WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,
(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or
(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).
(2) Mandatory order on application.— In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 Offence.—(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ROBERTO AMAYA
Before Justice T. Lipson
Reasons for Judgment released on April 7, 2026
Ms. L. Liscio for the Crown
Mr. L. Hochberg for the accused R.A.
Lipson J.:
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1R.A. entered pleas of not guilty to a five-count information alleging that he sexually assaulted and interfered with the complainant G.P. on two occasions in 2012 and sexually assaulted her again in 2016.
2This was a one witness trial. The case turns on the testimony of the complainant G.P. who was fourteen years of age at the time of the first two incidents and sixteen at the time of the third. G.P. is now 27 years of age. R.A. had been a long-time partner of the complainant’s maternal aunt. She regarded him as her uncle. G.P. characterized R.A. as a trusted adult figure within her extended family.
3The Court is required to determine whether G.P.’s evidence is credible and reliable on the material issues in this trial and whether her evidence establishes the elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt.
OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
4The following is an overview of the evidence concerning the three incidents giving rise to the charges before the court.
5G.P. testified that she had known the defendant virtually her entire life. She told the court that R.A. had been adopted by relatives and had been raised within her extended family. He later entered into a long-term common law relationship with her maternal aunt with whom he had two children. G.P. considered him a trusted family member and de facto uncle. Throughout her childhood, R.A. was a frequent presence at family residences and gatherings, even during periods when he and her aunt lived separately.
Incident #1- Counts 1(Sexual Interference) and Count 2 (Sexual Assault)
6According to G.P. the first incident took place in late August 2012 in R.A.’s basement apartment in the Jane-Trethewey area of Toronto. She was 14 years of age at the time. She testified that she had gone to his apartment after arguing with a friend. She was upset and called the accused. He encouraged her not to return home but instead come to his place. She agreed, describing that at that time, she trusted him and had no reason to anticipate danger.
7She described the basement apartment as sparsely finished, accessed by a side-entrance and occupied by R.A.. G.P. testified that shortly after arriving she wanted to leave but he persuaded her to stay by stressing that he had ordered pizza had drinks for them. G.P. felt that he would see her as being rude and ungrateful if she left. He offered her a drink she believed was soda but realized it contained alcohol. He pressured her to smoke marijuana for the first time. G.P. described becoming increasingly disoriented, physically unwell and confused.
8G.P. described R.A. gradually moving closer to her on the couch, commenting on her appearance, touching her breasts and buttocks, removing her clothing, and telling her that he loved her. He then inserted his penis into her vagina, telling her that she was “so tight”. G.P. testified that she did not feel able to resist and wanted the encounter to end. She was scared and confused as to why her uncle was doing this to her. She testified that he ejaculated but not inside her. R.A. told her that he was showing her how much he loved her. He warned her not to tell anyone because they “wouldn’t understand”, and he would get into trouble. G.P. returned home, still under the effects of alcohol and cannabis, went to her room and cried. She did not tell anyone because she was scared and did not want to get her uncle in trouble with the family.
9During cross-examination, counsel challenged the timing of this incident, suggesting that R.A. may not have been living in that apartment in August 2012. G.P. acknowledged that while she believed the incident occurred in late August, it could have been at the very beginning of September. However, she maintained that she was certain it occurred before school started and at that apartment. Counsel also challenged whether she was pressured into substance use. G.P. acknowledged attending voluntarily but testified that she repeatedly expressed a desire to leave , was “guilted” into staying and was pressured into substance use. She acknowledged memory gaps regarding some peripheral details but explained these as a result of trauma-related blocking rather than fabrication.
Incident #2 – Count 3 (Sexual Interference) and Count 4 (Sexual Assault)
10The second incident occurred approximately one to two weeks later, this time at her aunt’s apartment on Eglinton Avenue West in Toronto. G.P. was sent by her parents to help care for her young cousins. She testified that upon arrival, she was distressed to find that R.A. was there. Her aunt had left to do some errands. Although she felt uneasy, she testified that she remained because she feared R.A.’s temper when intoxicated and was concerned about leaving her young cousins with him.
