ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Morrissey, 2026 ONCJ 264

DATE: May 5, 2026

COURT FILE No.: 24-28107096

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

HEATHER MORRISSEY

Before Justice P.K. Burstein

Heard on March 23-27, 2026

Reasons for Judgment released on May 5, 2026

K. Buker................................................................................................ counsel for the Crown

K. Mathews.................................................................................... counsel for the Defendant

BURSTEIN J.:

A. Overview of the case

[1] Heather Morrissey was the sole, long‑time caregiver for her 53-year-old son, David Morrissey. Since he was child, David has been non‑verbal, autistic, and highly dependent on others for all activities of daily living, including the administration of his anti-seizure medication. Ms Morrissey now stands charges with the criminal offence of administering a noxious substance to him, namely, an overdose of that prescribed anti-seizure medication.

[2] By all accounts, Ms Morrissey has always been a devoted mother, not only to David but to her two other children, Dwayne and Debra. In the months leading up to August 2024, Ms Morrissey suffered a number of tragedies, including the death of Debra and Dwayne’s deteriorating mental health during his stay with Ms Morrissey following his marital breakup. On August 14, 2024, emergency services attended the Morrissey residence in Oshawa in response to a 9-1-1 call from Dwayne’s adult daughter, Summer Morrissey, about her discovery of her father’s apparent suicide in the basement of the residence. Family members and first responders who answered Summer’s calls for help quickly became concerned that Ms Morrissey may have overdosed on sleeping pills and that she may have administered an overdose of David’s medication to him. Although Ms Morrissey was conscious at the scene, by all accounts she was clearly impaired. Together, her and David were taken by ambulance to the hospital for further examination and treatment.

[3] During Ms Morrissey’s interactions with family members, police officers, paramedics and hospital personnel, she said things about having consumed sleeping pills and about her having administered David more medication than prescribed. She also said things to suggest that she had intentionally taken and administered the medications out of a desire to end both of their lives due to the recent family tragedies and her related concern for David’s future. Despite testifying that she had no memory of any interactions with the officers, with the paramedics or with her family on the night in question, Ms Morrissey denied having formed any intention to cause harm to herself or David through an overdose of medication.

[4] Toxicological evidence from a forensic scientist confirmed the presence of phenobarbital and phenytoin in David’s blood, the two prescription drugs he had been taking for years, likely at levels which were higher than would be expected.

B. Admissibility of Ms Morrissey’s utterances to police and ambulance personnel

[5] In its final submissions, the Crown conceded that its case against Ms Morrissey rested largely on the various admissions she had made to people on the night in question.

[6] Prior to trial, the defence had signaled its objection to the introduction of almost all of Ms Morrissey’s utterances, except for the utterances to Nurse Cathcart and the recording of her post-arrest police interview the following day. The defence had initially limited its objection to a claim that the Crown could not prove bard that Ms Morrissey’s utterances to the attending police officers and to the paramedics satisfied the common law voluntariness requirement because of concerns that Ms Morrissey did not have an “operating mind”. As part of that claim, the defence submitted that, in the context of this case, one or more of the paramedics also fell under the rubric of “persons in authority” for the purpose of the common law voluntariness requirements.

[7] After hearing some of the witness testimony about Ms Morrissey’s utterances, the Crown abandoned any intention to rely on utterances made in response to questions posed by either PC Tsui (at the house) or by PC Connolly (at the hospital), but maintained that their body-worn camera recordings and the evidence of utterances made to the paramedics, to Nurse Cathcart and to Florence Edwards were still properly admissible without any need to prove voluntariness.

[8] After the evidence on the blended voir dire and trial had already commenced, the defence sought leave to add a s. 7 Charter argument to the objection to Ms Morrissey’s utterances being introduced. As the prejudice arising from the late notice was minimal and could be addressed through a flexible application of the rules of procedure, the Crown fairly acknowledged that I should grant leave to the defence raising this additional argument. I agreed to allow the defence to so on the understanding that, given the late notice, the Crown would be allowed an opportunity to consider what additional evidence it might seek to present should I determine that some or all of the challenged evidence must be excluded pursuant to s. 24 of the Charter.

[9] As the Crown signaled its readiness to close its case, the parties sought a ruling on the admissibility of the various incriminating utterances. After hearing submissions from both parties, I retired for a short time to consider whether I could, or should, reach an expeditious conclusion on the admissibility of the various utterances given the panoply of complex legal issues involved. Both parties required a ruling as to which, if any, of the impugned incriminating remarks were admissible in order to decide what further evidence they may seek to present. Concerned that reserving my decision on this issue might derail the orderly completion of this trial, a trial which had already been significantly delayed, I determined that it was necessary to provide a bottom-line decision immediately with reasons to follow.

[10] I returned from a short recess and informed the parties that I was satisfied all but one set of Ms Morrissey’s utterances were admissible pursuant to the common law confession rule and that admission of those utterances would not run afoul of the Charter. With respect to Ms Morrissey’s responses to Paramedic Wilson’s questions in the ambulance, I ruled that the Crown had not satisfied the requirements of the voluntariness rule and, in the alternative, that admission of the evidence would violate s. 7 of the Charter. Although the Crown did not submit otherwise, I also ruled that evidence about those utterances from either P.C. Connolly or his body-worn camera was equally inadmissible.

