ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
VLADIMIR HUSSAIN-MARCA
Before Justice Joseph Hanna
Reasons for Judgment released on February 2, 2026
A. Midwood counsel for the Crown
K. Schofield/R. Singh…………………………………counsel for the Mr. Hussain-Marca
HANNA J.:
INTRODUCTION
1Mr. Hussain‑Marca is charged with several drug‑ and firearm‑related offences.
2Acting on information received from a confidential informant, police began surveillance of the applicant. Through this surveillance, they came to believe that a condominium building on Shore Breeze Drive in Etobicoke was potentially being used either for illicit transactions or as a “stash location.”
3Police obtained a series of production orders for video surveillance from 20 and 30 Shore Breeze Drive, key fob data, and a tracking warrant for the applicant’s vehicle. The results of these authorizations led police to identify a storage locker in locker room 20, located on the P3 underground level of 30 Shore Breeze Drive. Further authorizations, each dependent on the information obtained to that point, were subsequently issued and resulted in the discovery of contraband forming the basis of the applicant’s charges.
4As a preliminary step in his applications under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, the applicant seeks a ruling on the validity of the first authorization issued: a production order for condominium surveillance footage from 20 and 30 Shore Breeze Drive signed by Justice Hunter on October 30, 2024.
5The applicant submits that, on a normative assessment, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the search. He further argues that the information to obtain (ITO) failed to set out the reasonable and probable grounds necessary to justify the issuance of the production order.
6The Crown’s position is that the applicant lacks standing to challenge many of the observations obtained through the production order. Should standing be established, the Crown asks that I consider the undisclosed information and argues that, once that information is taken into account, the authorization was supported by sufficient grounds. The Crown also submits that certain portions of the surveillance footage were lawfully obtained through the property manager’s consent.
7What follows are my reasons addressing: 1) standing, 2) the step‑six application, 3) the sufficiency of the grounds supporting the production order, and 4) the effect of the third-party consent.
1) STANDING
Information Obtained as Result of the October 30, 2024 Production order
8To contextualize the standing inquiry, it is useful to outline the information obtained by the state through the production order being challenged.
9Exhibit 17 on the voir dire helpfully summarizes the events captured on the video surveillance obtained pursuant to the production order and included in the ITOs for subsequent authorizations.
10The applicant appears on surveillance footage from numerous locations within the 20 and 30 Shore Breeze Drive condominium complex.
11On October 9, the applicant is observed at 30 Shore Breeze. He proceeds from the lobby to the elevator, travels to the 6th floor, enters the men’s change room, and then goes to the gym. He uses the same route back. At 7:00 p.m., he returns to the P1 parking level, uses a fob to take the elevator to P3, walks toward the storage room, and then returns to the elevator.
12On October 15, the applicant attends the building. He uses a fob to access P3 and walks toward storage room 20. Six minutes later, he returns, uses his fob to takes the elevator to the 6th floor, goes to the gym change room, and then leaves. He then takes the podium elevator to the ground floor and exits the building.
13On October 16, the applicant enters the P1 elevator, travels to P3, and walks toward storage locker 20. He returns to the P3 elevator, proceeds to the 6th floor, enters the gym locker area, exits a short time later, and then takes the elevator back to P1.
14On October 21, the applicant attends the P1 lobby and takes the elevator to P3. He goes toward storage locker 20 and then returns to the elevator bank.
15On October 22, the applicant is at the lobby of 20 Shore Breeze. He takes the elevator to the 6th floor, crosses the bridge to 30 Shore Breeze, and attends the gym locker area. Approximately one hour later, he returns to the elevator, travels to P3, and walks to storage locker 20. He then returns to the P3 elevator, goes back to the 6th floor, crosses the bridge to 20 Shore Breeze, proceeds to the elevator bank, travels to the ground floor, and exits the building.
16On October 23, the applicant is on P1 carrying a microwave and enters the elevator. He exits on P3 and walks toward the storage locker before returning to the P3 elevator, traveling to P1, and exiting the building. Shortly afterward, he re‑attends, entering the lobby of 20 Shore Breeze. He takes the elevator to the 6th floor, crosses the bridge to 30 Shore Breeze, and goes to the gym locker room. He enters the gym, later returns to the gym locker room, and then leaves. He takes the elevator to P3, walks toward storage locker 20, returns, and proceeds across P3 toward 20 Shore Breeze. He enters the P3 elevator, travels to the ground floor, and exits the building.
