ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
HALEH JAVADY TORABI
Before Justice R. Tomovski
Heard on April 28, 2026
Reasons on Charter Application released on June 15, 2026
Sophie Zhao counsel for the Crown
Jordana Goldlist counsel for the accused Haleh Javady Torabi
Tomovski J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
1Police obtained judicial authorization to intercept Ms. Torabi’s boyfriend’s telephone calls as part of a large-scale criminal investigation known as Project Outsource, which included suspected firearms offences. During a late-night call between Ms. Torabi and her boyfriend, Ms. Torabi referred to being in her room and having contemplated retrieving a firearm located there, based on her mistaken belief that an intruder may have entered her home earlier while she was putting her children to bed in their room.
2Forty-seven days later, police applied for a warrant to search Ms. Torabi’s residence. The application coincided with the culmination of Project Outsource and the anticipated arrest of multiple individuals under investigation. The warrant was issued and executed. During the search, police located a loaded firearm concealed in a hidden compartment within a bedroom closet. Ms. Torabi was subsequently charged with several firearm-related offences under the Criminal Code.
3Ms. Torabi brings a facial challenge to the search warrant pursuant to s. 8 of the Charter. She argues that the warrant could not have issued because there were no reasonable grounds to believe that a firearm would be found in her residence at the time of the search. Specifically, Ms. Torabi submits that the information derived from a single intercepted call 47 days earlier, without more, was stale-dated and insufficient to support the issuance of the warrant.
4In determining whether the warrant could have issued, these reasons address five areas: the standard of review applicable on a facial challenge; the requirement of reasonable grounds to believe; the treatment of stale-dated information; the relevant evidence; and my findings.
II. ANALYSIS
Charter Issue: On a facial review, could the warrant have issued?
A. Standard of Review
5A search warrant is presumptively valid. The onus rests on the Applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the warrant is invalid and that the impugned evidence should be excluded: R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72 at paras. 35, 83; R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65 at paras. 51, 54; R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at para. 40.
6A challenge to a search warrant can be either facial or sub-facial. On a facial review, the reviewing judge examines the information to obtain (“ITO”) the warrant and determines whether, on the face of that material, the issuing justice could – not would – have issued the warrant: Sadikov at para. 37; R. v. Shivrattan, 2017 ONCA 23 at para. 26; R. v. Kalonji, 2022 ONCA 415 at para. 19.
7The reviewing judge must assess whether the ITO discloses sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit the issuing justice to find reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place: Morelli at para. 40; Kalonji at para. 19.
8The scope of review is narrow. It is not a de novo hearing, and the reviewing judge must not substitute his or her view for that of the issuing justice: Sadikov at para. 84. Rather, the reviewing judge considers the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the warrant could have issued: Araujo at paras. 51, 54; Kalonji at para. 19. Direct evidence is not required to link the offence to the place to be searched; the issuing justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the information contained in the ITO: Kalonji at paras. 25-27.
B. Reasonable Grounds to Believe Requirement
9The standard for issuing a search warrant under s. 487(1)(b) of the Criminal Code is reasonable grounds to believe. This standard does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or on a balance of probabilities. Rather, it reflects a credibly-based probability – one that exceeds mere suspicion but falls short of a balance of probabilities – and requires a reasonable probability, not a mere possibility: Sadikov at para. 81; R. v. Herta, 2018 ONCA 927 at para. 20; R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54 at para. 72; R. v. T.G., 2026 ONCA 298 at para. 67.
10The ITO must disclose reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been committed and that evidence of that offence will be found at the place to be searched. Where the inferences of criminal conduct and the likely presence of evidence are reasonably drawn from the facts set out in the ITO, the warrant could be issued: Sadikov at para. 81.
11In deciding whether to issue the warrant, the issuing justice considers the ITO as a whole, applying a common sense, practical, and non-technical approach. In addition to direct evidence, the issuing justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the information contained in the ITO: Sadikov at para. 82; Kalonji at para. 25; R. v. Diakoloukas, 2026 ONCA 410 at para. 33.
