His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario v. Kole McNeil, 2026 ONCJ 299

Court File and Parties

CITATION: R. v. McNeil, 2026 ONCJ 299

DATE: March 23, 2026

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE (East Region)

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO (Prosecutor)

• and –

KOLE McNEIL (Defendant)

SENTENCING DECISION

23 March 2026

J.P. C. Peltzer

Legislation

Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter H.8, s. 172(1)-(2) and s.200(1)(a)-(b)

Races, Contests and Stunts, O Reg 455/07

Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 57(1), s.72

Cases

Mississauga (City) v. Williams-Cordeiro, 2025 ONCJ 120

Real Estate Council of Ontario v. Wang & Feng, 2013 ONCJ 515

R. v. Cotton Felts Ltd. (1982), 1982 3695 (ON CA), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 287 (Ont. C.A.)

R. v. Bata Industries Ltd., [1992] O.J. No. 667 (Ont. Prov. Div.)

R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1991), 1991 39 (SCC), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.)

Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (1985), 1985 81 (SCC), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.)

R. v. Gladue (1999), 1999 679 (SCC), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.)

R. v. C.A.M. (1996), 1996 230 (SCC), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 (S.C.C.)

Exhibits

Victim Impact Statements

Crown’s Case Book – Sentencing

The Offences

1The defendant, Mr. McNeil, was found guilty of violating two sections of the HTA. The first charge related to stunt driving, having found that he operated his motor vehicle at 116 km/h in a 60 km/h zone, being at least 56 km/h over the limit, contrary to s.172(1) HTA, specifically O Reg 455/07 s.3(7), where anything more than 40 km/h would have made out the offence.

2The second conviction related to failing to remain at or return to the scene of an accident that a driver was directly or indirectly involved in, contrary to s.200(1)(a) HTA.

Sentencing Submissions

3Before imposing sentence, I gave the prosecution and defense an opportunity to make submissions as to the appropriate penalties pursuant to s. 57(1) Provincial Offences Act.

The Crown Submissions:

4The Crown sought the maximum sentence of six months for each offence to be served consecutively, with 18 months probation to follow; including a three year suspension for the stunt driving and a two year suspension for the fail to remain charges.

5The Crown had three victim impact statements read into the record in addition to filing additional victim impact statements which formed Exhibit 1.

6It was clear from the victim impact statements that the 31 July 2024 incident, and their losses as a result, have been devastating for them and that they will continue to experience lifelong impacts from the loss of two loved ones, especially given the tragic circumstances in this case. Again, I extend my condolences to them for their ongoing grief and sense of loss.

7The Crown submitted, and I agree, that the gravity of the offences can include the consequences that flowed from the driving behaviour, and that Mr. McNeil’s conduct following the collision is particularly aggravating, by failing to remain when it was clear that he was involved in and contributed to the collision.

8I also agree that deterrence is of paramount importance in relation to driving offences which result in fatalities, even in the regulatory context under the HTA.

9I also agree with the Crown that cases such as these involving stunt driving behaviour are not “momentary lapses in judgment” but occur as a result of a series of choices made over a period of time, be it several seconds or minutes in length.

10I also agree with the Crown’s submission that failing to remain in this case is aggravating and that general deterrence is required to prevent members of the public from doing the same.

11The Crown reiterated that driving is a privilege and that where the driving is the offensive behaviour a driving suspension is required.

12The Crown also agreed that Mr. McNeil was a youthful 17 years of age at the time of the incident but said any mitigation on this point should be minimal given the lack of a plea of guilt and in light of the impact and gravity of the offences.

13In conclusion, the Crown submitted that the driving behaviour was intentional, that the expression of remorse was minimally impactful in that at sentencing he still maintained his view that he wasn’t involved in the accident, although he now regrets what happened, and the steps taken to evade responsibility following the incident are relevant at sentencing, given the court’s findings on steps he and his father took to avoid detection by police and their instructions to witnesses not to step forward either.

Defense Submissions:

14Counsel reminded the Court that there are factual distinctions between the cases referenced in Exhibit 2 and the facts of this case, essentially that each of them arise in the context of a criminal proceeding or a careless causing death case, therefore they may be informative but have limited precedential value in this case.

15Counsel then called Mr. McNeil to testify about the impact this incident has had on him over the last 18 months, where stated that he was deeply sorry for what happened, that two people died and another was injured, and that there was nothing he could do to bring them back.

16Mr. McNeil also said that he has had a lot of time to think about what happened and that in hindsight he should have slowed down, even though at the time he didn’t think he was involved in the accident.

