ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N :
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
OGENE OLIMI
Before Justice J.R. RICHARDSON
Heard on November 21, 2025; January 30, 2026
Reasons for Sentence released on March 27, 2026
Michael Lunski and Connor Barbeau……………………………….Counsel for the Crown
Mellington Godoy Counsel for the accused
J.R. Richardson, J.:
Introduction
1On November 21, 2025, Ogene Olimi entered guilty pleas to the following offences, all of which occurred on the 30th of May, 2025:
a) Assault EW with a Weapon, to wit a knife, contrary to section 267(a) of the Criminal Code;
b) Uttering a Threat to Cause Death to EW, contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code;
c) Assaulting EW by Choking, Suffocating or Strangling Her Contrary to section 267(c) of the Criminal Code;
d) Forcibly Confining EW, contrary to section 279(2) of the Criminal Code;
e) Failing to Comply with a Probation Order by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, contrary to section 733.1 of the Criminal Code; and
f) Assault Causing Bodily Harm to EW, contrary to section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.
2The Crown proceeded on all counts by indictment.
3The issue in this case is the appropriate sentence.
4The Crown seeks ten years less time in pretrial custody. Defence seeks four years less time in pretrial custody.
Facts
5The parties filed an agreed statement of facts (Exhibit 1).
6EW lived through between two and three hours of horror.
7Two weeks before the incident took place, the parties started dating and Mr. Olimi moved in to live with EW in the City of Belleville.
8On May 30, 2025, Mr. Olimi saw a Snapchat message that EW received from another male friend. It made him irate. He began to beat EW causing bruising and swelling to her face and head. He also threw her around their apartment.
9Mr. Olimi also choked EW. At one point, he told her, “I am going to kill you”. EW told him, “You’re killing me” and “you’re going to kill me.” and she begged him to stop. She struggled to breathe. At another point, he picked her up by her throat and held her until she passed out. She recalled her vision turning black.
10At another point during the evening, Mr. Olimi grabbed a kitchen knife and held it to her throat. He again told her that he was going to kill her and that he would be going to jail that night.
11Towards the end of the incident, Mr. Olimi filled the bathtub full of water and held EW’s head under the water. She told police that she thought he was trying to drown her.
12Fortunately, EW had a neighbour. The neighbour heard sounds of a struggle, became concerned and called police.
13When the police arrived, they banged on the door. Mr. Olimi was choking EW in the bathtub. He refused to open the door. The police could hear EW crying. Mr. Olimi told EW to put on some clothes and don some makeup to hide her injuries. The police heard objects being dragged across the floor area.
14At that point, the police breached the door. Mr. Olimi had dragged a couch to block the door. They observed obvious signs of a struggle. EW was shaking and crying. She had visible injuries to her head and neck. She was wet. The floor was covered with water.
15Mr. Olimi was arrested and he has been in custody since.
16Photos of EW’s injuries were filed as Exhibit 3. She has bruises and lacerations to her head, neck, stomach, knees, elbows, back, left shoulder, and right arm.
17A photo of the bathtub was filed. It was full of water.
The Victim Impact Statement
18EW read her Victim Impact Statement to me on January 30, 2026. It was filed as Exhibit 5. She stated in part:
Before this happened I was happy, independent, financially stable, confident, hardworking, and career driven. I was dedicated to the gym, friends, family and loved studying to become a registered nurse. I was happy, social and close with family and friends. My life went from an outgoing, happy, fun loving girl to a depressed, substance using self conscious person …. I remember the panic, the burning in my chest from not being able to breathe and the strength of your hands around my throat. I begged silently for my life with no air, no voice and no control.
….Daily I struggle with guilt and emotional conflict – not just from the physical violence but because someone who I thought loved me and would protect me tried to kill me. I felt embarrassed, powerless, and I didn’t know why I wasn’t good enough to receive the love I deserved. There is a shame admitting that I provided both financially and emotionally to this person. The betrayal has changed me. I doubt my instincts, I question my judgment and carry a burden of self -blame that I am still working through, I am mourning someone I thought I knew, loved and gave everything to. I was isolated from family and friends.
….once you put my head under the water I accepted that I was going to die that day…. I now struggle with daily back pain as a result of the three vertebra that were fractured in my back and I have multiple visible scars.
I have nightmares of what you did to me every night. I have had 2 suicide attempts due to the pain, suffering and post traumatic stress you have caused me. I fear for mine and my families security and safety.
This significant event in my life has surfaced many triggers I am now beginning to become aware of; any man raising their voice at me, the smell of cigarettes, the feeling of being underwater, the feeling of holding my breath, I struggle with trust, opening up, being vulnerable, emotional numbness, suicidal thoughts and being constantly hyper vigilant with no sense of safety. I am always locking doors behind me. I do not go out after dark, I am always looking over my shoulder, and have learned to be very situationally aware. You have distorted my view on men, love and relationships.
Issues Raised with the Victim Impact Statement
19Defence counsel provided me with a copy of the Victim Impact Statement with proposed redactions. Defence counsel argued that there were parts of the Victim Impact Statement that was unnecessarily inflammatory. He cited R. v. Gabriel and R. v. McDonough and McClatchey.
20The contents of Victim Impact Statements, as well as when and how the Court is to receive them, are prescribed by section 722 of the Criminal Code, which states:
(1) When determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender or determining whether the offender should be discharged under section 730 in respect of any offence, the court shall consider any statement of a victim prepared in accordance with this section and filed with the court describing the physical or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as the result of the commission of the offence and the impact of the offence on the victim.
(2) As soon as feasible after a finding of guilt and in any event before imposing sentence, the court shall inquire of the prosecutor if reasonable steps have been taken to provide the victim with an opportunity to prepare a statement referred to in subsection (1).
(3) On application of the prosecutor or a victim or on its own motion, the court may adjourn the proceedings to permit the victim to prepare a statement referred to in subsection (1) or to present evidence in accordance with subsection (9), if the court is satisfied that the adjournment would not interfere with the proper administration of justice.
(4) The statement must be prepared in writing, using Form 34.2 in Part XXVIII, in accordance with the procedures established by a program designated for that purpose by the lieutenant governor in council of the province in which the court is exercising its jurisdiction.
