WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
J.K.
Before Justice P.T. O’Marra
Heard on April 13 and 14, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on April 14, 2026
J. Ng counsel for the Crown
A. Farooq counsel for the accused J.K.
P.T. O’Marra J.: (Orally)
Overview
1Mr. J.K. stands charged with one count of sexual assault and one count of assault. The Crown proceeded by indictment. I heard the trial on April 13 and again today, April 14, 2026. After submissions, I reserved the lunch hour and part of the afternoon to prepare reasons.
2A third count was withdrawn by the Crown during the trial. It plays no role in my decision on the remaining counts.
3This case turns on credibility and reliability. There is no independent eyewitness evidence of the alleged offences, no forensic evidence that resolves the central disputes, and no admissions. The outcome depends on whether the Crown has proven the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence.
Positions of the Crown and the Defence
4The Crown submits that Ms. F.K. was a credible and reliable witness. The Crown argues that any differences between her trial evidence and her earlier statements to police are minor, do not go to the heart of the allegations, and are explained by stress and the passage of time. The Crown submits that the sexual activity occurred without consent because Ms. F.K. participated out of fear of Mr. J.K.’s anger, and that the bread incident was an intentional application of force.
5The defence submits that Ms. F.K.’s evidence shifted on key details. The defence emphasizes inconsistencies between Ms. F.K.’s testimony and excerpts from her police statement, recorded on a body-worn camera, that were put to her during cross-examination. The defence submits that Mr. J.K. and his mother testified credibly that the sexual incident did not occur and that no bread was thrown. The defence also advanced a motive for fabrication.
Summary of the Evidence
6Ms. F.K. testified that she married Mr. J.K. in February 2022, initially lived in Pakistan, and later moved to Canada to live with him. She described early conflict in the relationship, including arguments and verbal hostility. She also testified that she left Canada for Pakistan for a period and later returned.
7Ms. F.K.’s evidence addressed two events relevant to the remaining counts.
8First, she alleged a sexual incident in a bedroom shortly before police attended in November 2024. She testified that Mr. J.K. wanted intercourse, that she said she was not in the mood, and that although she ultimately said “okay,” she did not want the sexual activity and participated because she feared his anger. She also testified that she did not physically resist. During cross-examination, she was confronted with limited excerpts from the police statement recorded on the body-worn camera, including whether she was “cuddling,” whether she asked to “keep it to cuddling,” whether she said she did not want to shower, whether she described being “pulled,” and whether she said, “leave, leave.”
9Second, she alleged that in March 2024, at dinner, Mr. J.K. threw bread at her face.
10Ms. F.M.K., Mr. J.K.’s mother, testified for the defence. She described the evening the police attended and said she was concerned about Ms. F.K.’s gestures. She denied seeing Mr. J.K. strike Ms. F.K. and denied seeing any bread thrown at Ms. F.K.
11Mr. J.K. testified. He said he called the police because he was concerned Ms. F.K. might hit his mother. He denied striking Ms. F.K., denied throwing bread at her, and denied that the alleged sexual incident occurred.
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
12The Crown bears the burden of proof throughout the trial, and it never shifts. Mr. J.K. is presumed innocent. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to absolute certainty, but it is far more than proof that an accused is probably guilty. A reasonable doubt is not imaginary or frivolous, nor can it be based on sympathy or prejudice. It is a doubt grounded in reason and common sense, arising logically from the evidence or its absence.
The W. (D.) Framework
13Where, as here, the accused testifies and credibility is central, I apply the framework from R. v. W. (D.). The analysis is not a contest in which I choose between versions of events. The controlling question is whether, on all of the evidence, the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
14The framework is often expressed in three parts. If I believe the accused, I must acquit. If I do not believe the accused but his evidence leaves me with a reasonable doubt, I must acquit. Even if I do not believe the accused and his evidence does not leave me in doubt, I must still acquit unless the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence. These reasons proceed from that third part.
Elements of the Offences
Assault
15To prove assault, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. J.K. intentionally applied force to Ms. F.K., directly or indirectly, without her consent. The mens rea is the intention to apply force, knowing there is no consent or being reckless as to consent.
Sexual Assault
16Sexual assault is an assault committed in circumstances of a sexual nature such that the sexual integrity of the complainant is violated. The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt an intentional touching, the sexual nature of the touching, and the absence of consent. Consent for this purpose is the complainant’s voluntary agreement to engage in the sexual activity in question. The absence of consent for the actus reus turns on the complainant’s subjective state of mind as to whether she wanted the sexual touching.
Assessment of the Defence Evidence and the First Two Branches of W. (D.)
17I do not accept Mr. J.K.’s evidence as true. In substance, it was a broad denial of each allegation, lacking a persuasive and coherent narrative addressing the surrounding circumstances described by the other witnesses.
18In assessing Mr. J.K.’s evidence, I place particular weight on his account of the head covering (“hijab”) issue because he identified it as the principal reason Ms. F.K. left Canada and returned to Pakistan during the first period of cohabitation. He testified that, when he married Ms. F.K., she wore a hijab, and that when she came to Canada, she no longer wanted to wear the Muslim hijab. He said this was the reason she was unhappy and why she returned to Pakistan.
