Citation and Parties
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— and —
GRAEME LOGUE
Before Justice John North
Reasons for sentence, released on March 26, 2026
D. Spence counsel for the Crown
R. Rotenberg counsel for the Defence
Reasons for Sentence
INTRODUCTION
1Graeme Logue pleaded guilty to two counts of child luring contrary to s. 172.1(b) of the Criminal Code.
2These are my reasons for sentence.1
THE OFFENCES
3The parties filed an agreed statement of facts. The facts were summarized as follows:
On May 28, 2024, Detective Constable Laura McFatridge #8952 commenced an online undercover investigation using an undercover profile of a 14-year-old girl. She logged into a chatroom website, Chatib, and waited. She used the name "Emma".
Mr. Logue, operating under the username"41_gta_" messaged the undercover officer"How are you doing? You good with older?" The accused told the undercover officer that he lived in Vaughan, and she told him she was in North York. The accused asked"How old? (won't tell)" and the undercover officer replied"I am 14".
Mr. Logue asked the undercover officer if she had "Snap" and she replied that she did. She provided him with an undercover Snapchat account. He messaged her a few minutes later.
Text-based messages over Snapchat continued for several weeks. Copies of the electronic communications between Mr. Logue and the undercover officer are attached hereto as Appendix "A". Their authenticity is admitted.
On a number of occasions, Mr. Logue cautioned the undercover officer (Emma) about this being illegal activity. Specifically on May 28, 2024, the first day of their correspondence, he wrote: "Am I going to be your secret?" "We could get in trouble for chatting because of age." "We just gotta kind of keep it between us for now."
Mr. Logue reiterated this point on May 31, 2024 when he wrote "don't tell anyone we chat" and "we could get in a lot of trouble because of the age gap" "people (any adult) would freek out 'cause it's kinda against the law. It just means we have to keep us being a thing kinda quiet is all."
Throughout the correspondence, Mr. Logue continued to reiterate this concern that what they were doing was illegal and expressed a fear that Emma's mother might read their messages. He told Emma to conceal their communications.
During their correspondence, Mr. Logue sent the undercover officer several pictures of himself. These included two photos with his face partially visible taken while he was in the shower.
One of the photos depicted his naked torso and showed what appeared to be a birthmark on his neck. Sending the picture, he asked"have you ever seen a guy like that before?" This photo was used in the latter stages of investigation to identify Mr. Logue via facial comparison with Ministry of Transportation records.
Mr. Logue also requested photos from Emma which she provided.
At times throughout the correspondence, Mr. Logue grew suspicious about whether or not he was actually speaking with a 14-year-old girl named Emma. There were a couple of reasons for this:
a. One of the photos that Emma had sent him, with a two-finger peace symbol, was thought to be photoshopped; and
b. Emma offered to communicate by email, which seemed contrary to the way a 14-year-old would communicate. He expected a 14-year-old to use text.
It is stressed, however, that any suspicions about the truthfulness of Emma's representations as to age were, in each case, fully dispelled, while lingering doubts were, at all events, promptly resolved with the firm belief and knowledge that Emma was a real child.
At times, Mr. Logue grew nervous about their correspondence and feared that perhaps he was being set up to be blackmailed.
On a previous occasion, Mr. Logue had chatted online with someone else who identified themselves as a teenage girl. It turned out to be a hoax and he was being blackmailed by the person on the other end of the correspondence. He ended that chat.
Despite his concerns, Mr. Logue determined in each case to continue the online communication with Emma while intending to facilitate the commission of an offence under s. 152 and s. 271 of the Criminal Code.
Mr. Logue told Emma that he wanted to be in a sexual relationship with her. He told her that they could drive his car to a private place; that he would teach her how to masturbate; that they could have sex; and that he would give to Emma her first orgasm. He said his preference was to not use condoms.
On June 21, 2024, Mr. Logue and the undercover officer made a plan to meet in-person. The parties agreed to meet in the area of Bathurst and Eglinton Avenue West at 4:00 pm. Mr. Logue cancelled shortly before the scheduled meeting time, telling the undercover officer that something had come up at work.
On July 9, 2024, the parties made another plan to meet the following day at Glencairn Subway Station. The parties planned for Mr. Logue to go back to Emma's house, as he understood her parents were at work. He said he would bring the underwear he said he had previously purchased for her as well as the "morning after pill" so he could ejaculate inside of her. On the evening of July 9, 2024, Mr. Logue cancelled the meeting, explaining he could not take time off work.
It is Mr. Logue's position that although he discussed buying Emma lingerie, he never did so. He concedes, however, that he desired to see Emma wearing lingerie as discussed in the messages.
On July 11, 2024, members of the Child Exploitation Section of the Toronto Police Service conducted a Criminal Code search warrant at the accused's home. The accused was located inside his residence and placed under arrest. He was transported to 31 Division where he was held for a show cause hearing.
A number of electronic devices were seized from his house, but no child pornography was located on said devices.