(5) The court shall, on the request of a victim, permit the victim to present the statement by
(a) reading it;
(b) reading it in the presence and close proximity of any support person of the victim’s choice;
(c) reading it outside the court room or behind a screen or other device that would allow the victim not to see the offender;
(d) or presenting it in any other manner that the court considers appropriate.
(6) During the presentation
(a) the victim may have with them a photograph of themselves taken before the commission of the offence if it would not, in the opinion of the court, disrupt the proceedings; or
(b) if the statement is presented by someone acting on the victim’s behalf, that individual may have with them a photograph of the victim taken before the commission of the offence if it would not, in the opinion of the court, disrupt the proceedings.
(7) The victim shall not present the statement outside the court room unless arrangements are made for the offender and the judge or justice to watch the presentation by means of closed-circuit television or otherwise and the offender is permitted to communicate with counsel while watching the presentation.
(8) In considering the statement, the court shall take into account the portions of the statement that it considers relevant to the determination referred to in subsection (1) and disregard any other portion.
(9) Whether or not a statement has been prepared and filed in accordance with this section, the court may consider any other evidence concerning any victim of the offence for the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed on the offender or whether the offender should be discharged under section 730.
21In Gabriel, at paragraphs 20 to 23 Hill, J. found that Victim Impact Statements serve the following purposes:
a) “The court receives relevant evidence as to the effect or impact of the crime from the person(s) able to give direct evidence on the point”. Hill, J. noted that this evidence is “not filtered through a third party reporter” and “is relevant to the seriousness of the offence which assists the court in imposing proportionate punishment”, which is a requirement under section 718.1 of the Criminal Code.
b) Victim Impact statements constitute the “best evidence on the subject of victim loss” and “also serves to bring home to the offender the consequences of criminal behaviour.”
c) Victim Impact Statements allow victims to participate in the process which “serves to improve the victim’s perception of the legitimacy of the process.” It “enhances respect for the justice system on the part of the harmed individual and over time, the community itself.” It allows the victim “to secure a sense of regaining control over his or her life and the alleviation of the frustration or detachment which can arise where the victim perceives that he or she is ignored or uninvolved in the process”.
d) Victim Impact Statements reduce the prospect that the “victim will be reduced to obscurity” based on the offender-centric nature of sentencing proceedings. It assists in achieving “a measure of balance in understanding the consequences of the crime in the context of the victim’s personal circumstances and those of survivors.”
22At paragraphs 24 to 32 Hill, J. cautioned, however against the following potential pitfalls of Victim Impact Statements:
a) They are not the “exclusive answer to the civilized treatment of victims within the criminal process”. In other words, it is important that that there be regular and ongoing communications between victims and prosecutors and “community support initiatives.”
b) They do not take the place of civil courts “to redress actionable wrongs between individual citizens.” Nor should their use allow the criminal court to become “a social agency”.
c) While victims are entitled to “a voice” in a criminal trial, the trial and the sentencing is a two-party process (Crown and Defence), not a “tripartite proceeding” (Crown, Defence and Victim).
d) The Court must be leery of the “dangers of a runaway model of victim participation” which “can in the long run, serve to defeat the very objectives of victim input.”
e) While retribution “remains an important sentencing objective”, “[v]engeance, however, has no place in a humane sentencing regime.” Victim Impact Statements should not “foster or encourage any element of personal revenge on the part of the victim.” “Offender bashing campaigns” should be avoided.
23At paragraphs 35 to 41, Hill, J. set out the following guidelines with respect to Victim Impact Statements in order to reflect the principles set out above:
a) They should not criticize the offender or engage in offender-bashing. This “tilts the adversary system and “risks the appearance of revenge motivation.”
b) They should not assert facts of the offence. This “usurps the role of the prosecutor and risks inconsistency with, or expansion of” evidence heard at the trial or “facts read in and agreed to, on the guilty plea.”
c) Generally speaking, “recommendations as to penalty must be avoided”. “The Attorney General”, not the victim, “represents the public interest in the prosecution of crime.” “The freedom to call for extraordinary sentences, beyond the limits of appellate tolerance, unjustifiably raises victim expectations, promotes an appearance of court-acceptance of vengeful submissions, and propels the system away from necessary restraint in punishing by loss of liberty”. The Court must not “react to public opinion” on the severity of sentences. There are exceptions to this general rule, including where the court requests it, where there is an Indigenous sentencing circle or where the victim seeks leniency. To these exceptions I would add where the parties take part in Victim-Offender Reconciliation or Restorative Justice Meetings.
d) Although the victim may choose to read in or have her victim impact statement read in, the discretion lies with the trial judge. Improvised victim impact statements, and disturbances in the courtroom or the courthouse should not be tolerated.
e) The statement should be filed in advance so that the presiding Judge can exercise a gatekeeper function to ensure that the statements comply with the requirements.
24Durno, J. picked up on this last issue in McDonough and McClatchey, supra, noting that last minute production of the Victim Impact Statements did not provide sufficient time to the Crown, Defence or the Court to ensure that the statements met the requirements of the section.
25Durno, J. also noted that “[p]ersons who are going to prepare the reports must be given clear guidelines as to the permissible content, that they are only to address the harm or loss they suffered, and that if they include inadmissible information, it will be excluded from the report” (at paragraph 28).
26Durno, J. agreed with Hill, J.’s findings in Gabriel, noting at paragraph 31 that:
It is the responsibility of the Crown to ensure that the statements comply with the section if they seek to have the Victim Impact Statements introduced, regardless if they have been prepared through the Victim Witness Program. It is also the responsibility of the Crown to determine in advance who is being asked to prepare the statements, and to give advice where required regarding the content of the report and who is entitled to prepare one.
27I pause to observe that we have fallen into bad habits since Gabriel and McDonough and McClatchey were decided twenty or more years ago. In my experience, the Crown frequently delegates supervision of the preparation of Victim Impact Statements to VWAP workers, or does not supervise them at all. Rarely are they filed in advance of the sentencing.
28I suspect that this now happens by virtue of the fact that since Gabriel and McDonough and McClatchey were decided, Parliament has amended section 722 to permit the court to disregard those portions of the Victim Impact Statements that are not relevant.
