ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
NATASHA LAPLANTE
Before Justice R. Wright
Heard on December 8 and 10, 2025, April 22, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on June 12, 2026
P. Moir counsel for the Crown
K. Anders counsel for the defendant Natasha Laplante
1This was a trial on two counts: impaired operation of a conveyance and having a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) in excess of the legal limit within two hours of having care or control of a conveyance.
2In the early morning hours of May 19, 2024, Natasha Laplante was involved in a very serious motor vehicle collision. The vehicle she was driving crossed the median. At least one large traffic post was knocked free and dramatically impacted a vehicle driving the other direction.
3Police received multiple calls for service. When officers arrived on scene, Ms. Laplante’s vehicle was badly damaged. The roadway was partially covered in vehicle fluids. Ms. Laplante was at the rear of the vehicle attempting to place things in the trunk.
4Officers interacted with Ms. Laplante and moved her to the median (away from the fluid-covered area). While asking her questions about the collision, officers smelled alcohol and asked her if she had been drinking. She was placed under arrest for impaired operation. A demand was made that she provide samples of her breath into an approved instrument. She was transported to the hospital and then provided two samples of her breath which registered well over the legal limit.
5Ms. Laplante seeks exclusion of the results of those samples from evidence for alleged breaches of her Charter rights under:
(1) Ss. 8 and 9 for lack of reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand/place her under arrest for impaired operation;
(2) Ss. 9 and 10 for an investigative detention while failing to advise her of the reasons for detention or her rights; and,
(3) S. 10(b) for failing to properly advise of the right to counsel by failing to follow up on special circumstances suggesting Ms. Laplante did not understand.
6I do not agree that the police breached Ms. Laplante’s Charter rights. Rather, I am satisfied that the police had both subjective and objective grounds to arrest Ms. Laplante for impaired operation (and make the demand), that she was not detained when dealing with police prior to her arrest, and that when she was arrested the police provided her with proper information about her rights and meaningful access to counsel.
7I am also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Laplante was impaired by alcohol and had an excess BAC while she operated her motor vehicle. These are my reasons supporting those findings.
Blended Charter Application: Evidence
8The Charter Application and trial proceeded in a blended fashion. Two police officers gave evidence relevant to the Charter: PC Tania Hugo, who was the more experienced “coach” officer (17 years) and PC Melanie Parker, who was still in her first two months on the road. Both officers were shown and authenticated video from their body worn cameras (“BWC”), clips of which became exhibits on the trial.
9PC Hugo testified that she and her partner were dispatched to a personal injury collision; the first call was at 3:01 AM. Information received from these calls was that the driver had been swerving, had hit a lamp post, and probably hit another vehicle. The vehicle was described as smoking and the engine revving. The second caller advised that he thought the driver had been drinking and that she was verbally fighting with others on scene.
10PC Hugo arrived on scene at 3:10 AM. She located Ms. Laplante, who was at the rear of her damaged vehicle. Ms. Laplante had visible blood on her face and was ignoring officers when they first engaged with her. She appeared to be trying to put things in the vehicle. PC Hugo initially thought she was dazed from the collision, with a head injury, and not really reacting.
11PC Hugo observed fluids on the road and noted that the whole roadway was shut down and that fire personnel would need to deal with the fluids. The roadway was extremely slippery behind the vehicle, and PC Hugo was worried Ms. Laplante would slip and hurt herself further. There were also shards of glass and metal and other debris. PC Hugo took Ms. Laplante by the arm and directed her to move away from the rear of the vehicle and onto the median area. She testified that she did this for safety; she wanted Ms. Laplante away from the fluids and slippery area, and was concerned about her safety and medical condition.
12As they moved onto the median, she smelled the odour of alcohol coming from Ms. Laplante’s breath. She asked if she had been drinking and Ms. Laplante said, “no.” She asked her for her driver’s license and observed her to have difficulty fumbling in her purse. Ms. Laplante moved toward the vehicle and seemed unsteady on her feet. She stumbled into the vehicle. She was slurring her words significantly. Her answers to questions were strange and she was slow to respond.
