ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
Central East - Newmarket
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
IRAKLI KRISTESIASHVILI
Before Justice M. Townsend
Sentencing Submissions Heard on March 18, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on March 20, 2026
S. Pearl counsel for the Crown
M. Simrod counsel for the accused Irakli Kristesiashvili
TOWNSEND J.:
1On December 9th, 2025, I found Mr. Kristesiashvili guilty of all 6 counts on the Information:
(1) Possession of a loaded restricted firearm, without being the holder of an authorization or licence permitting such possession at that place and the holder of a registration certificate for the said firearm, contrary to Section 95, subsection (2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
(2) Possession of a weapon and magazine, to wit: a Glock 9 handgun, for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, contrary to section 88, subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
(3) Possession of a prohibited device which was not a replica firearm, namely a 15-round capacity magazine, while knowingly not being the holder of a licence permitting such possession, contrary to Section 92, subsection (3) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
(4) Possession of a prohibited firearm, to wit: a Glock 19 handgun, without being the holder of a licence under which he may possess it and a registration certificate for the firearm, contrary to Section 91, subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
(5) Carrying a concealed a weapon, to wit: Glock 19 handgun without being authorized to do so under the Firearms Act contrary to Section 90, subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
(6) Unlawful possession of a substance, namely methamphetamine, contrary to Section 4, subsection (1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. And,
(7) While bound by a probation order made by the Ontario Court of Justice on June 20, 2023, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with such order, namely "Keep the peace and be of good behaviour.", contrary to Section 733.1, subsection (1) of the Criminal Code.
2The facts as I found them are contained within my judgment on trial, but by way of summary they are as follows:
(i) On September 29th, 2024, Ms. Bertha Alarcon drove into the carpool parking lot at Highway 400 and Highway 7 with her husband. When in the lot, Ms. Alarcon saw a "purse" that was on the road as they were driving past. The zippers on the “purse” were closed. I’ll describe it as more of a "satchel" than a "purse".
(ii) When she opened the satchel, Ms. Alarcon could immediately see a gun concealed inside. Once she saw the gun, she left the satchel where it was because she did not want to touch it. Ms. Alarcon noted also that the bag was quite heavy. She testified that there was nobody else around in the parking lot at the time, and that the police arrived 5 minutes or so after her call to them.
(iii) When Cst. Plummer arrived at the carpool lot, he spoke with Ms. Alarcon, and she advised of the position of the bag in the lot. Cst. Plummer located the bag and looked inside. He located a "head lamp" (which was on), ear buds, a can of beer, a wallet with some contents, and the Glock firearm. Cst, Plummer noted that the Glock firearm had no round in the chamber.
(iv) Within the wallet there were some bank cards, some ID cards, and some VISA and Mastercard cards. All the cards located in the wallet (ID, VISA, Mastercard), save one, were in the name of Mr. Kristesiashvili. On the driver’s licence, again was Mr. Kristesiashvili’s name and an address of 603-180 Dudley Ave, in Thornhill. Mr. Kr Kristesiashvili’s date of birth of Nov 19, 1989, was noted as well.
(v) While Cst. Plummer was in the lot, he heard on his police radio that there was a drunk unwanted male in the area of the nearby theatre. It was eventually relayed to him by other officers that they believed that the drunk individual was the male on the ID located in the satchel.
(vi) Cst. Brett Walton also arrived at the carpool lot. He spoke with Cst. Plummer, and observed Cst. Plummer proving the Glock safe. Cst. Walton took note of the ID also that was found in the wallet. He noted that the health card that was in the wallet was only 4 months old. Mr. Kristesiashvili's name, picture and date of birth were on the identification cards. Cst. Walton then went to the Moxies to investigate the unwanted person call. At the time he had no idea that the calls were related.
(vii) Cst. Walton got to the Moxies, spoke to staff, and was told that the person that they called about was out on the patio area. The patio was dark and when he went out there Cst. Walton could hear the male snoring. The male was unresponsive, not talking but mumbling. He was mumbling in what the officer thought was Russian. The male had no shoes on, and his socks were covered in dirt and grass. It was at this time that Cst. Walton realized that the male he was dealing with matched the ID found in the satchel that contained the firearm.