29More recent caselaw, however, makes it clear that Gabriel and McDonough and McClatchey are still good law. For example, in R. v. Beals, 2023 ONSC 555, at paragraphs 75, 76 and 79, Harris, J. discussed the awkward position that the Court is in when the Crown does not supervise the preparation of Victim Impact Statements:
Unfortunately, there were also inappropriate comments in the victim impact statement vilifying the offenders and recommending what should happen to them by way of penalty. In retrospect, I should not have allowed it to be read in open court without editing. After it was read, Mr. McGuire was quick to interject that the inappropriate parts of the victim impact statement were not Ms. Shraim’s fault. I fully agree. She could not possibly have known the law in this regard. Clearly, she had no guidance in writing the statement. It is hard to know what happened and whether it was the victim co-ordinator system or the Crown’s office who failed to manage the victim impact aspect of this sentencing.
As they are tendering the evidence in court, it is Crown counsel’s ultimate responsibility to ensure that the victim impact statement conforms with the legislation and the case law. I agree with my brother Justice Durno’s comments in this Region over 15 years ago in a case called R. v. McDonough. [Citation omitted]
Because of Ms. Shraim’s lack of guidance, the statement transgressed the limitation emphasized in the case law to neither opine on the appropriate punishment for the offender nor to condemn the offender. That did a disservice not only to the system of criminal justice but to Ms. Shraim herself.
30Later in the judgment, Harris, J. made it clear that the amendment of the legislation in 2015 was not “an attempt by Parliament to change the prevailing law” (at paragraph 86).
31Defence counsel objects to the following portions of the Victim Impact Statement:
a) In paragraph 1, EW wrote, “The person who did this to me did not just try and hurt me – he tried to erase me…” and “What happened to me was not just a moment of anger – it was a choice. A choice to confine me, choke me, assault me, tell me I was going to die and attempt to drown me.”
I agree that this is inappropriate given the caselaw and I will disregard it.
b) In paragraph 2, EW wrote, “You preyed upon my vulnerabilities.”, “I was told many times that I was going to die that day”, “I begged silently for my life with no air, no voice, and no control.”
I agree that “You preyed upon my vulnerabilities” is largely inappropriate and I will disregard it.
I find, however, that EW’s expression of how she felt as Mr. Olimi was choking her is not inappropriate. As I have said, the facts are clear: what Mr. Olimi did to EW was horrifying.
c) In paragraph 3, EW wrote, “You distorted my reality.”
I agree given the caselaw that this is inappropriate and I disregard it.
d) In paragraph 4, EW stated, “I begged you to stop hurting me. I told you that if you did not stop you were going to kill me. This lasted for over 3 hours. I screamed for help and as a result I had a knife held to my neck cutting me multiple times. You told me over and over that you are going to kill me, and that you would be going to jail. You dragged me around my apartment by my hair and my neck. You held me by my throat in the bathroom until I passed out. When I woke up, the bathtub was being filled with water.”
I agree given the caselaw that this is inappropriate and I disregard it.
e) In paragraph 4, EW also stated, “I was exhausted from the struggle and I begged you to stop. I begged for my life as I knew I could not fight anymore.”
I do not find that this is inappropriate. Like some of the other aspects of the Victim Impact Statement raised by defence, I find that EW’s sense of being “exhausted” and “not being able to fight anymore” is an expression of how Mr. Olimi’s assaults affected her.
f) In paragraph 5, EW stated, “You demonstrate superior power with intimidation, threats, unpredictable aggression and behaviours. Your mind is constantly in an altered state due to intoxication, anger and the inability to reason with your emotions.”
I agree given the caselaw that this is inappropriate and I disregard it. That said, similar comments EW made to the Probation Officer who prepared the Pre- Sentence report were admitted unchallenged.
32Before leaving this area, I wish to make it clear that like Harris, J. I do not blame EW for the contents of her Victim Impact Statement.
33She lived through a traumatic and horrifying experience, and she has suffered and will continue to suffer long-term mental anguish and physical pain as a result of it. It will also have significant financial costs for her as she deals with treatment costs and the effect of her psychological and physical injuries on her ability to work.
34I find that what happened to EW has fractured all aspects of her very being to the core. The cold, clinical precision with which the Court must review her Victim Impact Statement as filed, does not detract from the significant physical and psychological harm that Mr. Olimi has caused to EW.
The Criminal Record
35Mr. Olimi’s criminal record was filed as Exhibit 4. It begins in 2014 as a youth and continued to July 15, 2024. He has 24 prior convictions:
a) One conviction for Armed Robbery;
b) One conviction for Robbery;
c) One conviction for Sexual Assault;
d) Four convictions for Theft Under;
e) One conviction for Uttering a Threat;
f) Two convictions for Obstructing a Peace Officer;
g) Four convictions for Breach of a Release Order;
h) One conviction for Identity Fraud;
i) Two convictions for Break, Enter and Commit;
j) One conviction for Failing to Attend Court;
k) One conviction for Mischief Under;
l) One conviction for Theft of a Motor Vehicle;
m) One conviction for Fraud Under;
n) One conviction of Failing to Comply with a Probation Order;
o) One conviction for Forcible Confinement; and
p) One conviction for Assault Causing Bodily Harm.
36It is admitted that the Forcible Confinement and the Assault Bodily Harm Offences were committed by Mr. Olimi in relation to two previous intimate partners.
37He has been subject to at least seven probation orders.
38It is admitted that he was on probation for the latter of those offences at the time that he committed the offences against EW. That Probation Order was filed as an Exhibit.
39As I will discuss in greater detail below, the criminal record, and Mr. Olimi’s previous findings of guilt in relation to intimate partner violence offences, are extremely aggravating.
40I find that he is a serial batterer.
The Pre-Sentence Report
41Upon taking the plea on November 21, 2025, I ordered the preparation of a Pre-Sentence Report. The report was completed by Probation and Parole Officer Jason Curry of the Ottawa-West Probation and Parole Office. It reveals the following:
a) Mr. Olimi was born in Ottawa, and he is the youngest of a family of five children.
b) His parents divorced around the time he was born but they continued living together until he was a teenager. Mr. Olimi told Mr. Curry that his parents maintained a civil relationship.
c) When Mr. Olimi was an infant, the family moved to Vancouver. They remained there until he was eight at which point they returned to Ottawa.
d) When Mr. Olimi was 13, his mother took him to Africa. He spent two years in Tanzania and two years in Uganda. He was enrolled in boarding school, which he viewed positively.
e) They returned to Ottawa when he was 16.
f) When he was 15, Mr. Olimi moved with his mother to Gatineau.