13At 3:14 AM, PC Hugo advised Ms. Laplante she would be arrested for impaired operation. She instructed her partner to conduct the arrest and provide her with her rights and the demand. She then spoke with other emergency services on scene and requested another unit to search for any other vehicles and confirm that there were no other injured parties.
14At 3:45 AM, PC Hugo and her partner transported Ms. Laplante to hospital for medical assessment. They arrived at the hospital at 3:50 AM. Her partner contacted duty counsel at 4:03 AM. Duty counsel called back at 4:17 AM and Ms. Laplante was given private access to counsel. A Qualified Breath Technician attended the hospital and took breath samples from Ms. Laplante.
15In cross-examination, PC Hugo agreed that she would not have let Ms. Laplante walk away from the scene but disagreed that Ms. Laplante was detained. Ms. Laplante was bleeding, she needed to ensure she got medical attention and was safe. She would not have let her walk to a “Tim Horton’s”, but it was not a police detention. She took hold of Ms. Laplante’s arm to steady her and remove her from the roadway, where it was slippery and there were potential hazards. She was investigating a collision until she developed her grounds.
16She disagreed with suggestions that the video did not show the unsteadiness, stumbling or slurred speech that she had testified to. She agreed that, when setting out her grounds for arrest (as a training point for her partner) she had not said “odour of alcohol” explaining that she had heard her partner already state that she also smelled alcohol. She disagreed with a suggestion that PC Parker had said that she didn’t smell alcohol on the video.
17PC Hugo agreed that when they were at the hospital she learned that Ms. Laplante had answered “no” when asked if she understood her rights to counsel. She instructed her partner to re-read the rights to counsel to Ms. Laplante at the Hospital. She explained the delay in providing access to duty counsel at the hospital as due to an inability to provide privacy until they were in a room.
18PC Hugo was a credible and reliable witness. There were no significant inconsistencies in her evidence, and it was almost entirely confirmed by her BWC video. Obviously, the BWC cannot confirm that PC Hugo smelled the odour of alcohol, but her actions on the video are entirely consistent with an officer who has smelled the odour of an alcoholic beverage in dealing with a motorist. The fact that PC Parker initially responded that she had not smelled the odour but that PC Hugo misunderstood her and believed that PC Parker was in fact confirming her observation does not cause me any doubt about her evidence. It was loud at the scene and difficult to hear exactly what PC Parker said on the BWC. It had to be played multiple times, and could easily be mistaken for a confirmation rather than a contradiction. It wasn't until PC Parker testified and confirmed what she was saying that it was clear what had been said. That PC Hugo reasonably misunderstood PC Parker makes sense and accords with how she moved to the arrest.
19PC Hugo is an experienced officer. She was PC Parker's coach officer that night. She was attempting to use their dealings with Ms. Laplante as a teaching moment. She was specifically stating her observations as grounds out loud for that purpose.
20There was no inconsistency in PC Hugo's evidence as it relates to escorting Ms. Laplante away from the rear of the vehicle. Her explanation that the roadway represented a hazard and that they were assisting her to safety is confirmed by the BWC evidence and makes logical sense. That Ms. Laplante was not “detained” as legally understood also makes logical sense and is not inconsistent with PC Hugo's evidence that she would not have let her walk away for a coffee; there was a serious collision and Ms. Laplante had visible injuries that needed to be tended to. She also removed her hands from Ms. Laplante once they were out of the road. There is no inconsistency in her evidence on the point of detention.
21I accept PC Hugo's evidence.
22PC Melanie Parker testified that she had been on the road since March 1, 2024. This was her first impaired driving investigation.
