WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
An order prohibiting disclosure of a witness’s identity has been made in this proceeding pursuant to s. 486.31 of the Criminal Code and shall continue. This section of the Criminal Code provides that:
486.31 (1) - NON-DISCLOSURE OF WITNESS’ IDENTITY - In any proceedings against an accused, the judge or justice may, on application of the prosecutor in respect of a witness, or on application of a witness, make an order directing that any information that could identify the witness not be disclosed in the course of the proceedings if the judge or justice is of the opinion that the order is in the interest of the proper administration of justice.
(2) - HEARING MAY BE HELD - The judge or justice may hold a hearing to determine whether the order should be made, and the hearing may be in private.
(3) - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED - In determining whether to make the order, the judge or justice shall consider
(a) the right to a fair and public hearing;
(b) the nature of the offence;
(c) whether the witness needs the order for their security or to protect them from intimidation or retaliation;
(d) whether the order is needed to protect the security of anyone known to the witness;
(e.1) whether the order is needed to protect the identity of a peace officer who has acted, is acting or will be acting in an undercover capacity, or of a person who has acted, is acting or will be acting covertly under the direction of a peace officer;
(e) society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process;
(f) the importance of the witness’ testimony to the case;
(g) whether effective alternatives to the making of the proposed order are available in the circumstances;
(h) the salutary and deleterious effects of the proposed order; and
(i) any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant.
(4) - No adverse inference - No adverse inference may be drawn from the fact that an order is, or is not, made under this section.
2015, c. 13, s. 17, c. 20, s. 38
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ALAN DUGGAN
Before Justice Lori Anne Thomas
Heard on March 20, 2024, February 26, 2025, March 7, 2025, August 6, 2025, December 18, 2025, and March 10, 2026
Oral Reasons for Sentence released on March 12, 2026
Written Reasons for Sentence released on April 9, 2026
Rochelle Liberman counsel for the Crown
Vicky Powell counsel for the Defendant Alan Duggan
Reasons for Sentence
1This was a sentencing case for the offences of intimidation and utter threat by a parent towards his six-year-old child, A.A.1 For the reasons that follow, I declined to accept the parties’ joint submission for a conditional discharge, found that a custodial sentence was required, and imposed a custodial sentence to be served conditionally in the community.
2The issues before the Court were:
(a) The proper approach to a proposed joint submission made following a guilty plea that was not the product of a quid pro quo agreement.
(b) The mitigating weight, if any, to be afforded to:
- A guilty plea entered on a re-scheduled trial date;
- Post-offence counselling, undertaken years after the offence;
- Volunteer work aligned with the offender’s personal interest;
- Expressions of remorse, accompanied by the offender’s minimization; and
- Collateral consequences, such as immigration and separation from the family.
(c) Whether a conditional discharge is appropriate in circumstances involving a first-time offender committing psychological intimidation that led to self-harm of a child?
(d) If a discharge was not appropriate, what sentence would be fit and proportionate, including whether any custodial term may be served conditionally in the community?
Procedural History
3On December 7, 2019, Alan Duggan was arrested for the offences of intimidation and utter threat of bodily harm, both towards his son, committed on October 31, 2019, contrary to sections 423(1)(a) and 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
4This matter continued through the courts for about 4 years and 3 months, until it resulted in a plea. This delay and cancelled trials resulted from a combination of factors, including the COVID pandemic, court shutdowns, and multiple changes in counsel.
5The matter was scheduled for trial to proceed before me on March 20, 2024, where the Defence filed an Application for a stay of proceedings, pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter, as Mr. Duggan claimed that his section 7 Charter right was violated when the Crown retracted their offer to resolve the matter with a joint recommendation for a discharge. To support that Application, an “affidavit” and the Notice of the Application were filed.2 According to the Notice, the agreement was made with the previous counsel, who was requested to be removed for ethical reasons. The Crown responded, providing correspondence indicating that it was always the Crown’s position that the matter should be resolved by a suspended sentence only if Mr. Duggan underwent extensive counselling. The Crown’s screening position was one of jail. When Ms. Powell filed the Application on March 20, 2024, Mr. Duggan had not completed any counselling in the years since his arrest.