The Applicant’s Connection to the Building
17An agreed statement of fact was submitted regarding the applicant’s connection to the building.
18The applicant’s mother is a leaseholder of unit 3320 at 30 Shore Breeze Drive. The applicant resided at his family home located at 2171 Dufferin Street, Toronto, and regularly resided at the unit in Shore Breeze Drive. He regularly used the amenities at 30 Shore Breeze Drive. He had access to the keys and fob associated with unit 3320. In addition, utilities for the unit were listed in the applicant’s name.
Information Regarding the Building and the Consent forms Signed by the Property Manager
19The parties filed a building consent questionnaire and consent forms filled out by Kristina Todorovic, who is identified as the property manager at 30 Shore Breeze Drive.
20The information provided indicates that the building is 26 storeys and contains 1,283 units, consisting of a mix of residential and commercial spaces. Approximately 4,000 residents live in the building. The units are variously rented, owned, or leased.
21The building has a shared parking garage. Access to the common areas is obtained through the lobby, the parking garage, and the stairwells. The building is accessible only by fob, and all areas—except the staircases—require a fob or key for entry. Controlled areas are visible to the public. The building contains more than 400 cameras, positioned throughout nearly all areas. The P1 parking level is publicly accessible. Signage advising of CCTV cameras is posted. On the form, the box indicating whether the cameras were covert or overt was marked “N/A.”
22One consent form, titled “Consent to Provide Information for a Criminal Investigation,” is signed by Ms. Todorovic and dated October 18, 2024. In it, she confirms that she has the authority to provide police with access to the CCTV footage. She initials her understanding of the purpose for which police are seeking the footage, that she is under no obligation to provide consent, and that she may withdraw her consent at any time. She also acknowledges her awareness of the potential consequences of providing consent, including that the footage could lead to the arrest and charges of users or occupants of the building. The form records her consent authorizing police to access, review, and download the CCTV footage from the property at 30 Shore Breeze for the period spanning October 16, 2024, through to the conclusion of the investigation.
23The second consent form, titled “Standard Consent Form,” was also signed by Ms. Todorovic on October 18, 2024. It relates to 30 Shore Breeze Drive and authorizes police access to common areas of the building, including the lobby, elevators, stairwells, hallways, basement, and parking garage. It purports to permit officers to make observations and take photographs and videos for potential use in court. It also provides the police with fob and key access. The form expressly states that it does not authorize eavesdropping or looking into private residential units. It advises the signatory of the right to refuse consent, to withdraw it at any time, and explains how withdrawal may be communicated by email or phone. The form indicates that the signatory voluntarily authorizes police access to the common areas from October 16, 2024, until the end of the investigation, and that consent may be withdrawn at any time.
General Principles Regarding Standing
24The s. 8 inquiry begins with determining whether the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45.
25There are four lines of inquiry relevant to assessing this issue:
The subject matter of the alleged search;
Whether the claimant has a direct interest in the subject matter;
Whether the claimant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter; and
Whether the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances.
R. v. Yu, 2019 ONCA 942, at para. 67, leave to appeal refused [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 38; R. v. Dosanjh, 2022 ONCA 689, at para. 113; R. v. Nguyen, 2023 ONCA 367, at para. 36.
Analysis
26First, I must identify the subject matter of the search. Properly defining the subject matter of the search involves a functional analysis focused on the nature of the privacy interests that the state action potentially compromised. I must consider both the nature of information the police obtained and the manner in which they obtained it: Nguyen (2023), at para. 28; R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, at paras. 14–15. The normative purpose of s. 8 requires the Court to ask “what information the subject matter of the search tends to reveal”: R. v. Bykovets, 2024 SCC 6, at para. 53.
27I find that the police were attempting to ascertain the applicant’s movements within the building, who he was associating with, and whether he was depositing or retrieving any items and, if so, from where. While I must consider what the search tends to reveal, this analysis cannot rest on speculation. I do not find that the police were seeking core biographical information or intimate details of what the applicant was doing inside a residence: R. v. Nguyen, 2025 ONCA 609, at para. 28.
