R. v. Maurer, 2026 ONCJ 310

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Maurer, 2026 ONCJ 310 DATE: 2026 05 29 COURT FILE No.: Peel Region – Brampton 998 24 31112383

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

— AND —

Megan Sara Maurer

Before: Justice R. Tomovski Heard on: April 8, 9, 10, 2026 Reasons for Judgment released on: May 29, 2026

Counsel: Chanelle Thomas, counsel for the Crown Jessica Zita, counsel for the accused Megan Sara Maurer

Tomovski J.:

I. INTRODUCTION

1Two pieces of luggage containing cannabis were intercepted by a customs officer in a baggage container located in an area accessible only to airport personnel, shortly before the luggage was to be loaded onto a departing flight from Toronto for Switzerland. Affixed to the handle of each piece of luggage was an airline-issued tag bearing a distinctive tag number, the corresponding flight information, and the accused’s name. After the cannabis was discovered, another officer attended at the boarding ramp outside the airplane, where the accused was located and arrested. Among items in her possession was a boarding pass. On its reverse were two airport-issued stickers bearing the accused’s name and the same tag numbers and flight information as those affixed to the seized luggage. Ms. Maurer was subsequently charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of exporting it from Canada.

2All essential elements of the charge, save one, have been admitted by the defence. The lone issue is whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the cannabis – specifically, whether she knew the luggage contained cannabis and exercised a measure of control over it.

3As the Crown’s case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, the Crown submits that the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable inference available on the whole of the evidence. The Crown further submits that it has established, to the requisite standard, that Ms. Maurer checked the luggage, knew of its contents, and intended to export the cannabis from Canada.

4The defence, while bearing no burden, submits that there is a plausible alternative theory arising from the evidence that is inconsistent with guilt and gives rise to a reasonable doubt. It submits that it is neither conjecture nor speculation to conclude that, after Ms. Maurer checked her luggage, an airport worker may have removed the tags and affixed them to different luggage – the luggage ultimately seized. According to the defence, the “tag switching” theory, and the inferences consistent with Ms. Maurer’s innocence, are grounded in the evidence and in the absence of evidence.

5To determine whether the Crown has proven the charge – more particularly, the lone contested essential element of possession – beyond a reasonable doubt, my reasons address four areas: the law of constructive possession (knowledge and control); the applicable principles governing the burden of proof and circumstantial evidence (the Villaroman framework); the relevant evidence; and my findings of fact and the reasonable inferences available on that evidence.

II. ANALYSIS

The lone contested issue: Did Ms. Maurer possess the cannabis found in the luggage?

A. Constructive Possession

6As Ms. Maurer was not in actual physical possession of the seized luggage at the time of her arrest, the Crown submits that she had constructive possession of both the luggage and its contents.

7Pursuant to s. 4(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, a person has constructive possession where an item is “in any place for their own or another’s use or benefit”: R. v. Lights, 2020 ONCA 128 at paras. 47, 101.

8Constructive possession requires proof of knowledge and control: R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at para. 15.

9These essential elements require proof that the person (1) knew the nature of the item; (2) knowingly placed or kept the item in a particular location; and (3) intended that the item be there for their own or another’s use or benefit: Morelli at para. 17; Lights at para. 47.

10Knowledge of the nature of the item may be established by proof of actual knowledge or wilful blindness: Lights at paras. 51-52.

11In this case, the Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Maurer knew the seized luggage contained cannabis, intended to possess it, and exercised a measure of control over it: Lights at para. 102.

B. Circumstantial Evidence and the Villaroman Assessment

12Where the Crown’s case is wholly or substantially circumstantial, it must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable inference available on the evidence as a whole: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33 at paras. 20, 30, 37; Lights at para. 36. The standard of proof applies to the totality of the evidence, not to individual pieces of evidence: Lights at para. 37.

13Reasonable possibilities inconsistent with guilt, as well as other plausible theories, must be considered where they are grounded in common sense, logic, and experience. Such inferences may arise from proven facts or the absence of evidence. By contrast, inferences based on conjecture or speculation are insufficient: Villaroman at paras. 30, 35-38, 50; Lights at para. 38. The task is to determine whether the circumstantial evidence, viewed as a whole and assessed logically and in light of common sense and experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than guilt: Villaroman at para. 38.

14In this case, as the Crown’s case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, it must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the offence are the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole: Lights at para. 102.

C. Relevant Evidence

15Ms. Maurer did not testify, as is her constitutional right, nor did she call any evidence.

16The Crown called three border service officers (“BSOs”) with the Canada Border Services Agency and three officers with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”), all of whom were involved in Ms. Maurer’s arrest and the seizure of the cannabis. Their evidence included the following.

17Records established that Ms. Maurer was scheduled to travel from Calgary to Dusseldorf, Germany, via Toronto and Zurich, Switzerland. She had already arrived in Toronto from Calgary and was scheduled to depart for Zurich on October 13, 2024, at 8:30 p.m., on Air Canada flight AC880 at Toronto Pearson International Airport (“Pearson Airport”).