19Against that evidence, Mr. J.K. denied that there were any conversations or arguments about how Ms. F.K. wore her hijab. In my view, those positions do not sit comfortably together. If the hijab issue was as central as he claimed, it is difficult to accept that it generated no disagreement, discussion, or conflict. That is particularly so given his broader evidence that there were “many, many arguments” during that period.
20This internal tension in his evidence matters for reliability and credibility. It suggests either an attempt to minimize the extent of conflict in the relationship or an unwillingness to provide a consistent account of the circumstances he relied on to explain Ms. F.K.’s departure. I accept that witnesses may forget details, but this was not an incidental point. Mr. J.K. elevated it to a central explanation for a significant event yet simultaneously denied the kind of interaction that would ordinarily accompany such a significant marital dispute.
21His evidence also contained other features that caused me concern, including his portrayal of the relationship as “good” while acknowledging frequent arguments and being unable to explain, with clarity, what precipitated the conflict on the night he called the police. Taken as a whole, his evidence did not leave me with a reasonable doubt.
22I approach his mother’s evidence with caution. She is an interested witness, and her evidence was largely confined to the evening the police attended. Her evidence did not provide a reliable basis for resolving the contested historical allegations.
23Accordingly, my conclusion is not based on accepting the defence evidence, nor is it based on the defence evidence raising a reasonable doubt. The outcome turns on whether the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence, despite the weaknesses in the defence case.
The Crown’s Burden and the Inconsistencies in Ms. F.K.’s Evidence
24The decisive issue is whether Ms. F.K.’s evidence is sufficiently reliable on the essential elements of each offence, given the inconsistencies that emerged through the excerpts from her police statement, recorded on a body-worn camera, that were put to her in cross-examination. I confine myself to those excerpts, as they were the prior statements used in the trial to test her evidence.
Sexual Assault Count
25On the sexual assault count, the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual intercourse occurred and that Ms. F.K. did not consent.
26The inconsistencies raised on cross-examination concerned communications and the sequence of events central to the Crown’s burden.
27First, Ms. F.K. was confronted with her prior statement: “I just say I don’t want it, just keep it to cuddling” (page 12, line 18). She was also confronted with the body-worn camera transcript excerpt in which she told police she was “cuddling” (page 2, lines 28 to 29). At trial, her narrative about whether there was cuddling and how the interaction unfolded differed in ways that mattered to the sequence of events and the parties' communications.
28Second, Ms. F.K. was confronted with her prior statement in which she said Mr. J.K. “pulled” her (page 14, line 13). Her trial description on this point differed, and her account changed as she answered questions about it. That difference bears on the factual detail of the encounter in a case that depends almost entirely on her description of what occurred.
29Third, Ms. F.K. was confronted with her prior statement in which she used the words “leave, leave” (page 14, line 21). That differed from her trial description of what she said during the encounter and bears on the content and persistence of her verbal communication.
30Fourth, she was confronted with her prior statement in which she told the officer she did not want to shower (page 13, line 10). I accept that a reason for not wanting sex is not required to prove non-consent, and that the presence or absence of such a reason does not determine consent. The difficulty is that this was one of the specific details captured in the prior account used to test her reliability, and her evidence at trial was inconsistent in addressing it. This contributed to my overall concern about the reliability of her recollection of the event’s details.
31I accept that memory can be imperfect. The difficulty is that these inconsistencies concern the communications and the sequence of events, both central to proving non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt in a case that depends essentially on testimonial evidence.
Assault Count
32On the assault count involving bread, the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. J.K. intentionally applied force to Ms. F.K., indirectly, by throwing bread at her, without her consent.
33During cross-examination, Ms. F.K. was confronted with an excerpt from her prior statement in which she attributed the incident to something involving a “cat” (page 16, line 26). That detail did not form part of her trial narrative explaining why the bread was thrown, and her evidence did not reconcile the discrepancy in a way that restored my confidence in the accuracy of her recollection of the circumstances surrounding this alleged assault.
34There was also a further, more modest concern arising from her trial evidence about what was thrown. In her evidence-in-chief, she described a “loaf of bread.” In cross-examination, only after being pressed on the point in the context of their eating at the table, her description shifted to a round bread and then to a piece of bread. I accept that the size or type of bread may not, standing alone, be determinative of whether an assault occurred. Nonetheless, in a case where the Crown’s proof depends almost entirely on the complainant’s recollection of a brief domestic incident, that evolution in the description of the object and the circumstances in which it occurred contributed, in a small but real way, to my concern about the reliability of her account of this allegation.
The Third Branch of W. (D.) and the Ultimate Reasonable Doubt
35Although I do not accept the defence evidence and it does not leave me with a reasonable doubt, I must still decide whether the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence.
36In this case, the Crown’s proof depends on Ms. F.K.’s evidence regarding the essential elements of each offence. The inconsistencies identified in the body-worn camera excerpts put to Ms. F.K. in cross-examination leave me unable to rely on her account to the degree required by the criminal standard. In the absence of independent evidence confirming the essential elements of either offence, I am left with a reasonable doubt.
Disposition
37On the count of sexual assault, I find Mr. J.K. not guilty.
38On the count of assault, I find Mr. J.K. not guilty.
Released: April 14, 2026
Signed: Justice P.T. O’Marra