28I am satisfied that the applicant had a direct interest in the subject matter of the search. I have no direct evidence regarding whether the applicant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the matter. The threshold to establish a subjective expectation of privacy is low and can often be inferred from the circumstances: R. v. El-Azrak, 2023 ONCA 440, at para. 60. Furthermore, “[a] subjective expectation of privacy is neither a prerequisite to, nor determinative of, the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy”: R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, at para. 82.
29Finally, I must assess whether any expectation of privacy was reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. In R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45, the Court listed several factors to guide this inquiry.
30In R. v. White, 2015 ONCA 508, at paras. 45 – 47, and Yu, at para. 68, the Ontario Court of Appeal has articulated the following factors as relevant to determining a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of multi‑unit buildings:
Degree of possession or control exercised over the common area by the claimant;
Size of the building: the larger the building, the lower the degree of reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas;
Security system or locked doors that function to exclude the public and regulate access; and
Ownership of the property.
31Third party consent to the police entries is an important aspect of the "totality of the circumstances": Yu, at para. 70. “[T]he ability of a condo board and property management to co-operate with a police investigation by providing access to common areas of the building and other information is relevant to two issues: first, it will attenuate a resident's reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of the building; and second, it can provide lawful authority for a warrantless search and seizure”: R. v. Salmon, 2024 ONCA 697, at para. 20; Yu, at paras. 72-75.
32In this case, I note the following relevant circumstances:
The complex was large. Two connected towers with 1,283 units and approximately 4,000 residents.
Access to common areas, including the elevators, is controlled by fob/keypad access.
Over 400 cameras are installed throughout the complex, providing coverage of almost all areas.
There are signs informing individuals of CCTV monitoring.
The P1 parking level is publicly accessible.
The applicant regularly resided at a unit at 30 Shore Breeze Drive and regularly used the amenities at that building.
There were utilities for the unit listed in the applicant’s name.
Cameras viewed by police capture events on specific floors of the building.
The applicant should have reasonably expected that property management, could consent to police entry to common areas and could allow police access to video: Yu, at para. 90; R. v. Samir, 2024 ONSC 844, at para. 90.
33Considering the totality of the circumstances, I find that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking‑garage areas, which were shared with numerous other residents of a multi‑unit building and over which he exercised very little control: Nguyen (2025), at para. 25. I likewise find that he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the portions of the main lobby or parking elevator lobbies which were visible to the public.
34I reach a different conclusion regarding the controlled areas of the building that were not accessible, or observable to the public. The evidence is that the common areas—including the elevators—were accessible only by key‑fob entry. This, combined with the fact that the applicant regularly resided in the building and had utilities registered in his name, persuades me that he held a reasonable, albeit low, expectation of privacy in these areas: Yu, at paras. 81- 94; R. v. Bernard, 2025 ONSC 6773, at paras. 91–92; R. v. Hobbs, 2023 ONSC 5376, at paras. 71–73. While the building questionnaire indicates that controlled areas are visible to the public, the photographs filed do not make it apparent that this applies to any areas beyond portions of the main lobby and the parking‑elevator lobbies.
35I emphasize that this expectation of privacy was significantly diminished given the size of the building, the large number of residents, the fact that the applicant did not own a unit, the extensive CCTV coverage, the posted surveillance signage, and that the applicant ought reasonably to have anticipated that property management had the authority to grant police access to both the building and its surveillance recordings: Yu, at paras. 81 – 94.
36I turn next to assess the sufficiency of the ITO and the effect of the consent forms obtained by police.
2) THE STEP-SIX APPLICATION
Procedure in this Case
37Pursuant to step six in Garofoli, the Crown applies to have the Court consider the excised portions of the ITO.
38The voir dire was heard over multiple days spanning several weeks. At its outset, I received both the redacted and unredacted versions of the ITO for the general warrant issued on November 29, 2024. The Crown prepared a draft judicial summary, which I reviewed. In open court, the Crown and I exchanged further drafts proposing revisions that I considered appropriate. Any materials exchanged during this process that risked disclosing informer‑privileged information were marked as sealed exhibits.
