WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.5(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code. These subsections and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.5(1) or (2), read as follows:

486.5 ORDER RESTRICTING PUBLICATION — VICTIMS AND WITNESSES — (1) Unless an order is made under section 486.4, on application of the prosecutor in respect of a victim or a witness, or on application of a victim or a witness, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

(2) JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS — On application of the prosecutor in respect of a justice system participant who is involved in proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (2.1), or on application of such a justice system participant, a judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the justice system participant shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

(2.1) OFFENCES – The offences for the purposes of subsection (2) are

(a) an offence under section 423.1, 467.11, 467.111, 467.12, or 467.13, or a serious offence committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization;

(b) a terrorism offence;

(c) an offence under subsection 16(1) or (2), 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) or 22(1) of the Security of Information Act; or

(d) an offence under subsection 21(1) or section 23 of the Security of Information Act that is committed in relation to an offence referred to in paragraph (c).

(3) LIMITATION – An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice if it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Lewin, 2026 ONCJ 26

DATE: 2026 01 20

COURT FILE No.: 24-48105095

Toronto Region

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

Tiena LEWIN

Before Justice C. Faria

Heard on January 12, 2026

Reasons for Sentencing released on January 20, 2026

Stuart Rothman & Ella Brosh counsel for the Crown

Roma Mungol counsel for the defendant Tiena LEWIN

Faria J.:

1Tiena Lewin was found guilty after trial of an assault on a child in her care when she was a student at a daycare centre, contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code. The matter was adjourned for a pre-sentence report and submissions.

2These are my reasons for sentence.

I. Facts

3The detailed facts are set out in my judgment.¹ Briefly stated, January 23, 2024, was Ms. Lewin’s second day as an Early Childcare Assistant (ECA) student at the Learning Jungle Daycare. She was in the toddler room with MM, a 17-month-old child who was sitting on a chair at a children’s table. Ms. Lewin was by MM and mistakenly believed MM had thrown blocks on other children and at the floor. She told the child “I told you to pick up the blocks” and pulled the chair hard from under MM.

4MM fell off forward off the chair, hit her face on the table, and then fell to the floor. MM sustained a cut to the left side of her upper lip that immediately began to bleed. Ms. Lewin picked MM up and tried to console her. She gave MM to another worker, was told to get ice for the injury, and she did so.

5MM was taken to hospital and received stiches for the cut.

II. Tiena Lewin

6Ms. Lewin was 21 years old at the time of the offence. She has no criminal record.

7Ms. Lewin has had a challenging life. Her parents were separated early. She came to Canada with her mother and two sisters when she was 7 years old, leaving her alcoholic father with substance abuse issues behind. She is close to her older sisters and has 5 younger siblings with whom she is only in contact with one.

8As a child, Ms. Lewin experienced physical abuse at the hands of her mother that attracted the attention of child services. She was traumatized sexually at the hands of two perpetrators that led to a criminal case. She was bullied in high school, but was nonetheless able to get good grades, played rugby, and became the editor of the yearbook. She was completing her ECA diploma at the time of the offence in pursuit of her goal to work with children.

9Ms. Lewin has been employed but is currently on assistance. She has several physical and mental diagnosis that are interfering with her ability to work at the moment. This has and does cause financial stress.

10The court received documentation from her doctor identifying her medical conditions and noting her co-operative and meaningful efforts to deal with and overcome these issues.

11The court received 12 letters from various professionals, colleagues, teachers, employers, and friends, who have treated, worked with, taught, hired and cared for Ms. Lewin over several years. Each one attests to Ms. Lewin as a caring, polite, helpful, kind, responsible, and motivated individual who has consistently committed to therapy, counselling, and learning and who continues to demonstrate strength and perseverance to overcome her traumatic upbringing. She was specifically described as engaged, dependable, responsive, and dedicated to working with children. Those who know Ms. Lewis were surprised by the offence, and noted that she is remorseful about what occurred to the child in her care.

12Ms. Lewin has been working with EFry, Hope and Help for Women, an organization assisting her with housing, programming, medication, therapy, and counselling.

III. Positions

13The Crown submits a suspended sentence and a period of 2 years probation with terms, a DNA order and s. 110 weapons prohibition is warranted to adequately reflect the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

14Counsel for Ms. Lewin recommends a conditional discharge and a period of probation of 12 to 18 months emphasizing the many mitigating factors and strong rehabilitation efforts made.

IV. Victim Impact

15AM, MM’s mother, provided a victim impact statement describing her experience caring for MM during and after the injury. MM sustained a cut to her lip which required stitches. Because MM was so young, this meant she needed to be anesthetized. Consenting to this treatment was difficult for MM’s parents. They were frightened when it took longer for MM to recover from the anesthesia and vomited upon waking, which meant a longer hospital stay for observation.

16Unfortunately, after the injury, MM regressed from the positive steps she had taken to acclimatize to daycare. MM’s parents decided to withdraw MM from daycare. They were no longer comfortable entrusting MM’s care to caregivers and decided one parent would stay home to care for the family’s 3 children. This decision has led to financial stress.

17AM writes that MM’s injury significantly impacted the child, as well as the family emotionally, psychologically, and financially.

V. Legal Principles

18Every sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

19The sanction that the court imposes should have one or more of the following objectives:

• to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences
• to separate offenders from society, where necessary
• to assist in rehabilitating offenders
• to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community
• to denounce unlawful conduct
• to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.

20How much emphasis a court places on each of these objectives will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender.

21In addition to the aggravating and mitigating factors, the principles of parity, restraint, and rehabilitation must also be considered.

