WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.

(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.P., 2026 ONCJ 270

DATE: May 11, 2026

COURT FILE NO. C46001/25

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF TORONTO

JULIA O’BYRNE, for the APPLICANT

APPLICANT

• and –

S.P. and J.C.

THE RESPONDENTS ACTING IN PERSON

RESPONDENTS

HEARD: MAY 4 and 5, 2026

JUSTICE S.B. SHERR

REASONS FOR DECISION

Part One – Introduction

[1] This was the trial of a twice amended protection application brought by the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (the society) regarding the subject twin 4-year-old children, J.S. and J.R. (the children).

[2] The children were removed from the care and custody of their mother, the respondent S.P. (the mother), on April 23, 2025, and placed in the society’s care and custody. The children have remained in the society’s care since then.

[3] The society seeks an order finding the children to be in need of protection under sub-clause 74 (2) (b) (i) (risk of physical harm) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act). It seeks a disposition that the children be placed in the care and custody of the children’s father, the respondent, J.C. (the father), in Montreal, Quebec, for 6 months, subject to terms of supervision.

[4] The society also seeks an order that the mother’s access to the children be in its discretion, with respect to frequency, location, duration, and level of supervision, with a minimum of one monthly in-person visit, and weekly virtual calls. It also seeks an order for sibling access with the children’s 15-year-old brother (J).

[5] The father supports the society’s position.

[6] J was also a subject child in this protection application. He has lived with his adult half-brother, NC, since March 21, 2025.[^1] On consent of the society, the mother, J and NC, and based on their Statement of Agreed Facts, Justice Danielle Szandtner made final orders on April 28, 2026 regarding J. She found J to be a child in need of protection under sub-clause 74 (2) (b) (i) of the Act and placed him in NC’s care and custody for 6 months, subject to terms of society supervision.

[7] The society, the father, NC and J signed a Statement of Agreed Facts agreeing to the sibling access proposed by the society at this trial. J’s counsel, through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, confirmed J’s consent at the outset of the trial. Otherwise, J and NC did not participate in the trial.

[8] The mother opposes the society’s application. She does not agree that the children are in need of protection. If the court makes an order that the children are in need of protection, she seeks an order that they be placed in her care and custody, subject to terms of society supervision. In the alternative, she seeks an order that the children remain in the society’s care and custody. If the children are placed with the society or the father, she seeks as much access with them as the court will permit, including overnight access. She did not put forward a position on sibling access.

[9] The society called five of its workers who have worked with the parties and the children and a social worker from the Montreal Children’s Aid Society (Montreal CAS). They also filed a psychiatric report regarding the mother and the two Statements of Agreed Facts referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 above.

[10] The mother and the father did not file trial affidavits. They gave their direct evidence orally. They did not call any other witnesses.

[11] The issues for the court to determine are:

a) Are the children in need of protection?

b) Is intervention through a court order necessary to protect the children in the future?

c) If so, what disposition orders are in the children’s best interests?

d) What access orders are in the children’s best interests?

Part Two – Court assistance to the mother and the father

[12] The mother was self-represented at trial. She had counsel throughout these proceedings, including when these trial dates were set. On March 17, 2026, Justice Szandtner, removed the mother’s counsel from the record, at her counsel’s request.

[13] The father has been self-represented throughout his involvement in this case.

[14] The court was mindful of its obligation to assist self-represented litigants. It is this court’s view that this obligation to assist is enhanced in child protection cases where the stakes for families are so high. See: Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto v. N.D., 2021 ONCJ 369, per: Justice Debra Paulseth.

[15] The court provided the following procedural assistance to the mother and the father:

a) It spent additional time explaining the trial procedure to them.

b) It took additional time during the trial to explain legal terminology and the basis for its evidentiary rulings.

c) It offered the mother breaks after each witness’s testimony to organize her questions and thoughts. Sometimes, the mother took those breaks, and at other times she proceeded with her questioning.

d) At times, the mother became emotional during the trial. She was offered breaks when this happened and was successful in composing herself during those breaks.

e) It assisted the mother and the father in giving their direct evidence by asking questions about their backgrounds, positions, plans and concerns. It also asked the mother questions to make sure she had the opportunity to address the protection concerns raised by the society.

f) The court screened the admissibility of the society’s evidence. It limited the purposes for which certain evidence could be used.

Part Three – The parties

[16] The mother is 36 years old. She was born in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and came to live in Canada in 2008. She became a Canadian citizen in 2019.

[17] The mother has a degree as a social service worker. She worked as a settlement counselor and employment counselor from 2016 to 2019 and as a shelter worker until the children were born. She went back to school and is a hair stylist. She last worked as a hair stylist in 2025. She is presently in receipt of Ontario Works and is looking for employment.

[18] The mother has four children. Her eldest son is 22 years old and lives with his father. J is turning sixteen soon and is living with NC, subject to an order of society supervision.

[19] The mother presently lives in a shelter in Toronto.

[20] The father is 52 years old. He was born in Haiti and came to live in Canada in 2003. He is a permanent resident of Canada. He has lived in Montreal for the past ten years. He lives on his own.

[21] The father obtained a bachelor’s degree in literacy from Pierre Sully College in Haiti. He has worked in several fields in Canada. He has been a doorman, done security work, worked in manufacturing and has been an apple picker. He has been a professional truck driver and currently works as a bus driver at the Montreal airport.

[22] The father has six children, including the children before the court. Three of his children live with his ex-wife in Montreal. He says he sees them weekly and has a good relationship with them. He has another 7-year-old child with an ex-partner in Montreal. He does not see that child.

[23] The father plans to marry his present partner in May 2026.

[24] The mother and the father did not live together. The children lived with the mother in Toronto until they were removed from her care. The father had infrequent contact with them until he was notified by the society that they were in its care.

[25] The mother applied in this court for parenting and support orders for the children in 2023. The father did not file an Answer/Claim or attend at court. On February 26, 2024, Justice Szandtner conducted an uncontested hearing and made final orders, including the following:

a) The mother has primary residence and decision-making responsibility for the children.

b) The father’s parenting time with the children is in the mother’s discretion.

c) The mother may obtain or renew government documentation for the children, and travel with the children within or outside Canada, without the father’s consent.

d) The father shall pay child support to the mother of $1,284 each month, retroactive to March 1, 2021, based on an imputed annual income of $85,000.

[26] The parenting terms in this order were statutorily stayed under section 103 of the Act once this protection application was issued.[^2]

Part Four – Court history

[27] The society issued its protection application for J and the children on April 9, 2025. On the same day, Justice Carolyn Jones made temporary without prejudice orders. She placed J in NC’s care, subject to society supervision, and the children in the mother’s care, subject to terms of society supervision. She ordered that the mother’s access to J was in the society’s discretion.