23She and PC Hugo attended the scene at approximately 3:10 AM. She identified video from her BWC and confirmed its accuracy. At the point where PC Hugo asked about drinking, she confirmed that what she had said was, “I don't smell anything.” In cross-examination, she explained that she had not smelled alcohol at that moment, but as she dealt with Ms. Laplante, she began to smell alcohol. She testified there were a lot of smells, including blood, but when she started speaking with her more then she could smell the odour.
24Part of the roadway was slippery due to the collision; on the driver side at the rear it was leaking fluid on the roadway. They ushered Ms. Laplante to the area where it was not wet and slippery. PC Parker had decided Ms. Laplante was the driver due to her position next to the car and putting things in the trunk. As she spoke to her, she developed grounds. Ms. Laplante was answering but she was seeing more signs like slurring speech, rummaging through her purse, delayed motor skills, and holding her vehicle to balance herself up. PC Parker viewed these as indicia of impairment.
25PC Parker moved Ms. Laplante to the ambulance. At 3:18 AM she was formally arrested for impaired driving and her rights to counsel were given. When asked if she understood her rights she said, “no.” When asked if she wanted to call a lawyer, she said, “yes.” When asked if she had a lawyer she said, “no.” When asked if she understood her caution, she said, “no.” PC Parker then asked, “what don't you understand?” Ms. Laplante said, “nothing.” PC Parker said, “so you understand?” Ms. Laplante answered, “no.”
26PC Parker testified that she was of the view that Ms. Laplante had understood everything; she had previously been properly responsive and had followed direction.
27At 3:24 AM PC Parker made a demand for samples of Ms. Laplante's breath. Ms. Laplante again answered that she did not understand when asked. PC Parker was of the view that she did understand; she had said she wasn't going to provide a sample when the demand was being made, but then when asked if she understood had said, “no.” In the prior conversation, Ms. Laplante was answering questions in an appropriate manner. PC Parker believed she was attempting to delay the process.
28The BWC was played from 3:29 AM to 3:35 AM. Ms. Laplante asked some questions and was responsive during this section of video. She asked several times if she was going to jail. She was told the hospital then the division, and then it would be up to a judge. She asked if they had found her phone. She asked if she could call someone and was told she could when they could get her privacy. An officer investigating the collision came to try to speak to her, and she told him she understood her right to remain silent.
29Ms. Laplante was transported to hospital. They arrived at 3:50 AM. Ms. Laplante was re-read rights to counsel in the controlled environment and indicated she wanted to speak to counsel. PC Parker called duty counsel at 4:05 AM. They called back at 4:17 AM and Ms. Laplante was given a private consultation.
30PC Parker re-read the breath demand to Ms. Laplante at 4:42 AM. Ms. Laplante now indicated she understood. Ms. Laplante provided samples of breath to a qualified technician. PC Parker served her with notices and a copy of the certificate.
31In cross-examination, PC Parker agreed with suggestions that the collision could account for some of the indicia she had attributed to impairment. She agreed she would not have let Ms. Laplante walk away; she was bleeding from her head and needed to be checked out by EMS. She did not agree that she and her partner should have given rights to counsel when they took Ms. Laplante by the arms out of the roadway; she testified that they were worried for her safety. She would not agree that Ms. Laplante had not stumbled.
32It was suggested to her that a note in her memobook which read strong odour of alcohol was not correct; she disagreed. She stated that as she spoke to Ms. Laplante more, she could smell the odour.
33PC Parker was cross-examined extensively that her evidence about Ms. Laplante stumbling, staggering, or using the car to help with her balance were inconsistent with the BWC evidence. I do not agree that her evidence was inconsistent with the BWC footage. PC Parker's evidence in-chief was that Ms. Laplante had been unsteady on her feet. She provided several examples of her swaying or appearing unsteady. In cross-examination it was suggested to her she wrote stumbling in her notes, but there was no evidence of stumbling. She maintained that the word was accurate.