Some of the [above mentioned] messages …were sent and received while Mr. Logue was at work.
THE OFFENDER
4I ordered a pre-sentence report. I also received information about Mr. Logue from the defence.
5Mr. Logue is 43 years old. He has no criminal record. Mr. Logue has no substance abuse issues.
6He had a normal childhood. However, Mr. Logue struggled academically and left high school in grade 12.
7After leaving high school, he worked in the construction industry. He worked for a construction management company for 10 years. He left that job after the charges that are before the court came to the attention of the company's management.
8For more than a year after he was arrested, he was unable to secure employment.
9Mr. Logue supported himself by receiving payments from Employment Insurance and Ontario Works.
10Mr. Logue and his brothers recently registered a residential contracting company.
11Mr. Logue and his partner, Meghan Fortune, met in 2004. Ms. Fortune described their relationship as "an overall positive union, which has experienced stressful periods". These periods have included dealing with issues regarding the health and care of their children.
12Mr. Logue and Ms. Fortune have three young children. All their children have medical and/or health issues. One child has a serious medical condition. At one point, this child was in the hospital for eight months, and later that year required a lengthy surgery. This child has done well since they were discharged from the hospital, but their health is a constant concern. Another child has been diagnosed with autism. In part, because of the specialized schooling, therapy and care that this child receives, Mr. Logue and Ms. Fortune have been dealing with significant daily challenges. The third child has a health condition that requires some ongoing attention.
13After Mr. Logue was charged, the York Region Children's Aid Society identified no risk to Mr. Logue's children.
14Mr. Logue told the author of the PSR that "his online conduct was a response to the impact of employment-related stress and the erosion of intimacy in his marital relationship, which he indicated was associated with the overwhelming amount of attention required to provide care to his [child] at birth."
15Mr. Logue told the author of the PSR that online pornography "became boring", and he eventually started using chat rooms.
16Mr. Logue denied that he was attracted to young girls.
17After Mr. Logue was arrested, he began to see a therapist. His therapist described Mr. Logue as "highly engaged" in the counselling process and stated that he was "taking ownership and responsibility for his situation."
18According to the author of the PSR, Mr. Logue is interested in continuing counselling to "address his online conduct".
19Defence counsel filed letters of support from friends and family members of Mr. Logue. Several mentioned his strong work ethic and that Mr. Logue is a devoted and supportive father.
20Mr. Logue's family, including his partner Meghan, were shocked when he was charged with these offences. They viewed this conduct as being out of character for Mr. Logue.
21Mr. Logue lives in a small community. His arrest became widely known in this community. Mr. Logue's therapist noted that "a primary stress" for Mr. Logue has been the impact of his legal situation on his children and on the rest of his family. Part of Mr. Logue's fear relates to the risk of his family being ostracized, targeted and victimized at school and in the community.
22Mr. Logue has a close and positive relationship with his parents, his two brothers and his sister. His parents and one of his brothers live within a few miles of Mr. Logue's home.
23After Mr. Logue was arrested on July 11, 2024, he was released on a strict undertaking. He abided by all the conditions, which were subsequently relaxed with the Crown's consent.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
24The Crown takes the position that the Court should impose a term of imprisonment of 30 months, plus some ancillary orders.
25The defence takes the position that this is a "rare and exceptional case" which calls for the imposition of conditional sentence, to be followed by a period of probation. Alternatively, the defence argues that if the Court concludes a custodial sentence is required, the Court should impose an intermittent sentence.
26With respect to the ancillary orders that are sought by the Crown, the defence takes the following positions:
The defence is not opposed to an order for a DNA sample or a forfeiture order.
The defence is opposed to the Crown's request for a s. 161 order, arguing it is unnecessary. However, the defence argues that if a s. 161 order is necessary, the Court should not impose all the conditions requested by the Crown.
APPLICATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING
Proportionality
27The fundamental principle of sentencing is to impose a sanction that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed, and the degree of responsibility of the person who committed it. This means that, for the sentence I impose to be appropriate, it must be tailored to Mr. Logue's circumstances and the circumstances of the offences he committed.
28The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at paragraphs 96-97, observed that maximum sentences help determine the gravity of an offence.
29Where the Crown proceeds by indictment, an offender guilty of the offence of child luring is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years. In the case at bar, the Crown elected to proceed by indictment.
30I note that the mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment when the Crown elects to proceed by indictment was found to violate s. 12 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter: R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26.
31A decision by Parliament to increase maximum sentences for certain offences shows that Parliament"wanted such offences to be punished more harshly": R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 7.
32Over the years, Parliament has increased maximum sentences for sexual offences against children. As noted by the Supreme Court in Bertrand Marchand, at paragraph 46, over the last 20 years Parliament has elevated the maximum sentence for the offence of child luring on more than one occasion, most recently in 2015.