I note that there is something about these timelines when he was a teenager which does not add up.
g) Mr. Olimi dropped out of school at Grade 11 because he was not interested in academics. He admitted to regretting this decision.
h) Mr. Olimi states that he has worked in landscaping, construction and data collection.
i) Mr. Olimi says that he has a positive peer group and denies negative influences.
j) He told Mr. Curry that he met EW online two weeks before the offences.
k) Mr. Olimi endorses a significant problem with alcohol beginning at about age 20. He reported that because of this he became isolated from his friends and could not continue with his employment. He described his drinking problem as “binge drinking” and indicated that he experienced frequent black-outs while drunk.
l) Mr. Olimi indicated that he also uses cocaine when he is intoxicated.
m) When asked about how he felt about the offences he committed against EW, Mr. Olimi stated that he was ashamed and embarrassed.
n) He said that he was “blackout drunk and high on cocaine” when he committed the offences.
I asked defence counsel about this during submissions and I was advised that Mr. Olimi did not seek to maintain that he lacked mens rea for the commission of the offences.
o) Although Mr. Olimi denied any symptoms of depression, he admitted to one prior suicide attempt. He denied current suicidal ideation.
p) Mr. Olimi identifies as Christian and relies on his faith for support. He expressed interest in attending a faith-based treatment program (Harvest House) in Ottawa upon release from custody.
q) Mr. Olimi asked Mr. Curry not to contact any members of his family.
r) EW told Mr. Curry that she and Mr. Olimi were involved in a relationship for approximately two months before the offence was committed. She described him as being “charming”, “manipulative” and “a compulsive liar”. She stated that throughout the relationship he abused cocaine, alcohol and marihuana. With respect to alcohol use, she reported that Mr. Olimi would drink daily to the point of intoxication. EW expressed fear of Mr. Olimi once he is released from custody.
s) With respect to his response to community supervision, Mr. Curry reported that Mr. Olimi is polite and cooperative; however, he lacks motivation to address substance abuse issues and only attended one session of counselling, and one PAR session before the offences were committed. I note that when he committed the offences against EW, approximately nine and a half months had elapsed on the two-year probation order that he was placed on in July 2024 which required counselling for substance abuse and completion of the Partner Assault Response Program.
42Later in his submissions, Mr. Godoy acknowledged that although my request for the PSR asked the Probation and Parole Officer to be live to issues of systemic racism (Mr. Olimi is Black), Mr. Olimi stated that he “did not want to make excuses” for his behaviour.
43Mr. Godoy also told me that his family has a history of criminality in the Ottawa area, that Mr. Olimi’s father was “never in the picture” and that Mr. Olimi “learned how to be a man from his older brother”. Mr. Godoy indicated that Mr. Olimi’s older brother is also inclined to criminality, drug use and alcohol use.
44Mr. Godoy conceded that there is no suggestion that systemic racism plays a role here.
Mr. Olimi’s Allocution
45I asked Mr. Olimi if he had anything to say before I adjourned the matter to prepare these reasons. He told me that he was “really sorry” for the things that he has done. He acknowledged fault. He acknowledged letting his drug and alcohol consumption get out of control.
46Referring to EW, he acknowledged that “nobody deserves to be treated how I treated this person. I am sorry for the pain I caused her and her family”.
47He acknowledged, “I have to deal with things going on in my life.”
Submissions of the Crown
48Crown counsel submitted that the appropriate global sentence was ten years less pretrial custody which he asked me to credit at 1.5:1.
49Crown counsel submitted that this was essentially a near attempt murder and Mr. Olimi was deserving of a sentence that was near the maximum sentence for his crimes because of his record, particularly as it relates to domestic violence.
50Crown counsel focused on the aggravating facts, including the protracted violent, and terrifying three-hour beating which Mr. Olimi perpetrated upon EW, the fact that he threw her around, struck her several times, told her he was going to kill her, strangled her to the point of passing out, assaulted her with a kitchen knife, filled the bathtub with water and then held her head under it and attempted to barricade the door to keep the police from entering.
51Crown counsel reminded the Court of the numerous statutorily aggravating factors in this case, including:
a) EW was Mr. Olimi’s intimate partner;
b) that the offences took place in EW’s home which should be considered a place of safety;
c) that Mr. Olimi was in a position of trust to EW;
d) the aggravating nature of the victim impact and the long-term effects the commission of the crime has had on EW;
e) the fact that EW, as a female involved in an intimate partner relationship with Mr. Olimi, has increased vulnerability; and
f) the provisions of section 718.3(8) which increase maximum sentences where the offender has previously been convicted of offences involving the use, threat or attempt of violence against an intimate partner.
Defence Submissions
52Defence counsel submitted that the appropriate global sentence (as of January 30, 2026) was 246 days (for which the accused is entitled to credit at 1.5:1 equivalent to 369 days) plus two years less one day.
53Defence counsel submitted that the Court should recommend that Mr. Olimi serve his sentence at the St. Lawrence Valley Treatment Centre, where he could work on his addiction problems.
54Defence counsel submitted that the appropriate global range of sentence was between three and four years in custody. He also stated that Mr. Olimi wished to proceed to serve his sentence as soon as possible and had instructed him not to request lock-down and overcrowding records, which would have permitted him to seek additional credit for time served for harsh conditions in presentence custody (R. v. Duncan). He noted that Mr. Olimi has served most of his presentence custody at the Central East Correctional Centre, which has had issues of lockdown and overcrowding.
55Defence counsel took the position that the Crown’s sentencing position was premised on caselaw for more significant crimes, including Aggravated Assault and Attempted Murder. He argued that the Crown’s proposed sentence was not fit for the crimes to which Mr. Olimi entered pleas. He also pointed out that unlike some of the authorities relied upon by the Crown where there was an element of pre-meditation, Mr. Olimi committed these offences when he was under the influence of substances and he did not set out to hurt EW.
56With respect to the impact of the offences on the victim, Defence counsel maintained that although EW has experienced significant impacts, they do not rise to the level of victims who suffer permanent lasting disfiguring or otherwise crippling consequences.
57Defence counsel argued that the accused had a related criminal record, but he characterized the criminal record as “modest”, particularly having regard to the sentences meted out for Mr. Olimi’s previous domestic violence crimes. He acknowledged, however, that it is troublesome that there is a pattern of intimate partner violence. Defence counsel also submitted that virtually all, if not all, of the offences on Mr. Olimi’s record were committed when he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
58Defence counsel acknowledged that denunciation and deterrence are the paramount sentencing principles in play but stated that does not mean that the Court turns a blind eye to the rehabilitation of the accused.
