WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. D.B., 2026 ONCJ 292

DATE: May 26^th, 2026

COURT FILE No.: 23-23108466

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

D.B.

Before Justice Brian D. White

Plea Proceedings Heard on March 12^th, 2026

Reasons for Sentence released on May 26^th, 2026

Ms. Forward & Ms. Mehkeri................................................................... counsel for the Crown

Mr. Kugathasan…………………………………………………………………………………………… counsel for the Defendant

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Table of Contents:

Introduction- 4

Position of the Parties- 5

Position of the Defence- 5

Position of the Crown- 6

Application of the Principle in Kienapple- 7

Factual Nexus- 7

Legal Nexus- 8

Application of Kienapple- 8

Sentencing Framework- 9

Emphasis on Denunciation and Deterrence- 10

The Gravity & Wrongfulness of Child Sexual Offences- 10

Parity, Proportionality and the Emerging Range of Sentence- 12

Application of Sentencing Principles to the Facts- 13

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances- 14

Mitigating Factors- 14

Consideration of the Personal Circumstances of D.B. 14

Compliance with Bail Conditions- 15

Character Reference Letters- 15

A Consideration of the Defendant’s Good Character 16

Aggravating Factors- 17

Abuse of a Position of Trust or Authority- 17

Significant Impact on the Complainant 19

Consideration of a Conditional Sentence Order- 21

Conclusion- 23

Ancillary Orders- 25

White. J.

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Introduction

1This matter comes before the Court for sentencing following my decision at trial released on October 30, 2025.

2In those reasons, I found D.B. guilty of sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code and sexual assault contrary to s. 271, arising from his conduct toward his daughter, G.B. (hereinafter referred to as G.H., or the complainant), this conduct was over a defined period of time.

3At trial, I accepted the evidence of the complainant as credible and reliable in its material respects. The evidence that I did accept established that D.B. engaged in sexual abuse of his teenage daughter, including the following:

• Shower Incident: While wrapped in a towel after showering, her father asked to see her breasts. She refused, but he insisted and touched her breasts with his hands.

• Bedroom Incident: While changing clothes, her father repeatedly opened her bedroom door despite her protests. She called him a “pervert”.

• Rash Incident: While showing her father a rash on her arms, he asked to check her vaginal area. She refused, but he pulled her pants forward approximately 1–2 inches and looked. G.H. believed she was not wearing underwear at the time.

• Buttocks Touching: G.H. testified that her father frequently grabbed, slapped, or squeezed her buttocks. She stated that this occurred “too many times to count” and made her feel uncomfortable.

4I found that the touching was non-consensual and continued despite the complainant’s expressed discomfort and objections. I further found that these acts were deliberate, occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature, and constituted a violation of his teenage daughter’s sexual integrity. I rejected D.B.’s evidence where it conflicted with the evidence I accepted, finding it to be unreliable and not capable of raising a reasonable doubt. For a more detailed review of these factual findings please refer to my reasons for judgment at trial, dated October 30^th, 2025.

5These findings frame the sentencing exercise. D.B. now stands to be sentenced for the identified sexual abuse of his daughter that engages both the complainant’s vulnerability and a significant breach of the parental relationship.

6The sentencing hearing proceeded on March 12, 2026. I have had the benefit of comprehensive submissions from counsel, including written materials, a presentence report, victim impact evidence, and supporting exhibits. I have also considered the positions advanced by both the Crown and the defence.

7At this stage of the proceedings, my task is fundamentally different from that undertaken at trial. The presumption of innocence no longer applies. The Court must determine a fit and proportionate sentence having regard to the gravity of the offence, the degree of responsibility of the offender, and the applicable sentencing principles set out in the Criminal Code. This determination must be individualized to the particular circumstances of D.B., grounded in the factual findings made at trial, and informed by the broader legal framework governing the sentencing of sexual offences against children.

8With these principles in mind, I turn to the position of the parties.

Position of the Parties

Position of the Defence

9The defence seeks a non-custodial disposition to be served in the community. It submits that the appropriate sentence is a conditional sentence order of two years less a day, to be served under strict house arrest with GPS monitoring, together with any additional conditions the court considers appropriate. The defence takes the position that the rule in Kienapple applies on the basis that the offences arise from a single course of conduct.

10In support of its position, the defence submits that a conditional sentence is legally available, as the proposed sentence falls below two years and is not precluded by statute. The defence argues that a properly structured conditional sentence order can achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, while also permitting rehabilitation to occur in the community. It further submits that D.B. presents a manageable risk, pointing to his compliance with release conditions and the strength of his community support.

11The defence acknowledges the presence of aggravating factors, including the breach of trust and the impact on the complainant, but emphasizes several mitigating considerations. These include D.B.’s extensive community support, as reflected in numerous character letters, his stable employment, and his significant involvement in charitable work, including humanitarian initiatives. The defence also relies on the Defendant’s limited and dated criminal record and his compliance with court-imposed conditions while on release.

12In addition, the defence submits that the collateral consequences of incarceration would be significant and should be taken into account. In particular, it points to the potential loss of the D.B.’s business operations, the impact on employees, the disruption of charitable services, and the effect on his ability to meet child support obligations. The defence relies on appellate authority in support of considering such third-party impacts.

