. I was just talking with your client too.
J. MANN: She's indicated that she understands the sentence that she doesn't need a moment to speak with Ms. Jaffer unless Ms. Jaffer, do you feel the other, do you feel you'd like to speak with her?
S. JAFFER: No, that's okay. I was going to, Your Honour, answer any questions you might have if something had arisen, but if that's not needed, then I'm content.
THE COURT: All right. And you wanted to make a point, Ms. Jaffer, about the sentence. Go ahead.
S. JAFFER: I was going to ask Your Honour to consider, given the length of the probation and in terms of what may come in the future with her work with parenting courses and her interaction with Children's Aid, would you consider an exception to the contact, beyond what you’ve already ordered, that with the permission of Children's Aid, in other words, if she does [Indiscernible], would they allow her to have telephone contact without them having to be continuously present or supervising her, then maybe she could do that, [Indiscernible], she certainly couldn't, but it might leave open that possibility for the future. THE COURT: Does the Crown take any position with that exception?
A. MOSER: So I don't take issue with the exception of not having CAS supervise the phone calls, but the Crown does take issue with her being unsupervised with her children in person.
THE COURT: All right, so would you like to have an exception then in light of that, Ms. Jaffer, or for telephone communication if permitted by the Children's Aid Society.
S. JAFFER: Yes, please, Your Honour, very much so. THE COURT: Okay, so we're going to add that exception. We don't need it for the distance because that's not in play for a telephone call, but for the no contact term, the first one, we'll add an exception, Mr. Clerk, or for telephone communication. if permitted by the Children's Aid Society.
CLERK REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Okay. All right, anything else, Ms. Jaffer or Ms. Moser?
A. MOSER: Just one other thing, Your Honour. There is a trial date where Ms. A.S. is a witness in a matter that involves her daughter. I don't want to make an exception for contact, but perhaps we can add to the radius an exception for required court appearances.
THE COURT: Okay. When is that?
A. MOSER: The trial date is, just a brief indulgence, Your Honour.
THE COURT: I'm just wondering if it's while she's in custody.
A. MOSER: No, it's not. I checked. It's not while she's in custody. November 16th to 20th.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. So for both — I don't know if you're aware of that, Ms. Jaffer, do you have any comment with respect to that?
S. JAFFER: No, thank you, Your Honour, I was not aware of that. Thank you for sharing that Madam Crown.
THE COURT: Okay, so we'll add that exception to both of the no contact terms, first the general one and the one which is the 100 metres. So the additional exception would be or for required court appearances. So we will need a little bit of time for these papers to be done and signed. Do you want to be released, Mr. Mann? Thank you for coming to assist.
J. MANN: Thank you, Your Honour. Yes, I was meeting with a client and paused to step in. THE COURT: Thank you very much.
S. JAFFER: Thank you, Mr. Mann. Your Honour, and Ms. Moser, there is the fail to appear that we have not addressed that I think should be going into 205.
THE COURT: I don't know what day of the week that should go there, but that's fine.
A. MOSER: I can double check that, Your Honour, just a brief indulgence.
THE COURT: Okay.
A. MOSER: So that's a 33 Division. It can go into
205 court on the 10:00 a.m. docket on a Friday of Ms. Jaffer's choosing if she's counsel for that.
S. JAFFER: Okay, I'm happy to assist her with that. Perhaps we can try May 22nd. That would give us a little bit of time. Let's try the 22nd. I'll try to put the trial date for her next week so that we can put her on the record.
THE COURT: All right, sorry, I heard 205 court, but she's going to be in custody.
A. MOSER: Oh, 9:00 a.m. docket, thank you, Your Honour.
THE COURT: The 9:00 a.m., shall I say on video then, Ms. Jaffer? Are you representing her on that, or no?
S. JAFFER: Yes, I'll assist her with that. And I wish that the trial would be an out of custody trial because I expect her bail is still in good standing with bail program for that. So I expect the trial date will come after she has completed serving this sentence.
THE COURT: All right, but that's fine, but for May 22nd, it’ll be a set date in 205 on video at 9:00
a.m. And sorry, we've done that while the Crown — the clerk's right in the middle of trying to do the sentencing papers. All right.
A. MOSER: Your Honour, is Your Honour going to be providing written reasons? There's just no case law in this area. I was hoping to....
THE COURT: Well, you can order it.
A. MOSER: Yeah, I'll order. It's just really no case law in this area, as Your Honour probably gathered.
THE COURT: Yeah, no, that is fine. If you order it, it will come to me. I have to approve it, obviously, but that's fine.
A. MOSER: All right.
CLERK REGISTRAR: And Your Honour, in regards to the other two charges on the information.
THE COURT: Withdrawn.
CLERK REGISTRAR: Thank you.
THE COURT: Yeah, the Crown withdrew them. Just one minute.
. . .WHEREAS THIS MATTER WAS ADJOURNED
FORM 3
ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT (SUBSECTION 5(2))
Evidence Act
I, Derene Harriettha, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R. v. A.S. in the Ontario Court of Justice held at 10 Armoury Street, Toronto taken from Recording Number 4810_1007_20260514_090835 6_BROWNBE, which has been certified in Form 1.
June 12, 2026
Date (Electronic signature of authorized person)
1374896217
(Authorized court transcriptionist's identification number - if applicable)
Ontario, Canada
(Province of signing)
LEGEND
[sic] - Indicates preceding word has been reproduced verbatim and is not a transcription error.
(ph) - Indicates preceding word has been spelled phonetically.
[Indiscernible] - Indicates an inaudible or impossible to understand spoken word/phrase.
Transcript Ordered: June 1, 2026
Transcript Completed: June 2, 2026 Transcript Approved for Release: June 11, 2026 Ordering Party Notified: June 12, 2026
A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.