WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
Peel Region
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ANDRE DAVIS
Before Justice Robichaud
Heard on January 12 to 15, February 4 to 6, March 30 to 31, April 1 to 2, and May 7 to 8, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on May 28, 2026, via email
D. Ida counsel for the Crown
J. Guiliana counsel for the accused Andre Davis
Table of Contents
I. Part I – The Authentication and Admissibility of Cellebrite Reports and Other Evidence Relating to Phones Allegedly Connected to Mr. Davis. 4
- Use of Co‑Accused Text Messages and Adoptive Admissions. 5
- Prior Discreditable Conduct 6
- The continuity and seizure of Mr. Davis’s cell phones. 7
- Authentication of the extracted data under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act. 9 II. Part II – The Application to Introduce Hearsay Statements of N.T. 13 A. The Crown Position: The Principled Approach to Hearsay Necessitates Inclusion of N.T.’s Out-Of-Court Statements. 15 B. The Defence Position: Necessity and Threshold Reliability is Not Met Under the Principled Approach.. 17 C. Analysis – Necessity. 18 D. Analysis – Reliability. 21
- Analysis – Procedural Reliability. 21
- Defence Concerns Relating to Perception, Memory, and Narration.. 23
- Hearsay statements and communications lacking sufficient procedural reliability. 24
- Conclusion on procedural reliability: 26 E. Analysis – Substantive Reliability. 26
- The 911 call and “pimped” vs. “kicked” 26
- Corroborative Factors Relating to Material Aspects of the Statements: the “Bradshaw” Analysis. 28
- Reasonable alternatives to the materials aspects of the statements. 54
- Conclusion on substantive reliability on statements made October 25, 2024. 56
- Residual Discretion to Exclude. 56
- Remaining Hearsay Statements Made Beyond October 25, 2024 and Their Substantive Reliability. 56
1On October 25, 2024, police attended the Holiday Inn located at 5599 Ambler Drive in Mississauga after a hotel employee called 911 at the request of a woman, later identified as N.T., who had attended at the front desk in an injured and distressed state.
2As the investigation unfolded, Peel Regional Police charged Mr. Davis in relation to allegations of violence and threats inflicted upon N.T. that evening. In general terms, he also faces more serious allegations relating to human trafficking, including that he recruited, harboured, and exercised control over N.T., advertised her sexual services, and received material benefit from those activities between September 1, 2024 and October 25, 2024.
3At trial, N.T. did not attend voluntarily, and a material witness warrant was issued for her arrest. After considerable police effort and resistance on her part, she ultimately attended court. In her testimony, she did not adopt her prior statements to police. The Crown first attempted to refresh her memory and subsequently brought applications to have N.T. declared adverse and then hostile under the Canada Evidence Act and at common law. Both applications were granted, permitting cross‑examination at large.
4In substance, N.T. denied that Mr. Davis committed any criminal wrongdoing toward her, including the assaultive and trafficking‑related allegations described in her prior statements, and asserted that he was not involved in the conduct alleged.
5She was cross‑examined by the defence and did not abscond prior to the completion of all examinations.
6In response, the Crown seeks to introduce multiple out‑of‑court statements made by N.T. to police on October 25, 2024, as well as additional statements made in the period that followed. The Crown relies on the principled exception to the hearsay rule and submits that the statements meet the requirements of both procedural and substantive reliability. The defence opposes their admission, maintaining that the statements remain presumptively inadmissible, are unreliable, and lack sufficient safeguards to meet either branch of the principled test.
7In addition, the defence opposes the admission of extraction reports generated from telephones seized from Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest on November 15, 2024. At that time, he was arrested by D/C Cook, who states that upon apprehension he seized two cellular telephones from Mr. Davis’ person. According to the officer’s evidence, the devices were taken contemporaneously with the arrest in downtown Toronto, secured as exhibits, and later subjected to forensic examination and data extraction.
8This ruling therefore addresses, in two parts, the admissibility of the impugned hearsay statements and the authentication and admissibility of the cellular telephone extraction evidence.
I. Part I – The Authentication and Admissibility of Cellebrite Reports and Other Evidence Relating to Phones Allegedly Connected to Mr. Davis.
9On November 15, 2024, Mr. Davis was located by police in downtown Toronto and arrested on the strength of a warrant that had been issued on November 4, 2024.
10Upon his arrest, D/C Cook states that he seized two cellular telephones from Mr. Davis’s person. According to the officer’s evidence, the devices were taken contemporaneously with the arrest as part of the takedown and were secured as exhibits for investigative purposes.
11The phones were subsequently retained by police and subjected to forensic examination. This process resulted in the generation of extraction reports containing digital data said to have been obtained from the devices.
12The Crown seeks to rely on those extraction reports at trial. The defence opposes their admission, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence connecting the devices to Mr. Davis and, in turn, the admissibility of the data derived from them.
13The defence opposes the admission of the cellular telephone extraction reports on multiple grounds. First, with respect to hearsay, the defence submits that certain text message evidence, particularly involving severed co‑accused, is presumptively inadmissible and does not meet the necessity requirement. The Crown acknowledges this limitation in part.
14Second, the defence challenges the authentication of the extracted data under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act. It is submitted that the Crown has not established that the data extracted from the devices reliably reflects the contents of those devices at the time of seizure. In this regard, the defence relies on the evidence of the digital forensic examiner, who is said to have acknowledged an inability to verify the extracted data against the contents of the devices themselves. The extraction is characterized as incomplete, with no independent confirmation of accuracy and with limitations affecting the reliability of timestamps and other metadata. The defence further notes that one of the devices did not contain a SIM card.
15Third, the defence submits that aspects of the proposed evidence amount to prior discreditable conduct and are therefore presumptively inadmissible absent a proper application. It is argued that the Crown has not established the relevance or probative value of this evidence in relation to a live issue at trial, and that its admission would give rise to both moral and reasoning prejudice.
16Fourth and finally, the defence raises concerns regarding continuity and ownership of the devices. It is submitted that the arresting officer’s notes initially made no reference to any seizure, and that later entries inconsistently refer to one or two phones. The devices are described only in general terms, without unique identifiers. The defence further notes the absence of evidence as to where the phones were located at the time of seizure, and that they were not secured in a property bag. These deficiencies are said to undermine the Crown’s ability to establish that the devices belonged to Mr. Davis or that the data extracted from them can be reliably attributed to him.
1. Use of Co‑Accused Text Messages and Adoptive Admissions
17With respect to text message evidence involving third parties, the Crown does not seek to admit such communications for the truth of their contents. Rather, the Crown’s position is that, if Mr. Davis is found to be connected to and the user of the relevant devices, portions of the communications may be admissible as adoptive admissions or admissions by silence. On that basis, the Crown maintains that the hearsay rule is not engaged in the same manner, or alternatively that the necessity requirement is not in issue for that limited purpose.
18The Crown’s position is consistent with the principles governing adoptive admissions. An inference of adoption may arise from an accused’s words, actions, conduct, or demeanour in response to a statement made in their presence. Where the circumstances give rise to a reasonable expectation of reply, silence, or an equivocal or evasive response may constitute an adoptive admission.1
19The Court of Appeal has recently affirmed that assent may be inferred from silence where a response would reasonably be expected, but only where there is some evidence capable of supporting such a finding. The trial judge must first determine whether there is evidence upon which the inference may be drawn. If so, the ultimate determination remains one of fact, to be assessed contextually having regard to all of the circumstances in which the statement was made.2
20These principles inform the analysis in this case. If, as a threshold matter, the phones are found to be connected to Mr. Davis, then any communications authored by him may constitute admissions. Statements made by third parties are not admissible for the truth of their contents, but may be considered for the limited purpose of determining whether, through his responses or silence in context, Mr. Davis adopted or acquiesced in those statements. That assessment must be undertaken having regard to the communications as a whole and the surrounding circumstances.
21At the same time, caution is required in the use of silence. The law distinguishes between silence that may support an inference of adoption in appropriate circumstances and impermissible reliance on silence as evidence of guilt. Evidence of silence must be used within its proper limits and may not be relied upon to draw adverse inferences contrary to established principles.
22The Crown further submits that the probative value of this evidence lies not in the truth of any third‑party assertions, but in the fact of the communications themselves and, in particular, any absence of denial or response by the user of the device in circumstances where a denial would reasonably be expected. In that respect, the Crown argues that the evidentiary value arises from the conduct of the user of the device, rather than the content of the messages.
23Accordingly, provided the threshold issues of connection and authentication are met, the evidence contained within the extracted data cannot be dismissed at this stage as wholly inadmissible hearsay. Its admissibility, and more importantly its permissible use, will depend on the context in which the communications are assessed, and will be confined to its proper evidentiary purpose.
2. Prior Discreditable Conduct
24The defence further submits that portions of the extracted data disclose prior discreditable conduct and are therefore presumptively inadmissible. I accept that some of the content, viewed in isolation, may raise such concerns. However, the Crown does not rely on this material to establish propensity or bad character. Rather, the material arises within otherwise relevant communications and is tendered for limited, permissible purposes, including providing context, situating the narrative, and assessing the accused’s responses within those communications.
25In these circumstances, the admissibility of the evidence turns not on the presence of discreditable content, but on the use to which it is put. I remain mindful that such evidence may not be used to infer guilt by any alleged disposition. To the extent it is admitted, I will confine its use to its proper evidentiary purpose and disregard any aspect that would invite impermissible reasoning. The fact that certain communications may, at first glance, appear to engage prior discreditable conduct does not, standing alone, render them inadmissible.
26Should the Crown seek to rely on any such material for a broader purpose, including as similar fact evidence, that issue can be addressed at that stage on a proper evidentiary footing.
27As with the statements, hearsay, and alleged admissions arising from the communications themselves, the value of this evidence is highly contextual. It may be admissible for one purpose while remaining inadmissible for another, particularly where its use would invite impermissible propensity reasoning. The presence of discreditable content does not, in itself, determine admissibility or ultimate use.
28This is a judge‑alone trial, and I will disabuse my mind of any improper use of such evidence and confine my consideration to its permissible purposes. To the extent the evidence is admitted, I will not rely upon it for any inference of disposition or bad character.
3. The continuity and seizure of Mr. Davis’s cell phones
29Before turning to the issue of authentication under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act, I address the narrower question of the seizure of the devices themselves.
30D/C Cook testified that, upon locating and arresting Mr. Davis on November 15, 2024, he seized two cellular telephones from his person. The phones were secured as exhibits and retained for investigative purposes, including subsequent forensic examination.
31The evidence further identifies the devices seized and subsequently analyzed by reference to police property records. In particular, one device, bearing property number PY24105244, is described as an Apple iPhone SE (2nd Generation) associated with the telephone number +1 416‑721‑1548, with a last recorded use linked to +1 416‑904‑6421. This device was seized from Mr. Davis upon his arrest and marked with an “intake” date of November 18, 2024.
32A second device, bearing property number PY24105243, is described as an Apple iPhone 15 Pro Max associated with the telephone number +1 416‑721‑1548. This device was also seized from Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest and marked with the same “intake” date of November 18, 2024.
33These property identifiers provide an administrative continuity between the devices seized and those later subjected to forensic analysis.
34The defence points to inconsistencies in the officer’s notes, including the absence of any initial reference to a seizure and later entries referring to one or two phones. D/C Cook addressed these concerns directly in his evidence. He testified that the arrest occurred in a dynamic and chaotic environment and that his notes were recorded out of sequence and supplemented later with additional detail. He acknowledged that his later notes refer specifically to one phone, but explained that this was the device with which Mr. Davis had physical control and resisted relinquishing, and which he initially believed to be a firearm during the arrest.
35D/C Cook further clarified that his focus in those notes was directed to that particular device because of its significance in the moment. He accepted that the other phone was not described with the same level of detail in those entries. However, he was clear and consistent that, at the time of arrest, Mr. Davis had two cellular telephones on his person, both of which were seized.
36In my view, this explanation is consistent with the circumstances of the arrest and the practical realities of contemporaneous note‑taking in a dynamic investigative context. When the notes are read as a whole, together with the officer’s viva voce evidence, they support the conclusion that two cellular telephones were seized from Mr. Davis. The apparent discrepancy arises from the sequence and emphasis of the entries, and in particular the focus on the device initially perceived to be a weapon, rather than any uncertainty about the number of phones seized.
37Based on the totality of the evidence, I accept D/C Cook’s testimony that two cellular telephones were seized from Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest. The variation in his notes reflects the manner in which they were recorded and later expanded upon, rather than any inconsistency in the underlying events. This conclusion is further supported by the subsequent documentation and continuity of the exhibits linking the devices seized to those later subjected to forensic analysis.
38The issue at this stage is whether the evidence can support a finding that the devices seized by D/C Cook are those upon which the Crown relies.