39As the voir dire progressed, the parties increasingly focused on obtaining a ruling with respect to the initial production order issued by Justice Hunter on October 30, 2024. I was provided with the redacted and unredacted versions of the ITO supporting that authorization. The redactions in that ITO largely mirrored those in the general warrant ITO. The Crown prepared a further draft summary, which I again reviewed and edited using the same procedure described above. The resulting judicial summary for this ITO was provided to the defence and marked as Exhibit 19 on the voir dire.
40While the applicant initially sought leave to cross-examine the affiant, this request was later abandoned.
The Law on Step-Six
41I should consider the unredacted ITO "only if satisfied that the accused is sufficiently aware of the nature of the excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence": R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at para. 45; R. v. Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619, at para. 32. If the summary fails to meet this standard, the Crown cannot rely on the unredacted ITO to sustain the issuance of the authorization: R. v. Reid, 2016 ONCA 524, at para. 86, leave to appeal ref’d, [2016] S.C.C.A. No 432.
42In Reid, the Court provided three important reminders regarding the nature of judicial summaries. First, a summary is meant to be general, not detailed. Second, it must provide an accused with a meaningful basis on which to challenge whether the affiant made full and frank disclosure of the Debot factors relating to the informant. Third, the summary must include the nature of the redacted material, not its substance nor its details. The summary must be sufficient to allow the accused to mount a challenge to the redacted material by argument or evidence. A judicial summary, however, is not the only means available to an accused to challenge the issuance of the authorization. An accused may seek leave to cross-examine the affiant, may rely on other information contained in the Crown disclosure, or may adduce other evidence: Reid, at paras. 87 – 90; Crevier, at paras. 72, 77 and 83.
Analysis
43I find that the applicant has been made sufficiently aware of the nature of the redacted material to enable him to challenge the authorization through argument or evidence.
44The summary indicates the ITO contains the following information:
When the information was received, including the timing of subsequent information.
The source’s knowledge of, connection to, or relationship—if any—with the subject, including the relevant timeframe.
Whether the information provided by the source was based on firsthand knowledge or hearsay.
That the ITO sets out specific information regarding the subject’s involvement in firearm trafficking, including the timeframe of the source’s knowledge and whether it derived from firsthand or hearsay information.
That the informant provided specific details about the subject’s methods of trafficking contraband, including timing of that information and whether it was based on firsthand or second‑hand knowledge.
That the police were unable to confirm or refute a detail provided by the informant.
That the informant gave details regarding a storage location or locations, though the ITO does not indicate whether that information was based on firsthand or second‑hand knowledge.
Background information regarding the informant, including whether or not the informant had a criminal record or outstanding charges.
Details of a prior instance in which the informant supplied information that led to judicial authorizations, the seizure of illicit contraband, and charges being laid.
Details of a second instance in which information from the informant resulted in one or more arrests and the seizure of contraband.
The informant’s motivation for providing information.
Whether any consideration, including monetary compensation, was involved.
The affiant’s discussion of whether the informant has provided misleading information in the past.
45The Crown also responded to whether the affiant addressed if the informant had been advised of the penalties for providing false information.
46Furthermore, the unredacted portions of the disclosed ITO includes details regarding the surveillance the police conducted on the applicant.
47Having considered all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the summary when combined with the other tools available to the defence, provided a sufficient basis to meaningfully challenge the authorization.
48The step six application is allowed, and I will consider the unredacted ITO1 in assessing the sufficiency of the grounds for the production order.
3) THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE GROUNDS FOR THE PRODUCTION ORDER
Positions of the Parties
49The defence submits that the ITO fails to establish place‑specific reasonable grounds to believe that evidence would be found at the Shore Breeze building. It challenges whether the information relied upon was sufficiently compelling. The defence argues that the police surveillance revealed no suspicious activity. It further submits that the affiant improperly introduced a necessity consideration at paragraph 10 of the ITO. Relying on paragraph 35 of the ITO, the defence contends that the affiant applied a reasonable‑suspicion standard rather than the required reasonable‑grounds‑to‑believe standard. The defence submits in its factum that, even if the production order could properly have issued, I should exercise my residual discretion to set aside the authorization.
50The Crown responds that, when the ITO is considered as a whole, it demonstrates that the affiant applied the correct standard. It submits that the unredacted ITO establishes sufficient grounds such that the authorization could properly have issued.