17Counsel reminded the Court that causation, unlike in criminal or careless cases, was not a requirement to be proven in this case. He also stated that fear and shock may have had a significant effect on his judgement at that time which led to the offences before the Court.

18Counsel also reminded the Court that Mr. McNeil was not the sole cause of what happened that night and that it was the combination of decisions made by Mr. McNeil and Mr. Bagi that led to the collision.

19Counsel stated that Mr. McNeil continues to stand by the assertion that he was not involved in the accident because there was no contact with the cyclist and that there was no damage to his vehicle, and that this was an honestly held belief that he repeated to police and was corroborated in part by passengers in the vehicle. Due to this ongoing belief, counsel asked that this honest lack of awareness should be mitigating on sentence.

20Counsel concluded that any sentence should avoid being disproportionate or vengeful and should focus of deterrence and restraint, not punishment alone. In conclusion, counsel submitted that a $3000 fine for both the Stunt driving and Failing to Remain charges was appropriate, with a 2-year probation for each count, including a 1 year driving suspension and a further 6 months suspension for stunting driving and failing to remain accordingly.

Available Penalties

Stunt Driving: Fine or imprisonment

21s.172(2) of the HTA states that: every person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not less than $2,000 and not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both. 2024, c. 21, s. 25 (1).

Suspension

(3) In addition to the penalty imposed under subsection (2), the driver’s licence of a person convicted of a contravention of subsection (1) is suspended,

(a) on a first conviction under this section, for a minimum of one year;

Discretion to extend

(5) Where the court making a conviction under this section considers it to be proper and desirable for the protection of the public using the highways, the court may make an order extending the period of suspension referred to in subsection (3) to,

(a) a period greater than the period required under clause (3) (a) but not exceeding three years;

Penalty for Failing to Remain

22s.200(2) of the HTA states that: Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not less than $400 and not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both, and in addition the person’s licence or permit may be suspended for a period of not more than two years. 2009, c. 5, s. 54.

Sentencing Objectives

General and Specific Deterrence

23Deterrence should be the paramount consideration in sentencing public welfare offences. Not every strict liability provincial offence is of the same seriousness or poses the same threat to the welfare of the public. Every case will have aggravating and mitigating factors, and a fit sentence should reflect the circumstances surrounding the unlawful conduct and the offender's personal circumstances. See: Real Estate Council of Ontario v. Wang & Feng, 2013 ONCJ 515, [2013] O.J. No. 4294 (Ont. C.J.).

24General deterrence involves deterring the public generally from committing the offence. It is the most important sentencing goal for most regulatory offences: R. v. Cotton Felts Ltd. (1982), 1982 3695 (ON CA), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 287 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Bata Industries Ltd., [1992] O.J. No. 667 (Ont. Prov. Div.).

25Specific deterrence, on the other hand, involves deterring the specific offender before the court from committing the offence again. It is also an important goal of sentencing in regulatory offences.

26In, Mississauga (City) v. Williams-Cordeiro, 2025 ONCJ 120, a useful case given some of similar issues addressed therein, the presiding Justice stated in her decision that:

[9] In the regulatory context, the objectives of sentencing are specific and general deterrence, denunciation, proportionality, and restraint. As recognized in R. v. Cotton Felts Ltd., 1982 3695 (ON CA), 1982 O.J. No. 178, deterrence is the paramount consideration in sentencing for public welfare statutes. To be meaningful, a sentence must be felt by the defendant while also serving as a warning to others who might be likeminded in their misconduct. A just sentence must be appropriate to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender. This is unlike the criminal law wherein rehabilitation is also a factor for the court’s consideration. Given the lower mens rea in the regulatory context the concept of rehabilitation is an “awkward fit.” R. v. Miller, 2023 ONCJ 77, para. 63.

[10] The need for specific deterrence will depend on the individual offender, Miller, supra, para. 63, and turns on the circumstances of the matter at hand. Deterrence under the HTA reflects the need to discourage persons from “driving behaviours that negatively impact the safety of those using the roadways … [it] exists to ensure that the roadways are used safely by all.” R. v. Henry, [2023] O.J. No. 2974, para. 22.

[11] Denunciation as a sentencing objective in the HTA context will depend on the offender’s departure from the standard of “due care and attention.” It is the conduct of driving without due care and attention that is the focus of sentencing in the regulatory context. “… [I]t is not the consequences that is the focus of the sentence rather, it is the driving conduct itself, lack of due care and attention, along with other mitigating and aggravating factors being taken into consideration.” R. v. Grosse, 2017 ONCJ 228, para. 7.