13The defence also raises D.B.’s medical conditions, including sleep apnea and a scheduled orthopedic surgery on April 23^rd, 2026 (and the post-surgery rehabilitation), as factors supporting a community-based sentence or, in the alternative, an adjournment to address those issues. With respect to ancillary orders, the defence submits that if Kienapple applies, a 10-year SOIRA order would be appropriate, and that any order under s. 161 should be narrowly tailored and should not impose unnecessarily broad restrictions on contact with children. The defence further submits that his other daughter M.B. should not be included in any non-contact or probationary conditions, as she is not a complainant or witness. Ultimately, the defence maintains that a conditional sentence with stringent conditions would constitute a significant and proportionate sanction in the circumstances.

Position of the Crown

14The Crown seeks a custodial disposition and submits that the appropriate sentence is 18 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently on the counts of sexual interference and sexual assault, followed by a period of probation. The Crown takes the position that the offences represent separate and discrete acts, such that the rule in Kienapple does not apply.

15In advancing its position, the Crown emphasizes the seriousness of the offences, which involve a child victim and a significant breach of trust and authority arising from the parental relationship. The Crown submits that the statutory aggravating factors set out in s. 718.2(a) are engaged, including that the complainant was under the age of 18 and that D.B. abused a position of trust or authority. The Crown further relies on s. 718.01, submitting that denunciation and deterrence must be given primary consideration in cases involving offences against children. In that regard, the Crown invokes the principles articulated in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, emphasizing the profound and long-term harm caused by child sexual abuse and the appellate direction that sentences for such offences have increased in severity.

16The Crown highlights the significant impact on the complainant, as reflected in the victim impact statement, including the emotional and psychological harm described. While acknowledging certain mitigating factors, including the Defendant’s employment history, charitable involvement, and a dated and unrelated criminal record, the Crown submits that these considerations do not displace the need for a custodial sentence. The Crown further submits that D.B.’s lack of remorse is not an aggravating factor but may bear on the assessment of rehabilitation and risk.

17The Crown takes the position that a conditional sentence order would be inappropriate in light of the seriousness of the offending conduct and the governing sentencing principles. With respect to ancillary orders, the Crown seeks a lifetime SOIRA order on the basis of multiple designated offences and what it characterizes as a pattern of conduct, a s. 161 order for five years restricting contact with children, a DNA order, and restitution in the agreed amount of $2,671.39. The Crown also seeks a period of probation, including conditions prohibiting contact with the complainant and restricting contact with his other daughter M.B.. Finally, the Crown submits that the Defendant’s medical conditions can be appropriately managed within a custodial setting.

18Before turning to the appropriate sentence, I must first address whether both convictions can stand, in light of the rule against multiple convictions in Kienapple.

Application of the Principle in Kienapple

19The Kienapple principle guards against multiple convictions for the same offence, where there is both a factual and a legal nexus connecting the offences [See: R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 SCR 729; R. v. Saliba, 2019 ONCA 22, at para. 12]. This principle was first articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of John Kienapple having been charged with both rape and unlawful carnal knowledge of a female under fourteen years of age. As these two offences, at the time, were made up of substantially the same elements, with no distinct or additional elements to render them sufficiently different, this invited the application of the rule against multiple convictions.

20The Kienapple principle prevents an accused from being convicted of more than one offence arising out of the same events or “delict”. Where the same delict gives rise to two or more convictions with substantially the same elements, the accused should only be convicted of the most serious offence. The requisite factual nexus is established if the charges arise out of the same transaction; the legal nexus is established if the offences constitute a single criminal wrong or delict [See: R. v. M.R., 2020 ONCA 231, at para. 47].

Factual Nexus

21A factual nexus is present when the charges arise out of the same transaction [See: R. v. Meszaros, 2013 ONCA 682 at para. 31]. Whether two offences have a sufficiently proximate factual relationship to be characterized as the same transaction depends on factors such as the remoteness or proximity of the events in time and place, the presence or absence of relevant intervening events, and whether the accused’s actions were connected by a common objective.

Legal Nexus

22There is a sufficient legal nexus between the offences if they constitute a single wrong or delict [See: R. v. Meszaros, at para. 32]. The determination of whether a legal nexus exists is one that “defies precise answers” [See: R. v. Prince, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480]. Where the offences under scrutiny protect different societal interests, they are less likely to be subject to the rule precluding multiple convictions [See” R. v. Prince, at para. 32]. Conversely, where the same transaction gives rise to two or more offences with substantially the same elements, and an accused is found guilty of more than one of those offences, the accused should be convicted only of the most serious offence [See: R. v. Prince, at para. 33]

23In considering the legal nexus between the offences of sexual interference and sexual assault, I adopt the reasoning of Justice Goldstein in R. v. D.F., 2024 ONSC 1892. In D.F., Justice Goldstein noted that the elements of sexual assault and sexual interference are substantially the same and, absent a distinct factual nexus, the rule against multiple convictions is engaged pursuant to Kienapple [See R. v. D.F. at para. 10].

Application of Kienapple

24In this case, the accused is before the court on count 4, sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code, and count 5, sexual assault, both relating to his daughter, G.H. I am satisfied that there is a sufficient factual nexus between these offences, as they arise from the same date range and encompass the same underlying conduct. There is no evidence of distinct or separate incidents that would justify treating the offences arising from different transactions.

25I further find that there is a sufficient legal nexus, as the offences constitute the same criminal wrong, in the context of this case. The essential elements of the offences are substantially the same, and there is no meaningful distinction in the conduct relied upon by the Crown that would support multiple convictions.

26In these circumstances, the Kienapple principle applies. The conviction for sexual assault on count 5 is therefore stayed, and I will proceed to sentence on count 4, the offence of sexual interference.

