WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,
(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or
(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).
(2) Mandatory order on application.— In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 Offence.—(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
SEDRICK EDWARDS
Before Justice T. Lipson
Reasons for Judgment released on March 13, 2026
Ms. J. Cheng for the Crown
Mr. A. Sadro for the accused Sedrick Edwards
Lipson J.:
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1The accused, Sedrick Edwards, entered pleas of not guilty to charges of sexual assault and assault by choking. The complainant, M.M., was a friend of Ms. Edwards’ wife Janelle Walker Edwards. The charges arise from events alleged to have occurred on December 10, 2024, in the apartment Mr. Edwards shared with his wife.
2The core allegation is that, while M.M. and Mr. Edwards were alone in the living room for a short period, Mr. Edwards applied force to the complainant’s neck, forcibly kissed her, and then engaged in further non‑consensual sexual touching. Mr. Edwards testified and denied the allegations other than admitting a brief consensual kiss. The case turns largely on credibility and reliability assessed in light of the whole record, including Mr. Edwards’ contemporaneous WhatsApp messages to M.M. following the alleged assaults.
Summary of the evidence
3The complainant, M.M., and Ms. Walker‑Edwards became close friends through work. The complainant was a frequent visitor at the Edwards’ apartment and, in late 2024, both women worked for the same employer in a work‑from‑home role. M.M. sometimes worked from her friend’s apartment and had access to the residence.
4The evidence established that there had been some tension between M.M. and the Edwards. In late November 2024 there was a dispute about whether M.M. could rent a room in the apartment. Mr. Edwards opposed the arrangement. Ms. Walker‑Edwards also described suspicions—without proof—of an affair between her husband and M.M.
5On December10, 2024, M.M. stayed overnight at the apartment. Earlier, Mr. Edwards and his uncle came home from work. M.M. and Ms. Walker Edwards went out briefly for shopping and food. After they returned, Ms. Edwards Walker went to take a shower. M.M. and Mr. Edwards were in the living room. The accused’s uncle was in his bedroom.
6M.M. testified she was seated on a sectional couch near the entrance, on her phone. She and Mr. Edwards were exchanging text messages about his uncle. Mr. Edwards was initially on the other end of the couch and then moved toward her.
7M.M. testified that Mr. Edwards leaned in close, grabbed her by her neck and turned her face toward him. He told her that if she and Janelle weren’t friends, he’d “fuck her”. He said this in Jamaican patois and used that particular word. She immediately pushed him away and told him, in substance, to stop and not speak to her that way.
8M.M. testified that Mr. Edwards then returned and again placed his hand on her throat, this time with greater pressure, and forced an unwanted kiss on her. She described the kiss as “sloppy, wet and rough and disgusting” and that he forced his tongue into her mouth. She pushed him away again and told him to stop.
9The complainant testified Mr. Edwards then went further. He took her hand and placed it on his clothed penis, which she believed was erect. She pulled her hand away. He then made another sexually explicit remark—again in patois—asking to touch her “pussy”. She testified he attempted to force his hand down the front of her leggings and, for a brief period, touched the outside of her vagina. She was not wearing underwear. M.M. pushed him away with as much force as she could and began to cry.
10M.M. testified that Mr. Edwards immediately became apologetic. She described him as trying to hush her and indicating he would go to his bedroom. She testified that the entire encounter lasted only a few minutes. She did not cry out for help, did not call police that night, and did not immediately disclose what happened to Ms. Walker‑Edwards when she emerged from the shower. M.M. testified she was in shock and trying to hold herself together.
11The complainant remained in the apartment overnight. The following morning, she left and disclosed what happened to her sister, A.M. A.M. testified that her sister was visibly upset and crying and disclosed that the accused had touched her and had put his hand around her neck. A.M. encouraged her to report to the incident to police and assisted her with contacting police.
12The Crown tendered WhatsApp messages sent by the accused to the complainant late on December 10 and the morning of December 11. In those messages, the accused repeatedly apologized, wrote words to the effect that he did not know what ‘got into’ him, referred to the complainant crying, and asked her to delete the messages and keep the matter between them.
13Ms. Walker‑Edwards did not witness the incident. She confirmed she was out of the living room for periods while on the phone and while showering, and that M.M. and Mr. Edwards were alone in the living room for a period of time. She testified that when she saw the complainant later that night, she did not observe visible injury to her neck and did not observe M.M. to be in obvious distress.
14Mr. Edwards testified. He denied applying any force to the complainant’s neck, denied forcing a kiss, and denied any sexual touching beyond a brief kiss. He claimed the complainant initiated the kiss and that he kissed her back and then panicked because he is married. He acknowledged sending the apologetic messages but said they were apologies for kissing her back and were sent because he did not want his wife to see the messages.
15The central issue in this case is whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed sexual assault and assaulted the complainant by choking her.
Positions of the Parties
16The Crown submits that the complainant testified in a clear, measured way and that her account is supported by strong circumstantial evidence. The Crown emphasizes the immediacy and content of the Mr. Edward’s text messages, the complainant’s prompt disclosure to her sister while distressed, and the absence of any persuasive motive to fabricate. The Crown submits that Mr. Edwards’ explanation for his text messages is implausible and that his evidence should not raise a reasonable doubt.