18At approximately 7:00 p.m. that evening, BSO Adam Cullen was tasked with intercepting two pieces of luggage checked in under the name of “Megan Maurer”, based on information received from local intelligence that the luggage might contain cannabis. The Crown advised that it does not rely on this presumptively inadmissible information for any purpose other than narrative.

19BSO Cullen accessed Pearson Airport’s internal luggage tracking system and confirmed that two pieces of luggage registered under Ms. Maurer’s name had been checked in and were in a luggage container assigned to the outbound flight waiting to be loaded.

20BSO Cullen described the process by which checked luggage is handled. An airline worker affixes a tag to the luggage bearing a unique tag number and flight details, including the traveller’s name, flight number, and destination. In this case, the tag numbers were 0014AC027734 and 0014AC027820. The luggage is then placed on a conveyor belt and transported to an area known as the “lateral”, where airport workers load the luggage into containers designated for specific flights. Ramp agents employed by the airlines then transfer the luggage from the containers onto the airplane. BSO Cullen was unable to quantify how many individuals may handle a piece of luggage between check-in and loading, including in this case.

21Although the tags appeared to have been generated in Toronto, BSO Cullen could not say whether Ms. Maurer collected her luggage upon arrival from Calgary and re-checked it, or whether it was transferred directly by airport workers to the lateral area for onward transport to the Toronto flight without her involvement. He testified that a direct transfer would ordinarily occur if the connecting flight departed on the same day. However, neither he nor any other witness was able to confirm whether Ms. Maurer’s outbound flight departed on the same day as her arrival in Toronto. An entry dated October 12 in Ms. Maurer’s planner – “Leaving to Toronto then Germany” – does not specify her departure time from Calgary or her arrival time in Toronto, nor does it indicate whether this travel occurred on or into October 13.

22BSO Cullen testified that certain portions of the luggage-handling process at Pearson Airport are captured by surveillance cameras, including areas relevant to this case, although no such footage was obtained.

23At approximately 7:10 p.m., BSO Cullen attended the lateral area and located the container assigned to Ms. Maurer’s flight. He identified two pieces of luggage bearing tags with her name, matching tag numbers, and corresponding flight information. He described one tag as appearing “a little roughed up”, while the other did not. BSO Cullen and RCMP officer Chun Lee testified that the tags appeared to have originated from Toronto rather than Calgary. BSO Cullen also detected an odour of cannabis emanating from the luggage. The luggage was seized and taken to a secure area for examination.

24Each piece of luggage was zippered and secured with a lock. Keys to the locks were found in an outer pocket of one of the pieces. Despite this, BSO Cullen used a knife to open the zipper to access the contents. After completing the examination, he re-sealed the zipper so that the luggage appeared unopened.

25In total, the two pieces of luggage contained 55 vacuum-sealed packages of cannabis weighing 24.5 kilograms. The estimated value of cannabis ranged from approximately $50,000 to $98,000 if sold by the kilogram, and $120,000 to $170,000 if sold by the gram.

26Each piece of luggage also contained a tracking device. BSO Cullen testified that such devices can be traced to an associated electronic device, such as a cell phone, but no attempt was made to do so in this case.

27The luggage contained no other items, including clothing or personal effects.

28Neither the luggage nor the tags were fingerprinted.

29Several witnesses testified about the practice known as “tag switching” targeting unsuspecting travellers. It was described as a scheme in which an airport worker removes a luggage tag from an unsuspecting traveller’s luggage and affixes it to different luggage containing drugs, thereby facilitating the overt exportation of the drugs. BSO Cullen and RCMP officers Lee and Diego Jay acknowledged that tag switching occurs at Pearson Airport, describing it as a known and ongoing issue and “trend”. Officers Lee and Jay testified that they have personally investigated multiple such incidents at Pearson Airport and were aware of airport workers, including luggage handlers, who have been charged in connection with such conduct, including cases involving cannabis. They also noted that such schemes may involve reprinting or reusing tags or creating fake tags. Officer Jay testified that the possibility of tag switching in this case was not investigated, though no explanation was provided.

30After the cannabis was discovered, BSOs Martin Dulba and Lauren Lelyk attended the boarding ramp outside Ms. Maurer’s flight, and they located and arrested her.

31At the time of her arrest, Ms. Maurer was in possession of a carry-on bag containing clothing, a purse, a cell phone, a planner and a boarding pass. All items were seized. She did not have any keys in her physical possession capable of opening the luggage locks.

32Affixed to the back of the boarding pass were two luggage stickers bearing the same tag numbers – 0014AC027734 and 0014AC027820 – and corresponding flight information, including Ms. Maurer’s name.

33Ms. Maurer was fingerprinted.