Sentencing Framework

27Under s. 718 of the Criminal Code the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the objectives listed in s. 718. These objective include:

• denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

• deterrence of the offender and other persons from committing offences;

• separation of offenders from society, where necessary;

• assisting in rehabilitating offenders; and

• promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

28A “just sanction” is a proportionate sanction. Punishment must be neither excessive nor inadequate. Under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, a sentence must be proportionate both to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

29Under s. 718.2, additional principles, must be taken into consideration in sentencing, including the following:

• assessment of the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender must be informed by “any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances in relation to the offence or the offender [See: s. 718.2(a)];

• parity in sentencing must be respected: “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances” [See: s. 718.2(b)]; and

• the principle of restraint must be respected – under s. 718.2(d), “an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances” and under s. 718.2(e), “all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders…”

30I also recognize that the principle of restraint does not concern only the decision to imprison or not to imprison but entails that the duration of imprisonment should be the shortest period consistent with the proportionality of sentence and the achievement of the objectives of the sentence.

Emphasis on Denunciation and Deterrence

31In decisions spanning over a decade, our courts have emphasized the sentencing priority of deterrence and denunciation for sexual offences against children.

32In R. v. Friesen, at paras. 101-102, Chief Justice Wager and Justice Row emphasized the Parliamentary direction to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for offences that involve children. While primary consideration must be given to deterrence and denunciation (noting that other sentencing objective cannot be elevated to equal or higher priority), Friesen also recognized at para. 104 that a “sentencing judge retains discretion to accord significant weight to other factors, such as rehabilitation, in exercising discretion in arriving at a fit sentence” [Also See: R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26 at paras. 28 and 123].

The Gravity & Wrongfulness of Child Sexual Offences

33In Friesen, the Supreme Court of Canada reset the approach to sentencing for child sexual offences and provided comprehensive guidance on the assessment of proportionality, seriousness, denunciation, and the harm caused by these offences. The Court emphasized that sentencing judges must meaningfully account for the gravity and wrongfulness of sexual offending against children when crafting a fit sentence. The guidance in Friesen is central to the assessment in this case [See Friesen, at para. 74–76, 90, 103 and 104].

34At the core of Friesen is the direction that sentences must recognize and reflect both the harm caused by sexual offences against children and the inherent wrongfulness of such conduct. These considerations are essential to the proper application of the proportionality principle. The wrongfulness and harmfulness of the conduct inform both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. A proper understanding of these concepts ensures that the sentence imposed accurately reflects the offender’s conduct and its consequences and appropriately condemns both.

35The Court in Friesen made clear that it is not sufficient to simply state that sexual offences against children are serious. Rather, sentences must be demonstrably commensurate with that seriousness. In doing so, I must give full effect to three interrelated considerations: (1) the inherent wrongfulness of the offence, (2) the potential harm flowing from the offence, and (3) the actual harm caused to the victim [See: Friesen at para. 76]. These considerations must be examined together in order to properly reflect the gravity of the conduct.

36Sexual offending against children is always inherently wrongful and carries with it an ever-present risk of profound harm. As the Supreme Court stated in Friesen at para. 79:

[79] In addition to the inherent wrongfulness of physical interference and exploitation, courts have recognized that sexual violence against children inherently has the potential to cause several recognized forms of harm. The likelihood that these forms of potential harm will materialize of course varies depending on the circumstances of each case. However, the potential that these forms of harm will materialize is always present whenever there is physical [page472] interference of a sexual nature with a child and can be present even in sexual offences against children that do not require or involve physical interference. These forms of potential harm illustrate the seriousness of the offence even absent proof that they have materialized into actual harm (see McDonnell, at paras. 35-36).

37The very purpose of the offence of sexual interference is to address the profound harm sexual violence causes to children and its broader impact on families and society. Child victims may suffer lasting psychological consequences, including difficulty forming trusting intimate relationships because of the manipulation and exploitation they have endured [See: Bertrand Marchand, at para. 38].

38The harm caused by these offences is not confined to the child. It frequently extends to the family unit. As recognized in Friesen, “[t]he ripple effects of sexual violence against children can make the child’s parents, caregivers, and family members secondary victims who also suffer profound harm as a result of the offence” [See: Friesen at para. 63; Also See: Bertrand Marchand at para. 41].

39The harm extends further to the community and to society as a whole. The Supreme Court observed as follows at para. 64 of Friesen:

[64] Beyond the harm to families and caregivers, there is broader harm to the communities in which children live and to society as a whole. Some of these costs can be quantified, such as the social problems that sexual violence against children causes, the costs of state intervention, and the economic impact of medical costs, lost productivity, and treatment for pain and suffering (see Hajar, at para. 68; R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38, [2019] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 37; United Nations, Report of the independent expert for the United Nations study on violence against children, U.N. Doc. A/61/299, August 29, 2006, at p. 12). In particular, children who are victims of sexual violence may be more likely to engage in sexual violence against children themselves when they reach adulthood (D. (D.), at paras. 37-38). Sexual violence against children can thus fuel a cycle of sexual violence that results in the proliferation and normalization of the violence in a given community (Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, The Sexual Exploitation of Children in Canada: the Need for National Action, November 2011 (online), at pp. 10, 30 and 41). In short, the costs that cannot be quantified are also profound. Children are the future of our country and our communities. They deserve to have a childhood free of sexual violence (Hajar, at para. 44). When children become victims of sexual violence"[s]ociety as a whole is diminished and degraded" (Hajar, at para. 67).

40I must therefore consider not only the actual harm proven on the evidence, but also the reasonably foreseeable potential harm flowing from sexual violence against children when assessing the gravity of the offence [See: Friesen at para. 84].

