ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Carrie Alford (nee Marco)
Applicant
— AND —
Jodi Alford
Respondent
Before Justice S. E. J. Paull
Trial Heard on March 23-24, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on March 31, 2026
Danica Maslov counsel for the applicant
Respondent....................................................................................................... on his own behalf
PAULL J.:
1The parties are before the court for a trial on the issues of retroactive and ongoing child support.
2The applicant, who now goes by the surname Marco, seeks an order for child support retroactive to the date of separation in 2018, and ongoing child support based on an imputed income.
3Mr. Alford disputes that Ms. Marco is entitled to any arrears and submits that there should be no ongoing child support because he is totally disabled.
4The parties resolved the parenting issues on consent on August 20, 2025 when a final order for sole decision-making and primary residence were made in favour of Ms. Marco with regular parenting time to Mr. Alford.
The Law
Retroactive Support
5The court’s authority to make retroactive support orders is contained in clause 34 (1) (f) of the Family Law Act. This clause reads as follows:
Powers of court
(1) In an application under section 33, the court may make an interim or final order,
………(f) requiring that support be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order;
6In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 (Colucci), the court set out the framework that should be applied for applications to retroactively increase support in paragraph 114 as follows:
a. The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers.
b. Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor.
c. Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.
d. The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.
e. Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.
7This framework in Colucci addressed a request to retroactively increase the support contained in an order or an agreement. Courts have found that this framework should also be applied, with necessary modifications, for an original request for retroactive support
8In an original application for retroactive support, there will be no need to meet the threshold requirement of establishing a material change in circumstances, as required in Colucci. The first step will be to determine the presumptive date of retroactivity. The second step will be to determine if the court should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair.
9The court in D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; Laura Jean W. v. Tracy Alfred R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37, outlined a set of factors that will guide the exercise of that discretion, as described in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 25 (referred to as the D.B.S. factors).
10The third step will be to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines. L.S. v. M.A.F., 2021 ONCJ 554; M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555; A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189; M.K. v. K.M. , 2022 ONCJ 424; T.B. v. O.T., 2023 ONCJ 35; V.S.B. v. B.L.O., 2022 ONCJ 506; Mohamoud v. Farah, 2023 ONCJ 103.
11Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations. Michel - par. 25.
12Retroactive child support is a debt; by default, there is no reason why it should not be awarded unless there are strong reasons not to do so. Michel – par. 132.
13Retroactive awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. D.B.S.- par. 97.
In Michel, at paragraph 121, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance of support payors meeting their support obligations and commented that the neglect or underpayment of support is strongly connected to child poverty and female poverty
Imputing Income
14Section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines provides that the court may impute to a spouse “such amount of income … as it considers appropriate” and provides a non-exhaustive list of such circumstances. The relevant portions of s. 19 read as follows:
19.(1) Imputing Income – The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,
(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse;
15Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed. Clause 19(1)(a) of the guidelines is perceived as being a test of reasonableness. Drygala v. Pauli 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731(Ont. CA).
16The Ontario Court of Appeal in Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731(Ont. CA) and more recently in Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, set out the following three questions which should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:
Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his reasonable educational, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?
If not, what income is appropriately imputed?
17The court stated in Drygala that there is no need to find a specific intent to evade child support obligations before income is imputed; the payor is intentionally under-employed if he or she chooses to earn less than what he or she is capable of earning. The court must look at whether the act is voluntary and reasonable.
18The first element of the test requires a consideration of whether the spouse is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The onus is on the person requesting an imputation of income to establish an evidentiary basis for such a finding. Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322
19However, in Graham v. Bruto, 2008 ONCA 260, the court inferred that the failure of the payor to properly disclose would mitigate the obligation of the recipient to provide an evidentiary basis to impute income.
20Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking. Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719. If underemployment is established, the onus shifts to the payor to show one of the exceptions of reasonableness. Rilli v. Rilli, 2006 34451 (ON SC), 2006 CarswellOnt 6335 SCJ.
