ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE No.: Brampton 24-31112890 24-31105617
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
NIGEL RAMPERSAD
Before Justice P.T. O’Marra
Heard on February 5 and April 24, 2026
Reasons for Judgment on Sentence released on May 13, 2026
Andres De Avila.................................................................................. counsel for the Crown Armandeep Gill........................................... counsel for the accused Nigel Rampersad
Introduction
1On February 5, 2026, Mr. Rampersad pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm, contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, and uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm, contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. On April 24, 2026, I heard submissions and reserved my decision on sentence.
2This is a case in which denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public necessarily assume substantial weight. The loaded prohibited handgun was not merely possessed, it was used as a means of intimidation within an intimate partner context, and the threats were followed by an attempt to force entry into the complainant’s home.
Agreed Facts
3The facts are taken from the Crown’s materials and were read into the record on the guilty pleas on February 5, 2026. The parties proceeded on these agreed facts which are summarized below.
4On October 22, 2024, Mr. Rampersad sent the complainant two separate text messages containing threats. The first stated: “Or I’ll hurt everybody you love including you [sic] pussy dog”. The second stated: “If I see person there your [sic] both shot.”
5On October 28, 2024, Mr. Rampersad sent the complainant a video message in which he stated: “You thinking [sic] I’m fucking joking around here, bro? You thinking [sic] I’m fucking joking around here, bro? Yo, I need my fucking money, okay? I need my fucking money or there’s gonna be a fucking problem, bro. There’s gonna be a real fucking problem, Michelle. I’m warning you, bro. I need my fucking money, bro.” The video depicts a firearm appearing to be a Sig Sauer P320 9mm handgun. Mr. Rampersad is seen handling the firearm and displaying a loaded magazine containing live rounds.
6On October 29, 2024, Mr. Rampersad attended at the complainant’s residence, where he began kicking her front door and attempting to gain entry to the unit. The complainant contacted the police.
7Later that day, police executed a search warrant at Mr. Rampersad’s residence. Officers located a Sig Sauer P320 9mm handgun, a 15-round capacity magazine partially loaded with 9mm ammunition, one loose 9mm round, and two baggies containing a white powdery substance in a safe located in his bedroom. The serial number on the handgun was defaced.
8Mr. Rampersad was not authorized to possess any firearms, magazines, or ammunition. At the time of these offences, he was also subject to a weapons prohibition order.
9No victim impact statement was filed.
10For the purposes of credit and mitigation, the parties also agree on the following sentencing facts. Mr. Rampersad spent a total of 50 actual days in custody in relation to this matter.
11The parties further agree that Mr. Rampersad has been subject to restrictive bail conditions, including GPS ankle monitoring, for approximately 14 months.
Positions of the Parties
12The Crown seeks a penitentiary sentence, with three years on the s. 95(1) offence and a further consecutive six-month custodial term for the uttering threats offence.
13The Defence seeks a conditional sentence order in the community of two years less one day. The Defence relies on Mr. Rampersad’s rehabilitative efforts, family support, and the restrictive nature of his release conditions, including GPS ankle monitoring, as well as the Defence authorities filed.
14With the positions and the agreed-upon facts in mind, I turn to Mr. Rampersad's personal circumstances.
Mr. Rampersad’s Personal Circumstances
15Mr. Rampersad is 37 years old. He was 35 years old when he committed these offences. He was born in Toronto and raised in Mississauga. He reports a stable upbringing and describes his parents as hardworking and supportive. His parents separated when he was in his twenties. His mother relocated to Northern Ontario with her long-term partner. Mr. Rampersad describes a close relationship with his mother, stepfather, and brother. He relocated to Northern Ontario to distance himself from negative influences and establish a more stable life.
16Mr. Rampersad has no children. He has not established long-term intimate relationships of significance. He describes himself as a generally non-violent person, although he acknowledges a troubled period during adolescence that included truancy and physical altercations.
17Mr. Rampersad had educational success, including a scholarship. He did not complete post-secondary studies. His employment history includes work on the family farm and more recently, employment in welding, which he left due to strict release conditions. He is currently unemployed due to these same restrictions.
18The pre-sentence report addresses mental health and emotional regulation concerns. His mother observed increased alcohol use in early 2025 and behavioural deterioration that she believes improved after he began counselling. The report indicates that he has experienced depression and anxiety, and that the strict release conditions have affected him.
19Mr. Rampersad has a prior weapons-related disposition. In 2023, he received a conditional discharge for unauthorized possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon (brass knuckles), together with probation and a weapons prohibition order. This is, therefore, his second occasion before a court for a weapons-related matter.
20Since November 4, 2025, Mr. Rampersad has been actively engaged in the Canadian Mental Health Association Release from Custody Program, attending biweekly appointments focused on anxiety management, coping skills, and emotional regulation, with referrals to additional services.