[11] Given the ultimate positions of the parties at the end of the blended voir dire, there were two issues for me to decide in determining whether to formally admit evidence of Ms Morrissey’s various incriminating utterances on the night of August 14, 2024:

(1) Were either or both of the paramedics “persons in authority” such that the common law’s “voluntariness” requirement needed to be met before any utterances in response to their questions could be adduced in evidence?

If so, the defence contended that the evidence on the blended voir dire failed to satisfy that common law requirement as there was a reasonable doubt those utterances were not induced and that Ms Morrissey had an “operating mind” at the time she made them. On the other hand, if the paramedics are not properly classified as “persons in authority” in this case, then evidence relating to whether the utterances were proven to have met the common law voluntariness requirement would not impact their admissibility.

(2) In the circumstances of this case, would the Crown’s prosecutorial use of Ms Morrissey’s responses to the questions of the paramedics violate s. 7 of the Charter?

1) Has the Crown proven that Ms Morrissey’s utterances to the paramedics were either not made to “persons in authority” or, if so, that they were voluntary?

[12] The common law’s requirement for the Crown to prove the voluntariness of an accused’s utterances is restricted to utterances made to “persons in authority”. The test for whether someone is legally considered to be a “person in authority” within the meaning of the common law voluntariness requirement was set out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Hodgson, [1998] 2 SCR 449 (at paras. 34 and 36):

… where the accused speaks out of fear of reprisal or hope of advantage because he reasonably believes the person receiving the statement is acting as an agent of the police or prosecuting authorities and could therefore influence or control the proceedings against him or her, then the receiver of the statement is properly considered a person in authority. In other words, the evidence must disclose not only that the accused subjectively believed the receiver of the statement to be in a position to control the proceedings against the accused, but must also establish an objectively reasonable basis for that belief....

... there is no catalogue of persons, beyond a peace officer or prison guard, who are automatically considered a person in authority solely by virtue of their status. A parent, doctor, teacher or employer all may be found to be a person in authority if the circumstances warrant, but their status, or the mere fact that they may wield some personal authority over the accused, is not sufficient to establish them as persons in authority for the purposes of the confessions rule.... [T]he person in authority requirement has evolved in a manner that avoids a formalistic or legalistic approach to the interactions between ordinary citizens. Instead, it requires a case-by-case consideration of the accused's belief as to the ability of the receiver of the statement to influence the prosecution or investigation of the crime. That is to say, the trial judge must determine whether the accused reasonably believed the receiver of the statement was acting on behalf of the police or prosecuting authorities.

[13] I recognize that a number of courts have held that the paramedics in those cases were not “persons in authority” when they elicited admissions from the accused. However, as Hodgson expressly realized, the determination must be made within the context of a particular case: see also R v Singh, 2007 SCC 48 (at para. 40). In short, the operative question is whether, based on their perception of their interrogator’s ability to influence the criminal investigation or prosecution, the accused reasonably believed that making the utterance would be to their advantage.

[14] The Supreme Court of Canada has also made clear that while the accused bears an evidentiary burden of showing that the person to whom the confession was made was a person in authority, once that burden is met the burden then shifts to the Crown to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that the accused did not reasonably believe the person to whom the confession was made to be a person in authority, or, if so, that the statement was made voluntarily: see R v Grandinetti, 2005 SCC 5, [2005] 1 SCR 27 (at para. 37). In R v Bauman, [2026] OJ. No. 939, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently confirmed that an accused’s failure to testify on the voir dire in support of that claim does not bar them from still raising the issue.

[15] Because Ms Morrissey elected to not testify on the voir dire, there was no direct evidence that she perceived either of the paramedics to be a “person in authority” in the context of this case. Accordingly, I was required to examine the circumstances surrounding her interactions with each of the paramedics with a view to deciding whether it would have been reasonable for Ms Morrissey to have formed that belief. Logically, if it would have been open to a reasonable person to form such a belief then it may be reasonable to infer Ms Morrissey herself formed such a belief. While not dispositive of the issue, such circumstantial evidence of Ms Morrissey’s belief, coupled with a finding that it was reasonably based, could be enough for her to have discharged her evidentiary burden and thereby shift the burden to the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that the paramedics in this case were not persons in authority or, if so, that Ms Morrissey’s utterances to them were voluntary.

[16] There were a number of features to Paramedic Wilson’s interaction with Ms Morrissey which pointed towards a conclusion that, in the unusual circumstances of this case, there was a reasonable basis for Ms Morrissey to have believed she was someone who could exert influence over the investigation and, thus, was a “person in authority”. First, it would have been reasonable in the context of this case for Ms Morrissey to have perceived Paramedic Wilson as working together with PC Connolly. It is noteworthy that, as the body-worn camera footage showed, the uniform worn by Durham Region Paramedics like Ms Wilson bears many similarities to the uniform worn by DRPS officers like PC Connolly, such as colour, uniformity of pants and shirts, shoulder patches, white lettering on the back and utility belts. The similarly uniformed paramedics and police officers had both been roaming freely around Ms Morrissey’s home without her having invited them in, apparently pursuant to the same authority. More specifically, there were features of Paramedic Wilson’s interaction with Ms Morrissey in the back of the ambulance which bore some of the coercive hallmarks of questioning by a police investigator. The back of the ambulance was a confined space, and its back doors were closed. Ms Morrissey was seated on a bench with PC Connolly immediately behind her and Paramedic Wilson only a few feet away. At no point did Paramedic Wilson say anything to Ms Morrissey which clearly delineated a functional difference between her role and that of PC Connolly.