21Where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them. Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548; Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583
22Cook v. Burton 2005 1063 (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 190 (SCJ) and Stoangi v. Petersen 2006 24124 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 2902 (SCJ) set out that cogent medical evidence in the form of detailed medical opinion should be provided by the payor in order to satisfy the court that his/her reasonable health needs justify his/her decision not to work. In Davidson v. Patten, 2021 ONCJ 437, the court set out that a party resisting a claim for imputation of their income based on medical reasons should provide a medical report setting out diagnosis, prognosis, treatment plan, compliance with the treatment plan; and specific and detailed information connecting the medical condition to the ability to work.
23However, the failure to provide such evidence is not an absolute bar to a party resisting a claim for imputation of their income based on medical reasons. If the court believes the party’s evidence about their medical impairments, that can be a sufficient basis not to impute income. There is a small segment of litigants who have legitimate medical issues, but who are too overwhelmed by the process to obtain the necessary medical evidence to corroborate it. Their medical issues are often the very reason they are overwhelmed and cannot produce this evidence. When the court finds this is happening, it is left to assess the credibility and reliability of the party’s evidence. M.D. v. A.H., 2026 ONCJ 46.
24The receipt of ODSP or Workplace Safety and Insurance Board benefits is not sufficient proof of one’s inability to work for support purposes. Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 2017 ONSC 6499 (SCJ). The court cannot take judicial notice of any eligibility requirements for ODSP. Nor can it delegate the important and complex determinations of employability and income earning capacity to unknown bureaucrats applying unknown evidence to unknown criteria. Abumatar v. Hamda, 2021 ONSC 2165; Bougataya v. Turkmen, 2023 ONCJ 341.
25Absence of a reasonable job search will also usually leave the court with no choice but to find that the payor is intentionally under-employed or unemployed. Filippetto v. Timpano, 2008 3962 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 417, (Ont. S.C.).
Background and Evidence
26The parties began cohabiting on or around May 1, 2012, and were married April 29, 2014. The parties had one child together named Liam born July 15, 2015. The parties separated on February 1, 2018.
27It is not disputed that the parties had a verbal agreement that Mr. Alford pay $200 per month in child support commencing February 2018, and that this agreement was made without the exchange of financial disclosure.
28Ms. Marco provided receipts for payments made in 2018 up to May 2019, and etransfer confirmations commencing June 13, 2019 onward. The total amounts paid by Mr. Alford are as follows:
2018 – $2200
2019 – $2243
2020 – $950
2021 – $0.00
2022 – $50
2023 – $1420
2024 – $250
2025 – $0.00
2026 – $0.00
29Mr. Alford alleged that there were other payments made but provided no particulars or supporting documents. He stated that his bank was unable to provide it. He also indicated there were discrepancies between the etransfers and the amount Ms. Marco claims to have received.
30These discrepancies amounts to $86 total in 2023 and 2024. Ms. Marco testified that this amount was paid because she had ordered school pictures on Mr. Alford’s behalf according to the records she kept. Mr. Alford did not dispute this.
31Mr. Alford provided financial disclosure which confirmed his annual incomes in his Notices of Assessment since the date of separation as follows:
2018 – $31,952
2019 – $38,081
2020 – $37,914
2021 – $33,614
2022 – $51,391 (T4 income of $47,476.48; T4E income of $3915)
2023 – $48,681 (T4 income of $42,181.58; T4E income of $6500)
2024 – $49,261.37 (T4 income of $49,261.37)
2025 – $34,948 (T4 income of $16,094; T4E income of $18,854)
32Mr. Alford testified that he has significant health issues with his back which render him completely disabled. He was employed at Titan Trailers up until March 27, 2025 and he has been unable to work since. The ROE from Titan Trailers indicated the reason for the dismissal was shortage of work. Mr. Alford testified that work slowed significantly as a result of economic instability and the tariffs and many employees were laid off at that time. He collected Employment Insurance benefits until they were terminated November 28, 2025.
33Mr. Alford provided confirmation that as of January 10, 2026 he was in receipt of CPP disability benefit of $1077.10 per month, with an effective date of July 2025 which amounted to a retroactive payment of $6335.88.