11G.P. stated that while at the apartment, R.A. had been drinking alcohol and that he again pressured her to smoke marijuana, which she did on the balcony. Then, in the living area, he put some music on and started dancing close to her, pressing his pelvis against her buttocks which she described as “grinding”. She described herself feeling intimidated and unsure how to respond.
12R.A. then pulled her into the master bedroom, pushed her onto the bed, touched her breasts, removed her bottoms, and again engaged in vaginal intercourse with her. She described being first on her hands and knees and then flipped onto her back. One of her cousins briefly came into the bedroom. R.A. dismissed the child by saying they were ‘just playing’. The sexual assault resumed after the child left. G.P. remembered washing her hands in the kitchen afterward, thinking only about leaving, but not wanting to leave her young cousins alone. After her aunt returned, G.P. asked her parents to pick her up without explaining what had occurred. She didn’t disclose to her aunt or her parents what happened because she was afraid that her uncle would “turn things against me with her aunt”. She testified that he “could be mean when he is angry”.
13During cross-examination, counsel challenged her account in several respects. In her police statement, G.P. had indicated uncertainty as to whether the incident occurred one or two weeks after the first incident and whether she had already started school. G.P. acknowledged this imprecision, explaining that she struggled with exact timeframes but remained certain the incident occurred shortly after the first.
14Counsel also questioned why she did not leave immediately upon discover R.A. was present in the apartment. G.P. explained that when she arrived at her aunt’s apartment and discovering that R.A. was present, she did not leave despite feeling distressed and uncomfortable. She testified that her immediate concern was for her young cousins, who were alone with the accused while her aunt was out, and that she did not feel it was safe to leave them in those circumstances, particularly because she observed that R.A. had been drinking and knew from past experience that he could become aggressive. She also explained that, as a fourteen‑year‑old, she was afraid to travel home alone and felt trapped between concern for the children and fear for her own safety. G.P. put it this way: “Because he was drunk, and he was with my cousins who were very young, and I didn’t want to leave them alone, because he gets aggressive. I’ve witnessed him get aggressive….“I was 14. That’s how I thought.” When pressed on an apparent alternative explanation given to police (distance and safety), she explained that multiple reasons operated simultaneously.
15Counsel questioned her why her police statement did not include details such as the marijuana smoking on the balcony and the touching on the futon and dancing in the living room. G.P. explained that her police interview was her first disclosure to authorities and that she focused on recounting the sexual assault in the bedroom, which she experienced as the most significant and violating part of the incident. She testified that she did not intentionally omit those details, but rather that she had blocked out or compartmentalized portions of the surrounding context. She testified, “Blocking means that I went through something very traumatic and subconsciously I have put that in the furthest corner of my mind so that I can function.” Additional details emerged later as she was required to revisit the events sequentially and in greater detail under questioning at trial. G.P.’s told the court, “The more that I relive it, the more details I remember.” G.P. said that the police questioning was different than her questioning in court. When asked by the Crown in re-examination whether the police interview differed in structure from trial questioning, she explained why more detail emerged later: “Yes, you did [ask questions differently]. I feel that it allowed me to remember specific details that I had blocked out.”
Incident#3- Count 5 (Sexual Assault)
16G.P. testified that the third incident occurred approximately two years later, in August 2014, when she was 16 years old. A large birthday celebration for her younger sister was being held at the family triplex residence on […] Street in Toronto, attended by numerous relatives and guests, including her boyfriend. R.A. was present at the gathering.
17While briefly inside the house retrieving disposable cups for the party, G.P. testified that R.A. entered the kitchen, approached her from behind, pressed his pelvis against her buttocks, pushed her forward onto a table and groped her over her clothing while whispering sexualized remarks referencing her appearance and the earlier encounters. She described experiencing pain and shock. The incident ended abruptly when her mother called out and began entering the house, prompting R.A. to step away quickly.
18G.P. returned outside and testified that while no further physical contact occurred that day, R.A. commented on her legs and how tight she felt the last time.
19She disclosed this incident to her boyfriend but not to other family members or authorities at that time for fear of breaking up the family.