6Since the Application was filed late, it would have been heard after the trial. However, just before commencing the trial, the Crown advised the victim’s mother, B.B.3, advised the victim did not want to testify, and both were agreeable to any position that would resolve the matter without the victim testifying.
7As such, on March 20, 2024, Mr. Duggan pled guilty to both offences before me. At the time of the plea, the Crown was not in the position to propose a joint submission on sentence, but did agree that if Mr. Duggan completed satisfactory counselling, she would join in a recommendation for a conditional discharge.
8On February 26, 2025, after Mr. Duggan completed some counselling, the parties proposed a joint submission for a conditional discharge. I advised that I could not accede to the joint submission, as I felt the counselling was insufficient. Furthermore, there were no sufficient mitigating factors to support a discharge, given the gravity of the case.
9As such, the matter was adjourned for counsel and Mr. Duggan to make further efforts to support the conditional discharge submission. Ultimately, I could not agree to a conditional discharge as a discharge would fail to reflect Mr. Duggan’s high moral blameworthiness, the child’s vulnerability, and the harm caused by his conduct. The offence has had a significant, ongoing impact on the victim and his family. Denunciation and deterrence are paramount principles in this case, and a discharge would not adequately address either principle.
10R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, did not strictly govern this plea, as there was no quid pro quo plea agreement for a specific sentence before the plea was made. However, the Court relied on Anthony-Cook for guidance on fairness-based procedural matters out of an abundance of caution. Nevertheless, deference ordinarily afforded to joint submissions cannot displace the Court’s obligation to ensure that any sentence imposed remains proportionate and consistent with statutory aggravating factors. As such, I found that a conditional discharge would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the gravity of the offences, statutorily aggravating circumstances, the offender’s high moral blameworthiness, and the enduring harm to a vulnerable child.
11During submissions, I advised counsel that a jail sentence could be appropriate. Defence counsel suggested I consider a conditional sentence, which I decided was appropriate in light of the facts, the impact on the victims, the collateral impact on Mr. Duggan, the case law, and the mitigating and aggravating factors.
Facts Underlying the Offence
12A.A. is the victim and Mr. Duggan’s son. A.A.'s parents were not in a common-law relationship or married. However, they had arrangements for child access. At the time of the offence, A.A. was six years old. The offence was almost six and a half years ago, and Mr. Duggan was arrested shortly thereafter.
13On October 31, 2019, A.A.’s sister (not Mr. Duggan’s daughter) arranged for a FaceTime call with A.A. and his father, since Mr. Duggan reached out to her. Mr. Duggan contacted the sister. Mr. Duggan contacted the sister because A.A. had not contacted him after school as previously arranged.
14The sister secretly recorded the FaceTime call because of concerns about previous calls A.A. had with his father, based on A.A.’s behaviour after those calls. At the time of the call, A.A. was in his playroom in his mother’s home.
15The audio of the call was made an exhibit. It was a 30-minute call, which I would describe as profoundly unsettling. The audio of the call supported the finding that Mr. Duggan intentionally humiliated, intimidated, and coerced his six-year-old son to engage in repeated acts of self-harm.
16It was agreed that I would hear the call privately, as it could not be played in its entirety in court.4 As such, I have summarized below. Despite my best attempt to summarize the call, a review of these reasons would be incomplete without hearing the audio.
Summary of the FaceTime Call
17The FaceTime call duration was approximately 30 minutes, and the corresponding audio exhibit, which included a post-call recording, lasted 33 minutes.