34PC Parker did not describe Ms. Laplante as falling down drunk. She used the word stumble in her expression of Ms. Laplante being unsteady. The use of the word stumbling did not change the tenor of her evidence that what she was observing was unsteadiness. This was clearly what she conveyed to the Court through the whole of her evidence. There was no inconsistency in the inclusion of the word stumbling.
35The BWC evidence confirms PC Parker's evidence that Ms. Laplante appeared unsteady. She appears to hold the car to help herself stand early in the footage. As she walks, some of her steps are clearly off balance. At times she sways.
36I also disagree that there is an inconsistency in her evidence about the odour of alcohol. She testified that her words at the scene meant that she had not smelled alcohol when PC Hugo said she had. She explained that as she then dealt with Ms. Laplante more, she did smell alcohol, and eventually felt it was a strong odour of alcohol. This makes logical sense and accords with the video; once she moved into dealing with Ms. Laplante directly, and as she spoke to her further, she smelled the odour.
37Finally, in my view PC Parker's evidence about Ms. Laplante understanding her despite responding “no” also makes sense and is consistent with the BWC evidence. Watching the whole of the interaction, it is clear that Ms. Laplante fully understood what PC Parker was telling her.
38PC Parker's evidence was credible and reliable. It accords with the BWC evidence and that of PC Hugo. I accept PC Parker's evidence.
Reasonable and Probable Grounds for Arrest/Approved Instrument Demand
39In the case of a warrantless arrest and the attached search or seizure, in order to justify an approved instrument demand, the Crown must establish on a balance of probabilities that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the accused person was committing the offences of impaired operation or excess BAC: R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554, at para. 37
40Reasonable and probable grounds does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even the establishment of a prima facie case for conviction. In a drinking and driving case, the reasonable and probable grounds standard is not an onerous one: R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554, at para. 46; R. v. Wang, 2010 ONCA 435, at para. 17.
41Reasonable and probable grounds have both a subjective and objective component. The subjective component requires the officer to have an honest belief that the suspect committed the offence. The objective component requires that the officer's belief must be supported by objective facts such that a reasonable person in the place of the officer would conclude that there were indeed reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the suspect’s ability to drive was even slightly impaired by the consumption of alcohol: R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554, at paras. 38 and 48.
42Ms. Laplante submitted that there was an issue in PC Hugo's evidence as it relates to whether she formed subjective grounds to arrest Ms. Laplante and make a breath demand, or instruct her escort to, and that any grounds were objectively insufficient.
43The breath demand was formally made by PC Parker, but it is clear on the evidence that the arrest was initiated and grounds to make the demand/instruction to do so communicated by PC Hugo. The parties argued that it is PC Hugo's grounds that matter, and I have approached my analysis on that basis.
44The evidence in question began with PC Hugo being shown a portion of her BWC evidence, which culminated with placing Ms. Laplante under arrest. PC Hugo was asked by the Crown what observations had led her to arrest Ms. Laplante. PC Hugo responded with the following indicia:
When on scene she appeared dazed; she had blood on her face, so she considered it might be that she was hit to the head
But when she got closer to her, she smelled alcohol
Ms. Laplante's answers did not make sense
Ms. Laplante was slow with her answers, for example when asked for the driver's license Ms. Laplante said maybe
Ms. Laplante stumbled onto the car
Ms. Laplante was unsteady on her feet, and
Ms. Laplante was slurring words.
45PC Hugo then stated, “So I formed the suspicion that she was impaired by alcohol.” Neither counsel followed-up on this portion of her answer.
46PC Hugo was then asked what had led her to believe Ms. Laplante had been driving the vehicle. PC Hugo explained that one of the calls to 911 had included information that the female on scene who was bleeding was the driver.
47While it is the Crown’s obligation to prove that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to the make the arrest, the officer does not necessarily have to expressly set out her reasonable and probable grounds in her testimony: R. v. Hall, 1995 CanLII 647 (CA). If the evidence, taken as a whole, supports the conclusion that the officer thought that she had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and that those grounds were objectively reasonable, the arrest and attached breath demand will be valid.