[17] The evidence also supported an inference that the nature and tone of Paramedic Wilson’s verbal interactions with Ms Morrissey would have connoted an investigative interest in what Ms Morrissey had done to David. While not involved directly in the investigation of Ms Morrissey, Ms Wilson’s testimony led me to believe she was questioning Ms Morrissey with at least a view to assisting the police with their potential criminal investigation of Heather Morrissey. Other than asking how many pills David may have taken, Ms Wilson’s evidence showed that she already had the information she needed for David’s medical care before leaving the house. Second, before boarding the ambulance Ms Wilson had already formed a belief that Ms Morrissey may have committed a criminal offence. According to Ms Wilson, PC Connolly was riding with them in the back of the ambulance “because it could be criminal”. Lastly, there were elements of Ms Wilson’s testimony which made clear her intention to help further the police investigation by questioning Ms Morrissey. In cross-examination, she admitted wanting a police officer present in the ambulance for when she “confirmed things” with Ms Morrissey and that she was questioning Ms Morrissey “because of the possibility of it being a crime”. After one particularly poignant admission by Ms Morrissey, Ms Wilson tried to make eye contact with PC Connolly to ensure that he too had heard what she heard.

[18] I do not entirely accept Ms Wilson’s testimony that she had only been asking Ms Morrissey questions in the ambulance to further her duties as a paramedic. In addition to what I have already noted, there were specific features of Ms Wilson’s testimony which led me to doubt the credibility or reliability of her claimed purpose in questioning Ms Morrissey. For example, despite some initial hesitancy in admitting to having known PC Connolly was recording what was being said in the ambulance on his body-worn camera, Ms Wilson later testified that she had requested an officer accompany them in the ambulance in part so that they could record what would be said. On that point, it is also significant that shortly after their arrival at the hospital, in response to PC Connoly’s inquiry into whether she had heard some of Ms Morrissey’s remarks in the back of the ambulance, Ms Wilson said “I heard whatever was on that” -- the inference being that she was gesturing to the large rectangular body worn camera with the red flashing light on his chest when she said it.

[19] By contrast, Paramedic Best only briefly questioned Ms Morrissey when Ms Morrissey first exited the house. The two of them were alone outside the other ambulance. There were no police officers present. The only questions posed by Paramedic Best related to Ms Morrissey’s own health. It was Ms Morrissey who veered off topic and volunteered what she had done to David

[20] Having regard to the context of this case, I was satisfied that there was at least some evidence that there was a reasonable basis for Ms Morrissey to have believed Paramedic Wilson was a “person in authority” when posing questions in the back of the ambulance with PC Connolly present in uniform with his body-worn camera visible. Although there was nothing in the circumstances capable of generating a reasonable belief that Ms Wilson could exert any influence over a potential prosecution, Cory J. in Hodgson made clear that a reasonable perception in an interrogator’s ability to influence the investigation can also give rise to a finding they were a “person in authority”. A reasonable belief that Ms Wilson was acting in conjunction with the police is legally sufficient to trigger the requirements of the common law confession rule. Even without the direct testimony of Ms Morrissey, the circumstances leave me with a reasonable doubt that Paramedic Wilson was acting as a “person in authority” when questioning Ms Morrissey in the back of the ambulance.

[21] On the other hand, there was no evidence to reasonably show Paramedic Best was acting as a “person in authority” when she questioned Ms Morrissey. First, unlike with Paramedic Wilson, the circumstances did not give rise to a concern that Ms Morrissey would reasonably have perceived Paramedic Best to be a “person in authority”. Ms Best never formed a belief that there had been a crime nor that Ms Morrissey was involved. She did not invite any police officer to get into the ambulance with her and Ms Morrissey. Indeed, she was originally expecting to transport her patient, Ms Morrissey, in her own separate ambulance but was then directed to accompany David in Wilson’s ambulance so that Ms Morrissey could help placate David. I also accept Paramedic Best’s evidence that her brief initial interaction with Ms Morrissey was exclusively focused on Ms Morrissey’s possible medical needs, as opposed to any attempt by her to help further a criminal investigation. I am satisfied that there was nothing about the circumstances of Paramedic Best’s interaction with Ms Morrissey, which was capable of suggesting to Ms Morrissey that Paramedic Best’s role was anything other than providing treatment for Ms Morrissey’s medical condition.

[22] Turning then to the issue of whether the utterances to Paramedic Wilson were proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, I need not consider the defence submission that the evidence raises a reasonable doubt about whether Ms Morrissey had an “operating mind” at the time she responded to Ms Wilson’s questions. I did not need to address this concern at the admissibility stage because I was not satisfied her responses to Paramedic Wilson were made voluntarily in the context of this case.

[23] In one of its most recent restatements of the confession rule, the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Beaver, 2022 SCC 54 said (at para. 48):

The application of the confessions rule is necessarily flexible and contextual. When assessing the voluntariness of a confession, the "trial judge must determine, based on the whole context of the case, whether the statements made by an accused were reliable and whether the conduct of the state served in any way to unfairly deprive the accused of their free choice to speak to a person in authority" (Tessier (SCC), at para. 68). The trial judge must consider all relevant factors, including the presence of threats or promises, the existence of oppressive conditions, whether the accused had an operating mind, any police trickery that would "shock the community", and the presence or absence of a police caution. These factors are not a checklist that supplants a contextual inquiry (see Oickle, at paras. 47, 66-67 and 71; Spencer, at paras. 11-12; Singh, at para. 35; Tessier (SCC), at paras. 5, 68, 76 and 87).