34As a result of his entitlement for CPP disability benefit he is also entitled to ODSP. However, he has submitted the necessary documents, but has not yet been approved.
35Ms. Marco disputes that Mr. Alford is medically disabled and points out that he took this position upon being served with her application for child support in March 2025. She provided pictures she took of Mr. Alford over 3 days in September 2025 which show him working on a concrete job for his former employer, Mike’s Complete Concrete.
36Ms. Marco called Michael Lord as a witness. He is the owner of Mike’s Complete Concrete and he confirmed that Mr. Alford worked for him in the past and estimated that he last worked for him full-time in 2022. Mr. Lord indicated that they agreed at that time that Mr. Alford’s back problems made him unable to do the work required for full-time employment in the concrete industry. He stated that concrete work is hard on the body and that he could tell that Mr. Alford was feeling the “wear and tear” of the job.
37Mr. Lord acknowledged that Mr. Alford has worked for him for cash in 2025 between April and November, and he paid him a total of $4700.
38Mr. Alford testified that he was not in fact working for Mr. Lord last year but instead was showing other employees how to do the job. I do not accept Mr. Alford’s evidence on this point. He did not dispute that he received $4700 in cash from Mr. Lord in 2025.
39Mr. Lord confirmed that he has spoken to Mr. Alford about helping out again this year. He has not called on him yet as the season for concrete is just beginning.
40I accept the evidence of Mr. Lord. He was forthright that he employed Mr. Alford for several cash jobs in 2025 and kept a record of the amounts paid to him in each month. I also accept his evidence of how physically demanding working in the concrete business is and that he observed that it was taking its toll on Mr. Alford when he left his full-time employment in 2022.
41On June 2, 2025 Mr. Alford was ordered to provide a detailed report from his treating physician including diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment plan for any condition he claims limits his ability to work. He was also to provide his application for disability benefits. He did not provide these documents by the deadline of July 11, 2025. He was ordered again on August 20, 2025 to provide his ODSP application by October 3, 2025 and failed to do so.
42He provided his application for disability benefits dated March 31, 2025 for the first time on the second day of trial. On the first day of trial he provided his medical file from his family doctor, Dr. Aliu-Berisha, and she gave evidence on his behalf.
43Following a voir dire, the court found that that the evidence of Dr. Aliu-Berisha would be both relevant and necessary to assist the court. The court was satisfied that she understood her duty was to the court and to provide evidence that was fair, objective, and neutral, despite the doctor-patient relationship she maintains with the respondent.
44Further, the court found that Dr. Aliu-Berisha had the requisite skill, knowledge, and training to provide opinion evidence on medical issues with respect to Mr. Alford as a participatory expert rather than a litigation expert. She was able to provide observations and details of her involvement as Mr. Alford’s primary care physician. It is in this capacity that the court qualified her to provide expert opinion evidence concerning the respondent’s medical condition.
45Dr. Aliu-Berisha’s viva voce evidence and Mr. Alford’s medical records from her office can be summarized as follows:
She has been Mr. Alford’s family physician since 2017, and has been treating him for chronic back pain.
Mr. Alford had an L5-S1 fusion in his back in 2000 and has reported that he has experienced increasing difficulty since then.
MRI’s were conducted in August 2024 and June 2025 with both concluding that there was extensive lobulated disc protrusion. There was no significant spinal stenosis but moderate to severe diffuse disc bulging.
As a result of Mr. Alford’s reports of worsening pain she confirmed in the medical note dated November 26, 2025 that Mr. Alford was unable to work and she was in the process of assisting him and applying for disability compensation.
The treatment plan in the circumstances was not focused on curing the pain entirely, but to improve the pain and quality of life through a multimodal pain management approach.
The treatment plan includes prescribed medications, a referral to a pain clinic, and physiotherapy. She was unaware whether Mr. Alford attended physiotherapy but received a Report from the pain clinic dated September 30, 2025.