21These personal circumstances inform the assessment of moral culpability and prospects for rehabilitation. They do not diminish the seriousness of the offences, and they must be weighed within the statutory framework.
Summary of Sentencing Principles
22Sentencing is governed by ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that further one or more recognized objectives, including denunciation, deterrence, separation where necessary, rehabilitation, reparation, and the promotion of responsibility and acknowledgment of harm.
23The fundamental principle is proportionality. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
24In reaching a fit sentence, the court must consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including those deemed aggravating by Parliament. Evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s intimate partner is deemed to be an aggravating circumstance: s. 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.
25A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances, while recognizing that sentencing remains an individualized exercise. Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh. The principle of restraint also requires that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances, but restraint yields to proportionality and to the objectives that predominate in serious cases.
26Finally, the court may take into account time spent in pre-sentence custody and the statutory framework governing enhanced credit. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code permits enhanced credit up to 1.5:1 where the circumstances justify it, and that the loss of eligibility for early release and parole will generally support enhanced credit at that rate: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, at paras. 1-7.
27Those principles must now be applied to the particular circumstances of a loaded prohibited handgun offence that carries an intimate partner intimidation component.
Seriousness of Gun Crime and the Sentencing Range for s. 95(1) Offences
28Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code covers a broad spectrum of conduct. The Supreme Court of Canada has explained that: “Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not.”: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 82.
29The courts have also repeatedly described, in pointed terms, the inherent danger of illegal handguns. In R. v. Ferrigon, 2007 16828 (Ont. S.C.J.), Molloy J. stated: “Guns are dangerous. Handguns are particularly dangerous. Loaded, concealed handguns are even more dangerous.”: at para. 25.
30The destructive power of illegal firearms and the urgency of denunciation and deterrence have likewise been expressed in strong language. In R. v. Chizanga and Meredith, 2020 ONSC 4647, Harris J. stated: “The primary purpose of illegal guns is to threaten, to maim and to kill... They are a disease, a plague on our communities”: at para. 7. He continued: “A person with a gun in their hands has a god-like power over life and death”: at para. 8. He described the ease with which illegal guns are obtained and the disparity between the power of the weapon and the minimal prerequisites to acquiring it: at para. 9. He further stated that the ease of killing with a gun is “an exigent danger to us all”: at para. 10.
31This case falls at the true crime end of the spectrum. Mr. Rampersad had no lawful authority to possess any firearm and was subject to a weapons prohibition order. The handgun’s serial number was defaced. The magazine was over-capacity. Most significantly, the firearm was used as an instrument of intimidation against an intimate partner, and the conduct escalated to an attempted forced entry at her home.
Relevance of the Gun Prevalence Evidence
32The Crown tendered an affidavit from a Peel Regional Police Intelligence Analyst setting out statistics concerning firearms charges and shooting occurrences in Peel Region.
33This evidence does not make prevalence an aggravating factor in itself. It is relevant to the balancing of sentencing objectives. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the frequency of an offence in a particular region may be relevant in balancing objectives such as denunciation and general deterrence, while remaining subject to proportionality and fitness: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at paras. 89-90.
34I consider the affidavit for that limited purpose. It provides a factual foundation for the submission that unlawful firearms possession and shootings remain a persistent community concern and that meaningful denunciation and general deterrence are properly emphasized in an appropriate case, always subject to proportionality and fitness.
35Having set the governing framework, I turn to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that determine the fit sentence in this case.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Aggravating factors
36These offences involved a prohibited handgun and a 15-round capacity magazine with readily accessible ammunition. The firearm was carelessly and dangerously stored. It was not equipped with a trigger lock, nor was it stored in a proper case or cabinet. The serial number on the handgun was defaced. Mr. Rampersad was not licensed to possess any firearm, ammunition, or magazine. He was also subject to a weapons prohibition order.
37The most serious aggravating feature is the intimate partner context and the weaponization of the firearm as an instrument of intimidation. Mr. Rampersad sent explicit threats, including threats to shoot. He then sent a video depicting the firearm and a loaded magazine. The next day, he attended at the complainant’s residence, kicked the door, and attempted to gain entry. The facts demonstrate escalation and an immediate danger to the complainant and to others.
Mitigating factors
38Mr. Rampersad pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility. The plea spared the complainant the burden of testifying.
39Mr. Rampersad has supportive family relationships and has taken meaningful steps toward counselling and mental health programming while on release. He has also been subject to restrictive bail conditions, including prolonged GPS ankle monitoring, which I treat as a mitigating circumstance. Time spent on stringent pre-sentence bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor, and the amount of credit, if any, remains within the discretion of the sentencing judge: R. v. Downes (C.), 2006 3957 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 41-47.
Conditional Sentence: Why It Is Inappropriate
40The Defence seeks a conditional sentence order of two years less one day.