Analysis
The Statutory Sentencing Framework
59Section 718 of the Criminal Code states:
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
a) to denounce unlawful conduct in the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community.
60Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code establishes the fundamental principle of sentencing: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”
61Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code sets out “other sentencing principles”:
A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor,
(ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the
offender’s intimate partner or a member of the victim or the offender’s family,
(ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years,
(ii.2) evidence that the offender involved a person under the age of 18 years in the commission of the offence,
(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim,
(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation,
(iii.2) evidence that the offence was committed against a person who, in the performance of their duties and functions, was providing health services, including personal care services,
(iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization,
(v) evidence that the offence was a terrorism offence,
(vi) evidence that the offence was committed while the offender was subject to a conditional sentence order made under section 742.1 or released on parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, and
(vii) evidence that the commission of the offence had the effect of impeding another person from obtaining health services, including personal care services,
shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.
62Section 718.201 of the Criminal Code requires the court to craft a sentence that reflects society’s disdain for intimate partner violence offences that are perpetrated against vulnerable women. It states:
A court that imposes a sentence in respect of an offence that involved the abuse of an intimate partner shall consider the increased vulnerability of female persons who are victims, giving particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal female victims.
63Section 718.3(8) of the Criminal Code provides that:
(8) If an accused is convicted of an indictable offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened or attempted against an intimate partner and the accused has been previously convicted of an offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened or attempted against an intimate partner, the court may impose a term of imprisonment that is more than the maximum term of imprisonment provided for that offence but not more than
(a) five years, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is two years or more but less than five years;
(b) 10 years, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is five years or more but less than 10 years;
(c) 14 years, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is 10 years or more but less than 14 years; or
(d) life, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is 14 years or more and up to imprisonment for life.
64The parties agree that five of the six offences that Mr. Olimi has pleaded to are caught by this section rendering the maximum terms of imprisonment available for each count as:
a) Five years for Uttering a Threat to Cause Death, contrary to section 264.1 (the maximum absent the operation of section 718.3(8) is two years);
b) 14 years for Forcible Confinement, contrary to section279(2) (the maximum absent the operation of section 718.3(8) is ten years);
c) 14 years for Assault Causing Bodily Harm, contrary to section267(b) (the maximum absent the operation of section 718.3(8) is ten years);
d) 14 years for Assault with a Weapon contrary to section267(a) (the maximum absent the operation of section 718.3(8) is ten years); and
e) 14 years for Assault by Choking, Suffocating or Strangling, Contrary to section 267(c) (the maximum absent the operation of section 718.3(8) is ten years).
General Principles of Sentencing With Respect to Intimate Partner Violence Offences
65Principles of denunciation and deterrence are the overriding sentencing considerations in intimate partner violence cases: R. v. Inwood (1989), 69 C.R.(3d) 181 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Bates (2000), 35 C.R. (5th) 327 (Ont. C.A.) R. v. Boucher (2004), 186 CCC (3d) 479 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rahanam, 2008 ONCA 1.
66Principles of rehabilitation play a lesser role. It is an error to give undue weight to rehabilitation: R. v. Kormendy, 2019 ONCA 676; R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36.
67When the offence takes place in the victim’s home, this is a breach of trust: R. v. Cunningham, supra.
68Intimate partner violence recidivists who commit serious offences can expect significant sentences.
69In R. v. Fulton, 2012 ONCA 781, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s imposition of a nine-year sentence (but allowed the appeal with respect to the trial judge’s finding that the accused was a Long Term Offender) in a case involving an accused person who surreptitiously entered his former partner’s apartment and stabbed her five times with a scuba knife, causing her to suffer a collapsed lung. The accused had previous findings of guilt for offences involving violence against two former girlfriends.
70In R. v. Dockery, 2018 ONCJ 797, aff’d 2020 ONCA 278, Chapman, J. sentenced the accused to five years after he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault of his intimate partner. He met her at a bar, slapped her face, grabbed her by the hair, pushed her to the ground and stomped on her face rendering her unconscious. Her jaw was broken, and she had to have reconstructive surgery, which involved the installation of eight plates in her jaw and the removal of two teeth (on top of one the accused knocked out during the assault). As a result of the offence, she was in constant excruciating pain, suffered depression and anger, had difficulty trusting anyone, and lost her employment and friendships. His record consisted of 51 prior offences including multiple offences against at least two prior intimate partners.
71In Bill C-75 in 2019, Parliament made several reforms targeting intimate partner violence, including the expansion of factors in section 718.2(a)(ii), the enacting of section 718.3(8) and amendments to the Divorce Act.
72As Benotto, J.A. stated in R. v. Cunningham, supra, at paragraph 52:
Thus, the intention of Parliament clearly supports the enhanced penalties of perpetrators of domestic violence and denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives. It also supports changes in sentencing ranges to reflect societal awareness and knowledge of the damage to society, as well as victims, caused by domestic violence.
73Although Cunningham was a case involving the appropriate sentence for Attempted Murder in the context of an intimate partner violence relationship, the emerging principle in play is that sentences for intimate partner violence cases must go up. Dated caselaw may no longer be applicable given the “increase in society’s awareness of the prevalence of domestic violence and the evils it creates.” (Cunningham, supra, at paragraph 48).
74Justice Benotto found, citing R. v. AJK, 2022 ONCA 487, (which in turn cited R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 and R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64), that sentencing precedents are not “straightjackets”. Rather they are “historical portraits” that “can be departed from as societal understanding of offences and the severity of harm arising from those offences deepens.” (Cunningham, supra, at paragraph 53, citing AJK at paragraph 71 and Friesen at paragraph 108).
75The Court of Appeal recently considered Cunningham’s call for an upward shift in sentences dealing with domestic violence in R. v. Jiang, 2025 ONCA 624. In Jiang, the accused was found guilty of second degree murder in relation to his former girlfriend. The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment and increased the period of parole ineligibility from ten to 18 years. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision .
76Thus, sentencing judges in cases of intimate partner violence must look with caution on sentencing precedents decided before Cunningham and ensure that those precedents continue to reflect current realities.