[28] On April 23, 2025, Justice Szandtner made a temporary without prejudice order placing the children in the society’s care and custody. She ordered access to the mother and the father in the society’s discretion.

[29] On June 30, 2025, the mother filed her Answer/Plan of Care.

[30] On July 24, 2025, Justice Szandtner endorsed that the mother’s access with the children was problematic and had been reduced by the society to once each week. Further, J was refusing to see the mother. Sibling access was taking place every two weeks.

[31] On October 30, 2025, the society amended its protection application to seek a 6-month interim society care order for the children.

[32] On October 31, 2025, Justice Szandtner endorsed that the mother’s access with the children had been suspended by the society following an incident in August at its offices and that the mother had not met with the society since then. She wrote that the mother met with the society worker that day at court and a supervised visit was scheduled. She noted that the father was in court and had had four successful visits with the children.

[33] On November 20, 2025, the father filed his Answer/Plan of Care.

[34] On March 10, 2026, Justice Szandtner placed this case on the trial list.

[35] On March 13, 2026, the society amended its protection application for the second time to seek the supervision order placing the children with the father.

[36] On April 28, 2026, Justice Szandtner made final orders, on consent for J.

Part Five – Finding in need of protection

5.1 Legal considerations

[37] The society seeks a finding that the children are in need of protection pursuant to sub-clause 74 (2) (b) (i) of the Act. This sub-clause reads as follows:

(b) there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s,

(i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child,

[38] The society has the onus, on a balance of probabilities, to establish that the children are at risk of harm.

[39] If the court finds that the children are not in need of protection, then that is the end of the Society’s protection application. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.N., 2019 ONCJ 8, at para. 116.

[40] The risk of harm under clause 74 (2) (b) of the Act must be real and likely, not speculative. See: Children's Aid Society of Rainy River v. B. (C.), 2006 ONCJ 458; Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa-Carlton v. T. and T., [2000] O.J. No. 2273, (Ont. Fam. Ct.).

[41] The court can choose a flexible approach when considering the timing of the protection finding in a child protection proceeding. The court can and should admit evidence arising at any time up to the date of the court hearing. See: Family and Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin v. M.M., 2019 ONSC 4649, at para. 63; Children’s Aid Society of Halton Region v. L.S.A., 2019 ONCJ 759, at para. 82. The flexible approach allows the court to consider if the child is in need of protection at the start of the proceeding, the hearing date, or some other date. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2019 ONSC 2251 at para. 85.

[42] Physical abuse, inappropriate discipline, inadequate supervision, domestic violence, untreated mental illness, untreated addiction, inadequate shelter/food are common circumstances leading to the findings of physical harm or risk of physical harm. Verbal abuse, aggression and inappropriate situations that children are exposed to also constitute risk of physical and emotional harm. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., 2019 ONCJ 866, at para. 106; Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. C.F. and R.A., 2021 ONSC 6158, at par. 41.

[43] A periodic lack of consistent attendance at access also supports a finding of risk of physical harm as it can be seen as a pattern of ongoing neglect. A pattern of not exercising access consistently may also place the child at risk of emotional harm. See: Family & Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin v. M.M., 2019 ONSC 4649, at para. 77 (d).

5.2 Analysis

[44] On April 24, 2026, the mother signed a Statement of Agreed Facts to support final orders about J. She agreed that J was a child in need of protection under sub-clause 74 (2) (b) (i) of the Act.

[45] The facts the mother agreed to about J also support a finding that the children are in need of protection under sub-clause 74 (2) (b) (i) of the Act. The Statement of Agreed Facts for J includes the following relevant facts:

a) The society had prior involvement with the mother in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. In 2014, the society was involved with the family after the mother and her now 22-year-old son reported there was a demon in the home. The mother explained there was a spiritual belief in ghosts in her culture and the file was closed. In 2015, the society was informed that the mother was under the influence of marijuana and her children’s needs were being neglected. The concerns were not verified. In 2016 and 2017, the society was involved with the mother over concerns of domestic violence between her and her former partner.

b) On March 16, 2025, the Toronto police attended at the mother’s home. The officers observed that the mother was in the hallway banging on a neighbour’s door and screaming. When asked why, the mother told officers she was spiritual and the voices in her head told her to do it. The officers smelled alcohol on the mother’s breath.

When officers entered the mother’s apartment, she became hysterical, screaming at them incoherently; her utterances did not make sense. She was punching her ottoman and almost caused the mirror behind her to fall over. Officers had to move the mirror to prevent it from injuring anyone. The mother made rambling statements about how she had been shot in the head in her dreams.

c) Just after midnight, on March 17, 2025, the police apprehended the mother and took her to the hospital on a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act.

d) On March 21, 2025, J informed the police that the mother has hit him in the stomach and arm with a closed and open hand. He said he had been hit with belts, in the areas of his arms, legs and torso. He said he was hit by a belt by the mother on March 16, 2025. J went to live with NC. He did not want the mother criminally charged and no charges were laid against her.

e) On March 25, 2025, a society worker met with the mother. The mother said she was sorry and wished that she had not behaved in that manner. She said she was not hearing voices that day but was having a rough day. She denied using physical discipline against her children.

f) The society’s family service worker arranged to meet the mother at her home on April 1, 2025, but she did not answer the door.

g) On April 4, 2025, the mother called the society and said that J was not safe in NC’s home. The society brought the matter before the court.

h) J told the society he would return to the mother’s care if her presentation went back to normal and she could demonstrate that she could care for him full time. He recognized he could not return to her care and was content with remaining with NC for the time being.

[46] The mother was involuntarily hospitalized in the psychiatric ward of Humber River Hospital for five days. The society filed the psychiatric discharge summary of Dr. Joseph Park dated March 21, 2025. That report reinforced that the mother was struggling with mental health issues that were impairing her ability to parent the children.[^3] The report set out that:

a) The mother reported daily cannabis use and drinking beer and wine on weekends.

b) The mother was very agitated when she came to the hospital. She reported to hospital staff that she was hearing messages from the fridge in the television and was suspicious that her neighbour was carrying out voodoo in her home.

c) The mother showed little insight into her conduct. She denied having made the concerning statements. She felt the only reason the police brought her to the hospital was because she wanted to see the children, she had moved the camera monitor towards them, and they did not like that. She was adamant there was nothing wrong with her and wanted to immediately go home.

d) She reported she has sleep issues and falls asleep before her children. She wakes up at 1 a.m. and does chores because she is so tired during the day that she has trouble getting chores done.

e) The mother had an acute psychotic episode with comorbid cannabis use.

f) The mother was referred for outpatient supports. She was advised not to take drugs or consume alcohol.

g) The mother was prescribed medication.