12Information contained in the ITO need not be proven or independently corroborated in order to be considered: R. v. Ilia, 2023 ONCA 75 at para. 16.
13Nor is an affiant required to negate every alternative inference in order to meet the reasonable grounds threshold: R. v. D.D., 2026 ONCA 415 at para. 5; Ilia at paras. 17-18.
C. Stale-dated Information
14The passage of time is a relevant consideration in assessing the existence of reasonable grounds. However, the mere fact that information is dated does not render it stale: R. v. Ballendrine, 2011 BCCA 221 at para. 54.
15There is no bright-line rule or fixed date as to when information becomes stale. Rather, there comes a point at which it can no longer be relied upon, a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular facts: R. v. Porter, 2016 ONSC 5589 at para. 58, per George J. (as he then was).
16Whether information is stale, and therefore incapable of supporting reasonable grounds, requires a practical, common-sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances. In conducting that assessment, a judge is entitled to draw reasonable, common-sense inferences regarding the activities of individuals: R. v. James, 2019 ONCA at paras. 64-65, per Nordheimer J. (dissenting), adopted by the Supreme Court in R. v. James, 2019 SCC 52.
17In R. v. Fuller, 2021 ONCA 411, the Court of Appeal held that the nature of the items at issue (jewellery) meant that a delay of two months did not undermine the reasonable belief that the items would still be found in the accused’s residence. As the Court observed at para. 9, “[g]iven the nature of the stolen goods, there was no compelling reason to believe [they] would have been disposed of within that time frame.”
18A similar conclusion was reached in Diakoloukas at paras. 29-36 and 41-48, where the Court of Appeal held that the nature of the material involved (child sexual abuse and exploitation material), although accessed some 20 months prior to the warrant, did not render the information stale. The ITO supported a reasonable inference that evidence of possession would remain at the accused’s residence, given the accused’s control over the account used to access the material.
D. Relevant Evidence
19An initial criminal investigation known as Project Sahara led to a further criminal investigation in the Peel region in 2024, referred to as Project Outsource. That investigation focused on several members of a suspected criminal organization, including Ms. Torabi’s boyfriend, N.T., who were believed to be involved in acts of violence, extortion, and fraud. The individuals under investigation were also suspected of using and possessing firearms.
20Police obtained judicial authorizations to intercept the communications of members of the organization, including N.T. These intercepted communications occurred between January 2 to July 23, 2025. All events relevant to this matter took place in 2025.
21During that period, several of N.T.’s communications were intercepted, leading police to believe that he was in possession of a firearm. The relevant calls may be summarized as follows:
(1) On April 16 at 12:03 p.m., N.T. spoke to an associate and directed the associate to remove the “thing” (believed by police to refer to a firearm) from N.T.’s vehicle and store it elsewhere before borrowing the vehicle.
(2) On April 16 at 6:59 p.m., N.T. spoke with another associate and referred to having something on his person (believed to be a firearm based on a sound police associated with the racking of a firearm slide heard during the call).
(3) On April 25 at 8:25 a.m., N.T. spoke with Ms. Torabi and referenced an upcoming meeting with a superior that could become confrontational, stating he might “blow [him] away” (which police understood to be a reference to a firearm, again based on a sound consistent with the racking of a firearm slide).
22Earlier on April 16, at 12:03 a.m., police intercepted a call between N. T. and Ms. Torabi. The contents of that call led police to believe that Ms. Torabi kept a firearm in her bedroom for protection. Although neither an audio recording nor a verbatim transcript of the call was filed as part of the application materials, I reproduce below, at para. 26, the affiant’s summary of the call as set out in the ITO.
23There are no other intercepted calls of relevance between N.T. and Ms. Torabi.