39It is well established in law that continuity is a matter of weight, not admissibility.3
40Even if it is established that there is a break in the chain of continuity of an item, this does not make the item inadmissible. Gaps in continuity are not fatal unless they raise a reasonable doubt as to the integrity of the exhibit.4
41I have no such concerns, having regard to the careful cataloguing, storage, and secure preservation of the devices seized. To the extent this issue remains a concern, it is more appropriately addressed in closing submissions on the ultimate issue of attribution of the phones to Mr. Davis, rather than admissibility per se or the contents contained therein.
42I therefore see no basis to exclude the devices or the resulting extraction evidence on continuity grounds. While the defence may renew its submissions as to the weight to be accorded to this evidence and its attribution to Mr. Davis, those issues are properly addressed at the conclusion of the trial.
4. Authentication of the extracted data under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act.
43In a previous ruling in this case, filed as a lettered exhibit, I addressed the admissibility of Cellebrite extraction reports and concluded that, once properly authenticated, such reports meet the low threshold under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act and may be admitted without expert evidence.
44In doing so, I adopted the settled legal principle that authentication requires only evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is what it purports to be. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. S.M.:
“At common law, authentication requires the introduction of some evidence that the item is what it purports to be… The requirement is not onerous and may be established by either or both direct and circumstantial evidence… Under s. 31.1, as at common law, the threshold to be met is low. When that threshold is satisfied, the electronic document is admissible, and thus available for use by the trier of fact.”5
45The same principles apply in the present case. The issue is not whether the extraction was complete or partial, but whether there is evidence capable of supporting a finding that the extracted data is what it purports to be. I do not accept that a “partial” or “incomplete” extraction, without more, gives rise to a concern that the data has been altered, manipulated, or rendered inauthentic.
46As with continuity, concerns regarding completeness or limitations in the extraction process go to the weight to be afforded to the evidence, not to its admissibility, once the threshold for authentication has been met. In assessing this weight, the “partial” status of the extraction may deserve focused scrutiny, but such caution does not, at the admissibility stage, nullify its value.
47The question is whether there is some evidence upon which a trier of fact could find that the material is what it purports to be. Broader concerns relating to reliability, completeness, or interpretation are to be assessed at trial.
48In this case, there is such evidence. Mr. Car described in detail the process by which each device was received, documented, and forensically extracted. This included photographing the devices and associated property, noting their condition, identifying the presence or absence of SIM cards, and recording the steps taken to connect each device to forensic tools. This process was supported by property records and exhibit tracking that provide continuity between the devices seized and those later subjected to forensic analysis.
49While Mr. Car agreed that some of the extractions were partial and that there were technical limitations affecting the scope of data that could be extracted from the devices, he maintained that the data that was extracted was preserved and accurately reflected in the Cellebrite output. His evidence is capable of supporting a finding that the extracted data is what it purports to be.
50He testified that the extractions were performed using Cellebrite software, which converts device data into a readable format. He further described the distinction between full and partial extractions, including the limitations that arise where devices are locked or in a “before first unlock” state. Those limitations were identified in his evidence and acknowledged in cross‑examination.
51Notwithstanding my earlier ruling that expert evidence is not required for the admission of this material, the Crown nonetheless called Mr. Car, who performed the physical extraction of the data from the devices before that data was subsequently accessed by D/C Cook through a secure police server.
52I note this for clarity: Absent a change in the governing law, this decision should not be taken as establishing any expectation that the Crown must routinely call both the extraction technician and the officer who later reviews the data and prepares an investigative report. Mr. Car’s evidence explained the technical process by which the underlying dataset was created, while D/C Cook’s evidence addressed the manner in which that data was accessed, reviewed, and organized for investigative purposes. Although Mr. Car’s evidence was not required to meet the low threshold for authentication, it assisted in explaining the structure and provenance of the extracted material and provided useful context for how such reports are generated and used in practice.
53Mr. Car testified that the extraction process generates a comprehensive dataset from the device. That process is directed at preserving and capturing available data, subject to known technical limitations. The dataset is then made available to the investigating officer, who accesses it and prepares a report focused on material relevant to the investigation.
54His evidence also assists in clarifying what a Cellebrite extraction is, and what it is not. The software does not create or generate new evidence. Rather, it extracts and organizes data as it exists on the device at the time of examination, subject to the technical limitations described. The resulting material is not a police-authored narrative, nor does it purport to interpret the data. It is a formatted presentation of the underlying digital information, including communications, images, and associated metadata. Questions such as authorship, use, and significance are not resolved by the extraction itself, but must be determined by the trier of fact based on the totality of the evidence.
55Properly understood, the extraction is a preparatory step that creates the underlying dataset. The subsequent report reflects the investigative selection and presentation of material drawn from that dataset. This process serves both to confine the evidence to the scope of the judicial authorization and, as a practical matter, to render it intelligible. A complete raw extraction will often contain vast quantities of data, much of which is irrelevant to the issues at trial. Requiring the entirety of that data to be filed in order to establish authentication would not assist the trier of fact and would risk obscuring, rather than illuminating, the evidentiary issues. The law does not require such an approach.
56This approach is consistent with how courts have treated similar forms of digital evidence. In R. v. Fodor, the court relied on an “Axiom report” that extracted and reproduced the contents of a digital storage device, forming a significant component of the evidentiary record. The report was generated through software designed to analyze and replicate device contents and was treated as documentary evidence for the purposes of trial. Properly understood, such reports are not intended to place the entirety of a device’s raw contents before the court, but rather to present the data in a form capable of meaningful review and adjudication.6
57As the Court of Appeal confirmed in R. v. S.M., reiterating R. v. C.B.,7
At common law, authentication requires the introduction of some evidence that the item is what it purports to be: R. v. Donald, 1958 NBCA 470, [1958] N.B.J. No. 7, 121 C.C.C. 304 (C.A.), at p. 306 C.C.C.; R. v. Staniforth, 1979 ONCA 4477, [1979] O.J. No. 1026, 11 C.R. (3d) 84 (C.A.), at p. 89 C.R.; R. v. Hirsch, [2017] S.J. No. 59, 2017 SKCA 14, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 230, at para. 18. The requirement is not onerous and may be established by either or both direct and circumstantial evidence.
For electronic documents, s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act assigns a party who seeks to admit an electronic document as evidence the burden of proving its authenticity. To meet this burden, the party must adduce evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic document is what it purports to be. Section 31.8 provides an expansive definition of “electronic document”, a term which encompasses devices by or in which data is recorded or stored. Under s. 31.1, as at common law, the threshold to be met is low. When that threshold is satisfied, the electronic document is admissible, and thus available for use by the trier of fact.
58Authentication is a low threshold and, as R. v. S.M., supra, confirms at para. 28, it must not be conflated with the weight ultimately afforded to the evidence. At the same time, courts must be vigilant in assessing the reliability and probative value of electronic evidence, particularly where there are indicators of questionable provenance or integrity.
59As pointed out by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Aslami:
[T]rial judges need to be very careful in how they deal with electronic evidence of this type. There are entirely too many ways for an individual, who is of a mind to do so, to make electronic evidence appear to be something other than what it is. Trial judges need to be rigorous in their evaluation of such evidence, when it is presented, both in terms of its reliability and its probative value. 8
However, the case in R. v. Aslami is fundamentally different from the present circumstances.
60In Aslami, the Crown relied on electronic communications obtained through means that raised significant concerns about their provenance, integrity, and attribution. The incriminating messages were derived from screenshots taken by interested parties using a third‑party application “TextNow”, without any independent verification of the underlying data, its timing, or its source. There was no technical or expert evidence explaining how the application functioned, whether the data could be manipulated, or whether the messages could reliably be attributed to a particular sender.
61These deficiencies were compounded by the absence of any objective indicia of reliability. The messages were not extracted from the device or service provider, but rather reproduced through screenshots. There was no expert or technical evidence addressing the reliability of the application or the possibility of manipulation, nor was there any evidence tying the messages to a particular user beyond the subjective belief of witnesses who had an apparent motive to implicate the accused.
62It was in that context that the Court of Appeal emphasized the “inherent fallibility” of such evidence and cautioned that it must not be accepted at face value without careful scrutiny. The concern in Aslami was not merely that the evidence was incomplete, but that its origin, reliability, and integrity were fundamentally uncertain.
63The present case is of an entirely different character. Here, the data was obtained through a controlled forensic extraction conducted using specialized software by a trained digital forensic examiner. The process was undertaken on specific devices connected to the investigation and was accompanied by documentation of the devices, their condition, photographs, and the steps taken in the extraction process.
64It is true that Mr. Car acknowledged in cross‑examination that certain extractions were partial, including where devices were locked and in a “before first unlock” state. However, those limitations were explained and are inherent to the technical constraints of device security. They do not, without more, give rise to the kinds of foundational concerns identified in Aslami. There is no evidence on this record of data manipulation, fabrication, corruption, or any inability to preserve the data that was in fact extracted.
65Nor does this case involve the use of screenshots, informal reproduction of messages, or reliance on unverified applications. The data is derived directly from the devices themselves and is accompanied by system‑generated information, including timestamps and device‑specific identifiers, situating the material within its source environment.
66The evidence of D/C Cook further supports this conclusion. He testified that the extracted material included photographs of Mr. Davis and other individuals involved in these proceedings, as well as other material identified through the investigative review as relevant. This evidence provides additional contextual linkage between the device and its user, independent of any particular extraction limitation.
67Properly understood, Aslami does not stand for the proposition that limitations in digital extraction undermine admissibility. It stands for the proposition that where the source, integrity, or attribution of electronic evidence is genuinely in doubt, a trial judge must approach such evidence with caution and rigorous scrutiny. Those concerns are not engaged on this record. The issues raised in cross‑examination regarding the scope of extraction go to the completeness of the data and the inferences that may properly be drawn from it. They do not undermine the threshold requirement that the evidence be capable of supporting a finding that it is what it purports to be.
68For all of the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that there is evidence capable of supporting a finding that the devices seized from Mr. Davis, and the data extracted from them, are what they purport to be.
69A similar conclusion follows with respect to the Cellebrite reports derived from the device associated with Ms. A.. Those reports are likewise authenticated through the evidence of D/C Cook, who described the process by which the underlying data was accessed, reviewed, and organized from the forensic extraction. However, unlike the issue of authentication, the use to be made of M.A.’s phone contents engages separate considerations. While these Cellebrite extraction reports are admissible as authenticated electronic documents, the extent to which the contents may be relied upon for the truth of what is asserted within them will depend on the applicable evidentiary rules, including hearsay and any available exceptions.
II. Part II – The Application to Introduce Hearsay Statements of N.T.
70Over the course of the evening of October 25, 2024, N.T. made a series of statements to police, the substantial majority of which were captured on police body worn cameras. Although the recordings are not uninterrupted and involve more than one officer, the interactions themselves occurred in close temporal succession. From the initial contact at the hotel lobby, through her transport by ambulance, and continuing upon arrival at hospital, N.T.’s account unfolded in near continuous fashion. In practical terms, the evidence captures a sequence of events that progresses in real time across locations, rather than a series of discrete or isolated recountings.
71A brief chronology of the statements of N.T. is as follows:
| Time | Recipient / Officer | Exhibit |
|---|---|---|
| approx. 20:01–20:03 | 911 operator | Ex. 51 |
| 20:24–20:36 | Cst. Olabode (hotel lobby and ambulance) | Ex. 4a / 4b |
| 20:56 | Police / medical staff (arrival at hospital) | Officer notes |
| 21:16 | Police / medical staff (triage completed) | Officer notes |
| 22:08:14–22:16 | D/C Cook and Officer Wells (hospital statement) | Ex. 13a |
72All of these statements were made on October 25, 2024 within a confined temporal window beginning shortly after N.T.’s escape from the hotel room and concluding with her video‑recorded statement at hospital later that evening. From the initial 911 call to the hospital recording, the disclosures occurred within approximately two hours and form part of a single unfolding sequence.
73The body worn camera recordings provide more than a record of the words spoken. They capture the timing, sequence, and context of the interactions as they unfolded. While transcripts assist in identifying the content of the statements, they do not fully convey the tone, urgency, or continuity reflected in the recordings themselves. The recordings permit the trier of fact to observe the progression of N.T.’s disclosures in a manner that closely approximates the events as they occurred.
74Throughout her interactions with police and emergency medical personnel, N.T. identified three other individuals as being involved: M.A., H.C., and a man she referred to as “Dre,” later identified as the accused, Andre Davis.
75N.T. told police that a confrontation arose inside a hotel room after Ms. A. accused her of stealing money. N.T. denied the allegation. She stated that the confrontation escalated into a physical assault. She alleged that Ms. A. struck her with glass bottles and that Mr. Davis also participated in the assault, including striking and choking her. She further alleged that when she attempted to leave the room, violence ensued.
76According to N.T., after the assault, Mr. Davis and Ms. A. left the room. She then attempted to flee. She stated that Ms. C. attempted to prevent her from leaving but was unsuccessful. N.T. ultimately escaped and ran to the hotel lobby where she sought assistance.