[24] The relevant “context” in this case was Ms Morrissey being questioned by a paramedic in the back of an ambulance in which that paramedic had directed Ms Morrissey’s son to be transported to the hospital for emergency medical care following Ms Morrissey’s earlier utterance about having administered an overdose of medication to him. While rushing her son to the hospital, that paramedic began questioning Ms Morrissey about why they were taking him to the hospital. At one point, Paramedic Wilson prompted Ms Morrissey by saying “we have to tell the doctors and the nurses about David”. Based on the other evidence I heard on the blended voir dire, it is obvious that Ms Morrissey was willing to do anything for David, including sacrificing her own well-being for his. At a minimum, the remarks by Paramedic Wilson amounted to a powerful inducement for Ms Morrissey to respond regardless of the risk of self-incrimination. It is significant that Ms Morrissey was never warned by Paramedic Wilson that her responses in the ambulance could end up being used by the police as part of a criminal prosecution. It is equally significant that Ms Morrissey was never warned that she was under no obligation to respond to the paramedic’s questions. In the context of this case, before choosing to confess her alleged misdeed, Ms Morrissey was entitled to know not only that there was no legal obligation on her to respond but also that the paramedic already had the information needed to properly treat David and that the paramedic was only “confirming” things because of the potential crime being investigated by the police. Although the facts of this case may not fit squarely within the traditional voluntariness framework, I am satisfied that “the conduct of the state served … to unfairly deprive the accused of [her] free choice to speak to a person in authority” and so the Crown did not prove Ms Morrissey’s utterances to Paramedic Wilson in the back of the ambulance to be voluntary. Consequently, they were excluded.

[25] As for the utterances to Paramedic Best, even if it could be said that there may have been similar doubt about her being reasonably perceived as a person in authority, I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms Morrissey’s utterances to her were voluntary. Paramedic Best’s questions to Ms Morrissey were aimed at Ms Morrissey’s own medical issue. As part of that questioning, Ms Morrissey volunteered that emergency personnel had attended her house because of an intentional overdose. Without being prompted, Ms Morrissey proceeded to add further details about why she had taken the overdose and about why she had also given her son an overdose. As Paramedic Best testified, Ms Morrissey seemed to be rambling, as opposed to responding to questions being asked, “it was difficult at times to keep her on topic during the physical assessment because she was focused on the events”. Unlike with Paramedic Wilson, Ms Morrissey’s incriminating utterances to Paramedic Best were not induced by anything said to her and were instead volunteered by Ms Morrissey. Indeed, during its submissions, the defence ultimately conceded that Ms Morrissey’s utterances to Paramedic Best were voluntary.

[26] The defence also conceded that there was no evidentiary basis for concluding that Nurse Cathcart was a “person in authority” when she spoke with Ms Morrissey at the hospital and received the incriminating responses Ms Cathcart reported at trial. I agree. I also agree that, in any event, the utterances to Nurse Cathcart were proven voluntary in every sense.

2) Would introduction of any or all of Ms Morrissey’s incriminating utterances to the paramedics violate Section 7 of the Charter?

[27] Assuming that the evidence in this case did not raise a reasonable doubt that Paramedic Wilson could have been reasonably perceived by Ms Morrissey as a “person in authority”, the Crown would nevertheless have been unable to use Ms Morrissey’s self-incriminating admissions in the ambulance pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter. For reasons which will become more clear, I was not satisfied that Ms Morrissey’s s. 7 rights must also prevent the Crown from using her utterances to Paramedic Best as, unlike Ms Morrissey’s utterances to Paramedic Wilson, the utterances to Paramedic Best were not obtained in a state-created coercive context.

[28] Although it is well-settled that s. 7 of the Charter protects a detained accused’s right to silence, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that s. 7’s “principles of fundamental justice” provide more protection than just that. The principle against self-incrimination is one of s. 7’s fundamental justice principles which serves as the foundation for the various incarnations of the right to silence recognized in cases such as R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151, R. v. Singh, supra, and R. v. White, [1999] 2 SCR 417. Put differently, the principle against self-incrimination enshrined in s. 7 is broader than either the right to silence or the confession rule. As the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Singh (at para. 39):

…it may be that a breach of that constitutional right can result in the exclusion of otherwise admissible statements; without question, section 7 goes beyond the voluntariness rule in cases of ‘detained statements’, excluding many that would otherwise meet the voluntariness rule…. [emphasis added]

[29] In one of its leading cases on the confines of the “person in authority” requirements, the Supreme Court of Canada in Grandinetti recognized that resort may be had to the Charter to prevent the unfair admission of incriminating statements obtained in “coercive circumstances”, but which were not elicited by a person in authority. At paragraph 36, the Court said:

There is no doubt, as the Court observed in Hodgson, at para. 26, that statements can sometimes be made in such coercive circumstances that their reliability is jeopardized even if they were not made to a person in authority. The admissibility of such statements is filtered through exclusionary doctrines like abuse of process at common law and under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to prevent the admission of statements that undermine the integrity of the judicial process.”

[30] In White, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the principle against self-incrimination in s. 7 of the Charter prohibited the state’s prosecution arm from using information lawfully obtained from an accused in response to a separate state-created coercive context. After setting out the contextual factors to consider, the Court explained (at para. 67): “the principle against self-incrimination is strongly brought into play by numerous aspects of the context surrounding the compulsion”. Where a self-incriminatory statement has been generated within the context of state-created compulsion, the accused must be “entitled, at least, to use immunity in criminal proceedings”.