18The FaceTime call began with Mr. Duggan yelling because it had been 90 minutes since A.A. had arrived home, and he had not contacted his father. Mr. Duggan was not concerned about A.A.’s safety; instead, he was angry for the perceived disrespect A.A. showed by failing to call his father. While Mr. Duggan is clear on the call that was the reason for his reaction, the psychological report filed supported this as the basis for his anger.
19Mr. Duggan made a vague accusation that A.A. did “something stupid” instead of calling. And when A.A. could not explain why he did not call, Mr. Duggan called him stupid. Throughout the call, Mr. Duggan called his six-year-old son stupid six times, half-witted two times and a “dodo” twice.5 This was interwoven with Mr. Duggan calling his son “buddy”.
20When A.A. started crying, Mr. Duggan accused A.A. of wanting his father to yell, as well as wanting to get in trouble to “cry like a little baby”, all of which A.A. denied. When Mr. Duggan asked A.A. what he was to do when not obeying, A.A. responded that he was to stand in the corner. Mr. Duggan agreed but said A.A. was also to be nude but for his underwear. It is unclear if A.A. ever stood in a corner or took off his clothes.
21Then Mr. Duggan told A.A. to slap his face 10 times, ensuring that Mr. Duggan could see it. On the audio, A.A. can be heard immediately slapping himself, without hesitation or question. However, A.A. indicated to Mr. Duggan that he didn’t like hitting himself and that it hurt. In response, Mr. Duggan said that there must be something wrong with A.A.’s brain, and Mr. Duggan should take him to a doctor. To be clear, the suggestion of medical assistance was not born out of genuine concern for a medical issue; instead, it was used as a taunt to insult his child further.
22There was insufficient evidence before the Court to find that this conduct occurred on prior occasions, despite the sister’s concerns and her basis for recording the call. However, the child’s immediate and unquestioning compliance with the demands demonstrated the effect of Mr. Duggan’s intimidation and abuse of parental authority. As an example, when Mr. Duggan said that “your ass is full of crap too now” and maybe should go back in diapers, A.A. said, “no”. In response, Mr. Duggan told him, “Don’t talk to me. Just do what you’ve been told. I don’t want to know”. Immediately, A.A. returned to hitting himself and counting each hit. Notably, A.A. complied with his father’s demands to hurt himself throughout the call, without being argumentative or questioning his father’s commands. By the end of the call, Mr. Duggan told A.A. to hit himself nearly 160 times.
23A.A. was told to repeatedly slap himself because he couldn’t explain how he knew he went to school that day, along with being punished for crying. At one point, Mr. Duggan stated it was not he who was hitting A.A., but A.A. himself. As Mr. Duggan stated, “I don’t have to touch you. Can’t say daddy slapped me, because I never put my hand on him.”
24In addition, Mr. Duggan did the following during the FaceTime:
- Threatened to cut off A.A.’s lips, to which A.A. responded, “No.”
- Repeatedly told A.A. to hit himself “harder”, enough to draw blood. There was no evidence that A.A. bled.
- Stated, “I want you to bleed so you know what it is like,” though it was unclear what “it” was.
- Initially, told 10 times, but then Mr. Duggan would start the count again or miscount the number of hits the child did.
- Told the child not to hit himself in the forehead, as it could take punches and instead the child should hit his nose.
- Berated his child for rubbing his nose, speaking and not being clearly understood.
- Accused the child of liking to slap himself; A.A. said that was not true.
- Mocked A.A. for not recalling the day's events, stating that A.A. must continue to slap himself until he recalled what he did earlier in the day.
- Told A.A. he did not care if the child was black and blue or if it took 10 more hours.
- Threatened to drive over and get his son if A.A. did not slap himself harder.
- Also threatened A.A. to have two black eyes if A.A. did not remember what happened.
- Accused A.A. of “bullshit crying” and told A.A., “get on with it”, after only hitting himself 12 times.
- When A.A. initially asked to go to the bathroom, Mr. Duggan said no and said A.A. should suffer.