Post-Cunningham Cases Dealing with Serious Instances of Intimate Partner Violence
77Perhaps not surprisingly given the individualized nature of sentencing, and the various degrees of assault and violence committed, the post-Cunningham sentencing cases are all over the map.
78R. v. Kaviok, 2023 NUCA 13 has facts eerily similar to the case before me. The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault of his intimate partner. He is Innuit and he was 25 years of age. He had no record. He was immediately remorseful for his crime, gave a statement to the police and pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. The accused and the victim went to a party where significant quantities of alcohol were consumed. They left the party and returned to their residence where they had an argument. The accused punched the victim in the face. She went to the bathroom and got in the bathtub. He followed her punched her in the face, pulled her out of the bathtub by the hair, punched her in the face and torso, put his hands on her neck and told her that he was going to kill her. Fortunately, a neighbour heard what was going on and called police. Police arrived and breached the door. The victim was ultimately medevacked to Winnipeg where she had surgery to repair a fractured left orbital bone by the insertion of a surgical plate.
79The Victim Impact Statement revealed that the victim suffered physical pain, suicidal ideation, post-traumatic stress disorder, and self-harm (cutting). She reported losing all her confidence, being continually angry and scared and spending months in bed wanting to die. She lost her financial independence; she was unable to return to teaching and she lost her trust in others.
80The trial judge imposed a one-year conditional sentence followed by a one-year probation Order. The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge unduly focussed on the fact that the accused was a first-time offender and the principle of restraint. The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge disregarded the primary sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence. The Nunavut Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of 12 months incarceration followed by 12 months of probation. The Court noted that there were significant mitigating factors which took the accused into a range below the normal sentencing range in Nunavut for aggravated assault.
81The Court cited Cunningham as authority for the proposition that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing principles, but it did not expressly comment on whether sentencing ranges for intimate partner violence offences should increase.
82In R. v. Bananish, 2024 ONSC 1218, aff’d 2025 ONCA 364, the accused was an Indigenous person with four prior intimate partner violence offences against four partners, including the victim of the index offence. He stabbed the victim eleven times in a hotel room. She suffered two spinal fractures, a stab wound to her chest, and another to her finger which disfigured it. She was in hospital for 21 days. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Pinto, J. designated the accused a long-term offender and found that the appropriate sentence was seven years and three months less time served. Neither finding was disturbed by the Court of Appeal. Neither Pinto, J. nor the Court of Appeal made any comments with respect to the reasoning in Cunningham.
83In R. v. Kovacs, 2024 ONSC 1264, the accused was found guilty by a jury after trial of three counts of assault, one count of assault with a weapon and one count of forcible confinement in relation to four separate events over four years against his former intimate partner. The offences involved the accused assaulting the victim by pressing her head against the headboard, punching her with a closed fist on both sides of her head, slapping her in the face, threatening to kill her, slashing the headboard with a fruit knife (incident one), “backhanding” her in the face resulting in a bloody nose, swollen lips and a black eye (incident two), pushing her to the ground and punching her in the face resulting in a black eye and bruising to her forearm and knee (incident three) and punching her in the face and blocking her from leaving his home resulting in a bloody nose, facial swelling, broken eye vessels and goose eggs to her head.
84The accused was 40 years of age. He worked as a renovation contractor. He had a criminal record with ten prior convictions, including several assaults, but none of his prior convictions were committed against intimate partners. He had support in the community and from his family.
85The victim’s impact statement described emotional devastation, intense fear, anxiety and trauma, a shattered sense of security. She struggled to maintain her employment and pursue her education. Her son, who was a witness to some of the violence, also suffered from nightmares, trouble sleeping, fear and sadness.
86The Crown sought two years in custody. Defence sought a conditional sentence. Barrett, J. sentenced the accused to two years less time served and 18 months probation.
87In R. v. Islam, 2025 ONSC 291, the accused was convicted of Attempted Murder, Assault and Uttering a Threat against his intimate partner. The assault involved a minor injury to the victim’s hand when the accused pushed her. The Uttering Threat charge, which occurred the month before the Attempted Murder, involved the accused telling the victim that he would kill her, kill the children and then kill himself. The Attempted Murder charge involved the accused grabbing a piece of rebar and striking her repeatedly about the head and body as he told her that he would “finish you”, “end you” and “kill you”. The assault was interrupted by the victim’s 14-year-old son.
88The victim suffered fractures to her left arm, right hand and skull. She underwent multiple surgeries. She was not able to feed her children. At the time of the sentencing, she continued to suffer from significant pain in her forearm. She has neurological issues, which has resulted in her developing a stammer, light-headedness and vertigo. She reported that her trust in other people has been destroyed. She is scared that the accused will kill her and the children. She cannot sleep because of her worry about this. At the time of the offence, she was working on obtaining qualifications in nursing, which she was unable to continue resulting in significant student debt.
89The accused was 40 years of age and a first-time offender. He was born in Bangladesh and did not have Canadian citizenship. He was likely to be deported when he finished his sentence. He completed significant programming while in custody. He apologized to the Court and stated that he did not know what made him so angry. After conviction, he sent the victim letters from jail apologizing for his offences, contrary to a court order that he was to have no contact with her. This was read in as an aggravating factor.
90McArthur, J. sentenced the accused to 17 years in custody less time served.
91In R. v. Ciobanu, 2025 ONCJ 92, the accused was sentenced on five counts of assault against his wife and his 13-year-old son. The first assault took place in October 2022 when he slapped the victim across the face near a subway station after an argument concerning the parentage of two of their children. The accused was charged on the strength of statements from independent witnesses as the victim was afraid of what the accused would do if she cooperated with the police. While the accused was on a release order with no contact conditions, he told his children that if she did not withdraw the charges, he would leave them without a mother. In response to this, she sought a bail variation which was granted. This threat was an aggravating factor on sentence.
92In February or March 2023, the accused slapped his son with an open palm across the face. In May 2023, the accused pulled the victim from the bed and struck her in the lower abdomen with his knee. The accused did so because the victim came home late and he accused her of being unfaithful. He forced her to her knees and forced her to beg for forgiveness. Later in May, he struck her in the head with his right hand. When their son tried to intervene, he tried to kick the victim but struck the boy in the testicles instead, requiring treatment in hospital.