(viii) Cst. Walton noted that the grass and dirt on the male's socks was significant because there was a significant grassy area on an "as the crown flies" route from the carpool lot to the Moxies. In cross-examination Cst. Walton noted that he has a recollection that there were a pair of shoes randomly in the carpool lot, but those shoes were never seized or photographed. Nor is there mention of those shoes in his notes.
(ix) In a search incident to arrest a small baggie with a white substance was in the pockets of Mr. Kristesiashvili. It was admitted as between the parties that that substance is Methamphetamine. Also located in his pockets were a cell phone, keys and some cash.
(x) Officers also executed a search warrant on Unit 603 at 180 Dudley Ave. Their purpose was to search for firearms accessories, firearms, documentation and ammunition. At the time of the execution of that search warrant, Mr. Kristesiashvili’s mother and brother were located within the residence. Of significance a safe was located. Inside the safe, some miscellaneous papers, 6 bullets not in packaging, passports, and 3 drivers licenses were located. 2 licenses were in the name of Irakli Kristesiashvili with a date of birth of 1989 Nov 19 and an address of 603-108 Dudley. I was not told the calibre of the bullets from the safe.
3It is upon these general facts, and the conclusions drawn in my judgement on trial, that I am satisfied that Mr. Kristesiashvili is guilty of all 6 counts contained on the Information.
Application of the principle in R. v. Kienapple
4At the outset of the sentencing hearing, both the Crown and counsel for Mr. Kristesiashvili urged the application of the principle in R. v. Kienapple, 1974 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 on Counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 on the Information, following a conviction on Count 1. While I agree with counsel as it relates to Counts 2 and 4, I disagree with respect to Counts 3 and 5.
5The principle that emerged from R. v. Kienapple explains and perhaps expands the common law rule prohibiting more than one conviction for the same criminal action. Kienapple provides that where the same criminal transaction gives rise to two or more offences with substantially the same elements and an accused is found guilty of more than one of those offences, that accused should be convicted of only the most serious of the offences. The other charges should be stayed. See: R. v. Kienapple, supra, at p.540; and R. v. R.K., 2005 21092 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 2434 (CA) at para 28.
6Chief Justice Dickson (as he then was) in R. v. Prince, 1986 40 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480 identified that the Kienapple rule precluded multiple convictions for different offences only where there is both a legal and factual nexus connecting the offences. “The factual nexus is established where the charges arise out of the same transaction. The legal nexus exists if the offences constitute a single wrong or delict.”
7In discussing the factual and legal nexus requirements, Justice Doherty in R. v. R. K., supra, described their application as follows:
[33] The factual nexus is most obvious where offences arise out of the same act. Kienapple and Prince are examples of a single act leading to multiple charges. A transaction can, however, include more than a single isolated act: Prince at p. 44. The adequacy of the factual nexus between offences for the purposes of invoking the rule in Kienapple cannot be determined in the abstract, but must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. In describing the factual nexus inquiry, Dickson C.J.C. said in Prince at p. 44:
Such difficulties will have to be resolved on an individual basis as cases arise, having regard to factors such as the remoteness or proximity of the events in time and place, the presence or absence of relevant intervening events (such as the robbery conviction in Côté), and whether the accused's actions were related to each other by a common objective. In the meantime, it would be a mistake to emphasize the difficulties. In many cases, including the present appeal, it will be clear whether or not the charges are founded upon the same act.
[34] While there will inevitably be close cases, the factual nexus inquiry dictated by the Kienapple rule is relatively straightforward. The legal nexus inquiry, however, is more nuanced. A comparison of the constituent elements of the offences in issue is an essential part of the legal nexus inquiry. However, the mere fact that offences share common elements does not establish a sufficient legal nexus between those offences to warrant the application of the Kienapple rule. The legal nexus inquiry is directed not at finding common elements between offences, but at determining whether there are different elements in the offences which sufficiently distinguish them so as to foreclose the application of the Kienapple rule. As indicated in Prince at p. 49:
[T]he requirement of sufficient proximity between offences will only be satisfied if there is no additional and distinguishing element that goes to guilt contained in the offence for which a conviction is sought to be precluded by the Kienapple principle.