- Told A.A. to hit himself until his brain fell into the right spot.
25During the times when Mr. Duggan kept repeating, “hit yourself 10 more times” or such, Mr. Duggan consistently and demonstrably understood the number of times A.A. had hit himself, which could be heard on the audio.
26Eventually, A.A. figured out what he had done that day: he had had chicken noodle soup and worn a costume. While it was Halloween, A.A. did not refer to it as Halloween.
27During the call, Mr. Duggan told A.A. that he was kept from working and having dinner. When the call was ending, Mr. Duggan accused him of wasting his time for the last 30 minutes.
28At the conclusion of the call, Mr. Duggan permitted A.A. to go to the bathroom. Because the audio was still recording, it captured female voices in the background. They were calm and pleasant, in stark contrast to the 30 minutes of yelling A.A. had to endure.
Victim Impact
29A.A. mother B.B.6 provided a victim impact statement. However, it was notable that the Crown agreed to the joint position because both A.A. and his mother expressed that the prolonged procedural history and the preparations for multiple trials had worn them down.
30I accepted B.B.’s assertions of the impact on her, and A.A. has been traumatized. He has ongoing signs of depression, which are so significant that he has questioned his own existence. But also, that depression has manifested negatively in how he maintains his physical appearance, which he has trouble addressing because of his depression and activities that align with his father’s personal interests.
31Both B.B. and A.A. are in therapy, which has provided some support, but the psychological harm permeates his entire life.
32A.A. has been without a father, and there were questions about the level of financial support B.B. received. I was not able to make any findings, as it is unrelated to the specifics of these offences.
33Initially, B.B. explained she was hesitant to permit Mr. Duggan access to her child but would be willing to allow access in her direct company. However, between authoring the victim impact statement and the sentencing date, an incident in Family Court occurred that raised enough concern for her to believe that Mr. Duggan still posed a potential threat, even if access was in her presence. Although some information about the incident was provided, it was not considered an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sentence. Instead, its limited purpose was to inform appropriate sentencing conditions.
Background of the Offender
34Mr. Duggan was 54 years old, born in Northern Ireland and is a permanent resident of Canada. He is employed as an actor and has worked in renovation. In addition, he was a volunteer soccer coach. He indicated he had been financially sound, having incurred no debts or relied on any form of social assistance.
35Mr. Duggan reported no history of violence or problematic behaviour in his childhood or upbringing. Instead, he described his deceased parents as excellent and his upbringing as positive. Furthermore, he reported no history of alcohol or drug abuse.
36He is a father to three other children. One child, who is either a pre-teen or in her early teens, with whom he has not had contact since she was three years old. No explanation was given for the estrangement, and no allegation was made that it was related to criminal or abusive behaviour on his part.
37The other two children are shared with his current relationship partner. Similarly, there was no indication of any difficulties with those children. However, there were also no reports from either mother that the relationships with the children were or are healthy. I found his parental relationship with other children to be a neutral factor that did not assist me.
Psychological Report
38Mr. Duggan was assessed for a psychological report from August to September in 2025, after the plea was entered, and I indicated that I could not accede to the joint position.
39Unfortunately, although the psychology report outlined much of his background, it did not explain why Mr. Duggan harmed his child. According to Mr. Duggan’s comments in the report, he was dissatisfied with his son’s responses and expressed that he raised his voice for 20 minutes before they both regained their composure. Mr. Duggan stated that his frustration stemmed from being ignored, despite a prior agreement that his son would call him.
40I have trouble accepting this explanation. First, Mr. Duggan was in a rage immediately upon the call commencing. Second, the minimization that he was unsatisfied does not speak to how unreasonable Mr. Duggan was with his six-year-old son. Third, raising his voice was the least offensive aspect of the call. He insulted and directed his child to harm himself. In a review of the report, this minimization appeared consistent with the defensive and minimization traits identified in the psychological assessment.