41Friesen further emphasizes that offending against children increases the offender’s degree of responsibility. The intentional sexual exploitation and objectification of children is highly morally blameworthy because of their inherent vulnerability. Offenders who take advantage of that vulnerability to achieve their own purposes bear a heightened level of moral culpability.

42At the same time, the Court in Friesen confirmed that while denunciation and deterrence must be given primary consideration pursuant to s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code, sentencing remains an individualized exercise. Sentencing judges retain discretion to consider factors that may reduce moral culpability and must ensure that the sentence imposed is “just and appropriate … and nothing more” [See: Friesen at para. 91].

43A practical implication of the Friesen framework is that pre-Friesen sentencing authorities must be approached with caution. Sentences must reflect the contemporary understanding of the gravity and harmfulness of child sexual offences.

44These principles guide my assessment of both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender in this case.

Parity, Proportionality and the Emerging Range of Sentence

45At para 33 of Friesen, Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Rowe wrote that:

[33] In practice, parity gives meaning to proportionality. A proportionate sentence for a given offender and offence cannot be deduced from first principles; instead, judges calibrate the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases. Sentencing precedents reflect the range of factual situations in the world and the plurality of judicial perspectives. Precedents embody the collective experience and wisdom of the judiciary. They are the practical expression of both parity and proportionality.

46The parity principle raises the question of the proper range of sentence for child sexual offending. The range of sentences for sexual offences against children are being reassessed by courts in light of the reasoning in Friesen. In Friesen, the Court wrote at para 114 that "mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and ... upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances."

47Of course, sentencing continues to be a process tailored to the individual offender. Notwithstanding the recent jurisprudential focus on the nature and severity of sexual violence against children, sentencing for these offences must continue to follow the prime directive of proportionality and engage a specific factual consideration of every individual offender and their unique circumstances [See: Criminal Code ss. 718.1, 718.2(a); Friesen at para 30; R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para 70; R v Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at paras 10-12].

Application of Sentencing Principles to the Facts

48The fundamental principle of sentencing, as set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code, is that “[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” This principle governs the analysis that follows.

49A proportionate sentence requires a careful assessment of both components of that principle. The gravity of the offence reflects its inherent wrongfulness and the harm it causes, while the degree of responsibility turns on the offender’s moral culpability for the commission of the offence. These two considerations are interrelated and must be assessed together in determining a fit sentence.

50In the analysis that follows, I consider first the nature and seriousness of the offending conduct, and then the degree of responsibility of D.B. for that conduct. While personal circumstances remain relevant to the overall sentencing analysis, the focus at this stage is on the offender’s culpability in committing the offence itself, as distinct from considerations more directly tied to rehabilitation or mitigation.

In this case, I find that D.B.’s degree of responsibility is high. This conclusion arises from the nature of the offending conduct and, in particular, the fact that the offences were committed by a father against his child. The moral blameworthiness associated with such conduct cannot be overstated. A parent is entrusted with the protection and care of his child and is uniquely positioned to understand and safeguard that child’s vulnerability. The abuse of that relationship significantly elevates the offender’s responsibility. The specific aggravating factors that inform this conclusion are addressed in detail below.

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

51Section 718.2(a) of the Code provides that a court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration that “a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender”. I confirm that all identified aggravating and mitigating facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the totality of the evidence both at trial and through the exhibits filed in these sentencing proceedings.

52I turn now to consider the mitigating factors most relevant to these sentencing proceedings.

Mitigating Factors

Consideration of the Personal Circumstances of D.B.

53Since offences are committed in particular circumstances by particular offenders, the determination of a proportionate sentence is inherently individualized. As the Supreme Court confirmed in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at para. 43, sentencing requires careful attention to the specific circumstances of both the offence and the offender. Similarly, in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at para. 36, the Court emphasized that a sentence must be crafted “for this offence, committed by this offender, harming this victim, in this community” [emphasis added]. With these principles in mind, the Court must consider the personal history, background, and circumstances of D.B. in determining a fit and proportionate sentence.

54Not all personal circumstances bear directly on an offender’s moral culpability for the commission of the offence. However, pre-offence and post-offence factors may nonetheless be relevant to the overall sentencing analysis. These factors may inform the offender’s level of blameworthiness in a broader sense, as well as the relative importance of sentencing objectives such as rehabilitation and specific deterrence. They include circumstances arising before the offence, those that provide context for the offending conduct, and those that have developed since the offence, all of which assist the Court in arriving at a sentence that is individualized and proportionate.

55The pre‑sentence report describes D.B. as a man with strong community ties, stable employment, and a significant degree of social support. He is gainfully employed in the field of dental implant sales and is involved in organizing and supporting dental clinics, including charitable initiatives that provide care to underserved populations, particularly in Mexico. The materials before the Court reflect that his work contributes not only to his own financial stability but also to the employment of others and to the provision of medical services in the community.

56With respect to his personal background, the report indicates that D.B. has experienced difficulties earlier in life but has achieved a degree of stability in adulthood. He maintains relationships with family members and has support from friends, colleagues, and members of the community, many of whom describe him in positive terms. He is also a father and issues relating to parenting and support obligations form part of his personal circumstances.

57The pre‑sentence report notes that D.B. has a dated and unrelated criminal record. He has been compliant with his release conditions in the present matter. However, the report also reflects that D.B. does not accept responsibility for the offences. To be clear, this is not an aggravating factor but may have implications for his insight, rehabilitation, and risk assessment.