Relevant Legal Principles
51Production orders are presumed valid: R. v. Mawick, 2021 ONCA 177, at para. 36. An issuing justice’s decision is entitled to deference. On review, the question is not whether the reviewing justice would have issued the authorization, but whether the issuing justice could have done so: R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 54; Garofoli, at p. 1452. R. v. White, 2022 ONCA 538, at para. 14.
52The test for issuing a production order mirrors the test for issuing a search warrant: R. v. Hughes, 2023 ONSC 109, at para. 211. The applicable standard is reasonable and probable grounds, which requires a “credibly‑based probability.” This threshold is lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt and lower than a balance of probabilities: R. v. Okezie, 2025 ONCA 77, at para. 6; R. v. Desilva, 2022 ONCA 879, at paras. 57 and 114; R. v. White, at para. 14.
53A production order may be issued under s. 487.014(2) of the Criminal Code, if the judge or justice considering the application is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (a) an offence has been or will be committed, and (b) the document or data is in the person's possession or control and will afford evidence respecting the commission of the offence: Mawick, at para. 37.
54The reviewing judge determines whether, based on the entire record before the issuing judge (subject to amplification and/or excisions on review), there is "at least some evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis of which the authorization could have issued": Araujo, at para. 51; White, at para. 14.
55Where the grounds for an authorization include confidential information, the reviewing judge must assess based on the totality of the circumstances whether the information provided in the supporting affidavit is compelling, credible and corroborated. Weaknesses in one area may be compensated by strengths in the other two: R. v. Dhillon, 2016 ONCA 308 at paras. 30, 33; R. v. Chioros, 2019 ONCA 388 at para. 17; R. v. Iraheta, 2020 ONCA 766 at para. 23.
56A reviewing judge must recognize that an issuing justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence set out in the ITO: R. v. Kalonji, 2022 ONCA 415, at paras. 22 – 26; R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, at para. 82. A reviewing judge is also entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the contents of the ITO: R. v. Nero, 2016 ONCA 160 at para. 71.
57There remains a residual discretion to set aside an authorization even where reasonable and probable grounds exist, if the issuing justice was misled. In R. v. Paryniuk, 2017 ONCA 87, at para. 62, the Court stated: “Where an affiant has been shown to have deliberately provided false material statements, or to have deliberately omitted material facts from the ITO, with the intention of misleading the issuing judicial officer, the warrant may be set aside.” Similarly, in R. v. Vivar, 2009 ONCA 433, at para. 2, the Court explained that this remedy is reserved for cases where police conduct is “so subversive of the search warrant process as to, in effect, amount to an abuse of process and require that the warrant be quashed.” See also R. v. Dosanjh, 2022 ONCA 689, at para. 162.
Analysis
Excision
58Given my analysis on standing, one portion of the ITO must be excised. Paragraph 24(d) describes the applicant entering the lobby of 30 Shore Breeze Drive on October 9th, using a keypad to gain access, proceeding to the elevator lobby, taking the elevator, and arriving on the 6th floor. His use of the keypad to enter the building is not problematic, as I find this would have been observable from outside. However, based on the photographs filed, it is unclear whether the elevator lobby was visible to the public. In addition, the property manager’s consent did not extend to observations made on October 9th. I therefore excise the information from October 9th relating to the applicant entering the elevator lobby, using the elevator, and attending the 6th floor.
Assessment of the Sufficiency of the Grounds Contained in the ITO
59The ITO is largely based upon confidential information, requiring me to assess it using the Debot factors. Because of the need to protect informer privilege, my reasons must necessarily be less detailed than they would be in a case that does not involve confidential information.
60Common indicators of compelling information include the level of detail provided, the extent to which the information goes beyond what could be obtained through casual acquaintance or rumour, the recency of the information, and the informant’s ability to explain the source of the information: R. v. MacDonald, 2012 ONCA 244 at para. 19; R. v. Herta, 2018 ONCA 927 at para. 42.
61The redacted ITO states that information was received indicating the subject’s involvement in trafficking firearms and controlled substances, including fentanyl, cocaine, and crystal methamphetamine. The judicial summary reflects that the informant provided specific details about the subject’s method of trafficking contraband, and that the ITO identifies when this information was obtained and whether it was based on first‑ or second‑hand knowledge. The summary also notes that additional information was provided on this point. It further indicates that the informant supplied specific information concerning firearm trafficking, including the relevant timeframe and whether the information was first‑ or second‑hand.