[37] In Prince at pp. 49-51, Dickson C.J.C. provided guidance as to the situations in which there will be a sufficient legal nexus to justify the application of the Kienapple rule. He described three categories of cases where the legal nexus between offences will be established. I need not repeat those categories here. In essence, each presents a situation in which the offences charged do not describe different criminal wrongs, but instead describe different ways of committing the same criminal wrong.
[38] Dickson C.J.C. in Prince at pp. 51-54 further elucidated the legal nexus inquiry by referring to three factors that will defeat any claim that different offences have a sufficient legal nexus to warrant the application of the Kienapple rule. These factors do bear repeating in these reasons. First, where the offences are designed to protect different societal interests, convictions for both offences will not offend the Kienapple rule. Second, where the offences allege personal violence against different victims, Kienapple will not foreclose convictions for offences relating to each victim. Third, where the offences proscribe different consequences, the Kienapple rule will not bar multiple convictions.
[39] I think the three factors identified in Prince as severing any possible legal nexus between offences provide further support for the view that the crucial distinction for the purposes of the application of Kienapple rule is between different wrongs and the same wrong committed in different ways. If the offences target different societal interests, different victims, or prohibit different consequences, it cannot be said that the distinctions between the offences amount to nothing more than a different way of committing the same wrong.
8I agree with counsel that the criminal wrong sought to be identified in Counts 2 and 4 on the Information before me is the same as the criminal wrong identified in Count 1. A conviction for an offence under section 95(2) of the Criminal Code, contains within it the same legal and factual nexus to both section 91(1) offences and section 88(1) offences. The possession of a loaded prohibited firearm without being the holder of an authorization or licence permitting such possession can be for no purpose other than one dangerous to the public peace.
9Similarly, if an individual is convicted of a section 95(2) offence, then naturally a legal and factual nexus exists between that offence and a section 91(1) offence. Possession of a loaded prohibited firearm without being the holder of an authorization or licence permitting such possession, is strikingly similar to the possession of a prohibited firearm without being the holder of a licence under which one may possess it and a registration certificate for the firearm. We are talking about the same firearm for both offences.
10I agree that Counts 2 and 4 on the Information before me ought to be stayed pursuant to the principle in R. v. Kienapple.
11Counts 3 and 5 however are different offences than the section 95(2) offence, for which there are different elements, and no legal nexus exists.
12Section 92(3) is concerned primarily with the possession of a prohibited device. It matters not, i.e. it is not an essential element of the offence that an over capacity magazine is loaded within the prohibited firearm referenced in the section 95(2) offence. Said another way, one can be convicted of a section 95(2) offence regardless of whether the firearm is loaded with an over capacity magazine or not. As well, one can be convicted of a section 92(3) offence regardless of whether that prohibited device is loaded within a firearm or on its own. Put even simpler, you can have a conviction on a section 95(2) offence without a section 92(3) offence, and vice versa. They are two separate offences.
13If the section 95(2) offence on the information were particularized as being loaded with an over capacity magazine, then it may strengthen the Kienapple argument – but that is not the case here.
14The same argument holds for the section 90(1) offence. The primary element of the section 90(1) is the carrying of a concealed weapon. This is an action which goes over and above the simple possession element as contemplated in the section 95(2) offence. The additional act of concealing – or hiding in a satchel – severs any legal nexus between a section 95(2) offence and a section 90(1) offence.
15The Ontario court of Appeal in R. v. Singh, [1983] O.J. No. 138 at paragraph 18 held:
[18] Turning now to the appeal against sentence, counsel for the appellant argued that the offence of carrying a concealed weapon and being in possession of a restricted weapon arose out of the same delict and the principle of Kienapple v. The Queen, 1974 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 should be applied. However, the elements that make up the two offences are not the same. The "possession of a restricted weapon" offence contains elements distinct from that of "carrying a concealed weapon". Without multiplying examples, a concealed weapon need not be a restricted weapon. I do not agree that the conviction in the instant case offends the rule against multiple convictions.