58The report further notes certain health concerns, including sleep apnea and issues relating to his shoulder, for which surgery has been scheduled, and will include post-surgical rehabilitative steps. I recognize and consider these factors, as they form an important part of his personal circumstances, which may be significantly impacted by the sentence that I impose.

Compliance with Bail Conditions

59In addition to his background and personal history, I also consider his conduct while subject to court orders. It is a mitigating factor that D.B. has been able to be on bail for a lengthy period of time without incident (commonly referred to as Downes mitigation); which I have taken into account when determining a fit sentence in this case.

Character Reference Letters

60Letters to the Court were provided and filed collectively as Exhibit #3.

61The letters contain some information relevant to mitigation, including evidence of D.B.’s support in the community by both his family and friends. These letters demonstrate close and sustained connections with a broad network of individuals, including family members, long-time friends, professional colleagues, and participants in his charitable initiatives. Many of the letters describe D.B.’s involvement in organizing and delivering significant charitable dental services, particularly in Mexico, including the provision of free dental care and surgical treatment to underserved populations. Several authors describe his role in supporting clinics that employ multiple staff, pay wages significantly above local norms, and provide training and professional development to dentists and assistants. A number of letters express concern that these operations, and the livelihoods associated with them, would be jeopardized in his absence.

62The letters also speak to D.B.’s personal characteristics and history. Some writers describe a lengthy relationship with him, in some cases extending over a decade or more, and refer to his development over time, including overcoming earlier life challenges. Others describe him as a devoted and engaged parent, and as someone who has demonstrated generosity, mentorship, and leadership in both professional and personal contexts. Several authors specifically indicate that they have observed him interacting appropriately with children, including their own, and express trust in his conduct in those settings. The majority of the letters expressly acknowledge awareness of the charges or conviction when offering their support.

63The letters also contained pleas for leniency. The pleas for leniency do not affect sentencing. My task is to determine D.B.’s sentence based on the applicable law and the entirety of the evidentiary record. These letters clearly speak to the potential collateral consequences, which were identified by counsel for D.B. in submissions, which I have considered in determining the appropriate sentence in this case. While these letters speak to aspects of his character and community involvement, their significance must be carefully assessed in light of governing appellate authority.

A Consideration of the Defendant’s Good Character

64The character letters spoke to D.B.’s good character. Good character did not stop D.B. from committing this offence. It does not have any bearing on the gravity of the offence committed or on the responsibility for committing the offence that is before me.

65In R v. Scott, 2024 ONCA 608, Chief Justice Tulloch (speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeal) noted that good character, employment and stigma are less significant factors in sentencing child sexual offenders [See: para. 172]. Chief Justice Tulloch noted that prior good character and employment should receive only limited weight because many perpetrators are people of otherwise good character who secretly commit these offences that involve repeated conduct that is more than just an isolated out-of-character act. It is very blameworthy for people of otherwise prior good character to fail to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions [See: Scott at para. 172].

66In relation to stigma of the criminal proceedings, I do not find that D.B.’s conviction for this offence to be a mitigating circumstance. I do not find that the prosecution affected D.B. in a manner beyond what one would expect for any person facing criminal proceedings of this serious nature [See: Scott at para. 172; Also See: R. v. HS, 2014 ONCA 323, at para. 39].

67Ultimately, I will follow the clear direction from Chief Justice Tulloch in addressing the weight to be given to good character, employment and stigma [See: Scott, at para. 172]:

[172] …Courts cannot misuse these factors to discount sentences for well-off perpetrators with professional careers because they supposedly have better character and employment and stand to lose more and face greater stigma than people who already face disadvantage. Such class bias violates the rule of law principle of equality under the law by giving preferential treatment to the rich, privileged, and powerful: R. v. Carr, [1937] O.R. 600 (C.A.), at pp. 603, 605; R. c. Marchessault (1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 318 (Que. C.A.), at pp. 321-322; Ruby, at § 6.29.

68I now turn to consider the aggravating factors in this case, which increase both the gravity of the offence and D.B.’s degree of responsibility.

Aggravating Factors

69There are a number of statutorily recognized aggravating factors that are applicable to this case including:

1. Evidence that the accused abused a member of the offender’s family [s. 718.2(a)(ii)];

2. Evidence that the offender abused a child [s. 718.2(a)(ii.1)];

3. Evidence that the offender abused a position of trust [s. 718.2(a)(iii)]; and

4. Evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim [s. 718.2(a)(iii.1)].

70As I apply the reasoning espoused by Chief Justice Rowe, in Friesen, I will review the aggravating factors, in this case, that increase the degree of responsibility of D.B. and highlight the gravity of his sexual offending against his daughter.

71I begin with the most significant aggravating factor in this case, the abuse of a position of trust.

Abuse of a Position of Trust or Authority

72As indicated, s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code identifies the abuse of a position of trust or authority as an aggravating factor on sentence. Whether such a relationship exists is a question of fact [See: R. v. Aird, 2013 ONCA 447, at para. 31; R. v. R.D., 2020 ONCA 23, at para. 48]. Relationships of trust arise in a wide range of circumstances and are not all of equal weight [See: R. v. Aird, at para. 27]. Rather than applying a rigid category, courts recognize a “spectrum” of positions of trust [See: R. v. R.B., 2017 ONCA 74, at para. 21]. An offender may occupy more than one point along that spectrum at the same time, and the relationship itself may evolve or deepen over time [See: R. v. Vigon, 2016 ABCA 75, at para. 17].