VI. Analysis

22The aggravating factors include:

i. Ms. Lewin was in a position of trust as a student ECA.

ii. MM was a vulnerable victim as a young toddler in a daycare.

iii. MM sustained an injury that required stitches which included anesthesia because of her young age.

iv. MM’s injury had a notable negative impact on her and her family.

23Mitigating factors include:

i. Ms. Lewin is young. She was only 21 at the time of the offence.

ii. Ms. Lewin needed training and supervision herself as she was only on her second day on the job when she was placed in an environment she was not experienced with.

iii. She has no criminal record.

iv. She has a challenging background of familial violence, sexual victimization, financial hardship, mental difficulties, and personal hardship.

v. Ms. Lewin is a young Black woman in Toronto and has experienced some of the challenges of racialization, and anti-black racism in terms of immigration, poverty, and housing insecurity.

vi. She has an education, has been employed, and has a pro-social history despite the challenges she has faced.

vii. Ms. Lewin has also consistently pursued assistance, demonstrating a commitment to obtaining and benefiting from services which illustrates positive rehabilitative potential.

viii. She has articulated personal remorse and regret.

24Ms. Lewin has also sustained collateral consequences. The finding of guilt for this assault led to the conclusion of her pursuit of a career as an ECA.

25When considering whether a criminal record is warranted in this case, via a suspended sentence as the Crown recommends, or a conditional discharge as counsel for Ms. Lewin recommends, I am mindful that this is a serious offence given the daycare context of the assault on a young child, while also considering the youthfulness of the offender, her antecedents, her rehabilitation potential, her remorse, and the nature of the violence – which was the pulling of a chair.

26The Crown appropriately focuses on the principles of denunciation and deterrence to reflect the gravity of the offence – one of violence from a person in a position of trust on a child in her care violence that caused bodily harm and had a significant impact on the child and her family. The Crown provided caselaw in support of their position.²

27I distinguish the cases where the offender is a parent, there is more than one victim, the assault was a direct application of physical force, and the conduct was considered “abusive”, from this case, where this offender was a student, there was only one victim, the force was indirect, and the conduct is not characterized as “abusive”. I also note that Ms. Lewin does not benefit from the mitigation of a guilty plea, but, having a trial, of course, is not aggravating.

28The Defence emphasizes that denunciation and deterrence must be attenuated by restraint and positive rehabilitation potential as well as the contextualization of this offence within the life of the offender as a young Black woman who has experienced racism, homelessness, trauma, and done her utmost to ameliorate those disadvantages. She focuses on the fact the offence was momentary, out of character and her efforts since the finding of guilt. The evidence provided by the Defence supporting her position is extensive. She also provided caselaw in support of her position.³

29The evidence in the trial was also clear that Ms. Lewin’s immediate reaction to the child’s injury was to console her, assist her, and co-operatively participate in her care as both directed and required. Ms. Lewis has demonstrated remorse for the results of her action since the moment of the act.

30A conditional discharge is always in the best interests of an offender, and this case is no different. The issue is whether a conditional discharge is not contrary to the public interest.

31Ms. Lewin is a young woman who has demonstrated tremendous resilience, drive and success in the face of trauma after trauma, and challenge after challenge. She should not be working with children, but she is capable of and has demonstrated that she can and will be, a contributing member of society in a positive and pro-social manner both professionally and personally. She has community support, acquired via effort and the use of resources to improve herself. She has social support she has acquired via employment, volunteering, and academic achievement.

32The experience of the charge, the trial, the finding, and the collateral consequences all have long-term consequences that have a denunciatory and deterrent effect, as would the probation portion of both a conditional discharge, and a suspended sentence.

33A suspended sentence would be a conviction which inhibit her progress and limit her ability to obtain employment at a very young age while a conditional discharge would be less of an inhibition and limitation.

34It is in the community’s interest that Ms. Lewin overcome her challenges, continue with her education, get a job, and be self-supporting – all of which would be more difficult with a criminal conviction.

35As a result, a conditional discharge is both in Ms. Lewin’s best interest, and not contrary to the public interest.

VII. Sentence

36I sentence Ms. Lewin to a conditional discharge and a period of probation for 12 months. She must follow the statutory terms, report within 24 hours of this order, take counselling as directed by the probation officer, sign releases for the probation officer to monitor her attendance at such counselling, and have no contact with the child MM and her family.

37Although assault is a secondary designated offence, and a DNA Order can be issued, I decline to order one. This offence was an isolated incident of excessive force in a context where the objectives of obtaining DNA do not necessarily apply, and when they do, they do so in a limited fashion.

38Similarly, I do not find a weapons prohibition appropriate in this circumstance. Neither Ms. Lewin’s conduct, nor her history provide any indication that there is any concern that she would want to possess weapons, or that she would use a weapon in any manner of concern.

Footnotes

1. 1R. v. Lewin, 2025 ONCJ 196
2. 2R. v. MAC, 2023 ABCA 234 at para. 28, 49, R. v. Lis, 2020 ONCA 551 at para. 47, 48, 59, R. v. W.R. 2004 35055 (ONCA) at para. 14, 16, R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at para.29-40, R. v. Huh, 2015 ONCA 356 at para.12, R. v. El Hamaini, 2023 QCCO 97, R. v. Sahli, 2023 QCCQ 4891, R. v. Randell, 2022 10392 (NLPC), R. v. Morgan, R. v. Romasanta, 2022 ABPC 168, R. v. M.M., 2020 ONCJ 635, R. v. McKinney, 2024 ABCJ 1.
3. 3R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at para. 56, R. v. Fallofield, 1973 1412 (BC CA), R. v. P.R. 2019, ONCJ 535, R. v. Flordeliza Espina, 2020 ONSC 6342, 2020 ONCS 6342.