77CCTV footage from the hotel captured N.T.’s escape from room 408 and her arrival at the front desk. The alleged assault occurred inside the hotel room and was not directly recorded. When police later attended the room, they located an empty Don Julio tequila bottle and observed blood. N.T. was observed to have a significant laceration to her head, documented on body‑worn camera footage in the ambulance and later at hospital.
78As she reported the incidents, N.T. described pain, bleeding, and difficulty breathing. These statements were made while she remained at the hotel and continued during ambulance transport. Despite visible injuries and emotional distress, she was responsive to officers and medical personnel.
79In describing why the assault occurred, N.T. used language indicating that she had been under the control of others and that she was beaten when she attempted to leave. In the 911 transcript, her words are transcribed as stating that she was being “kicked out” of the room. In the statements captured on body worn camera, she used the phrase “pimped out.” The precise wording used in the 911 call, and what those words conveyed, is addressed later in these reasons.
80While at the hospital, N.T. provided a video‑recorded statement in which she described her involvement in the sex trade, the roles of the individuals she identified, the confrontation over money, the assault that followed, and her escape. She continued to deny stealing money and attributed the violence to that accusation.
81As the trial approached, N.T.’s willingness to participate changed. The record reflects increasing reluctance on her part to attend court. The Crown relies on a series of communications, including text messages, said to be relevant to N.T.’s reluctance and to the manner of her testimony. The defence disputes the interpretation and significance of those communications.
82When N.T. testified, she asserted a lack of memory in relation to significant aspects of the events and described factors such as intoxication and mental health affecting her ability to recall them. She did not adopt significant portions of her prior statements.
83The Court declared N.T. first adverse and later hostile, permitting the Crown to cross‑examine her on prior inconsistent statements.
A. The Crown Position: The Principled Approach to Hearsay Necessitates Inclusion of N.T.’s Out-Of-Court Statements
84It is in this context that the Crown seeks to admit N.T.’s prior out‑of‑court statements for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the rule against hearsay. The Crown applies to admit a series of statements, including the following:
(i) a portion of the 911 call made by Mr. Singh on October 25, 2024;
(ii) statements made by N.T. on October 25, 2024 and captured on police body‑worn cameras;
(iii) N.T.’s “KGB” recorded police statement made later that evening on October 25, 2024;
(iv) in‑person statements made by N.T. to Officer Laura Wells during the trial on February 4, 2026;
(v) in‑person statements made by N.T. to D/C Cook on November 17, 2024; and
(vi) text messages sent by N.T. to D/C Cook.
85Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible. The Supreme Court of Canada recently provided the following helpful summary relating to the nature of out-of-court statements in R. v. Saddleback:
[20] Evidence relevant to an issue at trial may nevertheless be inadmissible if it is subject to an exclusionary rule (see R. v. Schneider, 2022 SCC 34, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 619, at para. 36). Among the exclusionary rules is the rule against hearsay (see R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para. 2; R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 157). Hearsay is “an out-of-court statement tendered for the truth of its contents” (R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865, at para. 20; R. v. Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720, at para. 18). It is not defined by “the nature of the evidence per se, but by the use to which the evidence is sought to be put: namely, to prove that what is asserted is true” (Starr, at para. 162). Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible mainly because, without the declarant in court, it is often difficult to assess the truthfulness of the statement (see Khelawon, at paras. 2-3; R. v. Charles, 2024 SCC 29, at para. 43).
[21] However, the rule against hearsay has exceptions. A party seeking to rely on an out-of-court statement for the truth of its contents can attempt to have it admitted under one of the common law categorical exceptions or under the more flexible principled exception (see Charles, at para. 45; Khelawon, at para. 42; D. M. Paciocco, P. Paciocco and L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence (8th ed. 2020), at p. 151). Under the principled exception, hearsay evidence can only be admitted when the party tendering that evidence demonstrates on a balance of probabilities that it is necessary and sufficiently reliable (see Bradshaw, at para. 23). A voir dire on the admissibility of the hearsay evidence is normally held for this purpose (see Schneider, at para. 37).9
86The critical question in this case is whether, notwithstanding the hearsay nature of N.T.’s prior statements, the entirety of the circumstances surrounding their making permits the trier of fact to sufficiently test their truth and accuracy in light of all of the evidence, including N.T.’s recantation at trial.
87As articulated at para. 63 of R. v. Khelawon10:
[63] Another way of fulfilling the reliability requirement is to show that no real concern arises from the fact that the statement is presented in hearsay form because, in the circumstances, its truth and accuracy can nonetheless be sufficiently tested. Recall that the optimal way of testing evidence adopted by our adversarial system is to have the declarant state the evidence in court, under oath, and under the scrutiny of contemporaneous cross-examination. This preferred method is not just a vestige of past traditions. It remains a tried and true method, particularly when credibility issues must be resolved. It is one thing for a person to make a damaging statement about another in a context where it may not really matter. It is quite another for that person to repeat the statement in the course of formal proceedings where he or she must commit to its truth and accuracy, be observed and heard, and be called upon to explain or defend it. The latter situation, in addition to providing an accurate record of what was actually said by the witness, gives us a much higher degree of comfort in the statement’s trustworthiness. However, in some cases it is not possible to put the evidence to the optimal test, but the circumstances are such that the trier of fact will nonetheless be able to sufficiently test its truth and accuracy. Again, common sense tells us that we should not lose the benefit of the evidence when there are adequate substitutes for testing the evidence. 11
88Similarly, in R. v. Bradshaw:
[26] To determine whether a hearsay statement is admissible, the trial judge assesses the statement’s threshold reliability. Threshold reliability is established when the hearsay “is sufficiently reliable to overcome the dangers arising from the difficulty of testing it” (Khelawon, at para. 49). These dangers arise notably due to the absence of contemporaneous cross-examination of the hearsay declarant before the trier of fact (Khelawon, at paras. 35 and 48). In assessing threshold reliability, the trial judge must identify the specific hearsay dangers presented by the statement and consider any means of overcoming them (Khelawon, at paras. 4 and 49; R. v. Hawkins, 1996 SCC 154, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, at para. 75). The dangers relate to the difficulties of assessing the declarant’s perception, memory, narration, or sincerity, and should be defined with precision to permit a realistic evaluation of whether they have been overcome.
[27] The hearsay dangers can be overcome and threshold reliability can be established by showing that (1) there are adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural reliability) or (2) there are sufficient circumstantial or evidentiary guarantees that the statement is inherently trustworthy (substantive reliability) (Khelawon, at paras. 61-63; Youvarajah, at para. 30).12
89Threshold reliability may be established through procedural safeguards that provide an adequate substitute for contemporaneous testing, or through substantive guarantees of trustworthiness, or in limited circumstances, a combination of both.13
90The Crown further submits that procedural reliability alone is sufficient to meet the threshold for admissibility, given that N.T. testified and was subject to cross‑examination on the prior statements. The Crown also submits that the surrounding circumstances and corroborative evidence do not support any reasonably plausible alternative explanation for the statements, and that their truthfulness and accuracy is the most likely explanation on the material points.
B. The Defence Position: Necessity and Threshold Reliability is Not Met Under the Principled Approach
91The defence opposes the admission of the proposed hearsay evidence on two principal bases. First, it submits that the requirement of necessity is not met because N.T. testified at trial and provided an account, thereby rendering the prior statements unnecessary. Second, it submits that the statements lack sufficient indicia of threshold reliability. In particular, the defence argues that:
(i) N.T. did not “hold the truth hostage” within the meaning contemplated by the jurisprudence;
(ii) the circumstances in which the statements were made raise significant concerns relating to perception, memory, and narration, including alleged intoxication, injury, and emotional distress;
(iii) much of the evidence relied upon by the Crown as corroborative is equally, or more, consistent with alternative explanations, including that the alleged assault was committed by another individual and that N.T. was not subject to the control or coercion alleged;
(iv) the proposed corroborative evidence does not meet the standard required by R. v. Bradshaw, as it does not establish that the only likely explanation for the statements is their truthfulness or accuracy on the material points tendered; and
(v) in the alternative, the evidence should be excluded under the court’s residual discretion.
92The defence emphasizes the absence of contemporaneous cross‑examination and the absence of an oath at the time the statements were made. It submits that, in the absence of these safeguards, there is no adequate substitute for contemporaneous testing of the prior statements sufficient to meet the requirements of threshold reliability.
C. Analysis – Necessity
93Necessity is a flexible concept. It may range from cases of death, illness, or incompetence to cases where, although the witness is physically available, little would be gained by insisting on viva voce testimony in court. It may also arise where the witness’s attendance would add little because the witness is unable or unwilling to provide a meaningful account, or where the earlier statement represents the fuller and more complete account of events given closer in time to their occurrence.14
94Unlike the circumstances addressed in R. v. Oloko,15 N.T. testified at trial and was available for observation and cross-examination. The issue is therefore not her physical availability, but whether, in the circumstances of this case, the substance of her prior accounts remained meaningfully available through her viva voce evidence. That question is addressed in the analysis that follows.
95The focus is on whether the content of the prior statement is, in a practical sense, unavailable through the witness’s in‑court testimony. Where a witness recants, necessity may be established because the content of the prior statement is no longer meaningfully available through viva voce testimony.16 This inquiry is not answered merely by pointing to the witness’s physical presence in court.
96I find that, while N.T. testified at trial, her evidence did not provide a meaningful account of the events in issue. She refused to adopt material portions of her prior statements, asserted a lack of memory in relation to matters she had previously described in detail, and did not provide a coherent narrative of the events. In substance, the content of her prior statements was not available through her trial testimony. I find that N.T. was selective and strategic in what she would and would not adopt.
97The availability of cross-examination did not cure this difficulty, as there was no meaningful account to test on the central issues in dispute.
98Although N.T. did testify to certain background or limited matters, that did not make the substance of her prior account meaningfully available on the central issues for which those statements are tendered.
99Prior to testifying, N.T. refused to review her prior statements with the Crown. That refusal provides further context for her subsequent inability or unwillingness to engage with those statements in a meaningful way.
100The circumstances surrounding the execution of the material witness warrant further reinforce this conclusion. The body-worn camera recording captures N.T.’s immediate and sustained refusal to attend court. At the outset, she repeatedly told officers “No, you can’t” and demanded that they remove themselves from her doorway while refusing to comply with their direction that she would be brought to court.17
101Her resistance was not limited to refusal. She made clear that, if compelled to attend, she would not meaningfully participate in the proceedings. She stated, among other things, that when she went “on that stand” she would “make [the officers] look stupid” and that she was “not going up there to talk about the charges that [they] threw on him.” She further asserted that Mr. Davis “shouldn’t even be in there” and that another person was responsible.
102Despite being advised repeatedly of the existence of the witness warrant and that she was required to attend, N.T. continued to refuse, stating “No, I’m not” when told she would be brought to court, and indicating that the possibility of being compelled did not concern her. Her conduct required the attendance of multiple officers and extended interaction before she ultimately agreed to accompany them.
103This interaction demonstrates more than reluctance or discomfort. It reflects a deliberate refusal to attend and, if compelled to attend, an express intention not to provide evidence consistent with her prior statements. In these circumstances, her subsequent viva voce testimony must be understood as arising from a setting in which her participation was secured through compulsion and her willingness to engage with her earlier account was, from the outset, disavowed. The earlier account was therefore, in a practical sense, unavailable through her testimony.
104I am also satisfied that this testimony must be viewed in the broader context of efforts to avoid or minimize her participation. The record includes screenshots of messages sent to N.T. discouraging her attendance at court and directing her to contact Dre’s lawyer, and further records evidence that a woman identified as “Ellie” attended court on the first day of trial. The messages themselves include directions to call “Dre’s lawyer”, assurances that if she “were drunk” when she made the statement she “won’t get in trouble”, and advice to “lay low until Monday” and change her number because “the feds are looking for you”.
105This did not arise for the first time on February 4, 2026. The broader record reflects that, in the period leading up to trial, N.T. became progressively less responsive to police efforts to secure her attendance and indicated that she no longer wished to go through with the matter.
106The record also includes evidence that she reported being contacted by Mr. Davis and others and being offered payment to obtain counsel and refrain from cooperating with police.
107This conclusion is reinforced by further evidence from the transport to court. On the way to the courthouse, N.T. said that had she known a material witness warrant had issued, police would not have found her because she would have changed her phone number, her hotel, and even the city in which she was staying. That evidence is consistent with the broader picture of deliberate avoidance reflected in the warrant execution, the text messages, and her subsequent trial testimony.
108During the proceedings, I observed members of the public attending in courtroom 110 in a manner that closely tracked the timing of messages sent to N.T. Those messages were sent within minutes of developments in court, including when the issue of a material witness warrant arose. This timing occurred in circumstances where D/C Cook’s evidence established that communications were being received by N.T. while events were unfolding. I take this temporal connection into account as part of the surrounding context in assessing whether N.T. was being encouraged to avoid participation and to distance herself from her earlier account.