The Report from the pain clinic included the following:
a. Mr. Alford was able to perform most daily tasks with difficulty and with taking more breaks.
b. Cervical spine range of motion was well maintained. Sperling’s test was negative. Tenderness to palpate over the trapezius, rhomboids, and parascalpular musculature bilaterally, indicative of active trigger points.
c. Active range of motion was well maintained bilaterally. Empty can test, lift-off, bench press, and infraspinatus, but pain was elicited during.
d. Examination of the thoracic spine did not reveal any axial or paraspinal tenderness on palpation. Lumbar spine range of motion was well maintained. No tendered as noted on the lumbar spine paraspinal musculature. No tenderness on SI joint palpation. SLR was negative bilaterally.
e. Strength was graded as 5/5 and sensation was intact to light touch in the upper and lower limbs.
f. The report concluded Failed Back Surgery Syndrome and Myofascial pain syndrome.
g. Mr. Alford reported smoking 12 cigarettes and five marijuana joints a day along with a couple of alcoholic drinks, and that he used cocaine once per week
Dr. Aliu-Berisha confirmed that she relied on Mr. Alford’s self-reports of his pain and functioning. When shown pictures of Mr. Alford working in 2025 she testified that this was not consistent with what Mr. Alford told her and the complaint he presented with. She was not aware that Mr. Alford had worked for cash.
Overall, she was of the opinion that people with Mr. Alford’s condition can keep functionality with treatment. She concluded that the difficulty would be doing a job that requires significant physical labour, but that less physical work was achievable.
46There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness’s testimony in its entirety. On the contrary, a trier may believe none, part or all of a witness’s evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness’s evidence. R. v. D.R. [1966] 2 S.C.R. 291 at [para.] 93 and R. v. J.H. 2005 253 (ON CA).
47There were significant concerns with portions of Mr. Alford’s evidence which negatively impacted his credibility including the following:
He was working for cash for Mike Lord in 2025 starting within a month of when he claimed to be totally disabled.
He failed to disclose he was working occasionally to his doctor, in his EI reports, in his disability application, or in his sworn financial statements. If Ms. Marco had not taken the pictures and called Mr. Lord as a witness this evidence would not have come out.
Despite the compelling evidence from Mr. Lord and in the pictures that Mr. Alford was providing service and receiving renumeration, he still maintained that he was not “working”.
Mr. Alford’s claim to being totally disabled was not supported by the other evidence he offered, particularly that of Dr. Aliu-Berisha.
48Despite the concerns with Mr. Alford’s evidence at times, and the fact that Dr. Aliu-Berisha relied on the self-reporting of Mr. Alford, I nonetheless except that he has a medical condition that impacts his ability to work. However, I find that he has exaggerated the impact of his medical condition on his ability to work.
49Self-reporting was not the only source of information that Dr. Aliu-Berisha considered. Mr. Alford had a spinal fusion in 2000 and MRI’s in 2024 and 2025 which confirmed that he had degenerative disc disease and moderate to severe bulging in his lower back which had progressed and that was now showing in his upper back.
50Despite the level of functioning in some areas noted in the pain clinic Report, I accept that Mr. Alford experiences significant discomfort at times and that as a result his days of full-time work in a labour-intensive industry are likely behind him. I have accepted Mr. Lord’s evidence, including that he and Mr. Alford discussed this in 2022 and concluded that Mr. Alford’s back issues prevented him from continuing in the concrete business full-time.
51The evidence does not establish that Mr. Alford is totally disabled as he has maintained. His occasional work for cash in 2025 suggests otherwise. More importantly I accept the evidence of Dr. Aliu-Berisha. She was not of the opinion that Mr. Alford was totally disabled. Rather, she stated that people with his level of degenerative disc disease could do less physical work and maintain functionality with the proper treatment plan.
52I find that Mr. Alford has exaggerated the impact of his condition to avoid his child support obligation. However, I do accept that he has a degenerative condition in his back that precludes full-time work in a labour-intensive job.
Analysis
53Ms. Marco served her application on March 14, 2025. Support since that date is prospective support and is presumptively payable. Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.). The support claimed for prior to that date requires a retroactive support analysis.