20During cross‑examination, defence counsel suggested that R.A. had sustained serious injuries earlier in 2014 that would have prevented him from attending the party or engaging physically. G.P. firmly maintained that he was present and described specific details of the event. Defence counsel also highlighted subsequent polite text message exchanges between G.P. and R.A. in later years. G.P. acknowledged occasional communication but explained that it was motivated by family dynamics, her role as a peacemaker, and concern for her cousins, not by consent or reconciliation.
21G.P. explained that her delayed disclosure until 2024 stemmed from shame, fear, confusion, and a profound reluctance to destabilize family relationships. She described internalizing the accused’s insistence that she remain silent.
22She further testified that her enrolment in early childhood education studies prompted her to reflect on protecting children, which motivated her to come forward. G.P. told her mother on the way to the police station and later disclosed details to her aunt. Her testimony on this subject was as follows: “So I have been studying early childhood education for the past year and a half now and in doing so, it has made me realize how vulnerable children are and how important it is to speak up when—sorry—how important it is to speak up for them when things happen, and I just wanted to give myself that chance so that I could essentially protect that fourteen‑year‑old and give her a shot at letting go what she’s been carrying for so long.”
POSITIONS OF THE CROWN AND DEFENCE
23The central issues are whether G.P.’s evidence is credible and reliable on the essential facts and whether her testimony alone satisfies the Crown’s burden to prove the offences of sexual interference in 2012 and sexual assault in 2014 beyond a reasonable doubt.
24The Crown submits that the evidence of G.P. is credible, reliable and sufficient to establish the elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Ms. Liscio emphasized that although G.P. acknowledged uncertainty on some peripheral matters-such as precise dates, the estimated age of the child who briefly entered the bedroom in the second incident or the exact description of the garment she was wearing during that incident- her testimony on the essential elements was unwavering. G.P. consistently identified the accused , the location of the incidents, her age at the time, the sexual details of the conduct and her lack of consent.
25The Crown argues that the omissions in her police statement regarding the second incident marijuana use, the accused’s dancing in the living room and his alcohol consumption are explained by the nature of first‑disclosure police interviews, which tend to, and in this case did, capture summary information rather than full narrative detail. Counsel stresses that additional context often emerges at trial under structured questioning, and not unusual in cases involving historical sexual trauma. The further details serve to explain the circumstances leading to the assaults and to provide coherence to G.P.’s account without altering or expanding the core allegations.
26The defence argues that G.P.’s evidence is unreliable because her trial testimony contains significant additions which she omitted in her police statement. Counsel contends that balcony marijuana use and the accused’s dancing, grinding in the second incident were material parts of the narrative and that their absence from the police statement raises doubts about whether the incident ever occurred. The defence also cites inconsistencies in timing, the cousin’s age estimate, and the description of the cardigan or vest in the second incident, as well as the complainant’s subsequent attendance at family events involving the accused. The defence submits that these discrepancies, viewed cumulatively, generate reasonable doubt.
27In summary, the defence challenged the complainant's credibility and reliability, pointing to omissions from her police interview, variations in timing and sequencing, and asserted improbabilities. The defence submits those matters, viewed individually and cumulatively, should leave the Court with reasonable doubt. Mr. Hochberg submitted that the complainant’s evidence is too unreliable and unsafe to ground convictions.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
28R.A. is presumed innocent. The presumption of innocence is a foundational principle of criminal law that requires every accused person to be treated as innocent unless and until the prosecution proves guilt through admissible evidence. It protects individuals from wrongful conviction and ensures that suspicion alone carries no legal consequence.
29The burden of proof lies entirely on the Crown, which must establish each essential element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt—a very high standard designed to avoid convicting the innocent. The accused has no obligation to testify or present evidence, and any gaps or uncertainties in the Crown’s case regarding the essential elements of the offence must result in an acquittal.
30The Crown bears the burden of proof throughout. The Criminal Code expressly provides that no corroboration is required in sexual offence prosecutions.