16Accordingly, convictions will be entered on Counts 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 on the Information. Counts 2 and 4 will be marked stayed pursuant to the principle in R. v. Kienapple.
Positions of the Parties
17Counsel for Mr. Kristesiashvili submits that the proper sentence is one of 3 years custody, less 15 months credit given for time spent in pre-sentence custody and on restrictive bail conditions, leaving the remainder of the 3 years left to serve.
18Counsel for the Crown submits that the proper sentence, given Mr. Kristesiashvili’s record, and the facts upon which I found him guilty is 3.5 years in the penitentiary. The Crown submits that 5 months credit ought to be given for the pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.
Background of Mr. Kristesiashvili
19Mr. Kristesiashvili is 36 years of age, he is single, and he has no children. He was born in the country of Georgia and came to Canada with his parents and two brothers in September 2003.
20Mr. Kristesiashvili has a prior criminal record, including convictions for Public Mischief, Mischief Under $5000, Attempting to Obstruct Justice, Theft from Mail, and Failing to Comply with Undertakings.
21A pre-sentence report was ordered and has been marked as an exhibit on this hearing. The report is generally positive, and in line with the words spoken by Mr. Kristesiashvili’s mother, his friend, and Mr. Kristesiashvili himself at the sentencing hearing. All spoke of a man who has the support of his family, has endured some hardship in his life, and is a hard-working entrepreneur.
22In the pre-sentence report, Mr. Kristesiashvili indicates to the writer that he does not have a “problem” with drugs or alcohol, just that he is a habitual social user. Counsel for Mr. Kristesiashvili takes the opposite approach, and when questioned on Mr. Kristesiashvili’s position in the PSR, counsel indicated that this is the hallmark of someone who is an addict, they may not be prepared to admit it. Mr. Kristesiashvili did indicate in the PSR that prior to the offence he had not slept for a number of days.
23With respect to why he had a firearm, Mr. Kristesiashvili said “I just like guns, for hunting”. Then, however, he admitted that he has in fact never been hunting but just likes watching hunting videos. Mr. Kristesiashvili stated that he has never had concerns for his personal safety.
24Mr. Kristesiashvili expressed remorse and has taken responsibility for his actions.
Principles of Sentencing
25As outlined in section 718 of the Criminal Code of Canada, and as referenced in caselaw for years, the primary principles of sentencing with respect to firearms offences must be general deterrence and denunciation.
26In determining a fit sentence, a sentencing judge must consider several factors including the nature of the offence and the personal characteristics of the offender. A sentencing judge must weigh the principles outlined in section 718 of the Criminal Code, the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the principles of totality and restraint.
27Proportionality is a principle that governs the fitness of a sentence imposed on an offender. It requires that a sentence be proportionate not only to the gravity of the offence, but also to the degree of responsibility of the offender who committed that offence.
28The severity of a sentence depends not only upon the seriousness of the consequences of a crime, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender's degree of responsibility for that crime, the heavier the penalty. See: R. v. Capehart, [2025] O.J. No. 5101 at para. 14.
29I accept that Mr. Kristesiashvili has been convicted of “possession” offences as opposed to “use” offences, but the scourge of criminality related to the presence of firearms in our communities remains the same. The comments of Justice Harris in R. v. Chizanga, [2020] O.J. No. 3292 (SCJ) at paragraph 7 bear emphatic repeating:
[7] The primary purpose of illegal guns is to threaten, to maim and to kill. Lawyers and judges see first-hand the destruction wrought by guns. They are a disease, a plague on our communities. We have the means at our disposal to eradicate or at least to drastically curtail them. It is difficult to understand why our society would not do everything in its power to ensure that guns are not available for criminal purposes.
[8] Guns empower the unempowered. A person with a gun in their hands has a god-like power over life and death. Virtually all that is necessary is to point at another person and to apply a few pounds of pressure on the trigger in order to end a human life.