109Viewed cumulatively, these circumstances support the conclusion that her trial testimony did not fail merely because of reluctance, discomfort, or imperfect memory. Rather, the broader record supports the conclusion that she was being encouraged to avoid participation, to remain unavailable, and, if required to attend, to distance herself from or fail to adopt her earlier statements. Her asserted memory loss was not general; rather, her claimed inability to recall was focused on the involvement of Mr. Davis, while she remained capable of recounting other aspects of the events. I do not rely on this evidence to make any broader finding as to the identity of the sender or to determine any separate issue beyond the present one. I do, however, take it into account as part of the surrounding context in assessing whether N.T.’s viva voce testimony reflected a genuine effort to provide a meaningful account of the events.
110It does not answer the necessity inquiry to say that N.T. offered explanations for why she would not adopt her earlier statements. Even accepting that she advanced such explanations, the result remained that the content of those earlier accounts was not meaningfully available through her viva voce evidence.
111It is in this context that I find her testimony did not reflect a genuine effort to recount the events in issue. Rather, it reflected a refusal to meaningfully engage with the prior account when it implicated Mr. Davis.
112This conclusion is further reinforced by the timing and character of the prior statements. The 911 call, the statements to police at the scene and in the ambulance, and the hospital statement were all made within a tightly confined temporal window beginning shortly after N.T.’s escape and concluding just over two hours later. Those statements constitute the more immediate and complete account of the events. To the extent N.T. later asserted that she was too intoxicated to reliably make those statements, the evidence includes officer observations that she appeared sober, responsive, and coherent during those interactions, and that no concerns were raised about her mental state. I accept that evidence and expand upon it below.
113In these circumstances, the prior statements were, in a practical sense, held hostage and functionally unavailable. The difficulty was not the physical absence of the witness, but the unavailability of the evidence contained in her earlier accounts despite her attendance and testimony. That is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of necessity.
114Accordingly, I am satisfied that the requirement of necessity is met. The prior statements represent the only meaningful account of the events available to the court, notwithstanding N.T.’s physical presence and testimony at trial.
D. Analysis – Reliability
115The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly emphasized that the assessment of threshold reliability must proceed on a functional basis, directed at whether the dangers posed by the hearsay evidence have been sufficiently overcome.18
116In applying this approach, threshold reliability may be established through procedural reliability, substantive reliability, or a combination of both. However, the combined approach must not be used to admit statements where the hearsay dangers remain insufficiently addressed. The inquiry remains focused on whether there is an adequate basis to permit a meaningful evaluation of the truth and accuracy of the statement.19
117It is well established that threshold reliability is distinct from ultimate reliability. The former concerns admissibility. The latter is reserved for the weight to be given to the evidence, should it be admitted into evidence.
1. Analysis – Procedural Reliability
118The defence submits that procedural reliability is not met in this case because:
a) The statements were not taken under oath;
b) They were not subject to contemporaneous cross-examination at the time they were made, and later cross-examination at trial does not provide an adequate substitute;
c) The statements lack sufficient procedural safeguards generally, in that several were non-verbatim, not adopted or confirmed by the declarant, and recorded in circumstances that do not permit meaningful testing of their accuracy; and
d) The declarant, N.T., was intoxicated, injured, and not in a state of mind to reliably provide the statements in question.
119Procedural reliability must be assessed using a functional and flexible approach. No single factor is determinative. Rather, the available safeguards must be considered cumulatively and in light of the particular hearsay dangers raised on the record. Some safeguards will assume greater significance than others depending on the circumstances.20
120The law recognizes a number of traditional safeguards bearing on procedural reliability, including whether the statement was recorded, whether it was made under oath or accompanied by a warning as to the consequences of dishonesty, and whether the circumstances permit meaningful testing of the declarant’s account. Central among these safeguards is the ability to cross-examine the declarant. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that, in some cases, cross-examination of a recanting witness at trial may provide a satisfactory basis for testing the truth and accuracy of the prior statement, as it permits the trier of fact to assess both the prior account and the reasons for any departure from it. However, whether cross-examination provides such a substitute must be assessed in light of the extent to which the witness meaningfully engages with, or adopts, the contents of the prior statement.21
121Where, as is the case here with N.T., the witness at trial denies making or declines to adopt the earlier statement, cross-examination may be of limited value and other safeguards may assume correspondingly greater importance.22 Those safeguards include contemporaneous recording, cautioning, and the quality of the witness’s responsiveness on the recording.
122In the present case, the following factors that enhance procedural reliability were present:
(i) The statements were captured on contemporaneous video recordings, permitting direct observation of demeanour, responsiveness, and functioning;
(ii) The declarant is observed engaging with questions in a coherent and focused manner;
(iii) The questioning is largely open ended and non-suggestive;
(iv) The statements are detailed, structured, and coherent;
(v) The account is provided across multiple interactions in close temporal proximity to the events.
(vi) In relation to the video-recorded statement provided to Detective Constable Cook at hospital on October 25, 2024, the statement was not given under oath. However, it was preceded by a signed “KGB” caution.23 N.T. was advised that the statement would be recorded, that it was important to be truthful and accurate, that she should not guess, and that providing false or misleading information could attract criminal consequences. She indicated that she understood these instructions and signed the caution. While not equivalent to an oath, this provides a meaningful procedural safeguard in the circumstances; and
(vii) Most significantly, N.T. testified at trial and was subject to extensive cross-examination. This provided the defence with an opportunity to probe the prior statements, including the circumstances in which they were made and the factors bearing on perception, memory, narration, and sincerity. While her failure to adopt significant portions of those statements limited the extent to which that cross-examination could test their truth directly, it nonetheless provided a basis to assess her prior account in light of her trial evidence and her explanations for departing from it. In the circumstances of this case, and when considered together with the contemporaneous recordings and other procedural safeguards, I am satisfied that the prior statements were subject to a sufficiently meaningful form of testing to meet the requirements of procedural reliability.
2. Defence Concerns Relating to Perception, Memory, and Narration
123The defence submits that the circumstances in which N.T.’s prior statements were made give rise to significant concerns regarding perception, memory, and narration, relying in particular on alleged intoxication, physical injury, and emotional distress.
124It is undisputed that N.T. had sustained visible injuries and was in an emotional state following the events. The question at this stage is whether those factors raise concerns about her ability to perceive, recall, or describe what had occurred that are not sufficiently addressed by the available procedural safeguards. The contemporaneous recordings and the testimony of multiple officers who interacted with her demonstrate that she was responsive, coherent, and capable of providing a detailed account. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the potential concerns relating to perception, memory, and narration are sufficiently addressed for the purpose of threshold reliability.
125This conclusion is reinforced by my own observations of the body-worn camera recordings. During her movement from the hotel to the ambulance, N.T. is seen walking in high heels at a steady pace, maintaining her balance, and navigating her surroundings without apparent difficulty. She avoids obstacles, adjusts her path as required, and moves in a coordinated and purposeful manner. These observations are inconsistent with a level of intoxication or impairment that would materially affect her perception or functioning.
126Most significantly, her statements were not vague, fragmentary, or confused. They were detailed and structured, and contained a level of specificity inconsistent with an inability to perceive or narrate events reliably. She identified the individuals involved, distinguished between their respective roles, and described the sequence of events in a manner that was internally coherent and appropriately tethered to the timing reflected in the CCTV footage.
127The manner in which the account was provided is also relevant. Much of the information was volunteered in response to open-ended questioning, without suggestion or leading. The evidence does not disclose any attempt by investigators to shape or direct her narrative. Rather, she provided a continuous and evolving account across multiple interactions, including at the hotel, in the ambulance, and later at hospital. That continuity weighs against the suggestion that her narration was compromised.
128To the extent the defence relies on alcohol consumption or possible impairment, the question at this stage is whether those factors raise concerns about perception, memory, or narration that are not sufficiently addressed by the available safeguards. None of the officers who interacted with her observed indicia suggesting that she was unable to understand or respond appropriately. While she was upset and in pain, she remained communicative and oriented. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that any concerns arising from possible impairment are sufficiently addressed for the purpose of threshold reliability.
129Similarly, the fact of injury and emotional distress does not, without more, diminish reliability. Statements made in close temporal proximity to a traumatic event may, in some circumstances, bear indicia of reliability. In this case, the immediacy, detail, and continuity of her account weigh against the suggestion that her perception or narration was compromised.
130It is also notable that several aspects of her account are consistent with other evidence, including video recordings and physical observations at the scene. While consistency with other evidence is more commonly examined in relation to substantive reliability, I take it into account here in the limited sense that it assists in evaluating whether the specific defence concerns about perception, memory, and narration are sufficiently overcome by the available procedural safeguards and the surrounding circumstances. For example, if N.T. was as intoxicated or incapable of perception as she later asserted, it would be difficult to reconcile that level of impairment with the degree of detail and sequencing reflected in her account. I do not rely on this to determine the ultimate truth of the statements, but only to assess whether the defence concerns regarding perception and narration are sufficiently addressed at the threshold stage.
131In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the defence concerns relating to intoxication, injury, and emotional state do not undermine the threshold reliability of N.T.’s prior statements. Those considerations may bear on ultimate reliability and weight, but they do not justify exclusion at the admissibility stage.
3. Hearsay statements and communications lacking sufficient procedural reliability
132Outside of the statements made on October 25, 2024, there are several statements that the Crown seeks to admit that fall short of many of the reliability safeguards ordinarily expected at the threshold stage as it relates to procedural reliability. Those statements are of a materially different character from the audio and video‑recorded statements obtained on October 25, 2024.
133They consist of later in‑person utterances and text‑based communications. Many were not recorded verbatim, were not adopted or confirmed by the declarant, were not made under oath or subject to any comparable caution, and were not captured on any contemporaneous audio or video recording. These features significantly limit the extent to which the trier of fact can meaningfully assess the circumstances in which the statements were made or the reliability of their contents.
134In particular, the Crown seeks to admit an alleged utterance made by N.T. to Officer Cook on November 17, 2024, when police attended her hotel room to serve a subpoena, namely that “Dre reached out to her saying that the charges would be dropped soon.” It also seeks to admit an alleged utterance made by N.T. to Officer Laura Wells at the courthouse on February 4, 2026, at approximately 4:30 p.m., namely that “Dre was probably the best she ever had and her latest pimp was the second best.” As reflected in the Crown factum, these utterances were recorded in officers’ notes rather than through any contemporaneous audio or video process. They are not verbatim accounts, were not reviewed or adopted by N.T., and were not made under oath or subject to any caution comparable to the “KGB” warning given on October 25, 2024.
135The Crown also seeks to admit text‑based communications said to have been sent by N.T. to Officer Cook. These include:
- texts on November 2, 2024 in which N.T. did not recognize a photo and sent photographs of a black Audi SUV;
- texts on November 3, 2024 in which she sent a photograph of her middle finger and Andre Davis, another similar photo with a Snapchat filter, and said that she did not know Dre’s Snapchat handle;
- texts on November 5, 2024 in which she said that both H. and Dre were contacting her through Instagram, that “H” had provided her with his number, and that they had said they would pay a lawyer for her to drop the charges and pay her not to speak to police; and
- a text on November 8, 2024 saying that H had changed her ad to “Paris” and attaching a screenshot of that ad.
Although those communications are specific in content, they still do not carry the same procedural safeguards as the October 25, 2024 statements.
136Although N.T. was cross-examined on these alleged utterances, the absence of any contemporaneous recording significantly limits the effectiveness of that safeguard. The precision of the declarant’s words is important. Recorded statements permit the trier of fact to assess the exact wording, tone, and context in which statements were made. By contrast, the statements attributed to N.T. in the officers’ notes are paraphrased and not verbatim. They were not reviewed or adopted by N.T. As a result, cross-examination proceeded on the basis of an officer’s characterization of what was said, rather than the declarant’s actual words. This does not provide a comparable procedural substitute to the protections available in the recorded statements of October 25, 2024.
137The text messages raise distinct concerns. Although they preserve wording in a more direct sense, the surrounding circumstances in which they were created are not clearly established on the record. In particular, the record does not permit a reliable determination of whether the messages were authored exclusively by N.T., the extent to which they reflect her unassisted communications, or the conditions under which they were composed. Nor is there a sufficient evidentiary foundation to assess whether factors such as intoxication or impairment, addressed above in relation to October 25, 2024, were present at the time.
138While I accept that the officers who recorded their interactions with N.T. did so with the intention of capturing her statements accurately, this was not a case of contemporaneous audio or video recording capable of preserving the precise words used, or the tone, context, and circumstances in which they were expressed. The statements were unsworn and were not subject to any form of contemporaneous verification or adoption by N.T. The record also provides limited objective information about the circumstances in which they were made, such that the trier of fact cannot reliably assess the conditions bearing on their accuracy.
139In these circumstances, the November 2024 text messages do not provide sufficient procedural reliability to permit a meaningful assessment of reliability comparable to the contemporaneously recorded audio and video evidence. The ability to cross-examine N.T. on these issues did not mitigate these concerns.