Retroactive Claim
54The first step in the analysis is to determine the presumptive start date for support which requires a determination of the dates of effective and formal notice.
55Effective notice is defined as any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount needs to be renegotiated. All that is required is for the subject to be broached. Once that has been done, the payor can no longer assume that the status quo is fair. D.B.S., par. 121.
56Ms. Marco took the position that given the parties’ verbal agreement that Mr. Alford pay $200 per month from the time of separation, that he had effective notice of a claim at that time.
57However, she was candid that she never requested financial disclosure throughout that period and prior to commencing the application, or ever requested that the amount agreed to be reviewed. The text communications between the parties were clear that she was requesting the agreed upon sum of $200 per month. She also testified she would have been satisfied to receive this amount and had not requested to review it until serving her application in 2025.
58In these circumstances, the court finds that the effective date of notice is the date of formal notice when the application was served on March 14, 2025. This is the presumptive start date for support.
59The next step is to determine if the court should exercise its discretion to depart from the presumptive date, considering the evidence regarding delay, blameworthy conduct, the circumstances of the child, and hardship.
60In considering delay, courts should look at whether the reason for delay is understandable, not whether there was a reasonable excuse for the delay. The latter consideration works to implicitly attribute blame onto parents who delay applications for child support. Michel, par. 121.
61A delay, in itself, is not inherently unreasonable and the mere fact of a delay does not prejudice an application, as not all factors need to be present for a retroactive award to be granted. Michel, par. 113.
62Rather, a delay will be prejudicial only if it is deemed to be unreasonable, taking into account a generous appreciation of the social context in which the claimant’s decision to seek child support was made. Michel, par. 86.
63In Michel, the court, at paragraph 86, set out what might be understandable reasons for delay in a support recipient coming to court as follows:
a) Fear of reprisal/violence from the other parent.
b) Prohibitive costs of litigation or fear of protracted litigation.
c) Lack of information or misinformation over the payor parent’s income.
d) Fear of counter-application for custody.
e) The payor leaving the jurisdiction or the recipient unable to contact the payor parent.
f) Illness/disability of a child or the custodian.
g) Lack of emotional means.
h) Wanting the child and the payor to maintain a positive relationship or avoid the child’s involvement.
i) Ongoing discussions in view of reconciliation, settlement negotiations or mediation.
j) The deliberate delay of the application or the trial by the payor.
64Ms. Marco provided numerous texts in support of the notion that she repeatedly requested that Mr. Alford pay the $200 a month that they had agreed to in 2018. It was clear she continued to take Mr. Alford at his word that he was going to start paying and catch up on the unpaid amounts, including by making a lump sum payment.
65Mr. Alford’s responses for the lengthy periods of underpayment or nonpayment consisted of various apologies, promises, and excuses of why he fell so far behind. While his repeated promises never materialized, they nonetheless establish that the parties were having ongoing discussions to resolve this matter and justify some level of delay on Ms. Marco’s part in commencing her application. Ms. Marco also lacked the information about Mr. Alford’s actual income.
66There was no additional evidence offered by Ms. Marco to support any other reason for her delay in bringing the matter to court. While some delay on Ms. Marco’s part is understandable, the total length of the delay of almost 7 years is excessive.
67Blameworthy conduct is anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over his or her children’s right to an appropriate amount of support. D.B.S., par. 106.
68Courts should apply an expansive definition of blameworthy conduct. D.B.S., par. 106.
69The failure of a payor to disclose actual income, a fact within the knowledge of the payor, is blameworthy conduct that eliminates any need to protect the payor’s interest in certainty. Michel, par. 34.
70Mr. Alford engaged in blameworthy conduct as follows:
He acknowledged a verbal agreement to pay $200 per month in child support from the date of separation but failed to meet this commitment.
By the end of 2024 he stopped paying child support entirely, despite earning significant income and despite his continuing promises. By that time he was in arrears of the $200 per month agreement in the approximate amount of $7300.