….[13] The principle of restraint reminds the court that incarceration should be used sparingly and with “great care.” Miller, supra, para. 65. In this matter, I am mindful that this sentencing takes place in the regulatory context not in the criminal one.

27I concur with my colleague’s assessment of the objectives of sentencing and will apply them to this case accordingly appreciating it is distinct from this case.

Protection of the Public

28The purpose of public welfare or regulatory offences must be considered when imposing sentences under regulatory statutes. Regulatory offences are not criminal offences. Activity is not prohibited by regulatory offences because it is inherently wrong. The activity is regulated because, if left unregulated, it would result in danger to the public. These offences serve to protect the public from potentially harmful conduct by ensuring the safety of the food we eat, our work environment and the vehicles that transport us. See: R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. (1991), 1991 39 (SCC), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).

29I conclude that any penalty in this case requires significant general and specific deterrence so that there is minimal change of recidivism and that the public will understand the repercussions for poor driving choices. Also, moving forward, this sentence will minimize any future risk to the public by the defendant.

Principles of Sentencing

Proportionality

30The sentence imposed must “bear some relationship to the offence; it must be a “fit” sentence proportionate to the seriousness of the offence”: Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (1985), 1985 81 (SCC), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).

31The “appropriateness of a sentence will depend on the particular circumstances of the offence, the offender, and the community”: R. v. Gladue (1999), 1999 679 (SCC), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).

Parity

32The principle of parity requires that similar sentences be imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances: R. v. C.A.M. (1996), 1996 230 (SCC), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 (S.C.C.)

Totality

33If a defendant is sentenced for more than one offence and consecutive jail sentences are imposed, proportionality is expressed through the totality principle. This principle directs trial courts to consider whether the total of all the sentences imposed exceeds the moral blameworthiness of the offender. See: R. v. C.A.M. (1996), 1996 230 (SCC), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 (S.C.C.).

Factors to Consider

Mitigating Factors

34Mitigating factors justify a lower penalty than would otherwise be imposed. These factors may relate to the offence or the offender.

35Here the most relevant mitigating factor is that Mr. McNeil comes before the court with no criminal or driving record.

36Secondly, on the issue of remorse, which applies in this case in a limited fashion, McNeil was clearly apologetic for what happened but seemed to maintain his exculpatory position regarding the fail to remain. In relation to the stunt driving offence, he stated in hindsight he though he should have slowed down. The evidence at trial and in sentencing leads me to conclude that he was remorseful.

37The remaining factors for mitigation were not engaged as there was not a guilty plea, there were no efforts to minimize damage or harm, and these were not mens rea offences.

Aggravating Factors

38Aggravating factors are factors which justify an increase in the penalty which would otherwise be imposed.

39Here, I find that there was lack of effort to minimize the damage caused by the commission of the offence in that he did not stop to assist as needed and sought to avoid detection and had other witnesses do the same to avoid detection until it became obvious in the media that the blue Jeep was involved.

40On the issue of harm, this case involves extreme harm flowing from driving behaviour, both Mr. McNeil’s and Mr. Bagi’s. One man was serious injured and two people were killed in the collision, as a result of choices made by both of them. The harm was exacerbated by failing to remain as no assistance to the injured or authorities was provided notwithstanding the statutory and moral obligation to do so. Also, the efforts to avoid detection and have other witnesses do the same, until it became obvious in the media that the blue Jeep was involved, is highly problematic.

Evidence of Defendant’s Financial Circumstances

41Mr. McNeil was employed at the time of sentencing submissions but does not expect to maintain gainful employment if incarnated or if he faces a lengthy driving suspension. There was some indication that a significant fine would be problematic as well due to his limited means, even though his parents may be willing to assist.

Proof of Previous Conviction or Acquittal

42Mr. McNeil, as stated, comes before the Court today with no previous criminal or driving record.

Evidence of Untried Offences

43There is no evidence of untried offences or other outstanding charges.

Victim Impact Statements

44The Provincial Offences Act, unlike the Criminal Code, does not have provisions governing victim impact statements. However, a provincial offences court has jurisdiction to consider victim impact statements, See: R. v. Hutchings, [2004] O.J. No. 3950 (Ont. C.J.).

45I have heard and reviewed the victim impact statements as part of this sentencing deliberation. Their contents are heartbreaking and speak directly to the impact stunt driving can have on a family and a community as a whole. The damage is permanent, irreversible, and causes negative effects to ripple well beyond those immediately connected to the incident.

46To balance their input, I am also mindful that this incident involved the choices of not only Mr. McNeil, but also Mr. Bagi. The combination of their choices that night created this tragedy. Unfortunately, Mr. Bagi and Ms. Peruelo, have paid the ultimate price for these impulsive decisions in losing their lives. Mr. McNeil was all but unscathed by the incident except for the court process he has had to engage in and the sorrow and regret he carries with him.