4. Conclusion on procedural reliability:
140Taken together, these features provide the trier of fact with a sufficient basis to meaningfully evaluate the truth and accuracy of all N.T.’s statements made on October 25, 2024, notwithstanding their hearsay form.
141However, the statements attributed to N.T. outside of that time, namely those dated November 17, 2024 and February 4, 2026, do not attract comparable procedural safeguards. In the absence of contemporaneous recording, verbatim capture, adoption, or any meaningful basis upon which to assess the circumstances in which those statements were made, I am not satisfied that procedural reliability has been established in relation to them. Accordingly, if those statements are to be admitted for their truth, their admissibility must be assessed under the framework for substantive reliability.
E. Analysis – Substantive Reliability
142Where hearsay has been admitted on the basis of procedural reliability, it is not necessary to establish substantive reliability for hearsay to be admissible.24 Threshold reliability may be satisfied through procedural reliability alone, and no further analysis is required in such cases.
143However, for completeness, and in order to assess those statements that do not meet the threshold for procedural reliability, I turn to consider whether those statements are admissible on the basis of substantive reliability.
1. The 911 call and “pimped” vs. “kicked”
144Before turning to the broader analysis of substantive reliability, I first address the 911 call.
145The statement arises in circumstances long recognized as falling within a traditional exception to the hearsay rule, often described as res gestae or a spontaneous utterance. Its admissibility turns on whether the circumstances in which it was made provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.25
146The chronology of events demonstrates that the 911 call was made in immediate temporal proximity to the events in issue. Surveillance footage establishes that M.A. exited room 408 at 20:05:21 and Andre Davis at 20:05:41. N.T. is then seen fleeing the room at 20:06:22 and arriving at the front desk at approximately 20:07:04.
147The 911 call was initiated by the front desk receptionist at 20:07:13, approximately nine seconds after N.T.’s arrival. This timing constitutes an immediate response to an unfolding situation, with no meaningful opportunity for reflection, reconstruction, or fabrication.
148During the call, N.T. is described as crying and distressed, and she speaks directly with the dispatcher shortly after the call is connected. She is observed on the CCTV pacing at the front desk, appearing agitated and highly alert to her surroundings. The statement that she was being “pimped out” is therefore made in circumstances of acute stress and in direct temporal continuity with her flight from the room.
149While N.T. does not say much during the 911 call, she makes a critical utterance. That utterance was erroneously transcribed in Exhibit 51. I find as a matter of fact that, during the 911 call made from the Holiday Inn on October 25, 2024, N.T. stated that she was being “pimped out” of the room, not “kicked out” as reflected in the transcript.
150The CCTV evidence assists in interpreting that utterance. It depicts N.T. attempting to exit the room while Ms. C. appears to impede her departure. That sequence is difficult to reconcile with a description of N.T. being “kicked out” of the room and is more consistent with the language used in the 911 call. I rely on the CCTV only for this limited purpose, namely to assist in interpreting the words said, and not for the truth of the underlying allegation.
151The CCTV does not support a description of N.T. being “kicked out” of the room. Rather, it depicts Ms. C. attempting to restrain her departure, followed by Ms. A. and Mr. Davis leaving the hotel shortly thereafter. While N.T. is observed with certain belongings, which may be said to be consistent with her leaving the room, that fact alone does not account for the apparent effort to prevent her departure.
152The CCTV also does not account for the absence of N.T.’s phone when she exits. In her contemporaneous statements to police, N.T. said, “They have two of my – three of my phones”, “I need my phone”, and “Can someone at least get my phones before I go?” When asked whether she wanted to call anyone, she replied that she did not know numbers. These utterances are significant. They are contemporaneous, specific, and consistent with a situation in which she fled without her phones and wanted police assistance in recovering them. They also assist in understanding the surrounding circumstances in which the 911 utterance was made and in evaluating the coherence and immediacy of her account at the time.
153Other recorded interactions occurring in close temporal proximity assist in interpreting the word used, as they reflect the language employed by N.T. within the same unfolding sequence. In particular, on Officer Ahn’s body‑worn camera, in response to the question “what’s going on?”, N.T. states: “I was being pimped out and then because I wanted to leave, I got beat up.” The surveillance footage similarly provides context to the nature of her departure from the room. I rely on this evidence only for this limited interpretive purpose, and not for the truth of the underlying allegations or as prior consistent statements.
154I therefore find that the audio recording accurately captures N.T. stating that she was being “pimped out” of the room. This finding is confined to what was said and heard on the recording, and to the accuracy of the transcription. It does not determine the truth of the underlying allegation or its legal characterization, which must be assessed on the totality of the evidence.
155I further find that this utterance falls within the traditional res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and is admissible on that basis.
2. Corroborative Factors Relating to Material Aspects of the Statements: the “Bradshaw” Analysis
156I turn now to consider whether there are additional guarantees of reliability arising from evidence independent of the statements themselves.
157To the extent that aspects of N.T.’s statements are tendered for their truth, the analysis must focus on whether there is evidence capable of addressing the hearsay dangers associated with those aspects, in accordance with R. v. Bradshaw. This requires a careful and limited use of corroborative evidence, directed at whether it meaningfully reduces the risk of error in relation to the material issues in dispute. In this regard, the inquiry is whether the corroborative evidence is capable of supporting the conclusion that the only likely explanation for the hearsay statement is its truthfulness or accuracy on the material points, and not whether alternative explanations are conceivable.26
158At the outset, it is important to frame the task in its proper terms. While the defence has identified numerous specific alleged inconsistencies and individual statements, the focus of this analysis is on the material issues raised by the evidentiary record, not on a granular or atomized assessment of each individual factual assertion.27
159In applying this framework, it is necessary to identify, with some precision, the material aspects of the hearsay statements that are tendered for their truth. The analysis that follows is directed to those aspects of the evidence that bear directly on the issues in dispute and to which the hearsay dangers meaningfully attach.
160For the purposes of this analysis, the material aspects of the statements are as follows:
- The presence and identity of Mr. Davis in room 408 at the relevant time;
- His alleged participation in assaultive conduct toward N.T.;
- The nature of the relationship between Mr. Davis and N.T., including whether Mr. Davis exercised control, direction, or influence over her activities in the sex trade, her communications and advertisements, her movements, and the receipt or retention of proceeds arising from the provision of sexual services;
- The sequence of events leading to N.T.’s attempted departure and escape from the room;
- The source and general nature of the injuries described by N.T.
161The later statements sought to be admitted do not engage all of the material aspects identified above. Rather, they are directed more narrowly to issues relating to the nature of the relationship between N.T. and Mr. Davis and, in some instances, to contextual or background matters. In addition, as set out above, those statements lack the procedural safeguards present on October 25, 2024, and their admissibility must therefore be assessed, where applicable, under the framework for substantive reliability and with reference to those limited purposes.
162The question is whether the evidence, considered in its full context, is sufficiently reliable on those material aspects that matter to the determination before the Court.
163This approach reflects the functional nature of the inquiry. Reliability is not established or refuted by isolating each detail and testing it in a vacuum. Rather, the examination is based upon the combined features of the evidence, including the surrounding circumstances and any corroboration tied to the material points in issue, to determine whether they permit a reasoned assessment of its truth or accuracy.
164In that sense, the analysis proceeds holistically. It requires identifying the material propositions the evidence is tendered to prove, and then assessing whether, on the totality of the record, those propositions are established to the requisite threshold. While peripheral inconsistencies or inaccuracies do not, without more, determine the issue, they may carry significant weight where they undermine features that would be expected if the account were accurate. Conversely, the presence of multiple consistencies, standing alone, is of more limited value unless it is tethered to the material aspects in issue and capable of addressing the specific hearsay dangers identified.
165This is the lens through which the evidence in this case will be evaluated.
166Outside of the 911 call already addressed above, I will group the remaining statements into those made on October 25, 2024 and those made thereafter, for which procedural reliability has not been established.
(a) The October 25, 2024 statements
167In this case, the characterization of the October 25, 2024 statements as multiple discrete statements is, for practical purposes, artificial. The statements were made in a largely continuous and uninterrupted sequence over a relatively brief period of time.
168From the 911 call to the completion of the hospital statement, the total duration is just over two hours, notwithstanding that there are, technically, multiple statements: the initial 911 call, the interaction with Police Constable Olabode at the scene and in the ambulance, the subsequent interaction with him at the hospital, and the video‑recorded statement to Detective Constable Cook.
(i) Corroborative factor #1 - The presence and identity of Mr. Davis, H.C., and M.A.
169A material aspect of the statements tendered for their truth is the presence and involvement of Mr. Davis, H.C., and M.A. in room 408 at the relevant time. While the identity of these individuals in the surveillance footage is conceded by the defence, that concession does not eliminate the need to assess how the surrounding evidence bears on the overall substantive reliability of N.T.’s account. The question remains whether independent evidence meaningfully corresponds with the material aspects of that account in a manner that addresses the relevant hearsay dangers.
170N.T.’s 911 call provides limited detail regarding identity and sequence. It does, however, situate the events in room 408 and places her in immediate temporal proximity to that location. It also reflects that, upon arrival in the lobby, she remained engaged with a female connected to that room. While the call does not describe the sequence of departures or identify all individuals, it situates the relevant persons and location within a continuous and unfolding sequence.
171Within minutes of that call, Police Constable Olabode arrived at the hotel reception at approximately 20:23:50 and spoke to N.T. immediately thereafter. Her statement at that time was therefore made in close temporal proximity to both her exit from room 408 and the events captured on the surveillance footage.
172In that interaction, N.T. identified a male known to her as “Dre,” along with H.C. and M.A., as being present in room 408 immediately prior to her departure. She confirmed that she had been inside the room with these individuals and that the events she described had occurred there.
173The surveillance footage provides independent and objective evidence of the movements immediately surrounding N.T.’s departure from room 408. It depicts M.A. exiting the room first (20:05:22), followed shortly thereafter by Mr. Davis (20:05:42). N.T. is then seen exiting moments later, with H.C. immediately behind her in close proximity (20:06:26). These movements occur within a tightly compressed timeframe from the same location.
174To the extent the surveillance footage is capable of doing so, certain aspects of N.T.’s account relating to her attempt to leave the room and her interaction with others correspond with the movements captured on the video. By way of example, she described the sequence of events leading to her departure as follows:
[Sequence of timing of M.A. and Andre Davis leaving 408]:
“And then Barbie, she would like grab me, and she had her knees literally on my back. These are from being like this (demonstrates) and having her on my back with her knees on my back, just punching, punching, punching, punching, kicking. Like I had her come up behind me between my legs and kick me all up here (indicates chest), so that’s why I have pain, like I got pain right here (indicates chest).
And then I tried to hide in the bathroom. They slammed the door open, started coming in with two bottles at a time, just bottling me. And I have a big cut here (indicates head), like a goose egg right here (indicates head) or something.
And yeah, they started arguing again with each other, Dre and Barbie. So Barbie dipped, went back to her room, and she was like if you’re coming, then come. And he followed behind her and told H not to let me leave.” (EX13a, p.19)
[Altercation with H.]:
“Yeah, if you watch the footage back, you'l see her trying to like drag me back in and chase me out the hallways, like stuff like that. Like I had to throw my bags. I tossed myself. And yeah, that's how I got out of there. […] H was standing in front of the door. I picked up my bags, so I grabbed them. I was trying to be-, I was like H, you're not-, you're, you're not stopping me. I'm sorry. I will beat you if I have to. You are not stopping me. She's like no, I have to. Like you're gonna get me and beat and beat and beat. I was like girl, I don't give a fuck. You just watch me get beat. I'm a watch-, like you can get beat too or you can just leave with me. Like what the fuck?” [..] No, but she still fought with me. Like she chased me to the elevator. She was going like this in front of the elevator (demonstrates). Just like no, no, no, no, no, not like-, and then so I ran down the stairs. (EX13a, p.20)
175This evidence aligns with N.T.’s account of who was present in the room and the order in which individuals departed, namely M.A., followed by the individual she knew as “Dre,” and then H.C., who she described as attempting to restrain her. Her identification of those present is reflected in the footage showing the same individuals emerging from that room in succession, and her description of events culminating in her departure is consistent with the sequence recorded on the footage, including her use of the stairs and her arrival at the front desk. I rely on this correspondence only to the extent that it bears on the specific material aspects of presence, location, and sequence, and not as proof of the underlying allegations.
176This sequence of departures is addressed further below in the context of the statements where N.T. describes the roles of the individuals in the events leading up to her exit and the order in which they left the room after allegedly assaulting her and how.
177In addition, N.T.’s description of difficulty leaving the room finds objective context in the surveillance evidence. The footage shows H.C. immediately behind her at the point of exit, in close physical proximity and in interaction with her as she leaves. I rely on this evidence only to the extent that it corresponds with that aspect of her account, and not as proof of the underlying allegation.
178The temporal proximity between the events captured on the surveillance footage and N.T.’s statements further supports this correspondence. Her account was provided shortly after the sequence depicted on the footage and reflects the same individuals, location, and sequence of movement from the room.