62Having reviewed the ITO, I am satisfied that it contains sufficient detail regarding both the nature and the timing of the information to allow the issuing justice to find it compelling.
63Credibility is typically assessed by considering the informant’s motivation, whether the informant has a demonstrated track record of providing reliable information, and the informant’s criminal record (if any), including the presence or absence of offences of dishonesty. The issuing justice was provided with information relating to the source’s background and motivation. The judicial summary discloses that the source has provided information in the past that led to the seizure of contraband and charges. Some further details are provided in the unredacted ITO. The fact that the informer had provided reliable information in the past enhances their credibility. The summary also indicates that the ITO addresses whether the informer has ever provided misleading information in the past.
64The corroboration inquiry focuses on whether independent sources confirm aspects of the information. Criminality itself, however, does not need to be corroborated. Here, police confirmed several details regarding the subject’s identity, residence, and vehicle information. They did not, however, confirm any acts of criminality. Viewed as a whole, there were weaknesses in the corroboration criterion.
65With respect to the applicant’s submission that the affiant improperly introduced a necessity component into the authorization process, I see no basis for that inference. The fact that the affiant was candid about the limits of the police investigation to that point does not suggest that the issuing justice would have granted the production order based on expediency rather than on reasonable and probable grounds.
66I also am unpersuaded that the affiant authored the ITO with the reasonable suspicion standard in mind. The applicant points to paragraph 35 of the ITO which states:
During multiple days of surveillance, Vladimir attended 30 Shore Breeze Drive and Shore Breeze Drive, Etobicoke seven times. Some of which were short visits where surveillance could not be conducted to monitor his activities, despite the building authorization. In addition, On October 9, 2024, Vladimir was observed attending the building with a bag and leaving without it. On other occasions, Vladimir had attended this location with a bag. The behavior he is presenting at the condominium, in my opinion, is behavior that could be consistent with someone who maybe using this location as a possible stash residence and maybe conducting meets within the building or the underground parking garage.
67The applicant argues that the affiant’s use of the words “consistent,” “possible,” and “maybe” shows that he was applying only a reasonable‑suspicion standard. This is, in effect, a challenge to the subjective component of the reasonable and probable grounds standard. However, “the ITO must be read as a whole in a common-sense manner and having regard to its author”: R. v. Green, 2015 ONCA 579, at para. 18.
68The form used by the affiant refers to Appendix C under the heading “the reasonable grounds are.” In paragraph 9 of the ITO, he states: “This leads me to believe the confidential human source is credible and provided compelling information about Vladimir.” The headings throughout the ITO—“Grounds to Believe the Offences Were Committed,” “Grounds to Believe the Data Sought is in the Specified Location,” and “Grounds to Believe the Data Sought will Afford Evidence”—further indicate that he was applying the reasonable‑grounds standard. Read as a whole, the ITO demonstrates that the affiant possessed the requisite subjective grounds.
69I will next address the defence’s argument that the ITO fails to disclose reasonable grounds to believe that evidence would be found at the Shore Breeze building. In Mawick, the Court discussed the meaning of the words “evidence with respect to the commission of an offence” at para. 40, stating:
Section 487.014(2)(b) only requires the affiant to show reasonable grounds to believe that a production order will afford evidence "respecting the commission of an offence". As Dickson J. stated in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, the term "in respect of", which I would liken to the word "respecting", is "probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters": at p. 39. In R. v. P.W., this court explained, albeit in the context of a search warrant, that the ITO need only provide grounds for believing that the record holder has documents or data "relevant or rationally connected to the incident under investigation, the parties involved, and their potential culpability": at para. 30, citing CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, at para. 15.
70In R. v. Kalonji, 2022 ONCA 415, at paras. 23–25, and Okezie, at para. 7, the Court of Appeal emphasized that what is required is a reasonable inferential connection between the place to be searched and the evidence sought, not a direct link.