He knew or ought to have known that his income would have provided for a substantially higher amount of child support, and he only disclosed his income after she brought the application.
He made no efforts to pay any support after 2024. He is in default of the court’s temporary order dated June 2, 2025 that he pay $278 per month.
Mr. Alford significantly delayed the disclosure of the medical evidence.
71Ms. Marco has not engaged in blameworthy conduct of any kind. There was no evidence that the child support impacted the parenting issues or the time that Liam spent with Mr. Alford. She gave Mr. Alford every opportunity, perhaps too many opportunities, to pay what they had agreed upon.
72Liam’s circumstances have been disadvantaged by Mr. Alford’s failure to pay adequate support. I accept Ms. Marco’s evidence that she has struggled at times and had to borrow from her credit cards in order to be able to provide for Liam. The text messages she provided reflect that she was essentially pleading with Mr. Alford over a long period of time to help her support Liam by paying the $200 per month that they had agreed to.
73The issue of any hardship must also be considered.
74If there is the potential for hardship to the payor, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of hardship. In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment. Michel, par. 124.
75While the focus is on hardship to the payor, that hardship can only be assessed after taking into account the hardship which would be caused to the child and the recipient parent from not ordering the payment of sums owing but unpaid. Michel, par. 125.
76Mr. Alford provided evidence that he continues to owe a significant amount of money, over $30,000, to the CRA for past taxes, and that he is barely making ends meet. His position is that he is now on disability benefits and is unable to pay any ongoing or retroactive support.
77The court has considered his current circumstances, and has accepted that his earning capacity is impacted by a medical issue. The court has further considered Mr. Alford’s blameworthy conduct. The weight placed on any hardship to Mr. Alford is mitigated by his blameworthy conduct. As a result of his under or nonpayment of support he has essentially received a significant windfall since separation when he consistently earned employment income that would have required child support in a higher amount than the parties had agreed.
78The court has also considered that Ms. Marco and the child have and will suffer hardship if a retroactive order is not made. She struggled at times and has been required to borrow money from her credit cards to make ends meet and provide for the child. However, she was candid that she never sought financial disclosure or to review the support amount they had agreed upon. I strongly suspect that if Mr. Alford would have paid that amount she would not have felt forced to bring this application.
79When all these factors are considered, the court finds that it is fair to depart from the presumptive date and to commence support effective January 1, 2021, which amounts to just over four years of retroactivity. This reflects Mr. Alford’s circumstances and blameworthy conduct, and the circumstances surrounding Ms. Marco’s delay in bringing the application. The hardship of the retroactive order will be mitigated by the payment terms imposed.
80The final step in the Colucci analysis is to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the start date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the Guidelines, and giving Mr. Alford credit for any amounts paid.
81I accept Ms. Marco’s evidence with respect to amounts she did receive. She was a more credible witness, and she maintained receipts and etransfer records. Mr. Alford disputed Ms. Marco’s evidence, but provided no other particulars or documentary support.
82Mr. Alford earned $33,614 in income in 2021 and should have paid $288 per month or a total of $3456. He made no support payments in 2021.
83Mr. Alford earned $51,391 in 2022 and should have paid $473 per month or a total of $5676. He made support payments in 2022 totaling $50, which leaves $5626 owing.
84Mr. Alford earned $48,681 in 2023 and should have paid $450 per month or a total of $5400. He made support payments in 2023 totaling $1420, which leaves $3980 owing.
85Mr. Alford earned $49,261.37 in 2024 and should have paid $454 per month or a total of $5448. He made support payments in 2024 totaling $250 which leaves $5198 owing.
86Mr. Alford earned income of $34,948 in 2025 from employment and EI benefits, and earned an additional $4700 in cash income. When the cash income is grossed up and added, income for 2025 totals $42,059. This produces Guideline child support of $382 per month from January 1 to March 31, 2025 for a total of $1146. He made no support payments in 2025.
87The total retroactive support owing from January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2025 is $19,406.
88The claim for support commencing April 1, 2025 represents prospective support, following service of the application on March 14, 2025.