[47] On April 9, 2025, the children were temporarily placed with the mother under terms of society supervision. Justice Jones emphasized in her endorsement that the society should closely monitor the placement and that the mother must strictly comply with the terms of the supervision order. She endorsed that if this did not occur, the society was to immediately take protective steps and bring the matter back to court on an urgent basis.

[48] The mother did not comply with the supervision order. She did not cooperate in allowing the society workers into her home. In particular, the society had to obtain police assistance to obtain entry to her home and check on the children. The mother’s non-compliance with Justice Jones’s order resulted in Justice Szandtner ordering the children into the society’s care on April 23, 2025.

[49] On May 2, 2025, the mother told the society’s family service worker (the FSW) that she had been in a dark place for months and had been suffering from depression.

[50] On November 25, 2025, the mother told the FSW that she had been facing financial struggles. She told him this level of stress caused her to detach herself. She said that she had stopped taking the children to daycare and venturing out of the home. She accepted this was not healthy but said it was her way of coping.

[51] On December 16, 2025, the mother told the FSW that she had been experiencing depression, anxiety and trauma. She said that is why she had been drinking so much. She said the drink numbed the pain, so she got into a cycle. She said the cycle spiralled for around 6-9 months and that on her bad days she was mostly in her room. She would come out of her room to make food for the children and then return to her room. She understood the children would look to J to meet their needs if she was not available. She said she always smoked weed and the alcohol use was on top of that.

[52] The mother did not dispute the accuracy of the FSW’s evidence.

[53] The evidence amply supports the finding in need of protection sought by the society. The mother was struggling with mental health issues and not functioning as an adequate parent. She was not consistently meeting the children’s physical and emotional needs.[^4]

Part Six – Disposition

6.1 Legal considerations

[54] The society filed, and the court considered, the society’s plan of care pursuant to section 100 of the Act. That plan is consistent with the position it took in this case. That plan is supported by the father.

[55] Subsection 101 (1) of the Act provides that where a court finds that a child is in need of protection, it must first satisfy itself that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future.

[56] In determining if a court order is necessary to protect a child in the future, the court can consider protection concerns other than those that resulted in the child coming into care. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.P., 2019 ONSC 3482.

[57] In any analysis, first and foremost, there must be a consideration of the paramount purpose of the Act, as set out in subsection 1 (1), which is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children. As long as it is consistent with the paramount purpose, other purposes of the Act as set out in subsection 1 (2) are also designed to support the autonomy and integrity of the family unit and to utilize the least disruptive course of action available. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. H.F., 2020 ONCJ 526, per Justice Roselyn Zisman.

[58] If intervention through a court order is determined to be necessary to protect a child in the future, the court shall make one of the orders set out in subsection 101 (1) or section 102 of the Act in the child’s best interests. Only subsection 101 (1) of the Act applies in this case. It reads as follows:

Order where child in need of protection

101 (1) Where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, the court shall make one of the following orders or an order under section 102, in the child’s best interests:

Supervision order

1. That the child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months.

Interim society care

2. That the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified period not exceeding 12 months.

Extended society care

3. That the child be placed in extended society care until the order is terminated under section 116 or expires under section 123.

Consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision

4. That the child be placed in interim society care and custody under paragraph 2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under paragraph 1, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12 months.

[59] Subsection 101 (2) of the Act requires the court to determine what efforts the society or another agency or person made to assist the child before intervention under Part V of the Act.

[60] Subsection 101 (3) of the Act requires that the court look at less disruptive alternatives than removing a child from the care of the persons who had charge of the child immediately before intervention unless it determines that these alternatives would be inadequate to protect the child.

[61] Subsection 101 (4) of the Act requires the court to look at community placements, including family members, before deciding to place a child in care.

[62] The court considered the criteria set out in subsection 74 (3) of the Act in determining the child’s best interests. This subsection reads as follows:

Best interests of child

74 (3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

[63] It is important not to judge a parent by a middle-class yardstick, one that imposes unrealistic and unfair middle-class standards of childcare upon a mother, provided that the standard used is not contrary to the child’s best interests. See: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. B.-H. (R.), 2006 ONCJ 515.

[64] Having mental health issues does not preclude a parent from parenting a child. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.S., 2019 ONCJ 866, where this court wrote at paragraph 114:

[114] The court needs to assess several factors to determine if a parent’s mental illness places a child at risk of harm and if so, whether a child can still be placed in the parent’s care. These factors include:

a) The type of mental illness the parent has.

b) The severity of the mental illness.

c) The frequency of the parent’s mental illness symptoms – whether they are situational or chronic.

d) The impact of the mental illness on the parent’s functioning.

e) The impact of the mental illness on the parent’s parenting.

f) Other risk factors impacting on the mental illness, including substance abuse, difficulties with interpersonal relationships, domestic violence and other stressors such as unstable housing and financial problems.

g) The impact of the mental illness on the children.

h) The insight of the parent into their mental illness.

i) The ability of the parent to meaningfully engage with supports to address the mental health issues.

j) Whether the parent is compliant with treatment recommendations.

k) The strength of the parent’s support system, the insight of those support persons into the parent’s mental health issues and the ability of those persons to prioritize a child’s needs to those of the parent’s and to protect the child.

l) Whether the children have any needs that make them more vulnerable to compromised parenting.

Also see: Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto v. N.D., 2021 ONCJ 369; Valoris v. J.W., C.R. Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, 2022 ONSC 2901; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. O.G., 2025 ONCJ 363.

[65] The length of time a child is in care is at all times a relevant consideration in determining placement when a child is found to be in need of protection. Time is considered from a child’s needs and perspective. The time consideration, like all considerations in child protection matters, should be child focused. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. D.S. (Ont. S.C.J.); Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.R., 2024 ONCJ 233.

[66] A child’s need for permanency planning within a timeframe sensitive to that child’s needs demands that the legal process not be used as a strategy to “buy” a parent time to develop an ability to parent. In child protection proceedings, the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent’s desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from a parent’s evidence that they face some better prospects than what existed at the time of the society’s removal of the child from their care and has developed some new ability as a parent. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (Ont. C.J.); Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.R., 2024 ONCJ 233.

[67] In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.B., 2014 ONCJ 518, this court discussed the importance of a parent providing a child with a safe, stable, and secure home, at paragraph 112, as follows:

The major protection issue is the mother’s ability to be able to provide the child with a safe, secure and stable home. This is a critical aspect of being a parent. Children need stable housing. They need their parents to have a stable plan for them. Children need their parents to be consistent and reliable and to exercise good judgment. They need to be protected from conflict and crisis. The mother has just started to take some steps to be able to address these protection concerns, but she is still not close, at this time, to establishing that she can provide these basic needs for the child. The mother has had difficulty looking after herself, let alone the needs of a vulnerable child. Terms of supervision would be inadequate to protect the child.