31No special evidentiary rules apply to historical sexual offences. The complainant’s evidence is assessed using the same credibility and reliability principles used in all criminal cases: R. v. D.D. 2000 SCC 43; R. v. W.(R.), 2 SCR 122. Ther is no legal presumption that a complainant is more likely to be truthful.
32I must bear in mind that there is no “normal way” that victims of sexual assault behave. Courts have repeatedly recognized that delayed disclosure is common among child and adolescent complainants. A delay in reporting cannot, by itself, be used to infer fabrication or unreliability. It may however be considered in context as part of the overall credibility assessment.
33Courts must avoid relying on stereotypical assumptions about how complainants ‘should’ behave or disclose. The Supreme Court has held that such reasoning risks legal error and is prohibited (R. v. A.R.J.D., 2018 SCC 6 at paras. 1–3; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20 at paras. 74–82).
34Sexual interference requires proof of intentional touching of a person under sixteen for a sexual purpose (s. 151). Sexual assault requires proof that the accused applied force without consent in circumstances of a sexual nature (s. 271; see R. v. Chase, 1987 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293).
35The complainant is now 27 years of age and was 14-16 years old at the time of the incidents she described in her testimony. The law recognizes that when incidents occurred a long time ago and the victim is a child or young person, this will affect the way they testify and recall events. If the offences are sexual, this also affects the way they will remember events. The evidence of a witness must be considered in the context of her age at the time of the events. In R. v. W.(R.), 1992 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, the Supreme Court stated that the presence of inconsistencies, particularly as to peripheral matters such as time and location, should be considered in the context of the age of the witness at the time of the events to which she is testifying. Inconsistencies , particularly regarding minor or collateral matters, are not automatically fatal to credibility in historical cases. The court must evaluate whether any inconsistencies undermine the overall reliability of the complainant on the essential elements
ANALYSIS
36I have carefully considered the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence. I bear in mind the heavy burden of proof upon the prosecution.
37The court’s role in this case is not to determine whether G.P. recalled every detail with precision, nor whether her account unfolded in a perfectly linear or comprehensive manner from the outset. The guiding question is whether her evidence, considered fairly and contextually and as a whole, is credible and reliable on the material issues and proves the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. In historical sexual offence cases, particularly those involving adolescent complainants, the law expressly rejects an expectation of perfection. What matters is whether the core of the narrative is stable, plausible and consistent with ordinary human experience. Accordingly, my analysis focuses on the essential elements of the offences, the internal consistency of G.P.’s evidence, her explanation for uncertainty and whether the issues raised by the defence meaningfully undermine confidence in her account.
38Credibility cannot be determined based on appearance or demeanour alone. A witness may display emotions or behaviours influenced by trauma, cultural background, personality, shame, or the inherent stress of testifying. For these reasons, I approach demeanour with caution and do not treat it as a reliable measure of truthfulness. Instead, I focus on whether G.P.’s evidence remains consistent on the material points; whether any inconsistencies relate only to peripheral matters that naturally shift over time; whether her explanations for uncertainty are sensible; and whether her overall account aligns with ordinary human experience.
39Applying these principles, I found that G.P. testified in a careful, measured, and straightforward manner. She took time before answering questions and made fair concessions when her recollection was imperfect. She avoided overstating details she could not recall. She did not attempt to fill gaps in her memory with conjecture. Her emotional responses appeared natural and proportionate, not rehearsed or exaggerated. At times, she was visibly uncomfortable and distressed, particularly when describing the sexual acts themselves, yet she did not display excessive emotion or appear performative. These characteristics are consistent with a witness attempting to provide accurate evidence rather than persuade through performance. Her manner of testifying was consistent with someone recounting deeply personal and painful events, rather than someone attempting to persuade or dramatize.
40The most significant feature of G.P.’s testimony is its consistency on the matters that truly matter. Throughout her trial testimony, G.P. consistently identified the locations of the relevant events, and the essential sequence of what occurred. She described two incidents in late summer 2012—when she was fourteen—following a similar pattern. She consistently recalled remarks by R.A. that attempted to rationalize the acts he committed and to encourage secrecy. She also consistently described a brief interruption by her young cousin during the second 2012 incident, demonstrating that the risk of discovery was real rather than hypothetical. I found G.P. to be a credible and reliable witness who provided compelling evidence regarding the allegations before the court.