17The defence submits that Mr. Edwards credibly testified that the only event that occurred was a brief consensual kiss initiated by M.M. Counsel pointed to the absence of visible neck injury or mark on M.M., her decision to remain overnight in Mr. Edward’s apartment, her lack of disclosure of the incident to her friend Ms. Walker- Edwards and the prior housing dispute as a possible motive to fabricate as factors which should cumulatively lead the court to have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of Mr. Edwards. The defence also submits that the apologies Mr. Edwards in the texts to the complainant are ambiguous and that his request for secrecy can be explained by marital embarrassment rather than criminal conduct.
Applicable Legal Principles
18The accused is presumed innocent. The Crown bears the burden of proving each essential element of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt; it is a doubt based on reason and common sense arising from the evidence or the absence of evidence. The accused has no obligation to prove anything.
19Because Mr. Edwards testified, I must apply the analytical framework from R. v. W.(D.). If I believe the accused’s evidence, I must acquit. If I do not believe his evidence but it leaves me with a reasonable doubt, I must acquit. Even if I reject his evidence, I must still determine whether the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence I accept. This analysis must be carried out by considering the whole of the evidence.
20Credibility and reliability are related but distinct. Credibility concerns whether the witness is attempting to tell the truth. Reliability concerns whether the witness’s evidence is accurate. In assessing reliability, I consider the witness’s opportunity to observe, the coherence of the account, internal consistency, and whether the evidence fits with the other evidence and with common sense.
21I approach demeanour of all of the witnesses with caution. How a witness presents can be affected by many factors and is not a reliable stand‑alone indicator of truth. I do not decide this case on demeanour. I decide it based on the substance of the evidence and its consistency with the record as a whole.
22I must also avoid myths and stereotypes about sexual assault. There is no single expected response to a sexual assault. A complainant may freeze, comply, delay reporting, remain at the scene, or attempt to appear normal. These behaviours may be considered, but they must be assessed in context rather than used as automatic measures of truthfulness.
23Sexual assault is an assault committed in circumstances of a sexual nature that violates the complainant’s sexual integrity. The actus reus consists of the intentional application of force of a sexual nature without consent. Consent is the complainant’s subjective, voluntary agreement to the specific sexual activity at the time it occurs. There is no implied consent.
24For the mens rea of sexual assault, the Crown must prove the accused knew the complainant was not consenting or was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent. An accused’s belief in consent, if raised, must be a belief in consent communicated by words or conduct. A belief based on assumption, wishful thinking, or stereotype is not a lawful basis for consent.
25Assault by choking under s. 267(c) is made out where the Crown proves an assault in which the force involved choking, suffocating, or strangling. The Crown need not prove bodily harm, visible injury, loss of consciousness, or actual interference with breathing. The focus is on the deliberate application of force to the neck. As with assault generally, the Crown must prove the force was intentional and non‑consensual and that the accused had the required mens rea for assault.
Analysis
26Mr. Edwards testified that the complainant initiated a brief consensual kiss, that he kissed back, panicked, and went to his bedroom. He denied placing his hand on her neck, denied forcing a kiss, denied placing her hand on his penis, denied making sexual demands, and denied touching her vagina. He acknowledged sending repeated apology messages and asking for their deletion but said this was only because he is married and feared his wife seeing the messages.
27I do not believe Mr. Edwards’ account. I find that his denial of the allegations is not reasonably capable of belief when measured against the whole of the evidence, particularly the text messages he sent to M.M.
28The WhatsApp messages are important. They were sent immediately after the alleged incident and again the next morning. Mr. Edwards repeatedly apologizes (‘sorry about the whole thing’). He says he does not know what got into him. He refers to letting his ‘small head’ take over, instructs the complainant to ‘stop the crying’, and asks her to delete the messages and to keep the matter secret ‘forever’.
29Those messages are difficult to reconcile with the accused’s narrative of a brief consensual kiss initiated by M.M. If that were truly the event, one would expect a fundamentally different tenor: confusion, maybe a boundary‑setting message, or a mutual acknowledgment of awkwardness. Instead, the messages are urgent, one‑sided, and focused on apologizing and urging M.M. to keep the incident a secret. These texts are not plausibly explained as mere embarrassment about a brief consensual kiss.
30Mr. Edwards’ requests of her to delete the texts and keep the matter a secret are especially damaging. A request to delete and keep matters secret might arise where a married person regrets an indiscretion, but the absolute terms (‘forever’) and the repeated apologies for ‘the whole thing’ strongly point to a consciousness of wrongdoing rather than a simple consensual lapse of judgment.
31Mr. Edwards’ evidence about crying is internally inconsistent. In his messages, he tells the complainant to stop crying. In testimony, he minimized her show of distress as mere ‘sniffing.’ This inconsistency undermines his reliability and supports the inference that the complainant was extremely upset in the immediate aftermath.