[68] The society is seeking an order that will relocate the children to Montreal. There are no statutory provisions in the Act governing relocation of a child’s primary residence. There is no provision in either the Children’s Law Reform Act (the CLRA) or the Act that the relocation provisions in the CLRA apply to proceedings under the Act.

[69] In Children’s Aid Society of Brant v. A.C., 2022 ONCJ 63, Justice Kathleen Baker applied the relocation sections set out in section 39.3 and 39.4 of the CLRA in determining the child’s best interests. Justice Baker wrote at paragraphs 17 and 18:

[17] Where there is legislative silence, judges must look to the common law to determine what legal principles should be applied to ensure continuity and minimize inconsistency in the application of the law. It is arguable that consistency, predictability, and transparency in the law is most important in family law where the decisions judges are called upon to make have a significant impact on the day to day lives of the people who come before the courts.

[18] Applying the legislative framework set out in the CLRA mobility provisions makes sense from a policy and equity perspective. For a different test to be applied to parents proposing to relocate the primary residence of a child in a CYSFA proceeding than a parent who is seeking to do so in a CLRA proceeding potentially creates inconsistent and inequitable results. For litigants in CYSFA proceedings to be subject to a test that is either more or less stringent than that which is applicable under the CLRA is likely to offend the Charter principles of equality.

[70] The additional relocation best interests factors in section 39.4 of the CLRA that are most relevant to this case include:

(a) the reasons for the relocation of the children;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the children;

(c) the amount of time spent with the children by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the children and the level of involvement in the children’s lives of each of those persons;

[71] Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.M., 2015 ONCJ 463 involved a request for a temporary relocation of a child during a status review proceeding. This court discussed the differences between child protection cases and non-child protection cases that may affect a relocation analysis. Those differences include a different, risk-based best interests test, the secondary purpose of the least disruptive course of action, the need to balance a family placement against the principle of making reasonable efforts to return the child to the pre-intervention caregiver and how a move outside the jurisdiction could frustrate that objective.

[72] G.M. was a temporary relocation case. However, the relocation factors discussed in that case are also applicable at the trial stage. This court set out additional relocation considerations for child protection cases as follows:[^5]

[41] Other considerations which will impact on whether the proposed temporary move should be allowed in a child protection case include:

a) Whether the proposed move is in the context of a protection application or a status review application. The court will likely apply a stricter test during an original protection proceeding since there has not yet been a finding that the child is in need of protection, the statutory time limits are less likely to have been exceeded, the parents will be just beginning to address the risk concerns and should be given a reasonable opportunity to show that they can safely parent the child.

b) The nature of the protection issues, including the severity of the risk concerns. This will likely dictate how long a parent might take or should be given to address these concerns. If the risk to a child is low to moderate and will likely be addressed in a timely manner, it is not a proportionate response to move a child far away from the parent to an extended family member. The parent should be given every reasonable chance to succeed. The consideration is different if the risk concerns are high and unlikely to be addressed by the parent in a timely manner.

c) Whether the proposed move will involve a change in who is caring for the child. If the change is being proposed in a status review proceeding (as is the case here) the test in subsection 64 (8) of the Act and the law set out in paragraphs 32-34 above must be applied.

d) Whether the child is in the care of the society at the time of the motion. It is generally advantageous to a child to be placed with a member of his or her family, rather than remain in a foster placement.

e) Whether the child will be moving to reside with a parent, which move will generally be viewed more favourably than a move to live with an extended family member.

f) How closely the child protection case resembles a domestic dispute. In some cases the society is only involved to monitor high conflict between parents and to protect the child from emotional harm. There may only be a supervision order in place. The closer the case resembles a domestic dispute the more appropriate it will be for the court to apply the principles reviewed in Boudreault in assessing whether to permit a proposed move on a temporary basis with one of the parents.

g) The nature of the relationship between the child and the proposed caregiver.

h) The proposed caregiver’s ability to meet the needs of the child in the new jurisdiction, including the child’s academic, medical, social, and development needs. It needs to be kept in mind that many children in child protection cases have special needs due to their exposure to substandard parenting.

i) The proposed caregiver’s ability to work cooperatively and honestly with the society and to comply with court-ordered terms of supervision.

j) The proposed caregiver’s willingness to facilitate any order for access to the left-behind parent and extended family members.

k) The ability and willingness of a child protection agency in the new jurisdiction to monitor any supervision order. Its ability to do so needs to be assessed in the context of the degree of any risk concerns with the caregiver – the higher the risk, the more important the ability to monitor the caregiver becomes.

l) The nature of the relationship between the child and the left-behind parent or parents and their extended families and the possible emotional risk of harm to a child of diminishing those relationships. The court will generally be more reluctant to approve a move where the left-behind parent has been actively involved in raising a child. That parent should be given a longer opportunity, within the parameters of the statutory time limits, to demonstrate that he or she can adequately address the risk concerns.

m) The impact of the move on the left-behind parent or parent’s ability to present a positive plan for the child.

n) The child’s age, stage of development and degree of maturity.

o) The child’s views and preferences.

6.2 Continuing need for a protection order

[73] The court finds that a protection order is necessary to protect the children in the future. The evidence supporting this finding will be reviewed when assessing the mother’s plan to have the children returned to her care.

6.3 The children

[74] J.S. was described by the parties as a very active and happy boy. He is open and engaging. The father described him as intelligent and generous.

[75] J.S. has some issues focusing. He sometimes requires redirection, but follows it.

[76] J.S. is in junior kindergarten. He has made positive friendships. He sometimes gets into physical altercations with other students at school.

[77] J.S. is strongly attached to the mother and hopes to return home when she is better. He is comfortable with the father.

[78] J.R. was described as a shy girl when she first meets strangers. However, she expresses herself well. She is calm, positive and follows routines. She loves to colour and to play with her dolls.

[79] J.R. is developing normally. She is in junior kindergarten and has made positive friendships. She is doing well in school, and her teachers have not expressed any concerns about her.

[80] J.R. has a strong attachment to the mother and wants to live with her. She is comfortable with the father.

6.4 Services provided by the society

[81] The mother, father and the children have received considerable support from the society including:

a) J.S. received a pre-assessment developmental screening at the Erin Oak Centre for Treatment and Development.

b) The children have a Children’s Services Worker.

c) The mother has received the services of a Family Service Worker, a Family Support Worker and Case Aides from the society. The workers have provided the mother with concrete suggestions about managing the children when she gets emotional at visits.

d) The FSW has consistently set out for the mother, both verbally and in writing, the society’s expectations of her. He has encouraged her to obtain individual counseling and trauma counseling and to connect with Humber River Hospital for drug and alcohol support.

e) The FSW referred the mother to the Caribbean African Social Services Agency (CAFCAN) program.

f) The society paid for a hotel room in Toronto for the father to exercise overnight access with the children.

g) The society arranged for Montreal CAS to assess the father’s plan for the children.