93The accused was born in Romania. His father was murdered when he was a baby and he was raised by his mother. In 2019 he came to Canada and was granted refugee status on the basis that he was persecuted because he was Roma. He was employed as a general labourer. He had no record. Crown counsel sought a 12-month jail sentence, followed by three years of probation. Defence counsel sought a suspended sentence and probation. No Victim Impact Statements were filed, other than the Crown indicated that the victim wanted nothing further to do with the accused.
94Jones, J. found that the appropriate sentence was eight months and 24 months probation.
95In R. v. Gutkin, 2025 ONSC 3674, the accused was 69 years of age when he committed an aggravated assault upon the victim, with whom he had been in a relationship for three years. One night, as the victim was cleaning up after dinner, the accused approached her from behind and tried to strangle her with a wire and told her that he was trying to kill her. They both fell to the floor as he continued to strangle her. She began to claw at him and she could not speak. She started to lose her vision and thought that she might die. She was able to grab a glass of water and throw it at him which caused him to lose his grip. She stood up and started walking toward the bathroom. He pursued, grabbed her from behind by the neck, and started choking her again. For some reason, even though she was unable to overpower him, he stopped and let her go when she told him to. She went to the kitchen and grabbed a paring knife. He opened his shirt and told her to kill him. He then picked up a large kitchen knife and proceeded toward her. He put the knife down when she promised that she would not call the police.
96As a result of the attack, the victim suffered nerve damage. She suffered from panic attacks, loneliness and she felt guilty. She reported becoming more “thin-skinned” and vulnerable and less positive in outlook.
97The accused had a criminal record from 2014 for aggravated assault on a previous partner. He received the equivalent of a four-year sentence. The facts of that case involved the accused stabbing the victim with a knife and puncturing her lung, breaking her ribs and causing a laceration to her liver. He also choked her.
98At the sentencing hearing, the accused was remorseful and he had a number of positive letters of support. He has Parkinson’s Disease and there was extensive evidence before the Court with respect to the availability of treatment in the penitentiary. The accused served 525 days of presentence custody at the Central East Correctional Centre (the same facility where Mr. Olimi has been held) where he was subjected to multiple days of lock down and overcrowding, causing Leibovich, J. to comment at paragraph 37 that “[i]t would be easier to count that days that Mr. Gutkin was not on lockdown or subject to triple bunking than the days that he was”.
99The Crown sought eight and a half years. Defence sought seven years.
100Leibovich, J. found that the appropriate sentence was eight and a half years, less 1.5:1 credit for presentence custody. Leibovich, J. noted at paragraph 43(5) that “But for his age and serious health concerns and the conditions of his pre-sentence custody, a sentence of at least 10 years would have been appropriate even considering his remorse.”
101In R. v. Buni, 2025 ONSC 3948, the accused was found guilty after trial of aggravated assault against his intimate partner. The victim was stabbed multiple times with a kitchen knife. She was able to run to a neighbour’s home. She was taken by ambulance to a trauma centre where she underwent surgery. She spent a week in hospital. She suffered penetrating wounds to her face, neck, back, shoulders and left hand. The neck injury was particularly serious as it resulted in bruising to her carotid artery and jugular vein. She suffered pain on her left side as a result. She suffered from ringing in her ear and is unable to sleep on her left side.
102The accused had a criminal record which included Failing to Comply with Probation and Release Orders, Aggravated Assault, Assault with a Weapon and Mischief Under $5000. At the time of the sentencing, the Aggravated Assault conviction was under appeal. It did not involve allegations of intimate partner violence. The accused was from Somalia. He came to Canada as a refugee. He was exposed to “extreme violence” before coming to Canada. He completed some programming while in custody. He has mental health “challenges” and was under psychiatric care for depression, insomnia etc. He also has an alcohol and substance abuse problem. He had 572 days of pre-sentence custody. There was no evidence of remorse.
103The Crown sought nine years. Defence sought four to six years.
104Barrett, J. found that “cases involving intimate partner violence have their own range of sentence.” Her Honour also noted that “at the upper end, s. 718.3(8) of the Criminal Code provides sentencing judges with discretion to exceed the prescribed maximum for recidivists.” She found that the appropriate range in the case before her was between six and nine years (see paragraph 37) and sentenced the accused to seven and half years.
105In R. v. Lundi, 2025 ONCJ 716, the accused was found guilty of five counts of assault, three counts of assault by choking, three counts of uttering a threat, one count of mischief under and one count of forcible confinement in relation to seven incidents against his intimate partner. The accused was 33 and had no prior record. He was gainfully employed. He had positive community support. In the Pre-Sentence Report, he minimized the offences, denied remorse and denied responsibility. He changed his tune when he allocuted before sentencing. The victim described lasting physical and psychological trauma. Her children also suffered trauma. Lipson, J. imposed a 15-month custodial sentence plus three years probation.
106In R. v. P.B., 2026 ONCJ 16, the accused pleaded guilty to assaulting his intimate partner, assaulting his daughter and breaching his probation by having contact with the victim and being within 500 meters of his home. He punched the victim in the face multiple times resulting in a cut to her lower lip and swelling to her forehead. He slapped his daughter, who intervened to protect her mother, in the face and shoved her into a shoe rack, resulting in bruising and swelling around her eyebrow. The accused was intoxicated due to heroin and alcohol. He had four prior sets of convictions for offences against the same victim for assault, breach of probation, break and enter, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, choking and forcible confinement.
107The victim did not submit a Victim Impact Statement. The Crown sought three and a half to four years imprisonment. Defence sought 23 months. The accused was 36 years of age. His mother died when he was young. He developed an alcohol problem as a result of that. He started his own renovation company and was a hard worker. He has family support. He expressed the intention to remain sober and go to AA after his release from custody.
108Callaghan, J. found that the accused’s “lengthy persistent and related criminal record was highly aggravating.” It was also aggravating that the offences took place in relation to the same complainant as his prior intimate partner violence offences and that the offences took place just two months after he was released from custody on his last sentence for offences against her, while still serving probation.
109Callaghan, J. found that the appropriate sentence was “approaching four years” but reduced the final sentence to three and a half years “given all the mitigating factors including his guilty pleas and the initial rehabilitative steps Mr. B. has taken, and factoring in totality.” His Honour recommended that the accused serve his remaining time at the St. Lawrence Valley Treatment Centre or the Ontario Correctional Institute.
Parity?