179This account is repeated and elaborated upon in N.T.’s video recorded statement at hospital, given within approximately two hours of the initial 911 call. In that statement, she again identifies the same individuals, situates the events in room 408, and describes a sequence culminating in her departure after encountering difficulty in leaving. While that statement provides additional detail, its significance lies in maintaining the same structure of presence, location, and sequence described at the earlier stages.
180The continuity of these statements, when viewed in light of the independently recorded surveillance footage, supports the conclusion that the structure of the events described by N.T. corresponds with the movements of the individuals captured on video. The statements were made within a confined temporal window beginning shortly after her departure and continuing over approximately two hours. During that period, her account of the individuals present, the location of the events, and the sequence of departure remains materially consistent and aligned with the surveillance evidence.
181Another corroborative detail provided by N.T. to Cst. Olabode in her first statement (and repeated in subsequent statements) is the type of vehicle that “Dre” was driving, namely a black Audi SUV. Mr. Davis is arriving to the hotel in a black Audi SUV as described at 18:22:29, and then seen leaving the hotel at 20:08:47 on an outside parking lot surveillance camera into the same vehicle:
182While the identity of Mr. Davis is not in dispute, a formal admission was not made in relation to this specific sequence of CCTV footage. For clarity, I find as a fact that it was Mr. Davis depicted in these moments, and in the related movements captured on the surveillance footage that evening. This conclusion is supported by his description, distinctive clothing, gait, headwear, and the timing of the events, as well as the continuous sequence showing his departure from room 408, followed by his exit through the back entrance and return to the black Audi SUV in which he had earlier arrived.
183Taken together, the 911 call, the statement to police at the scene, and the hospital statement, when considered alongside the surveillance footage, provide confirmatory correspondence in relation to the presence of the identified individuals in room 408, the location of the events, and the sequence in which those individuals exited the room. This evidence does not establish the truth of the allegations described by N.T. However, it demonstrates that the material aspects of her account relating to presence, location, and sequence unfold in a manner that corresponds with the independently recorded surveillance evidence, and in that way supports the substantive reliability of those aspects of her statements.
(ii) Corroborative factor #2 – the injuries described by N.T.
184A further material aspect of the statements tendered for their truth is the nature, timing, and general source of the injuries described by N.T. Her account also attributes specific acts of violence to identified individuals and situates those injuries within the events said to have occurred in room 408 and immediately thereafter.
185In her initial body worn camera statement, N.T. described both the fact of injury and the persons she said caused it. She said: “he got her to hit me with bottle … this is from him (indicates)” and then, separately, “She was hitting me, he hit me too.” She also said, “He like choked me to the point that I couldn’t breathe almost.” In the same interaction, she distinguished between participants, stating that she was being held back by H.C., but later made clear in the subsequent recorded interaction: “No it’s just M. … H. never hit me.”
186In the later hospital interaction recorded on Officer Olabode’s body worn camera and the Axon phone video, N.T. again described the injuries in more specific terms and continued to differentiate who she said did what. When asked what Dre did, she replied: “Oh Dre? He did all this (points out injuries).” She then said, “He grabbed my throat,” and described him as having “picked me up off the ground by my head and tossed me down.” She added that “Dre came in again, started like choking me out,” and later stated, “this is him (indicates).” At the same time, she was equally specific about M.A.’s role, saying, “Yeah this is all M.. This is all M. now,” and then adding: “I know that for a fact. But the rest … M. was hitting me here (indicates) and the back … and my back a lot.”
187These descriptions are significant not because they prove the truth of the allegations, but because they are detailed and differentiated. N.T. did not make a generalized allegation that everyone present assaulted her. Rather, she separated the alleged conduct of Mr. Davis, M.A., and H.C.. In particular, she stated that H.C. “never hit me,” while attributing bottle strikes largely to M.A. and attributing choking and certain other injuries to Mr. Davis.
188Independent evidence establishes that N.T. was visibly injured shortly after the events. Photographs were taken of her injuries, and multiple officers who interacted with her observed those injuries at the scene and in the course of her transport and hospital attendance. The significance of that evidence, for present purposes, is that it confirms the objective presence of recent injuries at the very time N.T. was describing them.
189Importantly, as N.T. described the cause, nature, and source of her injuries, she was observed on body worn camera identifying those injuries in real time. The injuries she pointed to correspond with the areas she described as having been injured. This correspondence supports the reliability of her account in relation to the fact and general nature of the injuries.
190I remain mindful of the caution in R. v. Charles28 that corroborative evidence must be connected to the specific material aspect sought to be proved, and that it is not sufficient if it merely supports the declarant’s general credibility or one party’s theory of the case.29 In this case, the objective evidence does not, by itself, establish which specific blow was struck by which person. I therefore do not rely on the observed injuries or the surveillance footage as independently proving the precise allocation of responsibility for each injury.
191That said, the transcripts show that N.T. repeatedly differentiated among the roles of the three individuals in room 408. She did not make a vague or undifferentiated allegation that all three assaulted her in the same way.
192On body worn camera, N.T. said:
“She was hitting me, he hit me too”, and then clarified: “No, M. was hitting me, uh, H. was just trying to keep me hostage in the room.”
In the later recorded statement, she said:
“H. never hit me”, “Oh, Dre? He did all this”, “He grabbed my throat”, “Dre came in again, started like choking me out”, “Yeah, this is all M.”, and “I know that for a fact. But the rest … M. was hitting me here … and the back.”
193These were not vague or undifferentiated allegations. They described a sequence in which both Andre Davis and M.A. were involved, but in different ways, while H.C.’s role was described as restraining or preventing her departure rather than striking her. 30
194The photographic and observed injuries provide objective confirmation that N.T. had, in fact, sustained recent injuries of the kind she was describing. On body worn camera, she referred to having been struck with bottles and pointed to visible injuries, saying: “I have a big bruise like right here, and right here.” In the later recorded statement, she said that M. had her knees “literally on my back”, that she had been “punching, punching, punching, punching, kicking”, and that she had “a big cut here … big cut-, like goose egg right here.” These aspects of her account align with the objective evidence that she was visibly injured shortly after the events. I rely on this correspondence only to the extent that it bears on the material aspect of whether she sustained injuries of the general kind described, and not as proof of who caused each injury.
195The same is true of her description of being choked. On body worn camera, she said: “It’s him” and “He like choked me to the point that I couldn’t breathe almost.” In the later recorded statement, she said that Dre “chocked me and like pretty much only had me like almost breathless” and later again that he was “grabbing me by my throat.” Those descriptions correspond with the contemporaneous observations of marks to her neck recorded during her interaction with paramedics, including the observation that there were “quite a few marks on the neck there.”
196The surveillance evidence also corresponds with the sequence described by N.T. in the transcripts. In her recorded statements, she describes M.A. as initiating the physical confrontation and then stopping, stating in substance that M. “grabbed [her] by [the] hair” and then “stopped” saying “I can’t do this anymore.” She then describes Andre Davis entering the room and escalating the violence, including grabbing her throat, directing that she be “bottle[d]”, and himself engaging in choking and other assaultive conduct. She further describes a sequence in which M.A. left first, followed shortly thereafter by Andre Davis, who instructed H.C. to “not let her leave,” with H.C. remaining behind and attempting to prevent her departure.
197This sequence is reflected in the surveillance footage, which shows the same individuals exiting room 408 in that order and places H.C. in close proximity to N.T. as she attempts to leave. In that limited sense, the surveillance evidence corresponds with, and supports the reliability of, the material aspects of N.T.’s account relating to identity, presence, and sequence. I do not rely on it as independent proof of the precise allocation of responsibility for each individual injury.
198The temporal proximity of the statements is also significant. While this consideration overlaps with procedural reliability, it bears directly on substantive reliability. N.T.’s descriptions of being struck, choked, and injured were made in real time and captured on body worn cameras, beginning within minutes of her departure from room 408 and continuing over approximately two hours. This continuity reduces the risk of after the fact reconstruction and supports the reliability of those aspects of her statements relating to the fact and general nature of the assaults.
199I rely on this correspondence only to that limited extent. It does not determine the truth of each allegation or establish who caused each injury. It does, however, provide independent confirmation that N.T.’s account of having sustained recent injuries, and her differentiated description of who did and did not inflict them, was grounded in an objectively verifiable reality observed shortly after the events. In that sense, it contributes to the substantive reliability of her October 25, 2024 statements.
(iii) Corroborative factor #3 – “pimped out” of Room 408 by “Dre” and the nature of the relation
200The material aspects of N.T.’s October 25, 2024 recorded statements, and in particular the later video statement provided to Detective Constables Cook and Wells following the administration of a KGB caution (Exhibit 13a), include the existence of a working relationship within the sex trade, the manner in which she says she was recruited, and the degree of control she describes as being exercised over her activities, communications, and earnings. The question is whether independent evidence corresponds with those aspects in a manner that addresses the relevant hearsay dangers.
201In her October 25, 2024 statements to police, N.T. described a relationship with the individual she identified as “Dre” in which he exercised a significant degree of control over her activities in the sex trade. She stated that he created and managed her online advertisements, initially communicated with clients on her behalf, and later instructed her how to do so herself. She further stated that he attended to collect the proceeds of her work at the end of the night.
202N.T. also described limits placed on her independence within that relationship. She said that when she expressed a desire to leave, she was told she was “not going home anytime soon,” and that aspects of her work and associations were being directed. She also recounted prior instances of violence and degrading treatment. Taken together, these statements describe a relationship in which N.T. said that Mr. Davis recruited her, directed aspects of her work, and exercised control over both her earnings and her movements.
203As it relates to recruitment, N.T. described the following interactions with the individual she identified as “Dre”, including, but not limited to:
- He told her he could “put [her] in designer” and asked her to “come be with [him]” (EX13a, p. 7).
- He asked what she knew about “escorting” and “stripping” (EX13a, p. 8).
- She described being introduced to other women associated with him who “taught [her] a whole bunch of stuff” and “got [her] in the game” (EX13a, p. 8).
204In relation to control and direction of work in the sex trade:
- “He made my ad right in front of me.” (EX13a, p.37)
- “At first, it was him … then like he started to like show me how to talk to them.” (EX13a, p.37)
- “He runs my ad and everything.” (EX13a, p.37)
- [Communicating with clients] “At first, it was him, and then like he started to like show me how to talk to them.” (EX13a, p.37)
205In relation to financial control and collection of sex trade proceeds:
- “He’d come and collect it [the money] at the end of the night.” (EX13a, p.38)
- “Whenever we had like big stacks of money, he’d come, take it.” (EX13a, p.10)
- Described access to her bank accounts (EX13a, p.39)
- “He just takes it all… All of it. Every single last little dime I have.” (EX13a, p.41)
206In relation to control over movement and autonomy:
- “Like so I felt uncomfortable, and I brought it up to him. I'm like I wanna go home. He's like are you fucking retarded? You're not going home anytime soon. And then, yeah, it's like he would always like start talking-, ever since then he'd talk down on me. Like I, I was like some dumb bitch or like something like that. “I was like I wanna go home “He’s like … you’re not going home anytime soon.” (EX13a, p.10)
- And I was like that's insane. So I brought it up, and I told him like I'm ready to cut. And like all this and then he was like no, you're not cutting, you're not cutting.” (Ex13a, p.11)
207In relation to control over digital presence and identity as a sex worker:
- “He has access to everything.” (EX13a, p.38-39)
- N.T. described providing passwords and being required to remove or change access to her accounts. (EX13a, p.39)
- “He runs my ad and everything.” (EX13a, p.27)
208These descriptions were provided in close temporal proximity to the events of October 25, 2024 and form part of a continuous sequence of statements repeated in substance across her recorded statements. While not determinative of the truth of each assertion, they articulate the material features of the relationship as described by N.T. and provide the context within which the specific allegations relating to the events in room 408 are to be assessed.
209It is worth noting that in this assessment of threshold reliability, I am not placing weight on the mere repetition of similar assertions across different statements as a basis for enhancing the reliability of N.T.’s account. This is not a case in which multiple discrete statements are artificially stacked and their consistencies used to buttress one another. Rather, the statements form part of a largely continuous and evolving narrative given over a relatively short period of time, in response to unfolding events and the questions posed to her.
210In that sense, the significance of the evidence does not lie in repetition for its own sake. Instead, it lies in the absence of material inconsistency within that continuum on the issues that matter to the determination before the Court. While such consistency may be expected where an account reflects actual events, it does not, on its own, establish substantive reliability. Rather, it forms part of the overall context, which must be considered alongside independent evidence addressing the material aspects in issue in assessing whether the hearsay dangers have been sufficiently addressed.
211In this context, I now turn to the independent evidence, including the contents of the phones seized from Mr. Davis and the associated digital records, to assess whether those sources correspond with the material aspects of the relationship described above.