33In Friesen, at paragraph 95, the Supreme Court stated that Parliament has recognized:
"…the profound harm that sexual offences against children cause and has determined that sentences for such offences should increase to match Parliament's view of their gravity."
34In Friesen, at paragraph 100, the Court stated that to respect Parliament's decision to increase maximum sentences, sentencing judges should:
"…generally impose higher sentences than the sentences imposed in cases that preceded the increases in maximum sentences."
35In Bertrand Marchand, at paragraph 47, the Court stated as follows:
"These legislative changes should be regarded as a sign of Parliament's view of the offence's gravity. They make clear that proportionate sentencing that responds to the gravity of the luring offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender will often require substantial sentences of imprisonment. As a result, courts should depart from dated precedents that do not reflect society's current awareness of the impact of sexual violence on children in imposing a fit sentence." [Case citations removed]
36In R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, at paragraph 56, Justice Paciocco stated as follows:
"The message is clear. Given Friesen and the increase in the maximum penalty for child luring to 14 years in 2015 through the Tougher Penalties for Child Predators Act, the sentencing ranges reflected in existing authority for both child luring and possession of child pornography require reconsideration. Given that the establishment of a sentencing range is best identified incrementally, I do not purport to determine a set range applicable to the kinds of offences that the appellant committed, but it is evident that the existing sentence range cannot be applied without adjustment, and I propose to do so."
37In deciding the appropriate sentence in this case, I have considered Parliament's legislative initiatives in this area.
38In R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, at paragraph 58, the Court concluded as follows:
"If it is shown through the introduction of properly tendered evidence that the offence of luring has become a pervasive social problem, I believe that much stiffer sentences, in the range of three to five years, might well be warranted to deter, denounce and separate from society adult predators who would commit this insidious crime."
39Based on the affidavit of Monique St. Germain, General Counsel for the Centre for Child Protection Inc., which was filed by Crown counsel in this case and not challenged by the defence, and the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Friesen, at paragraphs 46-49, I am satisfied that the offence of child luring has become a pervasive social problem.
40Given the profound harm caused by child luring offences, the gravity of the offences before the court is clearly very high.
41When assessing an offender's degree of responsibility, multiple factors must be considered including: 1) the mens rea of the offence; 2) the offender's conduct in the commission of the offence; 3) the offender's motive; and 4) the offender's personal circumstances: R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, at para. 58.
42The mens rea of Mr. Logue's offences are highly morally blameworthy: R. v. Faroughi, 2024 ONCA 178, at para. 96.
43Over the course of several weeks, Mr. Logue repeatedly communicated with a person he believed to be under 18 years old. The graphic and detailed nature of some of these sexual communications increases his moral culpability.
44In assessing the seriousness of the offences and Mr. Logue's moral culpability, I have also taken into account that he never went to meet "Emma" and he twice cancelled plans to meet her. This is not a mitigating factor but it is a relevant consideration in situating the gravity of the offences: M.V., at para. 60.
45In measuring the gravity of the offence and the degree of Mr. Logue's moral culpability, and situating the offences on that spectrum, a court must consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances: M.V., at para. 45. I will address the mitigating and aggravating factors later in these reasons.
46In Freisen, at paragraph 5, the Court sent a "strong message" to ensure that sentences for sexual offences against children, including child luring, are proportionate and reflect the "wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families and society at large". See also M.V., at para. 51.
47While the absence of a specific victim in child luring cases where an undercover officer is involved is a relevant factor"it should not be overemphasized in arriving at a fit sentence", as the accused can "take no credit for this factor" and "as such, it does not detract from the degree of responsibility of the offender for that offence": Freisen, at para. 93.
The Fundamental Purpose of Sentencing
48The Criminal Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to "respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society". Courts attempt to achieve this goal by imposing just sanctions that address one or more of the following sentencing objectives: denunciation, general and specific deterrence, rehabilitation, making reparation to victims of crime, promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgment of the harm they have caused the community, and specific victims in our community. The relevance and weight to be given to these objectives will vary depending on the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender.
49The objectives of denunciation and deterrence will usually dominate the other objectives when an offence is particularly serious: R. v. Hamilton and Mason, 72 OR (3d) 1 (C.A.), at para. 103.
50For child luring, the paramount sentencing objectives are deterrence and denunciation: M.V., at para. 40; s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code.
51To accomplish deterrence, a sentence must be long enough to discourage both the offender and others from engaging in such behaviour in the future: M.V., at para. 41.
52In cases of offences against children, a sentence must be serious enough to denounce the wrongfulness of the conduct and the actual and potential harm that the offences give rise to: M.V., at para. 41.
53Since courts must individualize the sentence by accounting for a number of factors, even where the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives, judges must apply all the principles mandated by the Criminal Code to craft a sentence that advances the overall objectives of sentencing: Bertrand Marchand, at para. 12.