41While there was no evidence of psychological issues, the report noted:
He tends to portray himself as being exceptionally free of common shortcomings to which most individuals will admit.
Further:
He may be blindly uncritical of his own behaviour and insensitive to the negative consequences associated with it, tending to minimize the impact it has on others and on himself. Given his high level of defensiveness, the clinical scale profile potentially reflected considerable distortion and minimization of difficulties in several areas.
42This minimization was not considered an aggravating factor, but it significantly limited the mitigation weight that could be given to post-offence counselling and expressions of remorse.
43The report noted there was no evidence of psychopathic personality disorder. Mr. Duggan was able to express emotional empathy towards his son in the report and in court at his sentencing.
44Unfortunately, the report did not explain why Mr. Duggan emotionally and physically abused his child; it provided no evidence of true insight into his behaviour, and the harm was caused.
Aggravating Considerations
45There were several aggravating features in this case, including various statutorily aggravating factors. Beginning with s. 718.01, it is statutorily aggravating to abuse a person under the age of 18, and the objectives of denunciation and deterrence must have primary consideration.
46Similarly, s. 718.2(a)(ii.1) applies because of the abuse of a child. Section 718.2(a)(ii) applies as it is an abuse of his own child, along with the fact that Mr. Duggan abused his position of authority and trust with his son, making s. 718.2(a)(iii) applicable.
47I also find that 718.04 is applicable, as A.A. is a vulnerable person. As recognized in A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, at para 17, “the inherent vulnerability of children has consistent and deep roots in Canadian law.” Further, the protection of children is one of the most fundamental values of our society, see R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para 65
48As such, in addition to the inherent vulnerability of A.A., it is also aggravating that he was six years old, an age when children tend to be 1) dependent and compliant with all their parents’ punishment or demands and 2) able to recall and internalize the psychological abuse.
49I found that Mr. Duggan’s hostile actions towards his child meet the definition of child abuse. Taken together, these statutory aggravating factors elevate this case well beyond the range where a discharge could be considered. The offences involved sustained emotional and psychological violence, abuse of parental authority, and conduct directed at a child whose vulnerability was inherent, foreseeable, and exploited.
Child Abuse Consideration
50The support for finding Mr. Duggan’s actions met the definition of child abuse, I referenced external definitions that add clarity to legal definitions. The Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies’ What is child abuse? definition of “child abuse” includes physical or emotional abuse. They define “emotional abuse” as a “pattern of behaviour that attacks a child’s emotional development and sense of self-worth. It includes excessive, aggressive or unreasonable demands that place expectations on a child beyond his or her capacity.”7
51The World Health Organization’s webpage on Violence against children notes that most violence against children involves at least one of six main types of interpersonal violence, one of which is defined as emotional or psychological violence, which includes “restricting a child’s movements, denigration, ridicule, threats and intimidation, discrimination and other non-physical forms of hostile treatment”.8
52These definitions were not relied upon to expand criminal liability, but to illustrate that the conduct here accorded with well-established understandings of emotional and psychological abuse recognized by Canadian criminal law. The definitions are consistent with, and help contextualize, the criminal law’s understanding of emotional and psychological abuse of children.
53As noted by Justice Garg in R. v. R.H., 2025 ONCJ 163, at para. 31:
Child abuse often occurs behind closed doors. When the abuse is made public, the courts must send a message that [the] protection of children will be the predominant concern.
54Further abuse of a child is an assault on their dignity and self-worth with real potential for long-term effects.9 In this case, long-term effects are known, as this matter has stretched on for over six and a half years, allowing the Court to be informed of the true effects of this offence.
55I adopt Justice Garg’s words for this case: as “the abuse in this case exposed an innocent child to harm at the hands of the very person who was meant to protect [and love] him.”
56This happened in A.A.’s home, a place where he was entitled to feel safe and protected and free from violence, especially from his parents. Mr. Duggan’s anger intruded on his safety and his place of security: see R. v. Friesen, supra, at para. 178.