(iv) Corroborative factor #4 – the phones and contents via Cellebrite reports
N.T.: Dre had “two different phones” a personal and a “trap phone”
212She said that Mr. Davis had “two different phones,” describing one as a “thick 15 pro black” that was his personal phone and the other as “a smaller iPhone 7” or “eight or seven” that was his “trap phone.” She explained the functional distinction between them, stating that he would “post the ads off the trap … ’cause it’s a cheaper phone, doesn’t matter if you lose it,” that “he has a Snapchat and everything on it,” and that “he doesn’t put it on his main.”
213As previously noted, the phones seized from Mr. Davis upon his arrest included both a larger and a smaller device, namely an iPhone 15 Pro Max and an iPhone SE (2nd generation), as reflected in the photographic exhibits below.
iPhone SE (2nd generation)
iPhone 15 Pro Max
214The physical description of the phones corresponds with those identified above. In addition, that level of detail aligns in a focused way with the extraction evidence from a seized phone containing a large volume of photographs of N.T. apparently intended for online sex trade advertisements, including suggestive lingerie photographs and platform style authentication placards, together with other digital material consistent with account-based advertising activity. In that limited sense, the extraction evidence corresponds with N.T.’s account that Mr. Davis used a separate “work” or “trap” phone for that purpose.
215I do not rely on this evidence as proof of propensity or prior discreditable conduct. Rather, I rely on it only to the extent that it provides objective corroborative evidence relevant under the Bradshaw analysis to the specific manner in which N.T. described the system operating, namely that Mr. Davis maintained and used a separate, cheaper phone to create and manage online advertising connected to her sex trade activity. In that respect, it has corroborative value.
Clarification of exhibit file names
216I note for clarity that there is a minor inconsistency in the naming of the Cellebrite reports as between the exhibit labels and the descriptive file names. The photographs of the devices confirm that exhibit PY24105243 corresponds to an iPhone SE, and exhibit PY24105244 corresponds to an iPhone 15 Pro Max. When the underlying Cellebrite reports are opened, their contents correspond with the physical devices as depicted. This issue was raised with counsel prior to the release of these reasons and no objection was taken. I am satisfied that the evidence is properly understood and accurately attributed in the analysis that follows.
217The following table is provided for clarity only. I rely on the underlying Cellebrite extraction reports and associated exhibits for the specific findings that follow. The significance of the evidence lies not in the mere volume of digital material, but in its correspondence with the manner in which N.T. described the use of multiple phones to manage online advertisements and communications.
| Exhibit / Property No. | Device Description | Identified MSISDN / #s | Relevant Features in Extraction |
|---|---|---|---|
| PY24105243 (Exhibit 68) | iPhone SE (smaller device) | +14167211548 +14169046421 |
Extensive photographs consistent with sex trade advertisements, including lingerie photographs and platform style authentication placards; images of M.A. and H.C.; Snapchat communications involving account "$easons"; content consistent with advertisement creation and account based activity; multiple images of Mr. Davis. |
| PY24105244 (Exhibit 66) | iPhone 15 Pro Max (larger device) | 14167211548 | Additional digital content including photographs of N.T. consistent with sex trade advertisements, communications, and identifiers linking the device to accounts associated with N.T.’s online advertising activity, as well as multiple images of Mr. Davis. |
Exhibits 67 and 68: “Cellebrite Reports of the iPhone SE “PY24105243”
218In the extraction report relating to item PY24105243 (Exhibit 67b), derived from an iPhone SE seized from Mr. Davis at the time of his arrest, the email address “productions40@**********.com” is identified as being associated with a Snapchat account styled “$easons”.
219That same email address appears in the LeoList business records (Exhibit 61) relating to N.T., where it is listed as an associated email account linked to her profile. The presence of the same email identifier across both platforms provides objective evidence connecting the device seized from Mr. Davis to an account used in connection with N.T.’s online advertising activity.
220The extracted data also identifies two telephone numbers, “416 904 6421” and “647 642 5764”, identified as the “MSISDN” and the “last used MSISDN” associated with that device. This reflects that the device was configured for use with identifiers that also appear in the LeoList records relating to administrative control of the account.
221From the LeoList business records (Exhibit 61) associated with these numbers, one of the advertisements shows N.T. in a distinctive pose as follows:
LEOLIST ADVERTISEMNT linked to account associated with 416 904 6421”, “647‑642‑5764” and productions40@********.com (see: PY24105243 – iphoneSE)
222In the iPhone 15 Pro Max, PY24105244, the extracted data revealed an identical photograph of N.T. contained within the LeoList business records. This overlap provides additional objective linkage between the LeoList advertisements and the devices seized from Mr. Davis, and may be considered as a corroborative factor in relation to N.T.’s KGB statement.
IMAGE EXTRACTION FROM PY24105243 iPhone 15 Pro Max
223The above comparison is but one of several identical images between the LeoList business records and Exhibit 78 of enlarged photos extracted from the iPhone 15 Pro Max PY24105244 seized from Mr. Davis.
224In addition, the Cellebrite extraction report for the iPhone 15 Pro Max, PY24105244, contains a large volume of digital material relevant to this analysis. It includes numerous photographs of N.T. that appear to have been taken for the purpose of online advertisements, beyond those identical to the LeoList advertisement account associated with the other device.
225Many of these photographs are dated within the relevant time period.
226This is capable of corresponding with N.T.’s account that she was engaged in sex work at that time and that photographs were being taken for the purpose of advertisements. However, the presence of such photographs does not, on its own, establish who created them, who directed their creation, or who exercised control over their use. Those issues require further consideration in light of the totality of the evidence.
227It appears that most, if not all, of these photographs of N.T. are highly suggestive of having been taken for the purpose of sex‑trade advertisements. Many of these photographs also appear to have been taken in hotel rooms or other short‑term rental accommodations.
228The extraction report also contains multiple photographs depicting Mr. Davis. I identify Mr. Davis in those photographs based on my recognition of him throughout his court appearances, including his physical features, clothing, and overall presentation, which I had the opportunity to observe over the course of the trial. I have no difficulty concluding that many of the photographs in the device are Mr. Davis.
Exhibit 65 - Cellebrite pdf report PY24102704 M.A. PY24102704:
229I have also considered the contents of a device associated with M.A. (Exhibit 65 – Cellebrite report PY24102704). That extraction contains a number of photographs of N.T. and other women that are similar, and in some cases identical, to the types of images found on the devices associated with Mr. Davis and used in LeoList advertisement postings, including photographs consistent with those used for online sex-trade advertisements. This evidence is capable of supporting an inference that Ms. A. was involved in aspects of the same activity, including the creation or possession of images used for advertising purposes, and may have participated in that activity alongside others.
230However, the existence of similar material on a device associated with Ms. A. does not displace the corroborative significance of the evidence relating to Mr. Davis. The evidence does not demonstrate that Ms. A. was the sole individual responsible for the creation or management of advertisements, nor does it provide a coherent alternative explanation for the broader evidentiary record. In particular, the linkage between Mr. Davis’ devices and the relevant email account, telephone identifiers, and advertisement content, as well as the complainant’s description of his role in managing communications and proceeds, are not explained by the presence of similar images on Ms. A.’s device.
231Further, review of the Cellebrite extraction for PY24102704, comprising approximately 4,515 pages, does not reveal the same linkage between that device and the identifiers associated with the LeoList account as is present in the iPhone SE attributed to Mr. Davis. In particular, while multiple telephone numbers appear within the extraction, including repeated references to the number “16476425764” in text communications identifying that contact as “Daddy”, there is no evidence connecting those numbers, or any associated email account, to the operation or control of the LeoList advertisements in issue.
232By contrast, the evidence relating to the devices seized from Mr. Davis establishes direct connections between those devices, identified telephone numbers, including “16476425764” and “14167211548”, the email account “productions40@********.com”, and the advertisement content. The Cellebrite extraction from the device associated with Ms. A. contains repeated communications with those same numbers saved under the contact name “Daddy”. This reflects a connection between the parties and between those devices. However, the presence of such communications does not establish that Ms. A.’s device was independently used to operate or control the advertising activity.
233In these circumstances, the material found on Ms. A.’s device does not, on its own, provide a reasonably plausible alternative explanation for the operational features of the evidence described above. At most, it supports the possibility of overlapping or parallel involvement in the same activity. That possibility is not inconsistent with the Crown’s theory and does not, standing alone, displace the corroborative significance of the evidence linking Mr. Davis’ devices to the relevant advertising activity.
(v) Corroborative factor #5 - CIBC Bank Account of N.T.
234In her KGB statement, N.T. stated that she had a single bank account, identified as being with CIBC. When asked about Mr. Davis’ access to her financial information, she confirmed that he had access to that account. In that context, she described providing him with passwords and indicated that she had been required to remove or change access to her accounts. She stated that “he has access to everything.” In describing the condition of the account, she said that there was “nothing much he can do to it,” explaining that her credit card was in debt and that she was “$5 negative” in her savings.
235Exhibit 78, consisting of enlarged images extracted from item PY24105244, includes a screen capture depicting a CIBC banking interface. This provides objective confirmation that a device in Mr. Davis’ possession contained banking-related material associated with N.T. I rely on this evidence only to the extent that it corresponds with her description that Mr. Davis had access to her banking information.
236This evidence does not establish the nature or extent of control exercised over that account, nor does it demonstrate any particular transaction or transfer of funds. Its significance is more limited. It provides independent correspondence to N.T.’s account that Mr. Davis had access to her financial information, and that access extended to a CIBC account in her name. I remain mindful that this evidence is capable of more than one interpretation, including that the image may have originated from N.T. herself. However, when considered in the broader evidentiary context, it forms part of the objective evidence that corresponds to that material aspects she described the relationship. In that limited sense, it has corroborative value on the material issue of financial access.
(vi) Corroborative factor #6 – Hamilton Airbnb
237In her October 25 hospital KGB statement (Exhibit 13a), N.T. also described an earlier incident occurring in Hamilton while staying at a short‑term rental. She stated that, during a prior disagreement in which she told Mr. Davis she intended to leave, he became violent. In her words, “this is when we were in Hamilton one time in a BnB, he like grabbed me and like hit me right here (indicates head) and like just locked me in the closet and like all this shit.” She further described being “locked in the closet for like a couple…minutes,” and that the situation escalated into a broader altercation involving M.A. and Mr. Davis, during which “they were hitting each other, throwing each other, glass was being broken.”
238N.T. distinguished this incident from the events of October 25. She stated that, in relation to the Hamilton occurrence, “Feds showed up and everything,” and that she left before their arrival. She then transitioned to the subsequent events at the Holiday Inn, stating: “apparently, four band that night was stolen. I left way before the Feds showed up… I went to the 25… Holiday Inn.”
239At trial, N.T. did not adopt her earlier account of the events said to have occurred at the Hamilton AirBnB. While her prior statement described physical violence and confinement by Mr. Davis, her viva voce evidence was markedly different. She testified that Mr. Davis “did nothing wrong” and expressly agreed that he had never assaulted her. She further stated that she was “just partying” while in Hamilton and characterized her activities there as voluntary. In relation to the allegation that Mr. Davis had locked her in a closet, she did not affirm that account and stated that she did not recall whether such an event occurred
240More broadly, she attributed the contents of her prior statements to intoxication, emotional distress, and mental health difficulties, and asserted that she was not in a proper state of mind when those statements were made.
241However, this portrayal of the Hamilton AirBnB as a setting in which N.T. was merely “partying” is difficult to reconcile with other evidence. Detective Constable Cook testified that, following the events in Hamilton, he was required to make specific arrangements to retrieve N.T.’s personal belongings from that location. Those items included her wallet, health card, Ontario driver’s licence, PC Optimum card, CIBC bank card, and a temporary G1 licence.
242In text messages dated November 4 and 5, 2024, N.T. advised that she had “lost” her identification while she was “with Dre” and that the police had taken possession of it and provided it to a local police service. She asked whether someone could retrieve the items on her behalf rather than attending herself. These same exchanges indicate that additional items had been left behind, including her wallet and its contents, and a phone, which she confirmed had been left at the same location.
243The need for police involvement in recovering these items is not readily consistent with an entirely ordinary departure from a short-term stay. The fact that these items were left behind and later required police assistance to recover is capable of providing contextual evidence bearing on the characterization of the Hamilton events.
244N.T.’s initial account to police on October 25, 2024 also provides context for her subsequent conduct and association. In that statement, she described events in Hamilton in which, according to her, “four band” was taken that night and she left prior to police attendance. She further referred to police having “shown up” in Hamilton, connecting that event to what transpired later that evening.
245The reference to money being taken in Hamilton provides context for the confrontation that followed at the Holiday Inn. In Exhibit 13a, N.T. described that, upon arrival at the hotel, she was immediately confronted by M.A. and accused of having taken money. That confrontation formed the starting point of the physical altercation later described. The accusation that she had stolen money is therefore consistent with her earlier reference to “four band” having been taken in Hamilton, and situates the events of October 25 within the same ongoing dispute.
246N.T.’s statement to police on October 25, 2024 is also consistent, in material respects, with independent evidence of police attendance in Hamilton. She reported that the events giving rise to her account occurred at an AirBnB in Hamilton and that police “showed up” in relation to that incident, although she indicated that she had left prior to their arrival.