48The subjective component of reasonable and probable grounds is a finding of a state of mind. This is a question of fact and may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary to have direct evidence from a person whose state of mind is in issue in order to make a finding as to what that state of mind was.
49Ms. Laplante submits that PC Hugo's statement that she “formed a suspicion” is evidence that is contrary to the state of mind necessary; in all of the circumstances of this case, I disagree.
50PC Hugo's evidence on this point arose in the course of her reviewing and authenticating her BWC of the arrest. She had just adopted the evidence from her BWC showing the arrest. She was answering the question of what indicia had led her to arrest Ms. Laplante. She had not been asked for her state of mind. It was the follow-up question of what made her believe Ms. Laplante was the driver that asked for a direct response as to state of mind.
51PC Hugo's use of the words “formed a suspicion” has to be considered in the context of the totality of the evidence. She is an experienced officer. She had told Ms. Laplante she was being arrested and stated out loud on camera reasons for the arrest. She directed her partner to make an approved-instrument demand to Ms. Laplante.
52In my view, on the totality of the evidence, the only available inference is that PC Hugo subjectively believed she had reasonable and probable grounds for both an arrest and a demand. PC Hugo's in-court testimony using the words “formed a suspicion” at the end of an explanation of what indicia had led her to make the arrest does not cause me any doubt that PC Hugo had the appropriate subjective grounds in the moment.
53Those grounds are also objectively reasonable. The evidence is overwhelming that Ms. Laplante was dazed, smelled of alcohol from her breath once officers were closer, her answers did not make sense, she was slow with her answers and had difficulty providing her documents, she was unsteady and used the car for balance on at least one occasion, and she was slurring her words. I would add on top of these indicia that she had been involved in an unexplained collision in which she crossed the median of the roadway.
54These objective facts are more than sufficient that a reasonable person in the place of PC Hugo would conclude that there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe that Ms. Laplante's ability to drive was at least slightly impaired by alcohol.
Sections 9/10(a)/10(b) Prior to Arrest
55The first question to be answered on the claim of arbitrary detention is whether the Charter applicant was detained. If no detention occurred that ends the matter, because if there was no detention, there was no arbitrary detention. Accordingly, only where there is a detention does the court go on to assess whether it was arbitrary in nature.
56There are two forms of detention: physical and psychological.
57The applicant did not testify on the voir dire. Although she was under no obligation to do so, she bears the onus of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that she was psychologically detained. As explained in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, at para. 19, the words refer to situations involving “significant physical or psychological restraint”:
‘Detention’ has been held to cover, in Canada, a broad range of encounters between police officers and members of the public. Even so, the police cannot be said to ‘detain’, within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter, every suspect they stop for purposes of identification, or even interview. The person who is stopped will in all cases be ‘detained’ in the sense of ‘delayed’, or ‘kept waiting’. But the constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint.
58The question is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have concluded that she had no choice but to stay with the officers and answer the questions posed: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, at paras. 30, 26, 31, 44; R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, at paras. 3, 22. In other words, whether a reasonable person would have concluded that the choice to walk away had been removed. This must be determined objectively, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular situation.
59In the context of an investigation of suspected criminal conduct, a general inquiry of an individual, or exploratory investigation, by the police in an attempt to orient the officer to the situation as it unfolds does not give rise to a detention where the officer does not intend to deprive the individual of her liberty: R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, at para. 32.
60Ms. Laplante argues she was physically and psychologically detained when officers put hands on her and removed her from the roadway and then began questioning her.
61I disagree. PC Hugo testified about the presence of fluids on the roadway and that the ground was very slippery. There was substantial debris. Ms. Laplante appeared dazed and in need of medical attention. The dangers at this collision are obvious on the BWC. Ms. Laplante was bleeding from her head.