[31] Although decided within the context of s. 8 of the Charter, the Supreme Court in R. v. Colarusso, [1994] SCJ No. 2, similarly held that the subsequent use by the state’s criminal law enforcement arm of information lawfully obtained by medical personnel for a limited purpose will, in some contexts, be constitutionally impermissible. It is therefore of some significance that the Supreme Court of Canada in White recognized the link between the values protected by s. 8 and the principle against self-incrimination enshrined in s. 7 (at para. 43):

… the principle [against self-incrimination] has at least two key purposes, namely to protect against unreliable confessions, and to protect against abuses of power by the state. There is both an individual and a societal interest in achieving both of these protections. Both protections are linked to the value placed by Canadian society upon individual privacy, personal autonomy and dignity….

The values of “individual privacy, personal autonomy and dignity” were the values which the Supreme Court in Colarusso was particularly concerned about when it felt compelled to extend the Charter’s protection to the context of the state’s enforcement arm taking advantage of information already gathered by the state’s health care providers.

[32] The following comments in Colarusso help illustrate why the protections of s. 7 of the Charter should also help protect against the state’s prosecutorial arm using information originally obtained within the compulsive context of the state’s health care system (at paras. 70, 74, 79 and 90):

… hospitals have been identified as specific areas of concern in the protection of privacy, given the vulnerability of individuals seeking medical treatment….

…As discussed in Dyment the actions of the doctor are relevant and important. Though he or she may have obtained the sample under lawful circumstances, the limited purpose for which it was obtained cannot be ignored….

…Such a scenario could have catastrophic results if an accused resisted essential treatment for fear it might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings…. The following words used in Dyment, at p. 434, are especially apt here:

Under these circumstances, the courts must be especially alert to prevent undue incursions into the private lives of individuals by loose arrangements between hospital personnel and law enforcement officers….

The arguments advanced by the Crown seeking to establish the reasonableness of warrantless seizures by a coroner rely on the underlying premise that the coroner fulfils an essential non-criminal role. The state cannot, however, have it both ways; it cannot be argued that the coroner's seizure is reasonable because it is independent of the criminal law enforcement arm of the state while the state is at the same time attempting to introduce into criminal proceedings the very evidence seized by the coroner. It follows logically, in my opinion, that a seizure by a coroner will only be reasonable while the evidence is used for the purpose for which it was seized, namely, for determining whether an inquest into the death of the individual is warranted. Once the evidence has been appropriated by the criminal law enforcement arm of the state for use in criminal proceedings, there is no foundation on which to argue that the coroner's seizure continues to be reasonable.

[33] I appreciate that some might dismiss those constitutional concerns in a case such as this on the basis that there was no express legislative requirement for Ms Morrissey to provide the information to the paramedics, as there was in the White case and the Colarusso case. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the values “linked” to the principle against self-incrimination, it is hard to see why a compulsive context created by the state in a non-legislative manner could not equally undermine the individual and societal interests at stake. The focus should be on whether the four contextual factors identified by the Supreme Court’s decision in White support a case-specific conclusion that self-incriminatory evidence was obtained within a context of state-created compulsion such that using that evidence in a later criminal prosecution would amount to an abuse of state power.

[34] In White (at paragraphs 53 to 66), the Court outlined four contextual factors to consider in deciding whether the principle against self-incrimination is brought into play by the context surrounding the compulsion: (1) whether there was any coercive aspect to compelling an accused to respond, (2) whether the nature of the relationship between the accused and the interrogator was adversarial, (3) whether allowing prosecutorial use of the compelled statement will promote false information, and (4) whether prosecutorial use of the compelled statement could result in abusive state conduct.

[35] In the context of a paramedic questioning someone confined in the back of an ambulance about their loved one’s urgent medical condition, those four factors arguably weigh in favour of a conclusion that any responses were obtained within the context of state-created compulsion. First, even more than the drivers in White who the Court found had little choice but to take up the activity which led them to their coercive circumstances when reporting an accident, people who find themselves or their loved ones in need of emergency medical care have no choice but to deal with paramedics and to comply with their demands for information related to that necessary care. As for the second White factor, although a paramedic would not normally be seen as an investigator, the presence of a uniformed police officer in the back of an ambulance engages some of the contextual concerns raised in White by having the specter of the police involved in the paramedic’s questioning. Furthermore, as in White, later prosecutorial use of information gathered by paramedics for medical treatment does nothing to advance the purposes or policies underlying the state’s emergency health care scheme. The Supreme Court of Canada’s comments in cases like Colarusso and Dyment convincingly show the opposite to be true – allowing prosecutorial use of information collected by emergency health care providers “could have catastrophic results if an accused resisted essential treatment for fear it might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings”. This latter concern also heavily engages the third of the White factors. Finally, the facts of Ms Morrissey’s case show that “the possibility is real and serious that permitting the use of compelled [responses] within criminal proceedings might increase the likelihood of abusive conduct by the state”. In White, the Court found that it was enough that the compelled responses would create “an unconscious inclination” to rely on the non-criminal context “to obtain relevant information”, the effect of which would be to circumvent the accused’s s. 7 right to remain silent. In sum, even if it cannot be said that all four of the White factors point towards contextual compulsion, in the context of a paramedic questioning an accused about treatment “the principle against self-incrimination is strongly brought into play by numerous aspects of the context”, a conclusion which was sufficient to ground the s. 7 violation in White should the evidence be used in a criminal trial.