[9] To possess an illegal gun requires only the right connections and some money. No education, no accomplishment, no reputation in the community, no intelligence, nothing. As this case graphically illustrates, as is often true, an illegal gun could not find its way into worse hands. The disparity between the power of a gun and the preconditions necessary to obtaining it are a modern nightmare. Such immense power with so little reason must be opposed with everything at our disposal.
[10] The ease of killing with a gun, as the last decades in North American have sadly shown, is an exigent danger to us all. It is difficult to understand how such a grave threat to our well-being can be allowed to continue. We have become numb to the terrible consequences. Inundation of information about mass shootings and the almost daily prevalence of horrifying news about gun deaths dulls our senses. Description of the details of individual cases is an important antidote to wake us from our complacency.
30The Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R. v. Danvers, 2005 30044 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 3532 (CA) at para. 78, "our courts have to address the principles of denunciation and deterrence for gun related crimes in the strongest possible terms".
31Justice Goldstein in R. v. Sampogana, [2020] O.J. No. 692 (SCJ), and Justice Molloy in R. v. Hanse, [2019] O.J. No. 1418 (SCJ) both extensively outline oft cites cases which stress the importance of general deterrence and denunciation when sentencing offenders for firearms offences. These cases reflect the recognition that even simple possession of firearm offences present a clear and viable danger to society despite their use.
Credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions
32Both parties agree that Mr. Kristesiashvili ought to get come credit for the time he spent in pre-sentence custody, and the time that he spent on restrictive bail conditions, but that time credit differs as between the Crown and the defence.
33Mr. Kristesiashvili spent 5 real days in pre-sentence custody. He is entitled to 8 days enhanced credit for those days.
34Upon his release from custody, and for 15 months since, Mr. Kristesiashvili has been on restrictive bail, with an ankle monitor. Counsel submits that while Mr. Kristesiashvili has been able to work, he has only been able to work with his brother and has only been out of the house for the purposes of work with his brother.
35Counsel for Mr. Kristesiashvili submits that credit of 15 months (2 months shy of the entire time) ought to be given for time spent on restrictive bail conditions. The Crown submits that credit for 1/3 of that time (5 months) ought to be given.
36Any credit given on sentence for time spent on restrictive bail conditions is discretionary, and up to the sentencing judge.
37In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at paragraph 112, Justice Wagner (as he then was) stated: “The courts have seemed quite reluctant to grant a credit where the release of the accused was subject to restrictions, given that such restrictive release conditions are not equivalent to actually being in custody ("bail is not jail"): R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.); R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, 87 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 36; R. v. Panday, 2007 ONCA 598, 87 O.R. (3d) 1.”
38In R. v. Downes, 2006 3957 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 555 (CA), Justice Rosenberg notes:
[29] On the other hand, some of the same considerations that justify credit for pre-sentence custody apply to an offender who has spent a long time under house arrest. Stringent bail conditions, especially house arrest, represent an infringement on liberty and are, to that extent, inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. House arrest is a form of punishment, albeit of a different character than actual incarceration. Pre-sentence house arrest varies little in character from the house arrest that is often imposed as a term of a conditional sentence under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code. …
39In R. v. L.L., [2026] O.J. No. 696 (SCJ), Justice Lemay notes at paragraph 74:
[74] These principles have been addressed in more recent cases. In R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733, 153 O.R. (3d) 145, the Court noted (at para. 108):
[108] The propriety of treating "stringent bail conditions, especially house arrest", as a sentencing consideration was affirmed in R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321, [2006] O.J. No. 555, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 488 (C.A.), at para. 33. Although it is not uncommon to speak of providing "credit" for stringent bail conditions, "pre-trial bail is conceptually a mitigating factor" in assessing a fit sentence: R. v. Panday (2007), 2007 ONCA 598, 87 O.R. (3d) 1, [2007] O.J. No. 3377 (C.A.) [at para. 28]. Mitigation is given because stringent bail conditions can be punitive and therefore "akin" to custody: Downes, at para. 29. The criteria to be considered in assessing the weight of the mitigation to be given therefore include the amount of time spent on bail conditions; the stringency of those conditions; their impact on the offender's liberty; and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity: R. v. Place, [2020] O.J. No. 3685, 2020 ONCA 546 (C.A.), at para. 20. The mitigating effect that such considerations have on the sentence to be imposed falls within the discretion of the trial judge: Downes, at para. 37.