73In Friesen, the Court provided important guidance for assessing where a particular relationship falls on that spectrum and the significance of that assessment in sentencing [See: paras. 126, 129-130]:

[126] Any breach of trust is likely to increase the harm to the victim and thus the gravity of the offence. As Saunders J.A. reasoned in D.R.W., the focus in such cases should be on "the extent to which [the] relationship [of trust] was violated" (para. 41). The spectrum of relationships of trust is relevant to determining the degree of harm. A child will likely suffer more harm from sexual violence where there is a closer relationship and a higher degree of trust between the child and the offender (see R. v. J.R. (1997), 157 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 246 (N.L.C.A.), at paras. 14 and 18). This is likely to be the case in what might be described as classic breach of trust situations, such as those involving family members, caregivers, teachers, and doctors, to mention a few.

[129] The abuse of a position of trust is also aggravating because it increases the offender's degree of responsibility. An offender who stands in a position of trust in relation to a child owes a duty to protect and care for the child that is not owed by a stranger. The breach of the duty of protection and care thus enhances moral blameworthiness (R. v. S. (W.B.) (1992), 73 C.C.C. (3d) 530 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 537). The abuse of a position of trust also exploits children's particular vulnerability to trusted adults, which is especially morally blameworthy (D. (D.), at paras. 24 and 35; Rayo, at paras. 121-22).

[130] We would thus emphasize that, all other things being equal, an offender who abuses a position of trust to commit a sexual offence against a child should receive a lengthier sentence than an offender who is a stranger to the child. Many authors have expressed concern that the criminal justice system has historically failed to recognize the scale and gravity of sexual violence perpetrated within the family sphere (see Benedet, at p. 297; J. Desrosiers and G. Beausoleil-Allard, L'agression sexuelle en droit canadien (2nd ed. 2017), at p. 39; Todd, at p. 554). Specifically, some authors have criticized [page495] the tendency of courts to impose similar sentences on strangers and fathers for sexual offences against children, despite the fact that sexual assaults by fathers are more likely to occur on multiple occasions (see Bauman, at pp. 358 and 364; "The 'Statutory Rape' Myth", at pp. 289-90). As Professor Craig writes, framing sexual violence against children as the product of a handful of stranger-predators fails "to recognize that child sexual abuse is often a threat that comes from within the family and not from outside of it" (p. 41). Courts should ensure that the sentences they impose do not inadvertently reinforce this myth by failing to give legal effect to the increased gravity of the offence and degree of responsibility of the offender in cases that involve the abuse of a trust relationship.

74In this case, the accused was the complainant’s father. It was in the context of that relationship that the accused was able to affect his sexual offending against his daughter. While the child victim should have felt safe in her home, surrounded by family, she was instead sexually abused by the person she relied upon. In this case, D.B.’s moral blameworthiness and degree of responsibility are high, given this egregious breach of trust. Given this breach of trust against a child, it is understandable that this sexual offending has had a significant impact on the complainant.

Significant Impact on the Complainant

75In Friesen Chief Justice Rowe, for a unanimous court, observed that the degree of physical interference reflects the degree of violation of the victim’s bodily integrity and is recognized as an aggravating factor [See: Friesen, at para. 138].

76In considering the degree of physical interference Chief Justice Rowe provided the following guidance [See: Friesen at para. 142]:

[142]… [C]ourts should not assume that there is any clear correlation between the type of physical act and the harm to the victim. In assessing the significance of the degree of physical interference as a factor, as Christine Boyle writes"judges should think in terms of what is most threatening and damaging to victims" (p. 180). Judges can legitimately consider the greater risk of harm that may flow from specific physical acts such as penetration. However, as McLachlin J. explained in McDonnell, an excessive focus on the physical act can lead courts to underemphasize the emotional and psychological harm to the victim that all forms of sexual violence can cause (paras. 111-15). Sexual violence that does not involve penetration is still "extremely serious" and can have a devastating effect on the victim (Stuckless (1998), at p. 117). This Court has recognized that "any sexual offence is serious" (McDonnell, at para. 29), and has held that "even mild non-consensual touching of a sexual nature can have profound implications for the complainant" (R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440, at para. 63, per McLachlin C.J., and para. 121, per Fish J.). The modern understanding of sexual offences requires greater emphasis on these forms of psychological and emotional harm, rather than only on bodily integrity (R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, [2019] 1 S.C.R. 488, at para. 127, per Rowe J.).

77As discussed by Chief Justice Rowe there is no hierarchy of physical acts when it comes to sexual offending. This Court is tasked not with only considering the specific physical aspect of the touching but also to consider the harm that has resulted [See: in Friesen, at para. 146].

78In this case, the complainant describes a profound emotional impact arising from the offences, including the loss of her relationship with her father. She writes that she feels as though she no longer has a father in her life, which has caused her sadness and emotional distress. She reports experiencing feelings of guilt for disclosing the abuse, which in turn has caused her to withdraw from others and become closed off in her relationships.

79The complainant further describes feelings of embarrassment, disrespect, and betrayal at the hands of her father, as well as frustration and anger which she at times displaces onto others. She reports that the offences have caused her to develop significant trust issues, particularly with males, such that she now feels that no male is safe unless they can affirmatively demonstrate otherwise. This has had a direct impact on her ability to form relationships and has led her to avoid social interaction outside of a small circle of trusted individuals.

80The complainant also describes ongoing psychological and mental health consequences. She reports feelings of depression over an extended period and indicates that she has required psychiatric care and medication to manage her mood. She further describes becoming overwhelmed by the legal process, including these court proceedings.

81The complainant describes the impact of the offences on her education and daily functioning, including missing school because she was unable to manage her emotions. The offences have therefore had a tangible effect on her development during important formative years.