Mitigating Considerations
57Mr. Duggan had no prior criminal record or outstanding charges at the time of the sentencing.
58Further, I accept he has remorse, as he indicated in Court. Furthermore, a plea is an act of taking accountability for one's actions.
Counselling
59After pleading guilty, he completed anger management counselling and four hours of online parenting counselling. While counselling is mitigating, none of the counselling letters indicated what progress he personally made or any insights he gained into his behaviour. The letters do not indicate how he successfully completed the programs. Instead, they noted what was covered rather than what Mr. Duggan achieved.
60Furthermore, counselling was undertaken only after the plea was entered, more than four years after the offence. There is no evidence that he had insight into his behaviour and the harm it caused before pleading guilty. It is unclear whether his surety directed him to seek counselling, despite the recognizance issued on December 9, 2019, which permitted his surety to require him to do so.
61Though I found the counselling to be mitigating, in the absence of insight into the root causes of this behaviour, I was unable to determine whether the risk of reoffending had been meaningfully reduced based on the counselling letters.
Saving the Victim from Testifying
62Another mitigating consideration is that the guilty plea spared A.A. and his family from having to testify. This factor must be assessed in context. The plea was entered on the day of trial, almost five years after the offence. Moreover, it was precipitated by A.A.’s mother, B.B., expressing concern about her son’s emotional instability and advising the Crown that she did not want him to testify, requesting that the matter be resolved without a trial. In response to that request, and to avoid the risk of further trauma to the family, the Crown agreed, for the first time, to consider the Defence position.
63While a guilty plea is ordinarily entitled to significant mitigating weight, that weight is reduced in this case by the late timing of the plea, the protracted procedural history, and the fact that it arose largely from the victim’s vulnerability and participation in the process rather than from the accused’s early acceptance of responsibility. An earlier plea, accompanied by counselling, would have demonstrated accountability and remorse and would have spared the child the anxiety of preparing for multiple trial dates. Nevertheless, the plea retains mitigating value, as A.A. ultimately did not have to testify in court, and the Crown was relieved of the need to pursue alternative means of admitting the audio evidence at trial.
Community Service
64The final mitigating factor advanced by Mr. Duggan was the community service he completed at the Grant Brothers’ boxing gym, which he began in November 2025. According to the supporting letter and sign‑in records, his role primarily involved general maintenance and cleaning, and on occasion assisting youth attending the gym. Those records indicate that he completed 40 hours in November and December 2025, 43 hours in January 2026, and 40 hours in February 2026, for a total of 123 hours.
65While I had some reservations regarding the accuracy of the hours claimed, the Crown raised no concerns. This is likely because the alleged community service was brought to the Court’s attention for the first time on the final day of submissions. Any meaningful challenge would almost certainly have required a further adjournment. Given the already lengthy delay in reaching a sentence, particularly in light of the proposed joint position, such an adjournment would have been untenable. In these circumstances, and bearing in mind the principles of procedural fairness, I accepted that Mr. Duggan did perform some community service in the gym.
66Even if the hours were accepted as reported, they did not materially affect the proportionality analysis required under sections 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. While community service is generally a relevant mitigating factor, its weight depends on the extent to which it reflects genuine accountability and reduces moral blameworthiness.
67Both the psychological report and the victim impact statement confirm that Mr. Duggan is an avid boxer. Where volunteer activity is closely aligned with an offender’s personal interests and, as here, involves work performed in a familiar and self‑affirming environment, it has limited capacity to demonstrate meaningful acceptance of responsibility or significantly diminish moral blameworthiness. In the circumstances of this case, the community service undertaken does not meaningfully advance the sentencing objectives of accountability, responsibility, or rehabilitation contemplated by s. 718.