62As the Court stated in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para. 36:
We may rule out at the outset, situations where the police are acting in a non-adversarial role and assisting members of the public in circumstances commonly accepted as lacking the essential character of a detention. In many common situations, reasonable people understand that the police are not constraining individual choices, but rather helping people or gathering information. For instance, the reasonable person would understand that a police officer who attends at a medical emergency on a 911 call is not detaining the individuals he or she encounters. This is so even if the police, in taking control of the situation, effectively interfere with an individual’s freedom of movement. Such deprivations of liberty will not be significant enough to attract Charter scrutiny because they do not attract legal consequences for the concerned individuals.
63That is precisely what occurred here. Police did lay hands on Ms. Laplante to remove her from the hazardous roadway. After arriving at the side of the vehicle, they ceased physical restraint of Ms. Laplante. She was free to continue moving and did so. The fact that officers would not have let her walk away without further assessment of the medical issues does not turn this interaction into an investigative detention.
64The discussion with Ms. Laplante in the roadway involved preliminary questioning to determine what was going on. It was of a short duration. Other than escorting Ms. Laplante away from the slippery section of roadway, there was no physical restraint. And it is reasonable that officers felt the need to remove her from the roadway for safety.
65It would not have been objectively reasonable for Ms. Laplante to feel psychologically detained by the police removing her from the roadway and asking her exploratory questions. Those questions were:
(1) Have you been drinking?
(2) Where’s your ID?
(3) Do you have a driver’s licence on you?
(4) What’s your name?
(5) Where are you going tonight?
(6) Where’s home?
(7) What’s the unit?
(8) Where are you coming from?
(9) Who’s your friend?
(10) Where does she live? Or he?
66These questions were asked at the side of the roadway, and clearly related to the collision. Ms. Laplante was outside of the vehicle. EMS and fire were on scene. Police were not restraining her movement after she was moved away from the hazardous section of the roadway. Ms. Laplante may not have been able to walk away to get a coffee, but she could have walked away from police to get medical attention.
67In my view, the evidence establishes that Ms. Laplante was not detained until she was advised of her arrest for impaired driving at almost 3:15 AM.
Sections 10(a)/10(b) After Arrest
68Once there is an arrest or detention, s. 10(b) imposes a number of positive duties on the detaining officer: (i) the duty to inform the detainee of their right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of legal aid and duty counsel; (ii) if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, the duty to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise this right (except in urgent and dangerous circumstances); and (iii) the duty to refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until they have had that reasonable opportunity (again, except in cases or urgency or danger).
69PC Parker waited until Ms. Laplante was seated at the ambulance, three minutes and 24 seconds later, before formally advising of the reasons for the arrest and providing Ms. Laplante her rights. In my view, this brief delay was entirely justified in the circumstances. Ms. Laplante was bleeding from her head. A brief delay of the informational component of the police duty is justified in circumstances where the police want to confirm a person's safety and make sure that they are in a position to actually comprehend what is being said to them. To demand instead the immediate giving of information to a person who might not be in a position to take in that information would be absurd. And the police did not attempt to elicit any evidence from Ms. Laplante in between when she was detained and told she would be arrested and when she received the full information at the ambulance.
70Ms. Laplante further argues that police failed to meaningly fulfill her 10(a) and (b) rights because there was an indication that she did not understand and required further explanation.
71It is important to remember the purpose of the informational component. An arrestee is in a vulnerable situation, knowing only that they have been arrested by the state. They have the right to understand why they are being detained, and to be advised of their ability to access counsel and receive legal advice. This is important to an arrestee in the sense that they understand they are not entirely at the mercy of the police while detained. Where there is an objective indication of a lack of understanding, the police must take additional steps to ensure that the detainee is properly informed and can meaningfully exercise their rights.
72Ms. Laplante gave several conflicting answers to PC Parker when asked if she understood her rights. She said she did not understand her right to counsel. She said she wanted to speak to a lawyer. She said she did not have a lawyer. She said she did not understand the caution. She was asked what she didn't understand and said, “nothing.”