247Constable Chris McCullough of the Hamilton Police Service testified that, on October 23, 2024, he responded to a disturbance call at an AirBnB residence on Shoreview Place in Hamilton. The call involved reports of females yelling and screaming. Upon attendance, he observed a black Audi SUV in the driveway, consistent with other aspects of the evidence, and made efforts to contact occupants inside the residence.
248Further independent evidence relating to the Hamilton AirBnB is found in the records of Exhibit 62 - Communication from Global Stay Inc.. Those records confirm that the property located at 114 Shoreview Place in Hamilton was rented through Globalstay by M.A. for a three‑day period from October 21 to October 24, 2024. The materials also include identification documentation for the registered guest, including a photograph of the renter holding the identification used for the booking.
249This evidence provides independent confirmation of the existence of the Hamilton AirBnB booking and the individuals associated with it, consistent with aspects of N.T.’s statement of October 25, 2024. While it does not establish what occurred inside the residence, it forms part of the contextual record against which her account must be assessed.
3. Reasonable alternatives to the materials aspects of the statements
250The Crown submits that there are no reasonably plausible alternative explanations for the material aspects of the complainant’s statements. In contrast, the defence maintains that the record admits of alternative explanations, including that the complainant was not controlled or assaulted by Mr. Davis, that her injuries were attributable solely to an altercation with M.A., and that the surrounding evidence is equally consistent with those alternatives. The defence further relies on the complainant’s in court testimony, in which she denied being trafficked or assaulted by Mr. Davis, as providing a competing account of events.
251In my view, when the evidentiary record is considered as a whole, the alternatives advanced by the defence do not emerge as reasonably plausible explanations for the material aspects of the statements. Properly examined, those alternatives do not provide a coherent account of the material features of the evidence and do not adequately explain central aspects of the record.
252In particular, the following features of the evidence are not readily reconcilable with either an independent operation by the complainant or a scenario in which Ms. A. alone exercised control:
- the complainant’s consistent references, including during the 911 call and contemporaneous statements, to the involvement of more than one individual;
- evidence linking Mr. Davis to the complainant’s communications, advertisements, and the financial mechanisms associated with those advertisements;
- the absence of any evidentiary foundation describing how Ms. A. alone exercised control over communications, advertising, or proceeds, or how she functioned as a sole directing mind;
- the complainant’s lack of possession or control over her phone at a critical time, and her request for its return;
- her absence of funds and inability to access or retain proceeds, notwithstanding assertions of ongoing work;
- her flight from the hotel room, efforts to leave the premises, and conduct in seeking assistance from hotel staff and police;
- the existence of disputes concerning money and direction, which are difficult to explain on the basis that she was acting independently; and
- the presence of the relevant parties together at the material locations in a manner consistent with coordinated activity rather than independent operation.
253A further difficulty with the proposed alternatives arises from the contents of one of Mr. Davis’ seized phones (Exhibit 66 - PY24105244). The evidence establishes that his device contained at least 15 photographs of N.T. in what were described as “Leolist authentication” poses, displaying date-stamped placards consistent with verification requirements for advertisement postings. These are not casual or incidental images. Their number, uniform nature, and features indicating their functional purpose for advertisement authentication are consistent with use in the creation and maintenance of online postings. While the presence of such images admits of more than one interpretation, the collection as a whole is not readily reconciled with the suggestion that the complainant was operating entirely independently or that Mr. Davis had no involvement in her advertising or income-generating activities.
254These features, taken together, are not readily consistent with the suggestion that the complainant was operating an entirely independent and financially autonomous enterprise. The record reflects circumstances in which she was without funds, without control over her means of communication at a critical time, unable to exclude others from the premises in which she was said to be working, and unable to retain proceeds upon leaving. Those features are relevant to the assessment of the plausibility of the alternatives advanced.
255Nor do these features support a reasonably plausible alternative in which Ms. A. alone was responsible for the events. While there is evidence of an altercation involving Ms. A., that evidence addresses only a discrete aspect of the events and does not provide a coherent explanation for the broader evidentiary record, including the management of communications, advertisements, and proceeds.
256More broadly, the defence submission that the surrounding circumstances are “equally consistent” with alternative explanations is not borne out when the record is considered as a whole. The corroborative evidence does more than establish general consistency. It corresponds with material aspects of the complainant’s recorded account, including the presence of the identified individuals, the sequence of events, her injuries, and her actions immediately thereafter. By contrast, the proposed alternatives depend on isolated features of the evidence and do not account for other significant aspects of the record.
257In these circumstances, the alternatives advanced by the defence do not amount to reasonably plausible explanations for the material aspects of the statements. Considered in light of the material aspects identified above and the corroborative evidence addressing them, those alternatives do not account for significant features of the record. As a result, when the evidence is viewed as a whole, the only remaining likely explanation for those aspects of the complainant’s statements is their truthfulness or accuracy. In that sense, the corroborative evidence meaningfully reduces the risk of error and supports a finding of substantive reliability.
4. Conclusion on substantive reliability on statements made October 25, 2024.
258Taken together, the statements made by N.T. on October 25, 2024 are supported by multiple forms of corroborative evidence, as set out above. In addition to the evidence considered under the framework in Bradshaw, there is no material inconsistency between those statements and the independent objective evidence, including CCTV footage, business records, and the digital extraction evidence, in relation to the material aspects identified. That absence of inconsistency, while not sufficient on its own, forms part of the overall context in which the corroborative evidence addressing those material aspects must be assessed.
259Accordingly, and in addition to my earlier finding that they meet the requirements of procedural reliability, I am satisfied that the statements made on October 25, 2024 meet the threshold for substantive reliability within the meaning of the Bradshaw framework and are admissible on that basis.
5. Residual Discretion to Exclude
260The defence further submits that, even if the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability are met, the statements should be excluded under the court’s residual discretion on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value. I do not accept that submission.
261The admissible statements are highly probative of the material issues in dispute, including the events of October 25, 2024 and the nature of the relationship described by N.T. Their admission is the result of a careful application of the principled approach, with clear limits placed on their use. This is a judge‑alone trial, and I am able to consider the evidence for its proper purpose and guard against any improper reasoning. In these circumstances, the probative value of the admissible statements is not outweighed by any prejudicial effect, and there is no basis to exclude them under the court’s residual discretion.
6. Remaining Hearsay Statements Made Beyond October 25, 2024 and Their Substantive Reliability
262In addition to the detailed video‑recorded statements made by N.T. on October 25, 2024, which I have found admissible on procedural and substantive grounds, the Crown seeks to admit a number of additional out‑of‑court statements made after the date of the reported allegations.
263While these later statements lack the same degree of procedural reliability for the reasons previously outlined, I am satisfied that the text exchange of November 5, 2024 between Detective Constable Cook and N.T. is admissible for a limited purpose. In that exchange, N.T. reports the loss of personal property. The surrounding objective evidence, including the recovery of those items and the identification documentation linked to the AirBnB in Stoney Creek, provides independent confirmation of that aspect of her account. This evidence is probative of her presence at that location and supports the reliability of that limited assertion.
264However, I am not satisfied that other statements from that same date meet the threshold for substantive reliability. In particular, the asserted statements that H.C. and Mr. Davis were contacting N.T., that Mr. Davis’ number had been provided to her, and that offers were made to pay for legal counsel or induce her not to cooperate with police are not supported by independent corroborative evidence. Those assertions are therefore not sufficient to satisfy the test in Bradshaw and are inadmissible for the truth of their contents.
265Similarly, I am not satisfied that the statement dated November 17, 2026, made to Detective Constable Cook, in which N.T. is said to report that Mr. Davis contacted her and indicated that the charges would be dropped soon, is supported by any independent corroboration, whether through telephone records or otherwise. As such, I am unable to conclude that the threshold for substantive reliability has been met, and that statement is not admissible for the truth of its contents.
266Finally, I am not satisfied that the alleged utterances of November 2, 2024 relating to a black Audi SUV are sufficiently corroborated to meet the threshold for substantive reliability. While there is other evidence of a vehicle, the connection between that general evidence and the specific utterances is not sufficient to exclude other plausible explanations. Accordingly, those statements are not admissible on the basis of substantive reliability.
267Those statements found to be admissible are now properly part of the evidentiary record at trial. Their admissibility reflects only a finding that the threshold requirements under the principled approach to hearsay have been met. This determination does not resolve issues of ultimate reliability, credibility, or weight, which remain to be assessed at the conclusion of the trial on the basis of the full evidentiary record. Nothing in these reasons should be taken as a finding on the truth of any allegation contained within those statements.
268For convenience, a summary of admissibility is set out below
| Statement Date | Nature of Statement | Admissible |
|---|---|---|
| October 25, 2024 | 911 call (including “pimped out” utterance) | Yes |
| October 25, 2024 | Body worn camera statements (scene and ambulance) | Yes |
| October 25, 2024 | Hospital interactions (pre‑KGB) | Yes |
| October 25, 2024 | Video‑recorded KGB statement | Yes |
| November 5, 2024 | Text exchange re: lost property (Airbnb / identification items) | Yes (limited purpose only) |
| November 2, 2024 | Texts re: black Audi SUV | No |
| November 3, 2024 | Texts (photos, Snapchat, general communications) | No |
| November 5, 2024 | Texts re: contact by Dre / H. / alleged inducements | No |
| November 8, 2024 | Text re: advertisement change to “Paris” | No |
| November 17, 2026 | In‑person utterance to D/C Cook (charges will be dropped) | No |
| February 4, 2026 | In‑person utterance to Officer Wells (personal comment re: Dre) | No |
Released: May 28, 2026
Signed: Justice S. Robichaud
Footnotes
- R. v. Robinson, 2014 ONCA 63 at paras. 48–58; R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260 at para. 247; R. v. Gordon, 2022 ONCA 799.
- R. v. R.V.A., 2025 ONCA 501 at paras. 13–14, citing R. v. Robinson, supra, and R. v. Warner (1994), 1994 ONCA 842, 21 O.R. (3d) 136 (C.A.).
- R. v. McIlwaine, 1978 ABSCTD 3149, R. v. Murphy, 2011 NSCA 54 at para 130, R. v. O'Brien, 2009 NSSC 194 at para 10, R. v. Darren Lawrence, 2004 NSPC 7 at para 13, R. v. Donald (1958), 1958 NBCA 470, 121 C.C.C. 304 (NBCA); R.v. Oracheski (1979), 1979 ALTASCAD 140, 48 C.C.C. (2d) 217 (Alta SCAD); R.v. De Graaf (1981), 1981 BCCA 343, 60 C.C.C. (2d) 315; R.v. Andrade (1985), 1985 ONCA 3502, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 41 (Ont CA). (at para. 13), R. v. Penney, 2002 NFCA 15 , at para. 45
- R. v. Graham, 2024 ONCJ 592 at para 181
- R. v. S.M. 2025 ONCA 18
- R. v. Fodor, 2024 ONCJ 104
- R. v. C.B., 2019 ONCA 380, 146 O.R. (3d) 1, at paras. 66-68
- R. v. Aslami, 2021 ONCA 249, 155 O.R. (3d) 401, specifically at para. 30:
- R. v. Saddleback, 2026 SCC 18, at para 20
- R. v. Khelawon, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, 2006 SCC 57
- R. v. Khelawon, supra, at para 63
- R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R, [2017] S.C.J. No. 35
- R. v. Khelawon, surpa.,
- Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6th ed., at para. 6.109
- R. v. Oloko 2025 ONCA 894
- R. v. Rowe, 2021 ONCA 684
- Exhibit 49A, 49B – BWC footage and transcript of Cst. Mendoca – attendance to hotel to execute material witness warrant for N.T.
- R. v. Khelawon, supra, at paras 49, 55.
- R. v. Bradshaw, supra, at para. 32
- R. v. F.J.U., 1995 SCC 74, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764, at paras 20-21
- R. v. Bradshaw, supra, at para 28
- Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant: The Law of Evidence in Canada, 6th Ed., citing R. v. L. (C.), 1997 SCC 297, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1001, [1997] S.C.J. No. 99 (S.C.C.), adopting the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal (1996), 1996 QCCA 5636, 112 C.C.C. (3d) 472, [1996] J.Q. no 3550 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Eisenhauer (1998), 1998 NSCA 60, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 81, [1998] N.S.J. No. 28 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Snyder (2011), 2011 ONCA 445, 278 O.A.C. 233, 273 C.C.C. (3d) 211, [2011] O.J. No. 2635 (Ont. C.A.).
- Exhibit 60
- R v Budimirovic 2023 ONCA 609, paras 20-22
- R. v. Khelawon, supra, at para 60
- R. v. McMorris, 2020 ONCA 844 at para. 34
- R. v. Bradshaw, supra, at para 57
- R. .v Charles, 2024 SCC 29
- R. .v Charles, 2024 SCC 29 at paras. 55-56.
- Exhibits 4b, 4a, 5a,