68I have also considered the principle of restraint set out in s. 718.2(e). However, restraint does not operate in isolation from proportionality. Given the gravity of the offence, the delayed guilty plea, and the absence of demonstrated insight into the harm caused, the community service relied upon does not justify a reduction of sentence to a conditional discharge or a suspended sentence. Such outcomes would not reflect the seriousness of the offence, nor would they adequately promote respect for the law or achieve a fit and proportionate sanction.
Collateral Considerations
69As a collateral factor, immigration considerations apply, as Mr. Duggan was not a Canadian citizen. Both intimidation and utter threat are hybrid offences, with a maximum penalty of five years when prosecuted by indictment.
70The Defence submitted an opinion letter from an immigration lawyer. The opinion was focused on the effect of a conditional discharge in general terms and was not specific to the offences for which he was convicted.
71Instead, the letter addressed only the consequences if Mr. Duggan was convicted of an offence for which the maximum sentence is greater than 10 years, or of an offence carrying a sentence of more than 6 months' imprisonment. According to the advice, either or both will result in a removal order.
72In addition to being deported, Mr. Duggan expressed concern that his legal issues might impede his future employment, particularly his ability to travel to the United States, as he hopes to achieve “A-level actor status”.
73While immigration considerations must be taken into account, they cannot dominate or distort the proper application of fundamental principles such as denunciation and deterrence. As the Supreme Court of Canada cautioned in R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, at para. 16, such consequences may be considered, but they cannot be allowed to skew a fit and proportionate sentence.
74Although not specifically raised in submissions, I also considered the collateral effects that incarceration or removal would have on Mr. Duggan’s current partner and children. I did not know the extent to which his family depends on him financially. However, any custodial sentence would be served in a province where his family does not reside, thereby compounding the hardship caused by separation: R. v. A.A., 2025 ONCA 577, at para. 19.
75While these collateral consequences are significant and have been carefully considered, they cannot outweigh the need for denunciation and deterrence where a child has been subjected to abuse by a parent.
Sentencing Range
76I considered the gravity of the offence and the offender's degree of responsibility, as required in s. 718.1. In this case, the gravity would have been less known years ago. But the effect is well known, due to the passage of time.
77I found that Mr. Duggan, as a father, had a high degree of responsibility, and the gravity of the offence is significant given the 30-minute duration of the abuse, which has had long-lasting psychological harm on his child.
78However, I was also obligated to consider the principle of restraint, which requires that the least restrictive but appropriate sanction be imposed, particularly in the case of a first offender.
79Given the joint request for a discharge, I was not provided with any cases suggesting an appropriate alternative sentence. However, a review of the case law has demonstrated that child abuse cases, without a sexual violence component, can range from a discharge to a low penitentiary sentence, depending on the harm, as noted in R. v. Vieira-Paulino, 2023 ONCJ 563, at paras. 74-84, which outlined a series of child abuse cases where the offenders committed physical violence.
80Admittedly, I could find no case where an offender used intimidation to psychologically and physically harm a child remotely. However, given that A.A. can be heard physically assaulting himself on the call, I found there was no significant difference between the hand being A.A.’s at the behest of his father or it being Mr. Duggan, particularly since Mr. Duggan required A.A. to hit himself harder when Mr. Duggan was not satisfied with the initial slaps.
81As such, I found that a non-custodial sentence or a discharge was not appropriate for the following reasons:
- It does not address the multiple statutorily aggravating factors where denunciation and deterrence must take primary consideration for a vulnerable child who was subject to abuse.
- As stated by Justice Hill in R. v. M.E., 2012 ONSC 1078, at para. 47: “children are entitled to look for protection to their parents” and parental brutality toward children “cannot and will not be tolerated” by the courts.10
- Furthermore, “criminal law will decisively condemn and punish force that harms children, is part of a pattern of abuse, or is simply the angry or frustrated imposition of violence against children.”11
- The moral blameworthiness of Mr. Duggan is high, with no underlying reasons for his actions other than disproportionate frustration at a child for perceived disrespect.