73Viewing the totality of the tendered BWC evidence, I am satisfied that Ms. Laplante understood. PC Parker believed she had understood. That belief is not dispositive, but viewing the whole interaction, I agree that she understood. She responds to many questions, she follows police direction. Shortly after the section in which she had claimed not to understand, she specifically tells another officer that she knows her rights and that she doesn't have to speak to him.
74In my view, Ms. Laplante's answers to these questions were nothing more than obstinance in the face of an arrest. She understood what was being said to her, but had decided in the moment to be difficult.
75I have considered the BWC in coming to this conclusion. It is difficult to reduce the tone of Ms. Laplante's answers to writing, but in my view her tone is indicative of obstinance and sarcasm, not a genuine lack of understanding.
76PC Parker was a relatively junior officer. She asked follow-up questions to try to determine what Ms. Laplante did not understand. Ms. Laplante responded to her with, “nothing.” I accept that PC Parker believed Ms. Laplante was just being difficult and that she understood, and it is reasonable that she did not take further steps.
77PC Hugo, the coach officer, learned later what Ms. Laplante's answers had been. She had not been present to hear the conversation. In those circumstances, and remembering that she was acting in a coaching role on that night, she instructed that the rights and breath demand be re-read. That is obviously an appropriate practice when a detainee advises they do not understand. But I am satisfied that Ms. Laplante did understand. PC Hugo did not have the benefit of having overheard the actual conversation.
78Ms. Laplante’s argument that there is a breach of her Charter rights in the delay in re-reading rights and the demand is premised on her statements having been genuine. I have found they were not. Ms. Laplante understood her rights, caution and demand when they were read to her beginning at 3:18 AM. There is no breach of ss. 9, 10(a) or 10(b) of the Charter.
Impaired Operation
79Criminal impairment of the ability to drive is the impairment by drug or alcohol of one's judgment and/or the decrease in one's physical abilities. Any degree of impairment is sufficient, provided the Crown proves that the driver was impaired to the required criminal standard, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Stellato, 1994 CanLII 94 (SCC), [1994] S.C.J. No. 51, aff'g 1993 ONCA 3375.
80It is the ability to drive that must be proven to be impaired by the consumption of alcohol. Where the Crown attempts to establish proof of the impairment of the ability to drive by observation of the accused and her conduct, those observations must indicate behaviour that deviates from “typical behaviour” to a degree that the required onus of proof be met. Deviation from a norm or “typical conduct” is a useful tool in assessing the evidence. Where the evidence indicates that a driver's ability to walk, talk and perform basic motor functions or tasks of manual dexterity was impaired by alcohol, the logical inference may be drawn that the driver’s ability to drive was also impaired: in most cases, if the conduct of the driver was a slight departure from normal conduct, it would be unsafe to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that her ability to drive was impaired by alcohol: R. v. Andrews, [1996] A.J. No. 98 at paras. 23, 19-20, 29 (C.A.), leave refused [1996] S.C.C.A NO. 115; R. c. Belle-Isle, 2021 QCCA 600 at para. 24.
81The Crown must also show that impairment was due to alcohol. Symptoms of impairment that are not proven to be a result of the consumption of alcohol or drug are not sufficient: R. c. Jobin, 2002 CanLII 32209 (QC CA), [2002] J.Q. No. 575 (C.A.) at para. 53.
82The manner of operating a vehicle may be evidence of the condition of the driver, but it is not required: R. v. Grant, 2014 ONSC 1479.
83In many cases, the question of whether a driver was impaired by alcohol is a question of inference. In order to find the accused guilty of impaired driving, the Court must be satisfied that guilt is the only available inference to be drawn on the basis of the totality of the evidence accepted. Where there are other conceivable inferences, the Court must determine whether another proposed alternative way of looking at the case is reasonable enough to raise a doubt: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 at paras. 55-56.
84In addition to PCs Hugo and Parker, the Crown called two civilian witnesses.