[36] In this case, in addition to finding that the Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Paramedic Wilson was not a person in authority and that Ms Morrissey’s responses to her were legally voluntary, I was also satisfied that Paramedic Wilson’s questioning of Ms Morrissey in the back of the ambulance created a context of compulsion which prevents the state from now relying on those responses in this criminal prosecution. Ms Morrissey was given little or no choice but to accompany Paramedic Wilson and PC Connolly in transporting her son David to the hospital in the back of the ambulance. Paramedic Best’s evidence made clear that she had intended to transport Ms Morrissey as her own patient in a separate ambulance but was directed to bring Ms Morrissey into the ambulance transporting David. More importantly, Paramedic Wilson’s question clearly made it seem that for the health care providers to effectively treat David it was necessary for Ms Morrissey to provide further information about the medication she had administered to him. In other words, the evidence showed that the state’s emergency health care provider was suggesting to Ms Morrissey that her son’s life could be in danger unless Ms Morrissey spoke more about what had happened. For the reasons I have already given in relation to the voluntariness issue, Paramedic Wilson’s questioning of Ms Morrissey took place in a context of coercion, while Paramedic Best’s questioning did not.

[37] Regardless of whether Paramedic Wilson was acting as a “state agent” according to cases like Broyles, or as a government actor according to s 32 of the Charter, the fact remains that the coercive context of her questioning emerged from the monopolistic nature of the state’s emergency health care scheme. Allowing the prosecution arm of the state to use the information Ms Morrissey had provided for the limited purpose of saving her son’s life would amount to an abuse of power and therefore would be contrary to s. 7’s principle against self-incrimination.

[38] In addition to Ms Morrissey’s responses, I must also exclude Paramedic Wilson’s opinion evidence about Ms Morrissey’s state of mind during their interactions. It was clear from Paramedic Wilson’s testimony that her opinions about Ms Morrissey’s apparent lucidity and awareness were inextricably bound to the conversation in the back of ambulance on way to hospital. Although this was not expressly the target of Ms Morrissey’s Charter complaint, I am satisfied that this evidence must either be excluded because of its nexus to the constitutionally impermissible evidence or because of the impossibility of unpacking the notional impact of the inadmissible utterances on Paramedic Wilson’s assessment were I to somehow try to subtract it from her opinion. As Paramedic Wilson was never even asked to try and engage in such mental gymnastics, it would be inappropriate for me to try and jump through that hoop myself.

C. Has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms Morrissey is guilty of the offence of administering a noxious substance to her son David, contrary to [s. 245(1)](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html)(a) of the [Criminal Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html)?

i) Credibility and reliability of the witnesses

[39] Before setting out my summary of the admissible evidence at trial, I should say that, except for the portions of Ms Wilson’s testimony to which I have already referred and one aspect of Ms Edwards testimony, I accepted all of what the Crown’s witnesses said at trial. Indeed, most of their testimony was entirely confirmed by what was recorded on the police officers’ body-worn cameras, the recordings of which were played at trial. None of the Crown witnesses were seriously challenged in cross-examination by the defence and all of them testified in a reasonable manner. All of the Crown witnesses candidly acknowledged when they could not remember or were uncertain of details. Even the Defendant’s granddaughter (Summer Morrissey) and sister (Florence Edwards) were forthright in their accounts, readily providing details which would obviously tend to incriminate the Defendant.

[40] By contrast, I accept very little, if any, of the Defendant’s testimony about what happened on the day or days leading up to Summer Morrissey’s 9-1-1 call about Dwayne’s suicide. Her position at trial was that she had no memory of even speaking to any of the people at her house, not the police, not the paramedics and not even her sister or granddaughter. Both the viva voce testimony and the body-worn camera footage show that she most certainly had a number of coherent conversations with a number of people at her house. While I accept that she was at least impaired, likely by the sedative medication she had ingested, I reject her testimony that she was so intoxicated that she was either acting as an automaton during those interactions or that she genuinely suffers from some type of chemically induced amnesia up until the moment she started dealing with Nurse Cathcart at the hospital. Indeed, her account of her interactions with Nurse Cathcart are materially inconsistent with Nurse Cathcart’s testimony, evidence which I fully accept. Moreover, the Defendant’s utterances to Nurse Cathcart were very similar to what the Defendant had told others during the time frame which the Defendant testified she could not remember. Although I reject almost all of the Defendant’s testimony, I do accept one key aspect of her testimony, especially as it was abundantly confirmed by other evidence – she loved her children unconditionally and would do anything to prevent them suffering.

ii) Summary of the relevant evidence

[41] Summer Morrissey testified about the family dynamics and her grandmother’s lifelong role as the sole caregiver for her Uncle David. She described David’s medical needs, including that the Defendant was almost exclusively responsible for preparing and administering his medication. Summer recounted the Defendant’s growing concern in the months leading up to August 2024 about Dwayne’s paranoia and distress. On August 14, 2024, after failed attempts to contact her father and an odd phone conversation with the Defendant, Summer attended the house to check on them. On the first visit around 7 pm, the Defendant appeared unusually drowsy. When Summer checked on David, he was awake in his room sitting in his usual chair seemingly engaged with his computer. On the second visit a bit more than an hour later, the Defendant appeared extremely lethargic. She was slurring her words and seemed incoherent. Based on the Defendant’s repeated references to the basement, Summer went down to investigate. She discovered her father Dwayne deceased and then called 9-1-1. Summer again went to check on David and found him asleep in his chair. She described him as appearing confused but responsive when she woke him. Upon their arrival in response to Summer’s 9-1-1 call, Summer asked the paramedics to examine both David and the Defendant, recounting the Defendant’s historical comment that if something ever happened to Dwayne “we’re all going”.