41I now address specific inconsistencies and omissions in the evidence of G.P. raised by the defence and explain why they do not undermine her credibility and reliability on the material issues in this case.
42The defence argues that G.P. was inconsistent regarding whether the second incident occurred before or after the school year began, and whether it happened one or two weeks after the first incident. She readily acknowledged that she is not good with dates. Given the passage of more than a decade and her age at the time of the events, such temporal imprecision is entirely unremarkable. What is important is that she consistently placed both incidents in late August or early September 2012, described them as closely connected in time, and recounted the same central conduct. Whether the interval was one week or two, or whether her school year had technically begun, does not affect the essence of her account.
43G.P. was fourteen years old in 2012 and was testifying more than a decade later. Human memory does not preserve dates and timelines with precision under such circumstance, especially when the events themselves are traumatic. Importantly, G.P. consistently placed both 2012 incidents within a narrow timeframe in late summer and described them as occurring close together. Her uncertainty as to the exact length of the interval between the incidents does not diminish the reliability of her account.
44G.P. testified that during the first incident, R.A., while touching her, told her, “This is how adults show they love each other.” In her police statement, she placed this remark after the intercourse rather than before it. There was also slight variation regarding whether he warned that he would get in trouble or that she would get in trouble for visiting his home. It should not be surprising that minor shifts in the sequence of comments can occur when recalling traumatic experiences. The central point is that G.P. consistently remembered both remarks being made in close proximity to the assault. Each comment by the R.A. was intended to rationalize his conduct and to pressure her into silence, which helps explain her delayed disclosure. The precise order in which the comments were made does not diminish the reliability of her account.
45The defence placed weight on the absence, from the complainant’s police statement, of certain contextual details later described at trial in relation to the second incident, including the presence of a futon, dancing and grinding in the living room, and marijuana use on the balcony. G.P. explained these omissions directly in her evidence. She testified that the police interview was her first disclosure to an authority figure and was emotionally overwhelming, and that she focused on describing the core sexual assault in the bedroom rather than recounting every antecedent interaction. She further distinguished between “forgetting” and having details “blocked out,” explaining that while the sexual acts themselves were always clearly recalled, certain surrounding details emerged more fully when events were later explored sequentially through more detailed questioning at trial. G.P. consistently maintained that these matters formed part of the lead‑up to the assault, not a change to its substance. I accept this explanation and am satisfied that the later articulation of contextual detail reflects the manner in which memory and disclosure can unfold over time, rather than fabrication or unreliability.
46The defence submitted that if the second sexual assault incident had in fact occurred, it is implausible that G.P. would have remained at the apartment after it was over. G.P. explained that she did not immediately leave the apartment after the second incident for two reasons: she feared walking home alone, and she did not want to leave her young cousins unattended because R.A. had been drinking. These overlapping motivations are realistic for a fourteen‑year‑old experiencing confusion, fear, and responsibility simultaneously. She reacted to what was a highly confusing and stressful situation. In my view, her explanation supports, rather than undermines, the authenticity of her account.
47G.P. estimated that the child who briefly opened the door during the second incident was between three and six years old, whereas other evidence suggests the child was closer to nine years old. This discrepancy is understandable. In the moment, her attention would not have been on assessing the child's age but on the distressing circumstances she was experiencing. Age estimations made under stress are notoriously unreliable. The important fact—consistent across all of her accounts—is that a child did enter the room. That interruption demonstrates that the risk of discovery was real, directly contradicting defence suggestions that such an event could not plausibly have occurred without detection.
48G.P. described wearing either a long blue cardigan in her statement and in testimony a sleeveless grey‑blue long vest during the second incident. Recollections of clothing worn many years earlier are naturally imprecise, especially when the garment plays no meaningful role in the events. What is important is that the length of the garment covered her body when the child walked into the bedroom. This minor variation does not detract from her credibility or reliability on the substantive issues.