54I have concluded that Mr. Logue's rehabilitative prospects are reasonably strong. He has no prior criminal record, he has received a significant amount of counselling, and he has expressed a desire to continue counselling. He has the support of his family. Mr. Logue is a very engaged father of three children. I believe that the strong connection that he has to his family will assist in his rehabilitation.
55I note that despite Mr. Logue's anxiety about being ostracized, he and his partner have received support from friends in the community. I expect that these connections will assist Mr. Logue in his rehabilitation.
Other Applicable Sentencing Principles
56While proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing, other principles found in s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code must also be considered when determining the appropriate sentence, including:
a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender;
a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Mitigating Factors
57In this case, the mitigating factors include:
- Mr. Logue has no prior criminal record. The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor. It is also relevant to the principle of restraint. White Mr. Logue is a first offender, he is not a youthful first offender. In assessing the impact of Mr. Logue's previous pro-social conduct in determining a fit sentence, I have taken into account the following guidance from the Court of Appeal in M.V, at paragraph 69:
"…previous prosocial conduct has only limited significance in the sentencing of sexual offences, given that many sexual offences are committed by persons of prior good character and in many cases, prior good character helps enable sexual offences."
Mr. Logue pleaded guilty. That is an important mitigating factor: see M.V., at para. 70. I accept that it was Mr. Logue's intention to plead guilty at an early stage of the proceedings. Having regard to all the circumstances, including what Mr. Logue said at his allocution, I accept that the guilty plea was an expression of remorse by him. His expression of remorse, and the steps he has taken since he was arrested, are important mitigating factors: M.V., at paras. 70-71.
Mr. Logue has taken significant rehabilitative steps by participating in counselling. He has expressed a willingness to continue to take counselling.
Mr. Logue has the support of his family.
Mr. Logue has not committed any offences since he was released from custody.
Mr. Logue served one night in pre-trial custody.
The impact of the strict conditions of his release, which I will address later in these reasons under the heading "Downes credit".
Aggravating Factors
58In this case, the aggravating factors include:
While Mr. Logue had, at times, some doubts as to Emma's age, he ultimately believed that Emma was 14 years old. The photographs that the undercover officer sent to Mr. Logue of Emma were photos of a girl who appeared to be, at most, a very young adolescent.
At one point, Mr. Logue told Emma that "you look like you just turned 14". This did not dissuade Mr. Logue from continuing his communications with Emma.
Mr. Logue engaged in online communications with Emma for many weeks. The commission of these offences was clearly not the product of a momentary lapse in judgment.
Mr. Logue's communications included making plans to meet Emma. However, it is important to acknowledge that Mr. Logue did not actually go to a location to meet Emma.
The character of the communications is an aggravating factor and is relevant to Mr. Logue's moral blameworthiness. These communications were highly sexualized and detailed. Mr. Logue told Emma that he wanted to teach her how to masturbate, he told her that he wanted to give her her first orgasm, he told her that he would bring a morning after pill because he wanted to ejaculate inside of her without a condom, he offered to buy her a sex toy, he told her that he would "push [her] limits a bit" with ejaculation on her belly and chest, he offered to teach her how to give oral sex and he encouraged her to use birth control.
Mr. Logue asked Emma to send him images of herself. Even though the images were not sexually explicit, this is still an aggravating factor and heightens Mr. Logue's moral blameworthiness: Bertrand Marchand, at para. 79.
The communications show that Mr. Logue engaged in a relatively high degree of grooming of Emma for weeks. During these communications, he attempted to build trust through compliments, he offered to buy her gifts and normalized the sexualized behaviour to decrease Emma's inhibitions.
There was a very significant age gap between Mr. Logue and the age he believed Emma to be: Bertrand Marchand, at para. 87.
During his communications with Emma, he counselled her not to tell anyone about their relationship, including her mother. He did this to avoid detection and to facilitate the commission of the offences. This is both an aggravating factor and a relevant consideration in assessing his moral blameworthiness: Bertrand Marchand, at para. 80
Mr. Logue used a false name, which is both an aggravating factor and is relevant in assessing his moral blameworthiness: Bertrand Marchand, at para. 80.
DOWNES CREDIT
59In R. v. Downes, 70 O.R. (3d) 321 (OCA), at paragraph 33, the Court held that in some circumstances, when determining the appropriate sentence, it will be appropriate to take into account the time an offender spent under strict bail conditions.
60As the Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733, at paragraph 114"The relevant inquiry is whether bail conditions were punitive enough to be akin to punishment, thereby warranting mitigation."
61Whether a Downes "credit" should be provided is a matter of discretion for the trial judge: R. v. Eden, 2021 ONCA 733, at para. 10.
62Although sentencing judges often quantify Downes credit, and then reduce the sentence by the number of days credited"pretrial bail is conceptually a mitigating factor, which is to be weighed with all the other relevant factors when determining a fit sentence": R. v. Prindle, 2025 ONCA 386, at para. 12.