85Alberto Manluctao testified that he was operating his motor vehicle northbound on Markham Rd. toward Ellesmere. The light was green and he was proceeding through it. A grey Honda travelling southbound was travelling very, very fast and hit a post. The post travelled across the roadway and hit his car. His airbags deployed. The other vehicle also crossed the road and struck his car. The post also hit another car that was to his right.
86The driver of the southbound vehicle was screaming that they should leave. The driver's face was bloody. She was female. She seemed to him to be drunk because she was screaming and trying to get them to go away. He observed her in the driver seat and did not observe anyone else with her vehicle.
87He remained on scene until police arrived. When police came, they asked him to get out of his vehicle. He spoke to police at the side of the road. He observed the driver of the other vehicle being helped by police.
88Mr. Manluctao was a careful and conscientious witness. He had some gaps in his memory, which he was very clear to indicate. There were no major inconsistencies in his evidence. He was very clear that the other driver was the only person in that vehicle, that she was bleeding and had blood on her face, that she seemed drunk to him because of her screaming that they should leave, and that he waited and saw her being assisted by the police. I accept his evidence on these points.
89Mohamed Sakaulla testified to being the driver of the third vehicle. He observed the southbound vehicle strike two posts, one of which hit the black vehicle that was to his left and behind him (Mr. Manluctao). The southbound vehicle was travelling fast when this happened.
90The female driver of that vehicle was stuck in her vehicle. She was bleeding from her head, and her face was covered in blood. She couldn't come out the driver door. He tried to open the passenger door, but it was locked, so he called 911. He spoke to her and she told him she was fine, not to call the cops. He waited for police who arrived 5-10 minutes after his call.
91Mr. Sakaulla was also a careful witness. He had no major inconsistencies in his evidence. He appeared to have a good recall of the events. He was clear about the southbound vehicle having been travelling fast, about there being a female driver, and that she had blood on her face from an injury to her head. I accept Mr. Sakaulla's evidence.
92Acceptance of the evidence of these witnesses in conjunction with the police evidence proves that Ms. Laplante was the driver of the southbound vehicle. She was with the vehicle when police dealt with her, was the only female present, and was bleeding from the head and had blood on her face. Mr. Manluctao saw the driver being dealt with by police. The only available inference is that Ms. Laplante was that same driver.
93I have already set out my analysis of the evidence of PCs Hugo and Parker, much of which was supported by their BWC evidence. Their evidence of the odour of alcohol on Ms. Laplante's breath was not captured by BWC, but I have accepted it, and it is supported by Mr. Manluctao's evidence that Ms. Laplante appeared to him to be drunk.
94Ms. Laplante argued that the BWC evidence was the best evidence in this case. In general, I agree. The BWC evidence proves that Ms. Laplante was dazed, that her answers did not make sense, that she was slow with her answers and had difficulty providing her documents, that she was unsteady and used the car for balance on at least one occasion, and that she was slurring her words. She was involved in an unexplained collision which began with her single vehicle travelling southbound in which she crossed the middle of the roadway and took out two posts. When all of that evidence is considered in conjunction with the odour of alcohol from her breath, there is no other reasonable inference than that she was operating her motor vehicle while her ability to do so was impaired by alcohol.
Excess BAC
95The evidence also establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that she had a BAC in excess of the legal limit within two hours of operating her conveyance. The collision occurred approximately 5-10 minutes prior to police arrival. Conservatively, she was driving at 3 AM. The breath samples were taken at 5:48 AM and 6:11 AM, both having a result of 130 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. Given the latest time of operation is shortly before 3:00 AM., that places the first breath sample at least 2 hours and 48 minutes from the time of driving. Pursuant to s. 320.31(4) her BAC at the time of driving is deemed to be 135 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.
96The crown has proven both counts beyond a reasonable doubt and findings of guilt are entered.
Released: June 12, 2026
Signed: Justice R. Wright