34Ms. Maurer made a brief utterance following her arrest and later provided a video statement. Initially, only excerpts of the statement were relied on; however, the Crown ultimately abandoned reliance on this evidence and the utterance, which lacked context and probative value.

D. Findings of Fact and Reasonable Inferences

35I find that the Crown’s theory – that Ms. Maurer knowingly possessed the cannabis and attempted to export it outside of Canada – is one reasonable interpretation of the evidence. However, that does not conclude the analysis. I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that her guilt is the only reasonable inference arising from the whole of the evidence. When assessed logically and with common sense, the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than guilt. A finding that Ms. Maurer is likely or probably guilty does not meet the required standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

36Considering the whole of the evidence, including both the proven facts and the lack of evidence, an explanation involving tag switching is reasonably available on the facts of this case. This leaves me with a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Maurer’s guilt. The plausibility of “tag switching” is not speculative or based on conjecture; rather, it is grounded in the evidentiary record and its deficiencies. At a minimum, it undermines the conclusion that guilt is the only reasonable inference.

37The following evidence, together with the inferences arising from the absence of evidence, informs this conclusion.

38While it is reasonable to infer that Ms. Maurer checked two pieces of luggage, there is significant uncertainty regarding the circumstances of that check-in. It is unclear whether Ms. Maurer checked her luggage in Calgary only. It is unclear whether the luggage she checked corresponds to the luggage ultimately seized. There is little, if any, evidence concerning the timing, handling, or appearance of the luggage at check-in. No airport workers testified, and no surveillance footage was produced.

39Although surveillance cameras were present in areas where the luggage was handled, relevant footage was not obtained. Such evidence could have assisted in tracking the movement of the luggage and determining whether Ms. Maurer ever handled the seized items, but it was not pursued.

40It is also unclear when Ms. Maurer last had physical possession of her luggage – whether at initial check-in in Calgary or upon arrival in Toronto prior to a subsequent check-in. No evidence clarifies this point. In either scenario, the luggage would have remained in the custody of airport workers after check-in for a prolonged period, potentially hours. By contrast, tag switching could be accomplished in a matter of moments.

41Even absent tag switching, the evidence of BSO Cullen demonstrates how easily the seized luggage could be opened and re-sealed without detection. This creates a reasonable possibility that the contents were altered while the luggage was out of Ms. Maurer’s control. Although tag switching is the more persuasive alternative, this scenario remains plausible.

42The presence of luggage stickers on Ms. Maurer’s boarding pass supports an inference that she checked luggage at some point. However, the location, timing, and identity of that luggage remain uncertain. It is plausible that Ms. Maurer checked luggage other than the luggage seized by police. Even though the tags originated in Toronto, this does not exclude the possibility that they were switched, reprinted, or reused, especially when it is unclear whether she handled any luggage in Toronto.

43The condition of the tags is likewise inconclusive. One appeared “a little roughed up” while the other did not. In the absence of evidence about how easy or not tags are affixed or removed, either condition is equally consistent with a tag switching scenario.

44There is no forensic evidence linking Ms. Maurer to the luggage or its contents. Despite her fingerprinting, the luggage and tags were not examined for comparison. This omission represents a meaningful gap in the investigation.

45Although the tracking devices located in the luggage were capable of being traced to a connected device, Ms. Maurer’s seized phone was not examined to determine any such link.

46No other items were found in the luggage that could have potentially established that Ms. Maurer had knowledge of the cannabis.

47Ms. Maurer did not have in her actual possession any keys capable of opening the locks on the luggage, as might ordinarily be expected where an individual exercises some measure of control over its contents. However, the absence of keys in this case is a neutral factor and is not determinative of the issue of possession.

48I accept that a noticeable odour of cannabis was present. However, if the luggage was switched after check-in, that evidence has limited relevance, as Ms. Maurer would not have been in a position to detect it. Accordingly, this does not undermine the plausible theory that tag switching occurred.

49The Crown relies on the principle that possession of drugs of significant value may support an inference of knowledge: see R. v. Bains, 2015 ONCA 677 at para. 157. That inference is permissive and context dependent. In a tag switching scenario, it carries little weight, as such a scheme does not depend on the knowledge or participation of the unsuspecting traveller for the scheme’s execution.

50Individually and cumulatively, these factors raise a reasonable doubt as to Ms. Maurer’s guilt, even without establishing that tag switching actually occurred. That is not required. The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that guilt is the only reasonable inference on the whole of the evidence. In this case, tag switching remains a plausible alternative capable of supporting a reasonable doubt.

III. CONCLUSION

51On the whole of the evidence, I am not satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

52Although all but one of the essential elements of the offence were admitted, the Crown has failed to prove the remaining essential element to the requisite standard. I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Maurer possessed the cannabis – whether through knowledge or control – in the two pieces of luggage.

53Accordingly, Ms. Maurer is found not guilty of possession of cannabis for the purpose of export under s. 11(2) of the Cannabis Act.