63In this case, Mr. Logue was released on an undertaking on July 11, 2024. This undertaking imposed a number of restrictions on him, including on his use of the Internet and access to a cell phone.
64On consent of the Crown, Mr. Logue was later permitted to have limited use of the Internet when communicating with his lawyer, if this was done when Ms. Fortune was home.
65There has been no suggestion that Mr. Logue violated any of the conditions of the undertaking.
66While the conditions of the undertaking were appropriate given the nature of the alleged offences, I am of the view that these conditions had an impact on his ability to carry on normal relations and potentially to secure employment.
67I have chosen not to quantify the Downes credit. Instead, I have taken into account the impact of the conditions of the undertaking as a mitigating factor, which I have considered together with all the other relevant factors when determining a fit sentence.
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
68Any consequence of a criminal sentence must be considered when determining the appropriate sentence.
69Collateral consequences are not, strictly speaking, aggravating or mitigating factors. They are taken into account in sentencing as personal circumstances of an offender: R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, at para. 18. Their relevance "flows from the application of the principles of individualization and parity" and rehabilitation: Pham, at para. 11.
70In this case, the imposition of a custodial sentence will have a significant impact on Mr. Logue's wife and his children. Given his children's medical, health and neurodevelopmental issues, and the fact that Mr. Logue is involved their daily care, his absence will create real challenges for Ms. Fortune and their children.
71The collateral consequences of family separation, including the emotional harm to the family and resulting financial hardship, are factors that must be considered when determining the appropriate sentence: R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, at para. 13. These are factors that are central to proportionality: See D.B., para. 13. Collateral consequences of this nature must be taken into account when determining whether a custodial sentence is a "fit sentence". If a court concludes that a custodial sentence is necessary, these consequences are also relevant when assessing the length of the custodial sentence. In this case, I have taken into account the collateral consequences when deciding both issues.
72While a sentencing judge must consider the collateral consequences of family separation on the offender and his or her family"the sentence imposed must always remain proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender": R. v. L.C., 2022 ONCA 863, at para. 24. In other words, collateral consequences cannot be given undue weight, such that they result in a disproportionate sentence.
RANGE OF SENTENCE
73Sentencing ranges are guidelines, and not fixed rules: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 SCR 366. As the determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise, there will "always be situations that call for a sentence outside a particular range": Lacasse, at para. 58. Sentencing judges retain the flexibility and discretion that is needed to do justice in individual cases.
74The range of sentence for child luring offences has evolved over time. There is still some uncertainty about the bottom end of the range.
75In M.V., at paragraph 87, the Court concluded that five-years imprisonment is at the "upper-range" for child luring offences. As explained below, in M.V. the Court did not clearly arrive at a conclusion regarding the lower end of the range. The Court stated, at paragraph 78, that in the Superior Court there had been "an expression of support for a post-Friesen movement to a three to five-year sentencing range", but observed that in some Superior Court decisions, judges had not raised the sentencing range and imposed sentences of between 12 months to 2 years less a day imprisonment. At paragraph 79, the Court noted that "the range also continues to lean towards reformatory sentences in the Ontario Court of Justice".
76In M.V., at paragraph 81, the Court stated as follows:
"The function of the child luring offences is to prevent assault-based sexual offences before they happen. Often there is no real victim when child luring offences are committed, but an undercover officer posing as a victim."
77Consequently, at paragraph 81 of M.V., the Court concluded:
"Child luring can therefore reasonably be expected to carry a sentencing range that is lower than the range applicable to assault-based sexual offences involving children."
78In M.V., at paragraph 87, the Court expressed "significant reservations" about "endorsing a three-year sentence as the bottom of the range". In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted, at paragraph 85, that child luring can proceed either as a summary or indictable offence, and a summary conviction prosecution carries a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment. The Court was of the view that "it would make little sense to establish a sentencing range for an indictable prosecution of these offences that begins at a higher level than the maximum sentence for summary prosecutions." Finally, in M.V., at paragraph 84, the Court stated as follows:
"…although child luring is a serious offence that will generally require incarceration, it is a broad offence that can be committed by a wide range of offenders in varied situations, some of which may not deserve elevated levels of punishment. The sentencing range that is established must not be narrow and must not have a harsh lower end." [Case citations removed]
79R. v. Baulk, 2025 ONCJ 375 is a recent child luring sentencing decision. In some respects, the facts in Baulk are similar to the facts in the case at bar. In Baulk, Prutschi J. imposed a 22 month jail sentence for a first offender who pleaded guilty to child luring. In that case, the undercover officer posed as a 14-year-old girl. Over the course of nine days, there were communications of a sexual nature between the offender and the undercover officer. The offender asked the "girl" for photos of herself in her underwear. The offender did not attempt to arrange an in-person meeting. There was a 30 year age gap between the offender and the "girl". After he was charged, the offender was fired from his teaching position, stripped of any opportunity to teach again in the future, his marriage broke down and he became alienated from his children. The offender had a positive pre-sentence report, and he completed a significant amount of counselling. Prutschi J. concluded, at paragraph 21, that the lower end of the range of sentence for this offence "hovers around 18 months".