71Police came to believe that the applicant was involved in trafficking firearms and drugs. Surveillance revealed his recent attendance at ShoreBreeze—an address not known to be his residence—on multiple occasions, sometimes for short intervals. He was observed arriving with a bag on multiple visits and leaving without a bag on one occasion. Having reviewed the ITO as a whole, I find that it was open to the issuing justice to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe the production order would afford evidence of the commission of the offences.
72I have considered the ITO in its entirety, aside from the excised information, and assessed the Debot factors in combination. Having done so, I am satisfied that the issuing justice could have found that it disclosed reasonable and probable grounds and could therefore properly have granted the production order.
73At the hearing, the defence did not press its position that I should exercise my residual discretion to set aside the authorization should I conclude that the production order could have issued. I have, however, considered the arguments advanced in the applicant’s factum. In my assessment, the evidentiary record does not establish the misconduct necessary to justify the exercise of this discretion.
4) THE EFFECT OF THE CONSENT FORMS SIGNED BY THE PROPERTY MANAGER
74Cooperation by a condominium’s property management with police can provide lawful authority for a warrantless search and seizure: Yu, at paras. 72-75, 102; Salmon, at para. 26; R. v. Blackwood, 2025 ONSC 7222, at paras. 41-42.
75It is not necessary, in each case, to have evidence that the condominium board specifically authorized the disclosure of information to the police. In Yu, the Court noted that the condominium board—and, by extension, property management—is entrusted with the security of the building and its residents: paras. 91–93. This principle was recently reaffirmed in Salmon, at paras. 21–22.
76In the questionnaire filed on the voir dire, Ms. Todorovic lists her job title as property manager. One consent form records that she was employed as the “property manager or delegate of the condominium” at 30 Shore Breeze Drive, and another describes her as the “property manager/superintendent” of the building. One of the forms also confirms her understanding that she had authority to provide police with access to CCTV footage.
77The forms and questionnaire were filed on consent. Nothing before me suggests they inaccurately reflect Ms. Todorovic’s role, authority, intentions in signing, or understanding of their purpose
78Applying the factors set out in R. v. Wills (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 337 (C.A.), I find that the consent reflected in the forms signed by Ms. Todorovic was valid. She provided express consent, and she was authorized to do so. The forms state that they were signed voluntarily, and there is no evidence of coercion. They advised her of her right to refuse or withdraw consent, including how withdrawal could be communicated. They also outlined the potential consequences of giving consent. See Yu, at paras. 97–102.
79I accordingly find that the searches conducted in accordance with the consent forms were authorized by law, apart from the production order. For clarity, this includes the police access to the CCTV cameras and footage from 30 Shore Breeze Drive beginning October 16, 2024, and access to the common areas of 30 Shore Breeze Drive, as outlined in the second form, beginning on October 18, 2024. These consents do not extend to 20 Shore Breeze Drive, as neither form expressly refers to that building. Further, although one form purports to authorize police access to the building beginning October 16th, it was signed only on October 18th and therefore could not retroactively authorize attendance. I make no finding as to whether the purported consent to allow police to video-record or photograph would have been valid, as there is no indication that police engaged in either activity.
CONCLUSION
80I find that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking‑garage areas, or in the portions of the main lobby or parking‑elevator lobbies that were visible to the public.
81He did, however, have a reasonable—albeit low—expectation of privacy in the controlled areas of the building that were not accessible or observable to the public.
82The step‑six application is allowed. I conclude that the production order signed by Justice Hunter on October 30, 2024, could properly have issued.
83Police access to the CCTV cameras and footage at 30 Shore Breeze Drive beginning on October 16, 2024, was authorized by the property manager’s consent.
84Police access to the common areas of 30 Shore Breeze Drive beginning on October 18, 2024, was likewise authorized by the property manager’s consent.
85The seizure of the video surveillance from the condominium complex, covering the period between October 9 and October 23, 2024, did not infringe the applicant’s s. 8 Charter right.
For Released: February 2, 2026
Signed: Justice Joseph Hanna
Footnotes
- In my oral reasons, I stated that I would consider the “redacted portions” — that is, the undisclosed material. The meaning remains the same; I have simply revised the wording for clarity. A similar clarification is made at paragraph 50 of these reasons with respect to the Crown’s submission concerning the “unredacted ITO,” rather than the previously used term “redacted portions.” Again, the substance remains the same.