110What emerges from the caselaw is that significant custodial sentences are imposed even in the case of remorseful first-time offenders.
111I am mindful of the argument that the caselaw that I have cited includes sentencing for more serious crimes than Mr. Olimi has technically committed in this case, including aggravated assault, attempted murder and murder.
112To this I make the following observations:
a) The caselaw I have cited illustrates the theme that sentences for serious intimate partner violence offences must go up;
b) Whatever degree or label Mr. Olimi’s crimes merit, they are objectively extremely serious offences where EW suffered serious bodily harm and long-term, if not permanent psychological injury as a result of between two and three hours of torture. If not for the neighbour who heard her cries, and the actions of the police in breaching the door, Mr. Olimi might well have subjected EW to even more serious permanent physical and psychological injuries or even killed her. The sentence that is imposed in this case must reflect that reality, while at the same time, not sentence him for crimes that he did not commit.
Assessment of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
113The following factors are mitigating:
a) Mr. Olimi entered a guilty plea and saved the victim from the trauma of testifying about what happened to her. He also saved the justice system the time and expense of trial.
b) Mr. Olimi expresses remorse for what he has done. My sense from listening to his expression of remorse, where he referred to the victim as “this person” is that it is somewhat superficial.
c) Mr. Olimi seems to have some insight into his crimes. Similarly, however, my sense is that this is superficial. He did not permit Mr. Curry to contact collateral sources to verify information in the Pre-Sentence Report. Nor did Mr. Olimi wish counsel to explore the conditions that he has served in pre-sentence custody. While his explanation that he does not want to make excuses for his behaviour is laudable, I find that he wants to be sentenced as quickly as possible and start serving his time.
d) Despite the breadth and depth of Mr. Olimi’s criminal record, he has never served much more than a year in custody. This will be his first penitentiary sentence.
e) At 28, Mr. Olimi is relatively young.
114I find the following factors are aggravating:
a) The facts in this case are horrifying. The victim was subjected to extreme violence and terror for two to three hours. She was choked to the point where she lost consciousness. She was also held underwater. A knife was held to her neck while she was threatened. Furniture was pulled across the door to prevent her from leaving and/or prevent the police from entering. She thought she was going to die.
b) The victim suffered extensive bruising to her body and fractured vertebra in her neck. She has suffered significant psychological injury.
I disagree with defence counsel’s suggestion that these injuries are not as significant as serious physical injuries suffered by the victims in some of the caselaw. Physical injuries sometimes heal. Psychological injuries often remain, long after the offences take place. Sometimes they are permanent. As the victim eloquently stated in her Victim Impact Statement, things that the rest of us take for granted can be triggers and reminders of what happened to her.
c) Mr. Olimi has a significant criminal record with convictions for a number of crimes of violence.
d) Mr. Olimi has been subject to at least seven probation orders since 2014, none of which reduced his offending behaviour.
e) EW was Mr. Olimi’s intimate partner. He breached her trust by committing these heinous crimes. She was vulnerable.
f) Mr. Olimi has earned the dubious distinction of being a serial domestic batterer. EW is the third intimate partner he has offended against.
g) Mr. Olimi was on probation for an intimate partner violence offence when he committed the offences against EW. Despite the passage of about nine months since that probation order was imposed, Mr. Olimi did very little to engage in rehabilitative programming for intimate partner violence and substance abuse when the offences against EW were committed.
I find that this fact, coupled with superficial remorse and insight, does not bode well for the rehabilitation of Mr. Olimi and the ultimate long-term protection of the public.
h) The offence was committed against EW in her home, where she is entitled to feel safe.
i) Denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives.
115Parliament has made it clear that sentences for serious and repeat intimate partner violence offences must go up to reflect society’s abhorrence of these offences, the significant cost to society that these offences pose and the deepened understanding of the effects of these offences on victims.
The Appropriate Sentence
The Calculation of Pre-sentence Custody
116The accused has 302 days (just over ten months) of pre-sentence custody. At the Summers 1.5:1 rate, the accused is entitled to 453 days (15 months) credit.
117I am mindful, pursuant to R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 and R. v. Marshall, 2020 ONCA 344, given my knowledge of general conditions at the Central East Correctional Centre, that Mr. Olimi has been subjected to untenable conditions of overcrowding and lockdown while he has been in custody.
118I have not lost sight of this in imposing sentence.
The Principles of Restraint and Totality
119I am also mindful of the principles of restraint and totality. I repeat and rely on my analysis of the sentencing principle of totality which I discussed at paragraphs 236 to 242 of R. v. K.T., 2025 ONCJ 234.
120I find that the appropriate sentence is broken down as follows:
a) On the charge of Assaulting EW With a Weapon, to wit a knife, contrary to section 267(a) of the Criminal Code, the sentence is eight months served, 12 months credit;
b) On the charge of Uttering a Threat to Cause Death to EW, contrary to section 264.1 of the Criminal Code, the sentence is nine months concurrent to the sentence I impose with respect to count 3;
c) On the charge of Assaulting EW by Choking, Suffocating or Strangling Her Contrary to section 267(c) of the Criminal Code, the sentence is two months served, three months credit plus 33 months.
However, in taking “a last look” at the total sentence I must impose, I will reduce the sentence on this count to 24 months to account for the sentencing principle of totality.
I cannot find that a lesser sentence or a concurrent sentence is warranted given the fact that there were two serious instances of this crime, choking her when picked her up by her neck causing her to lose consciousness and suffocating her when he held her under water in the bathtub.
d) On the charge of Forcibly Confining EW, contrary to section 279(2) of the Criminal Code, the sentence is 12 months consecutive;
I considered reducing the sentence for this crime based on totality to a lower sentence or a concurrent sentence. However, I find that Mr. Olimi’s actions in moving the furniture to prevent EW from leaving (and/or prevent the police from entering) are extremely aggravating and deserving of significant separate punishment.
e) On the charge of Failing to Comply with a Probation Order by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, contrary to section 733.1 of the Criminal Code, the sentence is six months concurrent.
f) On the charge of Assault Causing Bodily Harm to EW, contrary section 267(b) of the Criminal Code, the sentence is 24 months consecutive.
121The total remaining sentence, therefore, is 60 months.
122I make the usual ancillary orders including a section 109 Order for life, DNA and 743.21 Order prohibiting contact with EW.
Released: March 27, 2026
Signed: Justice J.R. Richardson