49The defence suggests the second incident is improbable because the risk of being discovered was too high and because G.P. said the incident “felt like an hour.” These arguments are speculative. Sexual offences often occur despite clear risks, and here, the risk materialized when a child briefly entered the room. That event itself supports her account. As for the duration, G.P.’s description plainly reflects subjective time perception under stress, not an objective measurement of minutes. Neither point undermines the plausibility of her evidence.
50The defence argued that G.P.’s later polite interactions with the accused, including sending a family wedding video, undermine her credibility. G.P. explained that she maintained surface‑level cordiality to avoid conflict within a complicated family structure. G.P.’s explanation that she sought to keep peace within the family is credible and, in my view, does not detract from the truth of her allegations. To the contrary, disclosure carried clear personal costs- emotional distress , family conflict, and exposure of deeply personal events.
51During the cross examination of G.P., defence counsel suggested that injuries prevented the accused from attending the 2014 gathering where the third incident allegedly occurred. No supporting evidence was presented. By contrast, G.P.’s description of R.A.’s presence at the gathering and the details of the sexual contact in the basement kitchen was clear, specific, and credible. Unsupported speculation cannot generate a reasonable doubt in the face of credible testimony.
52Considering G.P.’s evidence as a whole, I find that the inconsistencies raised by the defence are minor, peripheral, and readily explained by normal memory processes, the passage of time, and the nature of late disclosure. On the essential points—identity, location, and the core sequence and nature of events—G.P.’s evidence was consistent. She made appropriate concessions when uncertain, avoided embellishment, and provided additional context only when prompted. I accept her evidence on the essential elements of each offence.
Findings On Each Count
Count 1 – Sexual Interference (Incident One-2012)
53To convict on count 1, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally touched, directly or indirectly, a part of G.P.’s body, that G.P. was under the age of sixteen at the time , the touching was for a sexual purpose and that the accused knew, was reckless, or was wilfully blind to G.P.’s age.
54I find that each element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. G.P. testified that R.A. touched her breasts, buttocks and vagina and penetrated her vagina with his penis. G.P. was fourteen years old at the time, a fact not in dispute and well known to the accused because of his familial relationship with her. The nature of the touching, the body parts involved, and the surrounding circumstances establish an unmistakable sexual purpose. The accused’s knowledge of G.P.’s age, or at a minimum recklessness or wilful blindness as to her age, is inferred from their familial connection and regular contact. R.A. is guilty on count one.
Count 2- Sexual Assault ( Incident 1-2012)
55For R.A. to be found guilty of sexual assault, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally applied force to G.P., the force was applied in circumstances of a sexual nature and that G.P. did not consent to the application of force.
56I find these elements of the offence are established beyond a reasonable. Penetrative intercourse constitutes an application of force. The act was inherently sexual. G.P. testified clearly that she done consent, felt unable to resist, and wanted the act to stop. The circumstances, including her impairment and the accused’s exploitation of his position of authority confirm the absence of consent. He is guilty on count 2.
Count 3 – Sexual Interference ( Incident 2-2012)
57I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that R.A. touched and penetrated the complainant’s vagina. G.P. was fourteen years old at the time. The touching was for a sexual purpose. The accused knew or was a reckless or wilfully blind to her age. R.A. is guilty on count 3.
Count 4 – Sexual Assault (Incident 2-2012)
58I find that R.A. intentionally applied force in circumstances of a sexual nature and that G.P. did not consent. Count 4 is proven beyond a reasonable doubt and R.A. is found guilty.
Count 5 – Sexual Assault (Incident 3-2014
59The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that R.A. intentionally applied force to G.P. without her consents in circumstances of a sexual nature. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that R.A. pressed his pelvis against her buttocks, pushed her forward onto a table and engaged in sexual touching. G.P. did not consent. He is guilty on count 5.
Conclusion
60Having considered all the evidence and submissions, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the offences charged. I accept G.P.’s evidence as credible and reliable on the material issues. The inconsistencies raised by the defence are peripheral and do not undermine her core account.
61R.A. is guilty on all counts.
Released: April 7, 2026
Justice T. Lipson