24Police determined that Ms. Torabi resided at [address redacted]. This conclusion was based on multiple sources, including her driver’s licence, which listed that address; property records identifying her as the owner; information provided by N.T. in an unrelated investigation that she resided there; police observations of Ms. Torabi at the address on April 23; and the presence of a truck registered in her name parked in the driveway at that time.
25On June 2, 47 days after the April 16 call, the affiant swore an ITO seeking warrants to search, among other locations, the residences of N.T. and Ms. Torabi for evidence relating to possession of a firearm between April 16 and June 2. The applications were brought in anticipation of the conclusion of Project Outsource, including the coordinated arrests of those under investigation.
26The April 16, 12:03 a.m. call between N.T. and Ms. Torabi is summarized in the ITO as follows:
On April 16, 2025, during a conversation with N.T. about the daily happenings of life, Ms. Torabi told N.T. about how her child, [name redacted], scared her when he came into her room. Ms. Torabi was so scared that she thought an unknown person was in her house and told N.T. that “it was to the point I’m like should I run and grab the gun or should I run out of the room? I, actually, genuinely, was gonna run…oops, oops, fuck, that really slipped. Um, I genuinely thought someone was in the washroom and then I thought maybe when I went to go put the kids to sleep someone snuck into my room. Imagine right now you’re laying there and a head just pops up out of nowhere
Ms. Torabi talks to N.T. about how her son came into her bedroom, was waking around and she didn’t see him. This scared her and for a moment she thought about going to grab the gun or run out of the room, She immediately says “oops that really slipped”
27A warrant to search Ms. Torabi’s residence was issued on June 4, authorizing execution between June 10 and 12. Police executed the warrant and located a loaded firearm concealed in a hidden compartment in the primary bedroom closet.
28Ms. Torabi was subsequently charged with several firearm-related offences under the Criminal Code.
E. Findings
29The Applicant advances two arguments in support of the position that the warrant could not have issued due to the absence of reasonable grounds to believe that a firearm would be found at Ms. Torabi’s residence on June 2.
30First, the Applicant submits that the 47-days interval between the intercepted call and the affiant’s application rendered the information stale-dated.
31Second, the Applicant submits that, when the intercepted communications are considered cumulatively, a reasonable inference is that there was only one firearm. On that theory, N.T.’s subsequent reference to a firearm in his vehicle indicates that the firearm initially located in the Applicant’s residence had been removed and placed in the vehicle, thereby undermining any reasonable basis to believe it remained at the residence at the time of the search.
32I address each argument in turn.
i. Was the information stale-dated?
33With respect to the passage of time, the Applicant properly concedes that reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of firearm possession would be found at the residence existed as of April 16, the day of the intercepted call. I agree.
34In my view, the passage of 47 days, standing alone, is not sufficiently lengthy in the circumstances of this case to render information that was otherwise credible and reliable stale-dated on June 2.
35The April 16 call provided credible and reliable evidence that the Applicant kept a firearm in her residence for protection. It is a reasonable and common-sense inference that a firearm maintained for that purpose would remain in the residence for ongoing protection so long as the Applicant continued to reside there.
36As noted in Porter, the passage of time may diminish the strength of an inference. However, the point at which that inference loses its reasonableness is not determined by the passage of time alone, but by a contextual assessment of all relevant circumstances. A period of 47 days – particularly when contrasted with significantly longer periods – does not, in the circumstances of this case, undermine the reasonableness of the inference that the firearm remained at the residence. That inference was available to the issuing justice.
37The source of the information is an additional and important consideration. Unlike information derived from an anonymous tipster or an untested confidential informant, which requires careful scrutiny of its credibility and reliability, the information here was first-hand, originating directly from the Applicant.
38The circumstances in which the statement was made further support its reliability. The Applicant’s reference to a firearm in her room occurred spontaneously during a private, late-night conversation with her boyfriend. There was no apparent motive to fabricate the statement.
39In these circumstances, the Applicant’s admission that she kept a firearm in her room for protection constitutes highly reliable information. It required little, if any, corroboration beyond confirming the location of her residence, which police did.