82The complainant further expresses ongoing fear for her personal safety. She describes being vigilant in public spaces, particularly in areas where she may encounter her father, and recounts instances where she feared unwanted contact. She also describes concern for the safety of her sister when that sibling had contact with the Defendant.

83I also recognize the broader and enduring emotional impact described by the complainant. She writes that prior to the offences her world was characterized by happiness and safety, whereas it is now “scary and sad.” She expresses that the offences have altered how she views herself and others, and that she continues to struggle, although she is attempting to cope and move forward.

84Taken together, the victim impact statement reflects deep and multifaceted harm, including emotional, psychological, physical, and social consequences. The harm is amplified by the fact that it was inflicted by a parent, resulting in a profound betrayal of trust that has fundamentally altered the complainant’s sense of safety, her relationships, and her development.

85Having regard to the identified mitigating and aggravating factors, I turn to whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

Consideration of a Conditional Sentence Order

86A conditional sentence can serve both punitive and rehabilitative purposes. When structured with sufficiently stringent conditions, it can deliver meaningful denunciation and deterrence. However, there are circumstances where the need for deterrence may necessitate actual incarceration. [See: R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at paras. 36, 102–107; see also R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736 at para. 31.]

87The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Proulx remains a leading authority on conditional sentences. From Proulx, the following principles emerge:

i. A conditional sentence is, in principle, available for all offences, including violent ones, provided the statutory prerequisites are met. The mere fact that the sentence is under two years and that the offender does not pose a danger to the community does not create a presumption in favour of a conditional sentence. Nonetheless, where these criteria are satisfied, the sentencing judge must seriously consider the appropriateness of a conditional sentence.

ii. I retain broad discretion to determine whether a conditional sentence is proportionate, taking into account the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s moral culpability. The principle of restraint, as codified in sections 718.2(d) and (e) of the Code, applies in deciding between a conditional sentence and incarceration.

iii. Conditional sentences can better achieve restorative objectives while still serving punitive functions and may be preferable where both goals can be met. Conversely, where restorative objectives are limited or punitive needs are paramount, actual incarceration may be more appropriate. Even in cases lacking restorative potential, a conditional sentence may still be suitable if it can achieve deterrence and denunciation as effectively as jail.

iv. While denunciation is generally more effectively achieved through incarceration, a conditional sentence can still carry significant denunciatory weight depending on the offender’s circumstances, the nature of the conditions imposed, and the community context. Similarly, although incarceration may offer greater deterrence, the lack of empirical evidence supporting this assumption calls for caution. A conditional sentence can also provide meaningful deterrence under the right conditions.

88The framework for imposing a conditional sentence is set out in section 742.1 of the Criminal Code. A conditional sentence may be ordered when three criteria are met: (1) the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years; (2) the court is satisfied that the offender would not pose a danger to public safety if permitted to serve the sentence in the community; and (3) the court finds that such a sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing outlined in sections 718 to 718.2.

89In this case, the Crown has proposed a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment. Accordingly, I must consider whether it is appropriate for D.B. to serve his sentence in the community. Importantly, the duration of a conditional sentence need not match the length of incarceration that would otherwise have been imposed. [See: R. v. Proulx, at paras. 60–61, 102.]

90A finding that the offender would not endanger the community is a prerequisite for imposing a conditional sentence. In making this determination, the court must assess the specific risk posed by the offender, rather than the broader concern that a conditional sentence might undermine general deterrence or respect for the law.

91Two factors are relevant in assessing risk: the likelihood of reoffending and the potential severity of harm if reoffending occurs. This assessment should encompass the risk of any criminal activity, not just physical or psychological harm. [See: R. v. Proulx, at para. 69.] The offender’s ability to comply with court orders also influences the availability of a conditional sentence. [See: R. v. Avansi, 2023 ONCA 547 at para. 6.] In this case, it is recognized that D.B. has complied with bail conditions for a significant period of time, without issue.

92That compliance is a relevant consideration. However, compliance with court orders, while important, does not in and of itself establish that the risk posed by the offender can be appropriately managed in the community. The assessment of risk must be grounded in the nature of the offending conduct, the offender’s insight into that conduct, and the circumstances that gave rise to the offence before me.

93In this case, I have significant concerns with respect to the risk of reoffending. As reflected in the trial findings and the presentence materials, D.B. does not accept responsibility for the offences and lacks insight into his conduct. This absence of insight is not an aggravating factor in determining the overall sentence but is directly relevant to the assessment of future risk. It undermines confidence in his ability to recognize, avoid, and control the circumstances that led to the offending behaviour. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the risk of reoffending can be adequately managed in the community, even with stringent conditions.

94In addition, the potential severity of harm if reoffending were to occur is extremely high. This case involves sexual offending against a child within a parental relationship. The harm caused by such conduct is profound, and the consequences for the victim, both immediate and long-term, are significant. The seriousness of that potential harm must be weighed heavily in the risk assessment. Even a relatively low likelihood of reoffending may nonetheless justify a custodial sentence where the potential harm is grave.

95Context is critical. This is a child sexual offence that involved a father repeatedly touching his daughter in a sexual manner. Section 718.01 of the Criminal Code requires that a court give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence when imposing a sentence for an offence involving the sexual abuse of a child [See: Friesen, 101-105; R. v. Branton, 2013 NLCA 61; R. v. Allen, 2012 BCCA 377]. Section 718.01 has been interpreted as directing courts to punish sexual offences against children more severely than sexual offences against adults [See: Friesen, at paras 115-118]. Conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate in cases involving child sexual offending that involves a serious breach of trust [See: R. v. M.M., 2022 ONCA 441 at paras. 15-16; R. v. B.S., 2023 ONCA 6 at paras. 49-51].