- The intimidation led to physical harm when the child was in his home, a place meant for safety and joy.
- The psychological impact on the victim and his family was significant and long-lasting.
- Jurisprudence supports a custodial sentence for child abuse as the most appropriate.
82However, in light of the principle of restraint, Mr. Duggan’s lack of criminality outside this offence, his immigration concerns, and the impact on his family if he were imprisoned, I accepted that the sentence can be served conditionally, that is, in the community. The stringent conditions imposed, combined with the no-contact orders and the absence of any evidence of ongoing access to the victim, satisfied me that a conditional custodial sentence did not endanger community safety. Furthermore, these offences and circumstances meet the requirements under s. 742.1. A conditional sentence in these circumstances remains a custodial sentence and carries significant denunciatory force.
83While I considered a 6-month custodial sentence appropriate, it was ordered to be served conditionally, without adding further months, limited to 179 days. There were no submissions with respect to any pre-sentence custody reduction.12
Sentence
84Mr. Duggan was ordered to serve a 179-day sentence, conditionally, with 126 days on house arrest. After the house-arrest portion, he was subject only to the general terms requiring him to notify his supervisor of any changes to his address or location. Given the previous counselling and limited insight into behaviour, Mr. Duggan was not permitted to attend counselling during the house arrest portion. Permitting counselling during the house arrest portion risked reinforcing performative compliance without demonstrated insight, and counselling was therefore deferred to the probationary phase, where accountability and supervision are more appropriate.
85The terms of his conditional sentence included:
- Not to be within 200 metres or have any contact, including through social media, with A.A., B.B. or A.A.’s sister, except pursuant to a Family Court Order made after March 12, 2026.
- He was not to have weapons, as defined by the Criminal Code.
- To be on house arrest for the first 126 days of the sentence, with the following exceptions:
- To attend to the necessities of life for 3 hours a week.
- Medical emergencies involving him or an immediate member of his family.
- Going directly to and from court appearances, with prior notice and approval. of the supervisor.
- Going to or from any previously scheduled medical appointments, with advance notice to the supervisor.
- Limited exceptions to directly take his children to and from school, and previously arranged access visits.
- A specified time to meet with immigration in another city, which had been previously scheduled.
86He was further ordered into a three-year probation, with the same contact restrictions and for him to attend counselling for anger management, child abuse and a psychological assessment to the satisfaction of his probation officer.
87For ancillary orders, he was ordered to provide a DNA sample and was made subject to a 10-year section 110 order, along with the victim fine surcharges.
Released: April 9, 2026
Signed: Justice Lori Anne Thomas
Footnotes
- The initials used do not reflect the initials of the child or the mother, pursuant to the Order made under s. 486.31.
- The affidavit was not sworn in compliance with Administering Oath or Declaration Remotely, O Reg 431/20. It was signed using a document-signature application, with at least one date that did not correspond to the affidavit's signature date, and there is no indication of the commissioner's and affiant's locations. Further, the affidavit contained blank lines for Mr. Duggan’s birthdate and location.
- Not her initials, but used for these Reasons.
- Because of the unsettling nature.
- Mr. Duggan explained that the dodo bird became extinct because it was stupid.
- Not her own initials, just used for this decision.
- Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies, “What is child abuse?” (last visited 11 March 2026) Online: https://www.oacas.org/childrens-aid-child-protection/what-is-abuse/
- World Health Organization, “Violence against children” (29 November 2022) Online: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-children
- R.H., ibid
- Citations omitted.
- Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4, at para. 59
- Upon subsequent review of the Information and Release, Mr. Duggan spent three days in custody. Although this circumstance was not raised in submissions, considering the exception sought after concluding that a conditional sentence was appropriate, the sentence is not disproportionate. Mr. Duggan will be free of conditions for up to 7 days solely to attend the Vancouver U.S. Immigration Office.