[42] The Defendant’s sister, Florence Edwards, also showed up at the residence on the night of August 14, 2024. She observed the Defendant sitting slumped over in a chair. The Defendant was incoherent and appeared as though she might be suffering a stroke or heart attack. She asked the Defendant if David had taken his medication, to which she whispered “yes”. At one point, the Defendant said she could not recall how many pills she had given David but then later answered “lots.” When Ms Edwards went to check on David, which the video evidence shows was after Summer had already gone in to wake him, Ms Edwards claims to have found him reclined unusually flat in his chair, breathing shallowly and was unusually difficult to rouse. Given its inconsistency with Summer’s evidence on this point, which I accept, I am not convinced of the reliability of Ms Edwards’ recollection in this regard.

[43] One of the first officers on scene, PC Tsui, testified that when he attended the Morrissey residence in response to an apparent suicide call, he went down the basement and observed Dwayne with a fatal knife wound and blood present. When he interacted briefly with Heather Morrissey, he noted she was drowsy, unsteady, and difficult to understand, possibly experiencing a medical issue. PC Connolly, another one of the first officers on scene, confirmed that he too thought that Ms Morrissey appeared drowsy. Their observations, as well as those of Summer Morrissey and Florence Edwards, were confirmed by what was depicted by the officers’ body-worn camera footage presented at trial.

[44] Brooklynn Best, a Durham Region paramedic called to the scene, testified that she was assigned to treat Heather Morrissey. Ms Best escorted the Defendant from the residence to an ambulance. The Defendant said she had taken Tylenol and sleeping pills intending to fall asleep and not wake up. Without being prompted, the Defendant went on to say that she had given David medication because she feared leaving him alone if she died. Ms Best described the Defendant as upset but coherent and capable of answering questions appropriately. The only challenge noted by Ms Best was the Defendant’s tendency to ramble off topic. Nevertheless, based on her interactions with the Defendant, Ms Best had no concerns about her mental capacity.

[45] Ashley Cathcart, a mental health nurse working at Lakeridge Health Hospital, testified that she conducted a mental‑health assessment of Ms Morrissey after she had been brought to the Hospital by ambulance. In Ms Cathcart’s opinion, the Defendant seemed coherent and fully oriented. The Defendant described having suffered multiple profound losses, including the deaths of her other two adult children and her husband. The Defendant also spoke of her role as David’s sole caregiver and her fear of what would happen to him if she died. The Defendant told Ms Cathcart that she had impulsively decided to give both herself and David extra medication with the intent of ending both of their lives, motivated by despair and concern for David’s future. Ms Cathcart described Heather as tearful and remorseful during their discussion. The Defendant denied any ongoing suicidal intent and a desire to continue caring for David.

[46] Cara Sheppard was qualified to give expert opinion in forensic toxicology. She analyzed the blood samples taken from David Morrissey at the Hospital and detected levels of phenobarbital at 24 ±2 mg/L and phenytoin at 16 ±1 mg/L. She explained that both drugs are anti‑seizure medications. Phenobarbital is a central nervous system depressant capable of causing drowsiness, respiratory depression, reduced consciousness, and death at sufficiently high levels. On its own, an excessive dose of phenytoin is unlikely to cause death but could still cause serious adverse health effects, especially if combined with an overdose of phenobarbital. The concentration of the drugs measured in David’s blood appeared somewhat elevated relative to typical therapeutic dosing but could not be definitively associated with an overdose of either medication. She acknowledged that the toxicology results alone could not confirm whether David had received extra doses of his prescribed medications.

[47] Heather Morrissey testified that she had been David’s sole caregiver all his life and that she was meticulous with his medication. She denied intentionally administering excess medication to David or intending to harm either him or herself. She acknowledged taking Tylenol and sleeping medication on the night of August 13, 2024 – the night before Summer showed up at the house and called 9-1-1 -- due to stress and insomnia but said her intent was not to lose consciousness. The Defendant stated she had no memory of the August 14, 2024 events, including interactions with paramedics or police, and only recalled waking up in hospital and speaking with Nurse Cathcart. She denied seeing Dwayne deceased in the basement and said had she known, she would have called 9-1-1 immediately. Heather rejected the import of statements attributed to her about wanting both herself and David to die and asserted that protecting David was central to her identity and that she could not have formed such intent.

iii) Analysis and Conclusions

[48] The evidence overwhelmingly proves that some time leading up to the night of August 14, 2024, the Defendant had intended to administer an excessive dose of David’s medication. She admitted this to three different people in the span of the first hour or so following the 9-1-1 call – her sister Ms Edwards, Paramedic Best and Nurse Cathcart. For the reasons I have already explained, I reject the Defendant’s testimony that she either did not intend to say these things or would not have comprehended what she was saying because of her drug-intoxicated state. Some of the material details in her admissions to Paramedic Best and Nurse Cathcart were confirmed by the evidence of Summer Morrissey and Florence Edwards, namely, the recent family tragedies, including Dwayne’s suicide, and the Defendant’s ongoing stress about David’s future care. The description of what the Defendant claimed to have done, and why, was also consistent in each of her three renditions, albeit with varying degrees of detail. Although she appeared extremely drowsy when initially speaking to her sister in the living room, by the time the Defendant was outside speaking to Paramedic Best she was more coherent. As the video showed, her perceived need to help David as he was being escorted out of the house seemed to rouse the Defendant from her initial stupor and cause her to rally. The Defendant had become even more coherent by the time she was at the Hospital speaking with Nurse Cathcart. I am satisfied that the slight increase in detail in the three accounts is readily explained by the events and the sobering trajectory of time.