80In the end, Prutschi J. concluded as follows at paragraph 22:
"Bearing in mind the age gap and the prolonged highly sexualized nature of Mr. Baulk's conversations with the fictional child, I find that the appropriate sentence in this case is 22 months in jail. That sentence would have been higher, quite possibly into the penitentiary range, were it not for the importance of Mr. Baulk's guilty plea, his obvious remorseful shame, and the insight he demonstrated into his conduct as illustrated within the PSR."
81In R. v. Dunnett, 2025 ONCA 392, the appellant was convicted of two counts of child luring following a trial. He was sentenced to 15 months incarceration on each count to be served concurrently and probation for two years. A 10 year SOIRA order was also imposed. The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence. The Crown cross-appealed against sentence. The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, save for substituting a 20 year SOIRA order in place of the unlawful 10 year order. In that case, the appellant had online communications with a 13 year old girl and an undercover officer posing as a 14 year old girl. The appellant had a 15 minute Snapchat conversation with the 13 year old girl, during which the appellant offered to send her pictures of his penis. He also sent a blurry photo of what the 13 year old girl thought were male genitals. The appellant's online communications with the undercover officer quickly turned sexual in nature, but were over in a day. This is in stark contrast to the communications that Mr. Logue had with Emma over the course of several weeks. In Dunnett, the appellant sent the undercover officer a photo of an erect penis. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's conclusion was entitled to deference. In rejecting the Crown's argument that the sentence was demonstrably unfit, Associate Chief Justice Fairburn acknowledged, at paragraph 62, that the range for this offence had increased since Friesen:
"…reflecting the growing prevalence of these insidious crimes targeting vulnerable children online, a deeper understanding of the harm they inflict, and an increase in the maximum sentence available for such offences."
82In Dunnett, at paragraph 63, the Court rejected the Crown's argument that the bottom end of the range is two years imprisonment. At paragraph 63, Associate Chief Justice Fairburn noted that the "circumstances of the offence encompass a broad spectrum of conduct". While Associate Chief Justice Fairburn characterized the sentence that was imposed by the trial judge as "undoubtedly lenient", she stated that "although the trial judge could have imposed a higher sentence, that alone does not render it demonstrably unfit": Dunnett, at paras. 65-66. Finally, in dismissing the Crown sentence appeal, Associate Chief Justice Fairburn observed that the trial judge took into account all of the relevant factors, including that the appellant was 21 years old, he had no criminal record, and he had strong family and community support.
83In R. v. Ramsay, 2023 ONCJ 450, the 48 year old first offender pleaded guilty to one count of child luring. The offender was a teacher who communicated with a female student in the school where he was employed. The victim was 16 or 17 years old. The offender engaged in several sexually charged conversations with the victim. The offender struggled with mental illness, social isolation and a learning disability. He was the sole caregiver to his 51-year-old brother who had multiple medical and health issues. His brother was wholly dependent on the offender for daily care, including toileting and bathing. In the end, the trial judge decided that the "decisive factor" in concluding that a conditional sentence of two years less a day was appropriate, was that if the offender were sentenced to a jail term, the community would have to assume responsibility for taking care of his brother. Justice Ducharme of the Superior Court allowed the Crown's appeal against sentence, and held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the circumstances of the offender's brother's need for care were sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate: R. v. Ramsay, [2025] O.J. 1409. Justice Ducharme concluded that a custodial sentence of 18 months should have been imposed.
SITUATING THE SENTENCE WITHIN THE RANGE FOR CHILD LURING OFFENCES
84In my view, given the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the applicable principles of sentencing, but for the significant impact of family separation, a fit sentence for Mr. Logue's offences would be in the middle of the range of sentences for child luring. Were it not for the family separation consequences, I would have imposed a penitentiary sentence.
85However, Mr. Logue's absence will have a real impact on his family's ability to deal with the unique medical, health and educational needs of the three children. I have concluded that the significant hardship to Mr. Logue's family of a custodial sentence warrants moderating the length of the sentence.
86In the unique circumstances of this case, I have concluded that the appropriate sentence is 18 months' imprisonment.
CONDITIONAL SENTENCE
87I will now turn to the question of whether a conditional sentence would be an appropriate sentence. When determining whether a conditional sentence under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code is appropriate, a court "must engage in a two-step process": Faroughi, at para. 102.
88First, a court must make a preliminary determination "that neither probation nor a penitentiary term is appropriate": Faroughi, at para. 102. As I have already indicated, I have concluded that a penitentiary sentence would not be appropriate. Further, a suspended sentence would clearly be inappropriate in this case, as such a sentence would insufficiently advance the objectives of deterrence and denunciation.