Ongoing Support
89Mr. Alford testified that he left his last employment at Titan Trailers on March 27, 2025 and has been unable to work since due to his complete disability.
90Ms. Marco takes the position that Mr. Alford remains capable of working and has worked despite the fact that he was on EI in 2025 and on disability benefits as of January 2026.
91The court may impute income to a party pursuant to section 19 of the Guidelines. The court has discretion to impute, or not impute, income based on other circumstances.
92Mr. Alford stated he has not worked since March 2025 when he was laid off from Titan Trailers due to a shortage of work. Mr. Alford is intentionally unemployed.
93The next question is whether Mr. Alford’s unemployment is justified by his medical condition. I have concluded that his employability is impacted by his medical condition but does not support a complete inability to work.
94As previously noted, the evidence does not support that Mr. Alford is totally disabled, but that his degenerative disc disease has likely progressed to a level that precludes him from the labour-intensive work that he has done throughout his life. Dr. Aliu-Berisha was of the view that his condition did not preclude the pursuit of less physically demanding work.
95The receipt of disability benefits is not sufficient evidence that Mr. Alford is unable to work for support purposes. There is no evidence that Mr. Alford has looked for other types of work or that he has made any efforts seek retraining for a less strenuous job.
96The final question is what is the appropriate amount to impute for support purposes in the circumstances.
97Mr. Alford is 46 years old, and has worked for the last several years in the concrete business and for Titan Trailers. Mr. Lord testified that he has called on Mr. Alford since he left his regular employment because of his extensive knowledge of the concrete business. He has spoken to Mr. Alford about his desire to continue to use him at times going forward.
98Mr. Alford presented as intelligent, articulate, and personable. He is capable of maintaining employment. However, his past work experience was labour-intensive which he can no longer maintain. He will be required to seek less strenuous work and may need to pursue a retraining program.
99Mr. Alford has not done all that would be reasonably expected to pursue different and less physically demanding employment.
100Since 2018, he is maintained income between $32,000 and $51,000. His highest income years were 2022-2024 when he worked for Titan Trailers. In all other years since separation he earned less than $38,000.
101In the circumstances, commencing January 1, 2026, Mr. Alford’s income shall be imputed at $38,000 for child support purposes. This is just above the current full-time rate for employment at minimum wage and produces a monthly child support payment of $312.
102For the period from April 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025 his actual income of $42,059 shall be used to calculate support. From April 1 to September 30, 2025 this produces Guideline support of $382 per month for a total of $2292. The period from October 1 to December 31, 2025 produces Guideline support of $355 for a total of $1065. Therefore, support arrears between April 1, 2025 and December 31, 2025 totals $3357.
103Commencing January 1, 2026 child support shall be payable in the amount of $312 per month on an imputed income of $38,000 per year.
104Mr. Alford will provide annual disclosure by June 1 of each year starting in 2026 and advise Ms. Marco in writing and provide details of any change in his income or employment within 10 days of the change.
105Based on all the considerations outlined herein, there shall be a final order as follows:
Arrears in retroactive child support from January 1, 2021 to March 31, 2025 are hereby fixed in the amount of $19,406.
Arrears in ongoing child support from April 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025 are hereby fixed in the amount of $3,357.
Commencing January 1, 2026 and monthly thereafter child support shall be payable by the respondent to the applicant for one child in the amount of $312 based on an imputed income to the respondent of $38,000.
The arrears which have accumulated pursuant to this order shall be paid by the respondent at a rate of $300 per month commencing May 1, 2026, and be paid in addition to the ongoing child support obligation.
The remaining claims are dismissed.
The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs in this matter. However, if either party seeks an order for costs they shall serve and file written submissions, not to exceed three pages, which shall attach any offers to settle and a Bill of Costs by April 20, 2026 with the responding party serving and filing written submissions, not to exceed three pages, which shall attach any offers to settle and a Bill of Costs by May 6, 2026. If no submissions are received seeking costs by the deadline there shall be no order as to costs.
Released: March 31, 2026
Signed: “Justice S. E. J. Paull”