41A conditional sentence is not a lesser sentence. It is a custodial sentence served in the community. It may be structured with strict conditions that significantly restrict liberty. Nonetheless, it remains available only where the fit sentence is less than two years and where service in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
42The Supreme Court of Canada recognized in R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, that a conditional sentence can provide denunciation and deterrence, depending on the length and the conditions imposed, but also emphasized that the sanction must have a punitive aspect and that restrictive conditions are often imposed: see paras. 22 and 36. The Court further made clear that the more serious the offence, the more restrictive the conditions must be if a conditional sentence is to satisfy denunciation and deterrence: see paras. 102, 105 and 107.
43In my view, a sentence in the reformatory range would be demonstrably unfit for the s. 95(1) offence on these facts. This case lies at the true crime end of the s. 95(1) spectrum described in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 82. It is far removed from licensing-type conduct. Mr. Rampersad had no lawful authority to possess any firearm and was prohibited from doing so. The handgun had a defaced serial number. It was paired with an over-capacity magazine. Most significantly, the firearm was used as a coercive tool against an intimate partner, in conjunction with explicit threats to shoot, followed by an attempted forced entry at the complainant’s home. A community-based custodial sentence would not adequately reflect the gravity of the offence or the degree of responsibility of the offender.
44Even if strict conditions could be crafted, the statutory requirement that a conditional sentence be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing would not be met. Denunciation, deterrence, and public protection predominate in this case. The court must communicate, in a clear and public manner, that the illegal possession and weaponization of prohibited handguns, particularly in an intimate partner context, will attract serious custodial consequences.
45Accordingly, I turn to the Defence authorities relied upon and explain why they do not lead to a different conclusion.
Distinguishing the Defence Authorities
46The Defence relies on R. v. Lewis, 2022 ONSC 1260, and R. v. Marier, 2023 ONSC 5194.
47Defence counsel submitted that Lewis involved a firearm secured in a residence and did not involve the weapon being used to threaten or intimidate a specific person. Counsel further submitted that the decision was materially influenced by the offender’s youth and rehabilitative prospects.
48Defence counsel submitted that Marier involved a youthful first offender and an exceptional period of compliance under stringent bail conditions, and that the analysis was heavily shaped by youth, the absence of a prior record, and rehabilitative progress.
49The case here is materially different. Mr. Rampersad was 35 at the time. He was subject to a weapons prohibition order. The handgun had a defaced serial number and was paired with an over-capacity magazine. It was unsafely stored with readily accessible ammunition. It was brandished to threaten an intimate partner as part of explicit threats to shoot, and the conduct escalated to an attempted forced entry at the complainant’s home. These aggravating features distinguish this case from the Defence authorities relied upon.
50In light of the foregoing, and having regard to the gravity of the offences, Mr. Rampersad’s degree of responsibility, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the applicable authorities, I conclude that a custodial sentence served in an institution is required. I turn, then, to the sentence that is fit and proportionate.
Sentence
51On the s. 95(1) count, I impose a sentence of three years’ imprisonment.
52On the s. 264.1(1)(a) count, I impose a sentence of thirty days’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively.
53The global sentence is, therefore, three years and thirty days.
54I now address the agreed credits and the manner in which the remaining custodial term is recorded.
55I have considered the mitigating impact of the conditions of Mr. Rampersad’s pre-sentence custody, and taking that into account, I fix the global sentence at three years and thirty days.
56Mr. Rampersad has served 50 actual days in pre-sentence custody. I grant enhanced credit at 1.5:1, resulting in 75 days of credit, or two and one-half months, consistent with the principles in R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, at paras. 1-7.
57I further reduce the sentence by four months to reflect the mitigating effect of the restrictive bail conditions, including GPS ankle monitoring for fourteen months, consistent with the principles in R. v. Downes (C.), 2006 3957 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 41-47.
58After deducting four months of Downes mitigation and two and one-half months (i.e., 75 days) of Summers credit, the remaining custodial term is twenty-nine months to be served.
59It remains to address the agreed ancillary orders and the victim surcharge.
Ancillary Orders
60A DNA order shall issue pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code.
61A weapons prohibition order shall issue pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code. For the items described in s. 109(2)(a), the prohibition shall be for ten years commencing upon Mr. Rampersad’s release from imprisonment on these offences. For the items described in s. 109(2)(b), the prohibition is for life.
62A non-communication order with the victim shall issue pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code for the duration of the custodial sentence.
63A forfeiture order shall issue for all items seized for destruction pursuant to s. 491 of the Criminal Code.
64The victim surcharge is waived pursuant to s. 737(2.1) of the Criminal Code. I am satisfied that imposing the surcharge would cause undue hardship, given Mr. Rampersad’s precarious financial circumstances, including unemployment and his current inability to pay.
Released: May 13, 2026
Signed: Justice P.T. O’Marra