[82] The court finds that the society has met its statutory obligation to provide services for the mother, father and the children.

6.5 Community and Family Plan

[83] The society has met its obligation to explore alternate family and community plans for the children by assessing and supporting the father’s plan.

6.6 The Plans of Care

6.6.1 The society’s and the father’s plan

[84] The society’s plan is to place the children in the father’s care and custody, subject to its supervision for six months, with access to the mother and J as set out in paragraph 4 above. The Montreal CAS worker testified that her agency was willing to supervise the placement. The father supports this plan.

[85] The society submitted it will support the mother’s and J’s access with the children. It will also continue to work with the mother to help her obtain services and assess her progress.

[86] The father plans to live in Montreal with the children. The children will attend kindergarten in a local school. Although he plans to marry in May 2026, his evidence was that the children would initially reside only with him, and his partner would maintain her separate residence until a gradual transition later in the summer. He testified that the children met his partner and they got along very well. He said his partner is employed as a Personal Support Worker.

[87] The father says his employer is flexible about his work hours and he can arrange to drop off and pick up the children from school. He identified friends who can care for the children in the event of an emergency. This includes his ex-wife, who lives nearby and with whom he has a friendly relationship.

[88] The father intends to have the children participate in extracurricular activities.

[89] The father is prepared to drive the children to Toronto monthly to have access with J and the mother.

6.6.2 The mother’s plan

[90] The mother’s plan is to have the children returned immediately to her care under an order of society supervision. She says she is willing to follow any conditions the court orders.

[91] The mother acknowledged that her housing is presently unsuitable for the children. She plans to apply for housing in a family shelter. She hopes she can obtain this quickly but has not yet explored its availability.

[92] The mother’s plan is for the children to continue in junior kindergarten in Toronto. She is presently not working and will care for them. She will financially support the children on Ontario Works. She will continue to look for employment. If she finds work, she will look for daycare for the children.

[93] The mother said she had friends and family who would support her with the children. The court did not receive any evidence from them.

[94] The mother said that she will go for individual counseling to address her emotional challenges. She is also prepared to attend drug and alcohol counseling.

[95] The mother said she is Christian. She used to lead her church choir. She will take the children to church on Sundays and on holidays.

[96] The mother said she will have the children participate in extracurricular activities. She would like J.R. to take ballet and J.S. to play soccer but is content to have them participate in activities they choose.

[97] The mother said she will support the children’s relationship with the father. He can call her and arrange to see the children in Toronto.

[98] The mother believes that her mental health is stable. She feels she can properly care for the children. She attributed issues with attendance at access and the quality of her access to her sadness about the children being in foster care.

[99] The mother testified that she was shocked by the children’s removal from her care. She said she wants to go back to her normal life. She wants to go for walks with the children and have barbecues with them. She said she hasn’t been herself. She is trying to figure out why this is happening. She is used to helping people and now people are helping her.

[100] The mother is strongly opposed to the children being placed with the father. She is concerned that her access will be reduced because the children will be placed in Montreal. However, her strongest opposition is to the father himself. She presented as being very angry with him. She does not trust him, and she feels he has manipulated this situation to hurt her. She said he has destroyed her life. She does not believe he is sincere about caring for the children. She testified that he abandoned her and the children when the children were born and inadequately supported them.

[101] The mother said she prefers the children remaining in society care to them being placed with the father.

6.7 Assessment of the mother’s plan

[102] The court will first assess if it is in the children’s best interests to be returned to the mother, subject to terms of society supervision, as she is the children’s pre-intervention caregiver. The court must assess under subsection 101 (3) of the Act whether this would adequately protect the children.

6.7.1 The mother’s strengths

[103] The evidence informed the court that the mother has the following strengths:

a) She is educated and intelligent. She has a college degree and has worked as a social service worker.

b) She lit up when speaking about the children. It was clear how much she loves them and how much she wants to parent them full-time.

c) The children have expressed they want to live with her. They both have a close attachment to her. The court has considered their very young age in assessing the appropriate weight to give to their wishes.

d) She is committed to facilitating the children’s relationship with J and said she is open to facilitating their relationship with the father.

e) She followed through with programming at CAFCAN. She attended the Kuponya program which is a trauma-informed program for Black biracial mothers.

f) She maintains a clean home. Good hygiene is important to her. She fears the father’s home will not be sufficiently hygienic for the children.

g) At times, she has positive visits with the children, is responsive to them, and interacts well with them.

h) She conducted herself, in very stressful circumstances, in a respectful manner at court.

6.7.2 The mother’s challenges

[104] Notwithstanding the mother’s strengths, placing the children in her care, subject to terms of supervision, will not adequately protect the children. It is not in the children’s best interests to make that order.

[105] The mother has been unable to make meaningful progress to address the risk concerns that led to the children being removed from her care as follows:

a) She has not adequately addressed her mental health challenges. Despite encouragement from the society, she has not obtained a referral to a mental health professional to be properly assessed and treated. She advised the court she stopped taking the medication prescribed at the hospital by the psychiatrist after 30 days.

b) Despite direction from the society, she has not taken any steps to obtain individual counseling and trauma counseling. She has not obtained drug and alcohol counseling as advised by the psychiatrist at the hospital and the society. The mother says she intends to take steps to obtain this counseling. Presently, the mother is not connected to any supports. The mother said she was too sad about the children being in the society’s care to take these steps before.

c) The mother continues to use cannabis and alcohol despite being advised by the psychiatrist at the hospital not to do so. The evidence informs the court that this use is frequent. The mother conceded at trial that she continues to use drugs and alcohol, although she claims not in an amount that would affect her ability to care for the children.

d) The mother has inconsistently co-operated with the society. She delayed providing the society with the children’s government documentation and immunization records. She has gone through long stretches where she does not respond to messages from the society, misses appointments and doesn’t attend meetings about the children.[^6] This makes it very difficult for the society to assess her plans and move forward.

e) The mother has been unable to move beyond supervised visits with the children at the society’s office. At times, in person visits have been suspended due to her presentation and lack of attendance. The following issues have happened with access to the children:

i) Several society workers described how the mother often becomes “frozen” at visits. She will stare blankly and not respond to anyone. This sometimes lasts 30 to 45 seconds. On occasion, it has lasted much longer. This agitates the children who wonder why the mother is not responding to them and if their mother is OK. Many times, the mother cries during the visits, upsetting the children.

ii) On August 12, 2025, the mother struggled to leave her visit with the children and remained at the society office for over two hours after the visit. Paramedics were called but the mother then left. The society paused the mother’s in-person access and set up virtual visits.