Decision on Sentence

47The cases filed were very informative and assisted in my decision-making for this case, although I appreciate that this case is unique in its facts, findings, and assessments of public harm and penalty.

48The cases had significant overlap factually in many ways, but the legal tests and sentencing provisions in them are distinct from this case in that many were either criminal cases or were HTA cases including careless causing death considerations. This case is presently limited to the issues of an appropriate penalty for stunt driving and for failing to remain.

49Given the findings in my trial decision, and my assessment of the evidence in the sentencing hearing I find the following:

50First, this case is one that requires a period of incarceration to drive home the need for both general and specific deterrence with a view to protecting the public moving forward.

51Proportionality and parity are difficult in this case as there do not appear to be cases on point. Most of the cases involved defendants who were either facing serious criminal charges, were convicted for causing the fatalities, or had existing criminal or driving records and were often already subject to driving restrictions at the time. This case involved stunt driving by going 116 km/h in a 60 km/h zone. The speeds in the cases provided were significantly higher and often the driving behaviour was more erratic or sustained. Here, Mr. McNeil was 16km/h into the stunt driving range, which is still offensive and dangerous, but not as significant as many of the cases referenced.

52Again, the focus on sentencing is the driving behaviour itself and not to specifically sanction him for the fatalities that occurred as a result of his and Mr. Bagi’s driving, although they are relevant.

53Similarly, in failing to remain, McNeil showed a callous disregard for his obligations to remain as he was directly involved in the accident, and his behaviour that followed is aggravating. Again, the penalty needs to focus on the driving behaviour itself and not simply attempt to punish him for the fatalities that occurred.

54Given my findings, a period of incarceration is necessary as a punitive measure for the offending behaviour. I laboured significantly on this issue because incarceration should not be imposed unless a less intrusive and appropriate measure would suffice. An elevated fine or lengthier suspension or suffocating probation conditions, absent incarceration, did not seem sufficient given the factors I have had to consider.

55I appreciate that Mr. McNeil was 17 years old at the time of the offences and does not have a driving or criminal record. I have already taken this into consideration.

56For the offence of stunt driving, I will impose an elevated fine of $5000, along with 60 days custody, and an elevated 2 year driving suspension.

57For the offence of failing to remain, I will impose 60 days custody (concurrent), followed by an elevated 2 year driving suspension (concurrent), and 2 years of probation, with specific conditions pursuant to s 72(3)(b) and (c).

58The probation order will run for 2 years following being released from custody. The terms of the probation order will include both the statutory terms along with the following discretionary terms:

• Do not operate or have care and control of any motor vehicle.
• Report to probation as and when required.
• Complete no less than 150 hours of community service for a charity that supports vulnerable people in your community, as chosen by your probation officer (e.g. St. Vincent de Paul, Martha’s Table, Partners in Mission Food Bank, or the local Kingston & District MADD).
• You are required to provide written proof of completion of the required hours to your probation officer prior to the expiry of this order.

59Some may think that a longer period of custody is required. This sentence puts McNeil at one third the maximum sentences available under the Act. I note that in many of the cases filed with the court, the offender, often with a record, having been found guilty of causing the fatalities, often received about half the available sanction. If custody was to run consecutively, it would but him close to half the available sanction which would mean he is similarly situated to the defendants in the quoted cases, which he is not. Again, other charges were available that involved either criminal sanction causation, or mens rea, where higher sanctions would have been available if proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Crown chose to run with lesser offences of stunt driving and failing to remain, and in my view given the facts in this case, Mr. McNeil does not attract higher sanctions in the circumstances.

60Sixty days of concurrent custody is significant for first offences, without being overly punitive. A member of the public observing these proceedings would be deterred from similar behaviours in that they would now clearly see that they would be exposed to months of custody and significant suspensions if they were stunt driving and/or fail to remain where injuries/fatalities occurred even if they never hit anyone or had a driving record: this is significant.

61The CSO will require Mr. McNeil to do something for others in need which will force him to think about others and to understand how fortunate he is to be young, healthy, and to have a supportive family. Serving others will assist Mr. McNeil is understanding the causes and effects decisions in life have on others, which will lead to better driving behaviour if he becomes licensed to drive in the future.

62Any breach of either the suspension or probation orders will almost certainly expose Mr. Neil to further custody if convicted, which I am sure he is fully aware of and therefore will not be an issue for him moving forward given his stated remorse and newfound reflection on life during this process.