96Having regard to the nature of the offences, the offender’s degree of responsibility, the absence of insight, and the risk and magnitude of potential harm, I am not satisfied that the statutory prerequisites for a conditional sentence have been met. Even if the risk could be said to be manageable, I find that imposing a conditional sentence, in this case, would be inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing, including the need to give primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence in cases of sexual violence against children.

97While I have considered the authorities relied upon by the counsel for D.B., I believe they are distinguishable, given the context of this case and the absence of pandemic related factors, the absence of a joint position on sentence, and no Gladue factors [See for example: R. v. K.K., 2020 ONSC 7198, R. v. M.S. 2025 ONSC 2688; and R. v. J.S. 2024 ONSC 4815] . Instead, I prefer the reasoning articulated by our court of appeal that notes that conditional sentences should only rarely be imposed for sexual offences against a child [See: R. v. M.M.; also see R. v. B.M. 2023 ONCA 224; Also See: R. v. D.S. 2021 ONSC 3972].

98I therefore conclude that a conditional sentence order is not an appropriate disposition in the particular circumstances of this offence and this offender and given the impact on this complainant in this community.

Conclusion

99In arriving at a fit sentence, I have considered all of the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. I have considered D.B.’s good character, employment, and the resulting stigma associated with this conviction. However, for the reasons already set out, I attach no significant mitigating weight to these factors in the context of this case.

100I have also considered the medical circumstances of D.B. as identified by his counsel. While relevant to his personal circumstances, I am satisfied that these concerns can be appropriately managed in a custodial setting and do not warrant a reduction in sentence or support a community-based disposition. I have also considered the identified collateral consequences to himself and others due to potential impact on his employment.

101In this case, the primary sentencing objectives are denunciation and deterrence. These objectives carry particular weight given the nature of the offence, which involves sexual abuse of his daughter, which is a profound breach of trust.

102I have carefully considered the submissions of counsel, including the defence request for a conditional sentence order. For the above noted reasons, I have concluded that a conditional sentence is not appropriate in the context of this case. I am not satisfied that the risk posed by D.B. can be adequately managed in the community, nor am I satisfied that a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing as they apply to sexual offences against children.

103Having regard to the gravity of this offence, the degree of responsibility of this offender, and the impact on this community, and the harm caused to the complainant, I conclude that a custodial sentence is required.

104D.B., I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, less any pre-sentence custody, to be followed by a period of probation of 2 years. This sentence reflects your individual circumstances, while also giving proper weight to the seriousness of the offending conduct and the egregious breach of your daughter’s trust.

105The terms of the probation order will be as follows:

❖ Statutory terms;

❖ Report in person to a probation officer within two working days of your release from custody and after that, at all times and places as directed by the probation officer or any person authorized by a probation officer to assist in your supervision;

❖ Do not contact or communicate in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means with your daughter G.H. (aka G.B.);

❖ Do not contact or communicate in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means with anyone named in writing by your probation officer;

❖ Do not be within 25m of the person of G.H. (aka G.B.), except for required court appearances;

❖ You shall not be within 25 metres of the person of any individual identified to you in writing by your probation officer, except as required for court appearances;

❖ Do not be within 100m of any place where you know G.H. (aka G.B.) to live, work, go to school, frequent or any place you know her to be;

❖ You shall not be within 100 metres of any place where you know a person identified to you in writing by your probation officer to reside, work, attend school, frequent, or any place where you know that person to be;

❖ Do not possess any weapon, as defined by the Criminal Code (for example: a BB gun, pellet gun, firearm, firearm part, imitation firearm, crossbow, prohibited or restricted weapon, ammunition or explosive substance or anything designed to be used or intended for use to cause death or injury or to threaten or intimidate any person);

❖ Attend and actively participate in all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by the probation officer and complete them to the satisfaction of the probation officer, including but not limited to child sexual offending;

❖ You shall sign any release of information forms as will enable your probation officer to monitor your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed;

❖ You shall provide proof of your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed;

❖ You will pay restitution in the amount of $2,671.39 to G.H. (aka G.B.), to be paid by way of certified cheque or money order, and provided to probation within the first 6 months of your probation order.

Ancillary Orders

106The ancillary orders are as follows:

❖ Pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, while you are serving your term of incarceration, do not contact or communicate in any way, directly or indirectly, by any physical, electronic or other means with your daughter G.H. (aka G.B.);

❖ A DNA order is primary compulsory under s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code;

❖ There will be a SOIRA order for a 10-year term under s. 490.012 of the Criminal Code;

❖ A victim fine surcharge of $300 will be imposed under s. 737 of the Criminal Code; with 12 months to pay.

107Given the totality of the evidence in this case, I make an order under s. 161(1) of the Criminal Code, for a period of 5-years, with the following conditions:

(a) Not to attend any public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare center, schoolground, playground or community center unless in the company of a person over the age of 21 who is fully aware of your prior conviction/circumstances and the conditions of your s. 161 order;

(b) Not to seek, obtain or continue any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years; and

(c) Not to have any contact, including communication by any means, with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless you do so in the presence of a person over the age of 21 years who is aware of the circumstances of your prior conviction and your associated orders.

108I wish to thank counsel for their comprehensive and well‑prepared submissions, and for the professionalism and care with which they addressed a difficult and sensitive matter. Their assistance to the Court was of significant value.