89Second, a court must determine, assuming the offender satisfies the other statutory prerequisites enumerated under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, whether a conditional sentence is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing: Faroughi, at para. 102. In this case, the key question when assessing whether a conditional sentence is appropriate, is determining whether a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
90In R. v. M.M., 2022 ONCA 441 at paragraph 16, the Court concluded as follows:
"Conditional sentences for sexual offences against children will only rarely be appropriate. Their availability must be limited to exceptional circumstances that render incarceration inappropriate – for example, where it gives rise to a medical hardship that could not adequately be addressed within the correctional facility."
91In R. v. Pike, 2024 ONCA 608, at paragraph 182, the Court held that in M.M. the Court "used 'exceptional circumstances' as shorthand for personal circumstances and mitigating factors that are sufficiently compelling to make a conditional sentence proportionate."
92In Pike, at paragraph 182, the Court concluded there is no closed list of such circumstances and factors. Indeed, the Court held at paragraph 182 that, in some cases, multiple non-exceptional factors taken together can collectively render a conditional sentence proportionate.
93In this case, given Mr. Logue's personal circumstances, including the fact that he is a first offender and the collateral impact that incarceration would have on his family, I must consider the principle of restraint and assess whether a non-carceral sentence is appropriate.
94In my view, while the principle of restraint is a relevant consideration in this case, it does not take on the same elevated importance as it would if the court were sentencing a first offender who was a teenager or someone in their early 20s when they committed the offences.
95In this case, after considering all the circumstances, I have concluded that given the gravity of the offences committed by Mr. Logue – including the profound harm caused by child luring offences – and the importance of the objectives of deterrence and denunciation, a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
96After taking into account all the relevant circumstances – including family separation consequences – I am not satisfied that these factors considered collectively amount to an exceptional circumstance that renders a conditional sentence appropriate.
97In my view, a custodial sentence is required to properly reflect the seriousness of the offences and to meet the aims of denunciation and general deterrence. A conditional sentence would not achieve these objectives.
INTERMITTENT SENTENCE
98Section 732 of the Criminal Code provides that where a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of 90 days or less on an offender, the court may, having regard to the age and character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the availability of appropriate accommodation to ensure compliance with the sentence, order that the sentence be served intermittently at such times as are specified in the order.
99In this case, an intermittent sentence is not available because I have concluded that, having regard to the gravity of the offences, and the importance of denunciation and general deterrence, a sentence of 90 days' imprisonment or less would not be a proportionate sentence.
CONCLUSION
100After considering all the circumstances, I have concluded that the appropriate sentence is 18 months imprisonment, to be followed by a period of probation of 18 months.
101The terms of the probation order are as follows:
You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
You must appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court.
You must notify the Court or your probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the Court or the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation.
You must report to a probation officer within two working days following your release, and thereafter when required to do so by your probation officer.
You must live at an address approved of by your probation officer, and not change that address unless you receive the permission of your probation officer in advance.
You must attend, actively participate in, and complete to the satisfaction of your probation officer all assessment, counselling or rehabilitative programs as directed by your probation officer including programs on the topics of child exploitation.
You must sign any releases that will enable your probation officer to monitor your attendance and completion of any assessments, counselling or rehabilitative programs.
You are prohibited from using the Internet or other digital network, unless you do so in accordance with the following conditions:
o Where you are not self-employed, with a device issued to you by your employer for the purpose of and while at your place of employment or volunteer work.
o When interacting on any Internet platform you must use your full name as it appears on this order.
o On your personal cell phone, registered in your name, for the purposes of accessing the cellular phone network and not the Internet.
o To use a "smart" television to access streaming services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, Disney+ or similar services.
o You may not access any social media or online messaging platform on ANY device, including but not limited to Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly known as Twitter), Snapchat, TikTok, Omegle, WhatsApp, Telegram, Reddit, WeChat, Weibo, QQ, Quora, Discord, Twitch, or Mastodon.
o When accessing the Internet pursuant to the above-mentioned exceptions, you must not: a) save files in an encrypted fashion; b) have TOR, peer-to-peer, torrent, social media, scrubbing software, Usenet, Freenet or cloud-storage applications installed; c) use any encryption software or security software designed to prevent access to the contents of your Internet capable devices or take independent action to encrypt any digital storage devices in your possession; have any software or service designed to defeat forensic analysis of the Internet capable device; have any program or service designed to allow anonymous use of the Internet (e.g. TOR browser); or have any scrubbing software or software that saves files in an encrypted fashion.
Ancillary Orders
102I also make the following ancillary orders:
An offence under s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code is a primary designated offence under s. 487.04. Mr. Logue must provide a suitable sample of his blood for inclusion in the DNA data base, pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code.
The items included in the draft forfeiture order will be forfeited as offence-based property, pursuant to s. 490.1(1) of the Criminal Code.
Pursuant to s. 490.012 of the Criminal Code, there will be an order requiring that you to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registry Act for 20 years. I see no reasonable basis to not impose this order.