iii) The mother’s in-person access with the children resumed on November 12, 2025, to take place weekly, supervised at the society’s office. However, this quickly broke down. The mother cancelled six consecutive weekly visits starting on December 17, 2025, citing either illness or her car not working. The society offered her presto cards for public transportation, but she declined. The mother reiterated these reasons for not attending access at trial. She also said she was sad about the children not being in her care. On February 3, 2026, the society reduced her visits to bi-weekly because of her poor attendance.

iv) The mother’s virtual calls with the children have also been problematic. Society workers testified that she often does not engage with or respond to the children. The children will ask what is wrong and she will not respond.

v) Two society workers were asked if there had been any improvement in the mother’s access over the past few months. They said no. The FSW was asked about the possibility of expanding access. He did not feel it was in the children’s best interests, as the mother was struggling with the present length of the visits.

f) The mother has been unable to obtain secure housing. She has moved between living with friends and at shelters. She is slow to inform the society where she is residing. She described her present shelter as an individual residence that cannot accommodate the children.

g) The mother appears to be isolated. No one attended court on her behalf to testify about how they would support her.

[106] The mother has not provided a viable plan to care for the children. She has not proposed a safety plan for the children if she has another mental health episode.

[107] The mother demonstrated little insight into the protection concerns at trial. For instance:

a) When asked why the children came into care, she said it was because she made a mistake. When asked what the mistake was, she could not explain it.

b) She felt the children should have been returned to her care right away. She showed little understanding about how her children were neglected due to her mental health challenges.

c) She feels her alcohol and drug usage do not impact her parenting despite being warned by the psychiatrist that it may negatively affect her mental health.

d) She blamed the father for manufacturing this matter so that the children were removed from her care. This wasn’t the case. The father was not involved with the children’s removal from her care and only came forward after being notified by the society that the children were in the society’s care.

[108] The mother’s lack of insight makes her a poor candidate to make meaningful changes.

[109] The children require a stable and consistent caregiver who is functioning well and who can meet their needs. Unfortunately, the mother is not functioning well and cannot adequately meet their needs at this time. She has been unable to show she can consistently parent the children in a positive manner for more than one hour in a supervised setting, let alone care for them on a full-time basis. She struggles to attend access consistently and to maintain her focus on the children during short visits.

[110] The mother has not shown any real change since the children were removed from her care. The children were neglected and were being cared for by a dysfunctional caregiver with significant mental health challenges prior to being brought into the society’s care. The risk concerns for them remain just as high today.

6.7.3 Would a supervision order adequately protect the children?

[111] Even if the children were returned to the mother’s care, it would have to be pursuant to strict terms of supervision. For the court to make a supervision order, it would need to be confident that the mother would comply with the order. See: Windsor-Essex CAS v. L.H., 2004 ONCJ 196, [2004] O.J. No. 3889 (OCJ) and this court’s comments in Jewish Family and Child Services of Toronto v. A.K., 2014 ONCJ 227.

[112] The evidence informs the court that the mother would not consistently comply with a supervision order. The court made a supervision order on April 9, 2025, and the mother did not comply with it. The mother misses meetings with the society and cancels appointments. She often does not respond to messages. She has not come close to meeting reasonable expectations of her that have been provided several times to her by the society.

[113] More importantly, the risk concerns for the children are too high to be mitigated by any terms of a supervision order.

[114] The court finds that the physical, emotional and developmental risks of placing the children in the mother’s care are far too high. It is not in their best interests to make that order.

6.8 Should the court make an interim society care order and extend the statutory time limit under subsection 122 (5) of the Act?

[115] The mother submitted that if the children are not returned to her, they should remain in society care.

[116] Section 122 of the Act sets out time limits for making interim society care orders. It reads as follows:

Time limit

122 (1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), the court shall not make an order for interim society care under paragraph 2 of subsection 101 (1) that results in a child being in the care and custody of a society for a period exceeding,

(a) 12 months, if the child is younger than 6 on the day the court makes the order; or

(b) 24 months, if the child is 6 or older on the day the court makes the order.

Calculation of time limit

(2) The time during which a child has been in a society’s care and custody pursuant to the following shall be counted in calculating the period referred to in subsection (1):

1. An agreement made under subsection 75 (1) (temporary care agreement).

2. A temporary order made under clause 94 (2) (d) (custody during adjournment).

Previous periods to be counted

(3) The period referred to in subsection (1) shall include any previous periods that the child was in a society’s care and custody under an interim society care order made under paragraph 2 of subsection 101 (1) or as described in subsection (2) other than periods that precede a continuous period of five or more years that the child was not in a society’s care and custody.

Deemed extension of time limit

(4) Where the period referred to in subsection (1) or (5) expires and,

(a) an appeal of an order made under subsection 101 (1) has been commenced and is not yet finally disposed of; or

(b) the court has adjourned a hearing under section 114 (status review),

the period is deemed to be extended until the appeal has been finally disposed of and any new hearing ordered on appeal has been completed or an order has been made under section 114, as the case may be.

Six-month extension

(5) Subject to paragraphs 2 and 4 of subsection 101 (1), the court may by order extend the period permitted under subsection (1) by a period not to exceed six months if it is in the child’s best interests to do so.

[117] The children have been in the society’s care for just over one year. This is beyond the one-year statutory time limit, set out in subsection 122 (1) of the Act, for the court to make an interim society care order.

[118] There are only two ways the court can keep the children in the society’s care. The first is to make an extended society care order. The second is to make an extension order under subsection 122 (5) of the Act and make an interim society care order.

[119] Although, the mother did not expressly request an extension order under subsection 122 (5) of the Act, her alternative position effectively sought that relief. She wants the children returned to her care and seeks additional time to take the necessary steps to address the risk concerns. She fears she will be unable to accomplish this if the children relocate to Montreal.

[120] The test for granting a subsection 122 (5) extension order was set out in Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society v. B.D., 2022 ONCJ 284 as follows:

1. The decision to extend must be made in accordance with the child’s best interests.

2. The decision to extend must be viewed from the child’s perspective.

3. The factors in subsection 74 (3) of the Act must be considered.

4. The court must be satisfied, balancing the factors set out in subsection 74 (3), that there are unusual or equitable principles in the circumstances that would justify granting an exception to the general rule “for the child’s sake”.

[121] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. S.S., 2011 ONCJ 803, this court gave examples of some of the cases where an extension could be granted at paragraph 135 as follows:

There will be cases where, for a variety of reasons, it is in the best interests of a child to return to a parent, but a delay is appropriate. In these limited cases, the court should make the extension order set out in subsection 70(4).[^7] See Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society v. K.M., (2001), 110 A.C.W.S. (3d) 491, [2001] O.J. No. 5047, 2001 Carswell­Ont. 4507 (Ont. Fam. Ct.). These would include cases with the following facts: where a parent needs a little more time to complete a program where participation was delayed due to waiting lists; where a parent or child is waiting for an important support service or imminent housing to become available or where a child needs additional time to make a positive and gradual transition from a foster placement to a home placement. It would be detrimental to a child in such cases to rush this process for the sake of strict compliance with a time limit.