[49] I am also satisfied from the Defendant’s admissions to these three people that she intended to administer an excessive dose of medication to David for the purpose of harming him. While it may have been open to question how much extra of David’s prescribed anti-seizure medication would be required to criminalize the administration of it pursuant to the “administering a noxious substance” offence, the administration of an amount which materially increases the risk of serious adverse health consequences, including death, would clearly satisfy that essential element of the s. 245(1)(a) offence. The intention to administer an amount of prescribed medication which the accused believes will cause death would also satisfy the essential mental element (i.e., the mens rea) of that offence.

[50] In this case, however, even though I am satisfied from the Defendant’s post-event utterances about intending to cause David’s death through administering an excessive dose of his prescribed medication, the question remains whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she did in fact administer an excessive dose. In the unique circumstances of his case, the evidence falls short of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant actually did what she later claimed she had intended to do. The Crown principally relies upon the Defendant’s admissions as circumstantial proof that she did in fact administer such an overdose. However, I have some doubt about the reliability of those admissions given the Defendant’s own overdose of sleeping pills and Tylenol with codeine. The Crown’s expert toxicologist testified that the sleeping pills ingested by the Defendant can impair memory. Indeed, in answer to her sister’s question while still in the living room, the Defendant said she was not sure how many pills she had administered to David. In other words, though satisfied her admissions were reliable enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had contemplated ending their lives, those admissions were not reliable enough to also circumstantially prove the historical accuracy of the fact the Crown also needed to prove; namely, that the Defendant administered an excessive amount of David’s prescribed medication to him.

[51] When considered in light of the timeline provided by Summer Morrissey, it seems that David was fine when she saw him at around 7 p.m. on the night in question, even though the Defendant already appeared to have ingested her own overdose of medication some time before that. Consequently, it is reasonably possible that Ms Morrissey did not begin to act on her intention to end David’s life until after she was already suffering the impairing effects of her own overdose. Although she may have been able to reliably report her earlier thoughts to Paramedic Best and to Nurse Cathcart, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that those later reports were reliable enough to also prove she had actually administered an overdose of David’s prescribed medication. The expert toxicological opinion provided only cautious support to a finding that David had received an excessive dose of his regular medication. The modestly elevated levels detected in his blood could have been explained by individual variability and could have represented the levels expected from the therapeutic amounts he regularly received. Summer Morrissey’s evidence about being able to wake David by shaking him seemed at odds with him having experienced an overdose of his prescribed medication. The video footage of David being able to walk out of his room, into the living room and then out of the house, further weakens any inference of an overdose. I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only reasonable conclusion is that David had in fact been administered an overdose of his prescribed medications.

[52] That said, given my conclusion that Ms Morrissey formed the intention to administer an overdose of medication, I must still consider whether she engaged in any conduct going beyond mere preparation toward committing the criminal offence of administering a noxious substance. If so, Ms Morrissey may be guilty of the lesser and included offence of attempting to commit the offence with which she is charged.

[53] Despite my doubt about whether the Defendant’s admissions on the night of August 14, 2024, proved she actually administered an overdose of medication, I have no doubt from her admissions that she took steps to, and did in fact, administer at least some of David’s prescribed medication to him with her stated intention in mind. Summer Morrissey’s evidence and the opinion evidence of Ms Sheppard lend support to the more modest factual conclusion that David received at least some of his prescribed medication on the night in question. According to the evidence at trial, including the Defendant’s own testimony, the administration of David’s medication required the Defendant to crush the medications, mix them with his usual drink and then bring that mixture to him. Together, the commission of those acts by the Defendant went well beyond mere preparation and, in the context of her professed intent, demonstrated a dangerous commitment to administering David a noxious substance. Both the viva voce testimony and the video evidence show that the Defendant was initially having a difficult time controlling her body and her movements, even though she still seemed able to formulate the thoughts she was struggling to articulate. It is a reasonable inference that she suffered from a similar, if not more extreme, lack of motor skills in the hour or so prior to the 9-1-1 call when the timeline provided by Summer Morrissey suggests David was administered his medication. The fact that the Defendant may have inadvertently avoided administering the intended overdose because of her impairment, does not relieve her of criminal liability for having intended to administer a noxious amount of his prescribed medication. The only reasonable conclusion from the Defendant’s admissions is that she had at least attempted to administer a noxious substance to David on the night of August 14, 2024 despite the lack of convincing proof that she had managed to actually do so.

D. Verdict

[54] Pursuant to s. 24 of the Criminal Code, Ms Morrissey is found guilty of the lesser but included offence of attempting to administer a noxious substance, contrary to s. 245(1)(a).

Released: May 5, 2026

Signed: Justice P.K. Burstein