Section 161 Order
103As previously stated, the Crown argues that an order under s. 161 for 10 years should be imposed. The conditions proposed by the Crown would prohibit Mr. Logue from:
Attending a public park or public swimming pool where persons under the age of 16 years are present or expected to be present.
Attending a daycare center, school ground, playground or community center.
Having any conduct – including electronically – with a person who is under the age of 16 years old, unless Mr. Logue is under the supervision of an adult over 30 years old. The Crown is content to have an exception for Mr. Logue's children.
104The Crown also proposes several restrictions on Mr. Logue's access to the Internet or devices that could be used to access the Internet.
105In R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONCA 598, at paragraph 41, the Court stated that"the overarching protective function of s. 161 of the Criminal Code is to shield children from sexual violence".
106A prohibition order under s. 161 falls within the definition of "sentence" in s. 673 of the Criminal Code: R. v. J.B., 2022 ONCA 214, at para. 55.
107The statutory regime for imposing s. 161 orders is "highly tailored and discretionary": R. v. J.D., 2021 ONCA 376, at para. 85; R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31.
108In Schulz, at paragraph 41, the Court stated as follows:
"An order under s. 161 constitutes punishment and is not available as a matter of course: there must be an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a risk to children; the specific terms of the order must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk; and the content of the order must respond carefully to an offender's specific circumstances."
109In J.B., at paragraph 56, the Court stated as follows:
"Related convictions are not prerequisites to an order under s. 161(1). Nor must the offender have committed the offence in the circumstances contemplated by the order. A finding of pedophilia is not necessary either. A sentencing judge need only have an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a serious risk to young children and be satisfied that the terms of the order are reasonable attempt to minimize it."
110In Schulz, the appellant was convicted of one count of possession of child pornography. The appellant was found in possession of 45 unique images of child pornography and 111 unique videos, which the Court of Appeal described as "a significant amount of child pornography". The sentence imposed by the trial judge in Schulz included three years' probation and a s. 161 order for 10 years. The probation order and the s 161 order included a term limiting the offender's use of devices to access the Internet or e-mail, which the appellant challenged on appeal. The trial judge declined to impose certain other terms as requested by the Crown (including limitations on where the appellant could go, who he could contact and the type of employment he could undertake). In deciding not to impose the terms under s. 161(1)(a) to (c) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge in Schulz considered evidence from a psychiatrist that the offender was a low risk for sexual recidivism and the absence of evidence that the offender had contacted or attempted to contact children. The Court of Appeal, at paragraph 56, concluded that the specific conditions the sentencing judge imposed in the s. 161(1)(d) order were, while strict"nonetheless carefully responded to the offender's specific circumstances." The sentence appeal was dismissed.
111In this case, Mr. Logue was, for weeks, engaged in highly sexualized communications, which involved significant grooming, with someone he believed to be a minor. This was not a spur of the moment mistake. After balancing all the relevant factors, while I appreciate that this order will create some difficulties for Mr. Logue and his family, I have concluded that it is necessary to impose an order pursuant to s. 161 for six years. The length of the order and the conditions that I have imposed attempt to minimize the risk that Mr. Logue poses and are responsive to the specific circumstances in this case.
Mr. Logue is prohibited from attending a public park or a public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare center, school ground, playground or community center unless he is in the presence of one of his children or Ms. Fortune.
Mr. Logue is prohibited from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, (whether or not the employment is for financial compensation), or becoming a volunteer in any capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.
Mr. Logue is prohibited from having any contact – including communicating by electronic means – with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless he does so under the supervision of an adult over the age of 30 years. This term does not apply to any contact or communication with his children.
Mr. Logue is prohibited from using the Internet or other digital network, unless he does so in accordance with the following conditions:
o Where he is not self-employed, with a device issued to him by his employer for the purpose of and while at his place of employment or volunteer work.
o When interacting on any Internet platform, he must use his full name as it appears on this order.
o On his personal cell phone, registered in his name, for the purposes of accessing the cellular phone network and not the Internet.
o To use a "smart" television to access streaming services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, Disney+ or similar services.
o Mr. Logue may not access any social media or online messaging platform on ANY device, including but not limited to Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly known as Twitter), Snapchat, TikTok, Omegle, WhatsApp, Telegram, Reddit, WeChat, Weibo, QQ, Quora, Discord, Twitch, or Mastodon.
o When accessing the Internet pursuant to the above-mentioned exceptions, he must not: a) save files in an encrypted fashion; b) have TOR, peer-to-peer, torrent, social media, scrubbing software, Usenet, Freenet or cloud-storage applications installed; c) use any encryption software or security software designed to prevent access to the contents of his Internet capable devices or take independent action to encrypt any digital storage devices in his possession; have any software or service designed to defeat forensic analysis of the Internet capable device; have any program or service designed to allow anonymous use of the Internet (e.g. TOR browser); or have any scrubbing software or software that saves files in an encrypted fashion.
NORTH J.