[122] The court finds it is not in the children’s best interests to grant an extension order for the following reasons:

a) They have been in the society’s care in excess of the statutory time limit and need permanency.

b) The mother has provided no evidence that she has meaningfully addressed the protection concerns about her mental health and functioning. Despite being told what she needs to do to address the protection concerns, she has taken few steps to do this over the past year. There is no reason to believe that she will address them anytime soon.

c) The mother has shown little insight into the protection concerns, making it far less likely that she will make meaningful changes to address the protection concerns in the near future.

d) The protection concerns are so profound that the mother would have to establish a long period of mental health stability, consistent access attendance and improved engagement with the children before a court could seriously contemplate placing the children with her. It is not in their best interests to wait in limbo for this to happen, particularly when the mother has been unable to do this in the past.

e) None of the circumstances listed in S.S. are present here. There is no evidence that suggests this is one of those limited cases where a delay is appropriate, or that unusual or equitable principles in the circumstances justify granting an exception to the general rule.

[123] Since the mother’s plan has been rejected and an extension order is not in the children’s best interests, the court’s disposition options are to either place the children with the father under a supervision order or place the children in extended society care.

6.9 Assessment of the plan to place the children with the father

[124] The society and the father both propose that the children be placed with the father in Montreal for six months, subject to the terms of a supervision order. The mother opposes this order.

[125] The court has some concerns with the father, as follows:

a) Until he was notified the children had been removed from the mother’s care, he had little involvement with them. This creates a concern about the father’s long-term commitment to parenting the children.

b) The father has not adequately supported the children. He is seriously in default of his child support payments under the existing court order made under the CLRA.

c) The father told the court he is seriously in default of the support order for his three children who live with his ex-wife in Montreal.[^8]

d) The father was charged in 2019 with assaulting the mother of his other child. Those charges were withdrawn. However, he was convicted of a breach of release conditions because he contacted that mother. The father does not see that child.

[126] The court considered the impact on the children of being relocated to Montreal. It will mean they are removed from their school, teachers and friends. It means they will see their mother less often because of the distance.

[127] The court considered that relocating the children to Montreal makes it more challenging for the mother to have the children returned to her care. However, this would be a more compelling argument if this trial had taken place when the children had been in care for only six months. We are now over the statutory time limit set out in the Act. The Act mandates at this stage that the court shifts its focus to permanency planning. It is not in the best interests of the children to delay permanency planning in the hope that the mother will take the necessary steps to address the risk concerns.

[128] The court’s concerns about placing the children with the father were outweighed by the following evidence:

a) He has shown a strong commitment to parenting the children since he was told they were removed from the mother’s care. This has mitigated the court’s concerns about his prior lack of involvement with the children and his failure to properly support them financially. For instance:

i) He has come to Toronto for every court attendance.

ii) He has fully cooperated with the society’s workers. He has signed all required consents. He is responsive to their calls and messages. He attends meetings. He is open and responsive with them.

iii) He fully cooperated with the assessment by Montreal CAS.

iv) He has frequently driven to Toronto since August 2025 to visit the children.

v) He is committed to driving the children to Toronto monthly to visit J and the mother.

b) The FSW is a very experienced worker. He testified that he has grown to trust the father’s judgment.

c) The Montreal CAS worker assessed his plan. She was very positive about it and felt it was a good plan for the children. She said he has no prior child protection history. He has adequate housing for the children. The children’s rooms are furnished and he has toys for them. He knows what school the children will attend. He has flexible work hours and is available to care for them. She spoke to his friends who would help him with the children. She has no concerns about them. She spoke to his ex-wife who confirmed his good relationship with their three children.

d) Several workers testified that he is gentle and loving with the children. They respond well to him. He is prepared for the visits and engages positively with them.

e) He presented as very calm and measured at trial – even when the mother was agitated with him.

f) Montreal CAS will supervise the children’s placement with him.

[129] The father is commended for showing a meaningful commitment to the children since becoming involved in this case. There was no evidence to support the mother’s contention that he only came forward to hurt her.

[130] The court finds that the children can be adequately protected by placing the children in Montreal with the father, subject to the terms of supervision proposed by the society and agreed to by the father. It is in the children’s best interests to be placed with him.

[131] The court also finds that the relocation of the children to Montreal is in their best interests for the following reasons:

a) The father has lived in Montreal for over 10 years. He is employed there. His three children who reside with his ex-wife live there. That is his home. He cannot be expected to move to Toronto. If the children are to be placed with the father, they need to relocate to Montreal. The father has provided good reasons to relocate the children.

b) The mother cannot adequately parent the children. No other family or community member in Toronto presented a plan to care for the children.

c) The father has a viable plan to care for the children in Montreal.

d) The children will be exposed to their French culture and heritage and to their paternal family, especially their half-siblings in Montreal.

e) The father has shown a commitment to facilitate the children’s relationships with the mother and J.

f) The distance between Montreal and Toronto is not prohibitive to maintaining the children’s relationships with the mother and J.

g) The father has complied with all court orders in this protection case.

h) The father has fully cooperated with the society and Montreal CAS. He has been open and honest with them. The court is confident he will continue to do so.

i) Montreal CAS will monitor this placement.

j) The children are developing a closer relationship with the father. They have been observed to be comfortable and happy with him.

k) The case is beyond the statutory time limits set out in the Act. The focus is now on permanency planning for the children.

l) The protection concerns are profound and are unlikely to be adequately addressed by the mother anytime soon. Providing the children with a secure family placement outweighs the benefits to them of having more access with the mother, and creating a better opportunity for the mother to have the children returned to her care.

m) The only other option for the children is extended society care. Subsection 101 (4) of the Act requires the court to consider the viability of a family or community plan before placing a child in the society’s care. The father has presented a viable plan. It is preferable for the children to relocate to Montreal rather than being placed in extended society care.

[132] To summarize, the evidence establishes that it is in the children’s best interests to be placed with the father in Montreal, subject to terms of society supervision. The court finds that:

a) The society’s and the father’s plan will best meet the children’s need for continuity and stability.

b) The society’s and the father’s plan will best meet the children’s physical, mental and emotional needs.

c) The society’s and the father’s plan will best meet the children’s physical, mental and emotional level of development.

d) The society’s and the father’s plan will better address the children’s needs than the plan proposed by the mother.

e) The least disruptive alternative, consistent with the children’s best interests, is to place them in the father’s care and custody for six months, subject to terms of society supervision.