40The nature of the item also informs the analysis. A firearm is not a consumable or transient item, supporting an inference of ongoing possession: R. v. Burke, 2013 ONCA 424 at para. 32. Where unlawfully possessed, it is typically kept securely and discreetly. It is reasonable to infer that such an item would not be frequently moved, particularly where its stated purpose is to protect the occupant and her children within the home.
ii. Was the one-gun theory an available inference?
41As noted in D.D., even if the one-gun theory advanced by the Applicant were an available alternative inference, the affiant was not required to exclude it in order to satisfy the reasonable grounds threshold, provided that the competing inference – that more than one firearm was involved – was itself reasonably available.
42In any event, I am not satisfied that the one-gun theory arises as a reasonable inference from the contents of the ITO.
43On the facts known to the affiant, as set out in the ITO, that theory is speculative and unsupported by the evidentiary record.
44There is no evidence that the Applicant and N.T. resided together. Their communication by telephone on April 16 supports the inference that they were not in one another’s presence at the time. Nor is there any evidence that they met between the initial call at 12:03 a.m. and N.T.’s later reference to a firearm in his vehicle at 6:59 p.m. There is therefore no basis to infer that N.T. retrieved a firearm from the Applicant’s residence and transferred it to his vehicle during that period. Further, nothing in the intercepted communications on April 16 or April 25 suggests that the parties were referring to the same firearm. To the contrary, the calls support the inference that separate firearms were being discussed – one referenced by the Applicant in her room and another referenced by N.T. in his vehicle.
45It was therefore open to the issuing justice to infer that the firearm referred to by the Applicant was distinct from the firearm later referenced by N.T. From that, it was also reasonable to infer that the Applicant’s firearm remained in her residence on April 25 and continued to be there as of June 2.
46The Applicant further submits that police were required to act more expeditiously in seeking the warrant. I do not agree. Provided that reasonable grounds to believe existed at the time the warrant was sought – which I have found they did – police were entitled to delay in order to avoid compromising the broader investigation and to coordinate the execution of warrants and arrests in connection with Project Outsource. That approach was reasonable in the circumstances: see James at paras. 70–74; Robinson at paras. 20–25.
iii. What reasonable inferences arose from the ITO?
47The information contained in the ITO, in particular the April 16, 12:03 a.m. call, permitted the issuing justice to draw the following reasonable inferences:
(1) That Ms. Torabi was in possession of a firearm
(2) That she kept the firearm in her room
(3) That the room referenced was a bedroom within her residence, inferred from its proximity to the room her children slept in and because the call occurred late at night
(4) That she possessed the firearm for the purpose of protecting herself and her children from intruders into her residence
(5) That a firearm kept for that purpose would likely remain at the residence for as long as she continued to reside there and perceived a need for protection
(6) That a person who unlawfully possesses a firearm would likely conceal it within their residence: see Kalonji at paras. 20-28; Herta at para. 54
(7) That a person who unlawfully possesses a firearm may retain it for a prolonged period of time: see Herta at para. 48; Tomaszewicz at para. 45
48Viewed in their totality, these circumstances provided sufficient credible and reliable information to permit the affiant to form a reasonably grounded belief that a firearm would be found in the Applicant’s residence on June 2.
49Accordingly, the issuing justice could have concluded that the ITO, together with the reasonable and common-sense inferences arising from it, established a credibly-based probability that a firearm would be located at the residence on that date.
50On its face, the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable information to establish reasonable grounds to believe that a search of the Applicant’s residence on June 2 would yield evidence of the offence of firearm possession.
51I am therefore satisfied that the warrant could have issued.
III. CONCLUSION
52The Applicant has not met its burden of demonstrating that the search warrant could not have issued.
53Accordingly, Ms. Torabi’s application under s. 8 of the Charter is dismissed.
54In light of this finding, it is unnecessary to undertake an analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
Released: June 15, 2026
Signed: Justice Tomovski