32The accused’s explanation for the messages—panic, poor wording, fear of his wife—does not account for the key features of his texting which are repeated apologies across two time periods, statements of loss of control, focus on the complainant’s crying; and his insistence that she delete the texts and keep the incident a secret. I find his explanation simply implausible.
33Mr. Edwards texted M.M., “I just wanna let you know that I’m sorry about last night. I don’t know what gotten into me. I let my small head take over. Your like my lill sister. I’m really sorry”. In cross-examination, he explained that he was not referring to his penis when he used the expression “little head”. He said this was a poor choice of words and that he was referring to his head, the one with eyes.
34I do not accept that explanation. In ordinary usage, particularly in the context of sexual behaviour, the phrase “little head” is a well‑known euphemism for the penis. Nothing in the surrounding messages suggests an innocent meaning. To the contrary, the message was sent immediately after the incident, alongside repeated apologies, references to the complainant crying, and requests for secrecy. Interpreted in context, the phrase plainly conveys that Mr. Edwards acted on sexual impulse. His alternative explanation is strained, self‑serving, and inconsistent with the common meaning of the words he chose. It therefore undermines the credibility and reliability of his account.
35Finally, his account does not sit comfortably with the next‑morning evidence. A.M. described the complainant as crying and upset and testified to a disclosure of throat grabbing and an unwanted kiss. This prompt disclosure and visible distress are inconsistent with the accused’s benign description of the incident.
36In short, I reject Mr. Edwards’ evidence.
37I also find that the accused’s evidence does not leave me with a reasonable doubt.
38I now turn to the issue of whether the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence I accept.
39I accept the complainant’s evidence on the essential sequence of events. I do so based on the internal logic of her testimony, her candid concessions, and its support in independent circumstantial evidence.
40M.M.’s narrative was detailed and coherent. She described a progression of escalating conduct over a short period: (i) the accused moved close, placed a hand on her neck, turned her face, and made a sexualized remark; (ii) he returned with greater neck pressure and kissed her without consent; (iii) he escalated to further sexual touching by placing her hand on his clothed penis and forcing his hand under her tights to touch her genital area. She consistently described resisting, pushing him away, and telling him to stop.
41M.M. made concessions that support reliability. She acknowledged that there were no visible injuries, that she did not seek medical attention, that she did not call 911, that she did not immediately disclose to Janelle, and that she remained in the apartment overnight. Those concessions were not evasive. They demonstrate she was not tailoring her evidence to eliminate points that might appear damaging to her credibility.
42Independent support comes from the WhatsApp messages. The content of the messages aligns with the complainant’s account that she cried and that the accused apologized immediately afterward. The nature of Mr. Edwards’ texts also indicate that something serious occurred, given the rapid sequence of apologies and the request for secrecy.
43A.M.’s evidence provides further circumstantial support. She described the complainant as crying and upset the next morning and testified to a disclosure of the essential allegations. Post‑event demeanor evidence is not determinative, but it is properly considered as circumstantial evidence.
44I considered Ms. Walker-Edwards’ evidence carefully. She did not witness the events. She confirmed she was away from the living room for periods. Her evidence that the complainant appeared normal later that night is not inconsistent with M.M.’s evidence that she attempted to hold herself together and did not want to disclose immediately to Janelle. The law warns against assuming a complainant must behave in a particular way.
45The defence argued the complainant’s overnight stay and delayed disclosure undermine her credibility. I do not accept that submission. There is no single ‘expected’ response. The complainant’s explanation—that she was overwhelmed and did not want to break down in front of family—was plausible. The contemporaneous messages and her distress the next morning reduce the significance of any perceived inconsistency in her post‑incident conduct.
46Having rejected the accused’s evidence and accepted the complainant’s evidence on the essential sequence, I turn to the elements of each offence. I address each charge separately.
47With respect to the charge of sexual assault, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Edwards engaged in non-consensual sexual touching of M.M. He kissed her as she described. He touched her vaginal area after forcing his hand under her tights. I accept the complainant’s evidence that she did not consent and that she physically resisted and told him to stop. Consent is subjective; on the evidence I accept, the Crown has proved lack of consent on the part of M.M. beyond a reasonable doubt.
48The complainant’s resistance and repeated direction to him to stop, coupled with Mr. Edwards’ continued escalation, establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew M.M. was not consenting, or was reckless or wilfully blind to the absence of consent. His subsequent messages are inconsistent with an honest belief in communicated consent.
49With respect to the charge of assault by choking, the complainant testified that the accused placed his hand on her neck with increasing pressure and turned her face toward him. I accept that evidence. Neck compression of this kind falls within the ordinary meaning of choking under s. 267(c).
50The Crown does not have to prove the complainant’s breathing was actually impeded, nor that the accused intended to impede breathing. It is sufficient that the accused placed his hand around her neck and applied force, even minimal, without consent. I accept M.M.’s evidence that she did not consent, resisted, and told him to stop. The accused’s conduct was deliberate and persisted despite resistance. Section 267(c) incorporates the mens rea of assault—intentional application of force without consent. The Crown has proven that beyond a reasonable doubt.
51In the result, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the guilt of Mr. Edwards on both counts.
Released: March 13, 2026
Justice T. Lipson