Part Seven – Access

7.1 Legal considerations

[133] Subsection 104 (1) of the Act sets out the test for ordering access as follows:

Access order

104 (1) The court may, in the child’s best interests,

(a) when making an order under this Part; or

(b) upon an application under subsection (2),

make, vary or terminate an order respecting a person’s access to the child or the child’s access to a person, and may impose such terms and conditions on the order as the court considers appropriate.

[134] Subsection 74 (3) of the Act (set out in paragraph 62 above) sets out best interests factors for the court to consider in determining access. The court has considered these factors in making this decision.

[135] Courts should give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.M., 2024 ONCJ 607.

[136] The party who seeks to reduce normal access will usually be required to provide a justification for taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. C.P.I., 2020 ONCJ 304; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.M., supra.

7.2 The mother’s access with the children

[137] The society seeks an order that the mother’s access with the children be supervised in its discretion, with minimum in-person access once each month and minimum virtual access once each week. The father supports this position.

[138] The mother asked to see the children as much as possible. She said she wanted access every day. She wants overnight visits with the children.

[139] The court recognizes that the children love the mother and would like to see her more often. They have a close bond with her. The court also recognizes that some of the mother’s visits are positive. However, the court finds that the access orders sought by the society are in the children’s best interests for the following reasons:

a) The mother has been unable to show she can consistently meet the children’s needs during her supervised visits. She often becomes frozen, as described by the workers, and becomes unresponsive to the children’s emotional and physical needs. Society workers need to intervene to ensure the children’s needs are met. The FSW testified that, “she can manage and regulate about an hour. Then, it becomes too much. She gets distracted and spaced out”.

b) The mother has had periods where she is unable to consistently attend her access visits. This is likely due to her mental health struggles. She needs to show much more consistency in access before visits can become unsupervised.

c) The mother has not adequately addressed her mental health issues. She has not followed through with many recommended services after her hospitalization. She stopped taking prescribed medication.

d) The mother continues to use alcohol and cannabis against medical advice. This increases the risk of mental health episodes.

e) The mother lacks insight into the protection concerns, which makes it less likely she will address them.

f) The court must consider the logistics of access. The father is being generous by agreeing to drive the children to Toronto each month for access visits. He will facilitate weekly virtual calls.

g) The significant protection concerns inform the court that it is in the children’s best interests that access be fully supervised at this time. The order requested by the society gives it the flexibility to increase the hours of access and decrease the level of supervision if the mother can make gains during the term of this order.

[140] The court will qualify the society’s discretion over the frequency of in-person access by requiring the father’s agreement to any increase beyond the minimum monthly in-person visits, since he is responsible for transporting the children between Montreal and Toronto. Otherwise, the details of access, including duration, location, and level of supervision, shall remain in the society’s discretion.

7.3 J’s access with the children

[141] The society, father, NC and J signed a Statement of Agreed Facts for the children’s access with J. The mother also agreed to J having access to the children on these terms in J’s protection proceeding. She did not make submissions about this issue at this trial.

[142] The parties agreed that J and the children have a close and positive relationship. It is important for them to maintain this relationship.

[143] The court finds that the access set out in the Statement of Agreed Facts is in the children’s best interests. It will be ordered. The court will qualify the society’s discretion over increases in the frequency of in-person access as set out in paragraph 140.

Part Eight – Conclusion

[144] A final order shall go on the following terms:

a) Statutory findings are made for the children as set out on page 4 of the society’s twice-amended protection application.

b) The children are found to be children in need of protection under sub-clause 74 (2) (b) (i) of the Act.

c) The children are placed in the care and custody of the father, subject to terms of society supervision, as set out in the appendix to the society’s twice-amended protection application, for six months.

d) The father is authorized to relocate the children to Montreal.

e) The mother shall have access with the children at the society’s discretion as to duration, location, and level of supervision, with a minimum of one in-person visit each month and one virtual call each week. Any increase in the frequency of in-person visits beyond that minimum shall require the father’s agreement.

f) The children and J shall have access at the society’s discretion as to duration, location, and level of supervision, with a minimum of one in-person visit each month and one virtual call each week, subject to J’s schedule and wishes. Any increase in the frequency of in-person visits beyond that minimum shall require the father’s agreement. Any additional virtual access may be arranged between NC and/or J and the father.

g) The father shall transport the children between Montreal and Toronto once each month for the children’s in-person access with the mother and J, and those in-person visits shall take place during the same monthly trip.

[145] The court observed at trial how much the mother loves the children. She has faced significant challenges. The court strongly recommends that she do the following:

a) Go to her family doctor and receive a referral for a comprehensive mental health assessment. She needs to be able to understand her mental health challenges so that she and supporting professionals can address them.

b) Follow through with any recommendations in the mental health assessment, including taking prescribed medication.

c) Participate in individual counseling for trauma and how to regulate her emotions at access visits.

d) Participate in substance abuse counseling.

e) Attend visits consistently.

f) Consistently meet with the society workers and respond promptly to their calls and messages.

g) Support the children’s placement with the father. This will ease the children’s adjustment into his home.

[146] Court staff shall schedule a status review date before November 10, 2026 with the case management judge, Justice Szandtner.

[147] The society shall promptly take out this order. Approval of the order by the respondents as to form and content is dispensed with.

[148] The court thanks the parties and the society’s counsel for their civil presentation of this case.

Released: May 11, 2026

Justice Stanley B. Sherr

[^1]: NC is not the mother’s child. He is the child of J’s deceased father.

[^2]: Section 103 of the Act reads as follows: If, under this Part, a proceeding is commenced or an order for the care, custody or supervision of a child is made, any proceeding under the Children’s Law Reform Act respecting decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the same child is stayed, except by leave of the court in the proceeding under that Act.

[^3]: The society was unable to get this report until August 18, 2025.

[^4]: There is also significant evidence after April 23, 2025 supporting the finding in need of protection. The court will review that evidence when discussing the disposition of this matter.

[^5]: G.M. has been followed in child protection cases after the relocation amendments were made to the CLRA in 2021. See: DCAS v P.A., 2022 ONSC 606; CAS v. M.M. and J.B., 2021 ONSC 5686; Simcoe Muskoka Child, Youth and Family Services v. H.D. and J.D., 2022 ONSC 5953.

[^6]: For instance, the mother was out of contact with the society from August 12, 2025 until she attended court on October 31, 2025.

[^7]: Subsection 70 (4) of the Child and Family Services Act was the predecessor to subsection 122 (5) of the Act.

[^8]: Financially supporting one’s children in a responsible manner is an important part of being a parent. The failure to do so demonstrates poor judgment and an inability to prioritize the child’s interests. See: Jama v. Mohamed, [2015] ONCJ 619; McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610; J.T. v. E.J., 2022 ONSC 4956; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057.