[75] In Joseph, the Court goes on to note (at para. 114) that the relevant inquiry is whether the bail conditions were punitive enough to be akin to punishment, thereby warranting mitigation. That requires a review of the effect of the bail conditions on the offender.
40I’m told that the restrictive bail conditions placed on Mr. Kristesiashvili restricted his ability to go outside his residence, and he was required to wear an ankle monitor. While there were terms akin to house arrest, Mr. Kristesiashvili was able to go to work with his brother and maintain employment while on bail.
41I agree that some credit should be given to Mr. Kristesiashvili for the time that he spent on restrictive bail conditions and the 8 days that he spent in pre-sentence custody. While “bail is not jail”, the conditions placed on Mr. Kristesiashvili were restrictive and placed significant limitations on his liberty.
42I find that Mr. Kristesiashvili is entitled to 6 months credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody, and time spent on restrictive bail conditions.
Range of Sentence
43Courts have routinely pronounced that sentences for firearms offences must further the goals of denunciation, deterrence and protection of the public. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, while affirming the decision of Justice Doherty at the Ontario Court of Appeal, stated the following at paragraph 82:
[82] Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct. Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed, "stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade... . [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public": para. 51. At this end of the range - indeed for the vast majority of offences - a three-year sentence may be appropriate. A little further along the spectrum stands the person whose conduct is less serious and poses less danger; for these offenders three years' imprisonment may be disproportionate, but not grossly so. At the far end of the range, stands the licensed and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise [page815] merit under the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code
44R. v. Nur struck down the previous three-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm. Nevertheless, even after mandatory minimum sentence was struck down, the Ontario Court of Appeal has held that people who possess a loaded restricted firearm and engage in criminal activity or activity that poses a danger to the public should still receive exemplary sentences in the range of three to five years: See: R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692, [2015] O.J. No. 5348 (CA) at para. 47:
[47] In R. v. Nur, 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 206, this court held that, the s. 95 statutory mandatory minimum aside, offenders who engage in s. 95 offences at the "true crime end of the s. 95 spectrum of offences" should continue to receive exemplary sentences that emphasize deterrence and denunciation. Nur provides, at para. 206, that: "[i]ndividuals who have loaded, restricted or prohibited firearms that they have no business possessing anywhere or at any time, and who are engaged in criminal conduct or conduct that poses a danger to others" will still attract such sentences, regardless of the constitutionality of the three-year minimum penalty.
45The three to five year range has been found to been appropriate even when the defendant is a young first-time offender. For defendants with a criminal record involving firearms offences, the range is much higher. See: R. v. Chambers, 2013 ONCA 680, R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68, R. v. Graham, 2018 ONSC 6817 at para. 38.
46The principle of proportionality – Mr. Kristesiashvili’s degree of responsibility coupled with the seriousness of the offence – places Mr. Kristesiashvili at the lower end of the three to five year range. Mr. Kristesiashvili comes before the court not as a first-time offender. He has a prior weapons conviction (non-firearm) for which he received a suspended sentence, and convictions for mischief and breached of court orders. He was in possession of this firearm in a public place, while intoxicated, and together with a small amount of methamphetamine. A constellation of circumstances which had the potential to cause grave danger to the public.
47Despite the recognition of this range in sentence time and time again by courts across the country, and despite the recognition that this range reflects the principles of general deterrence and denunciation as it applies to firearms offences, people still aren’t getting the message. Our courts in Canada, and in particular here in the Greater Toronto area, are full of offences related to the use and/possession of firearms. Everyone knows the danger of firearms, everyone knows that firearms are designed to kill, and everyone knows that if you use or are in possession of a firearm you are liable to a significant penitentiary sentence, even as a first-time offender. Despite this – the offence continues.
48I adopt the comments of my brother Justice Robichaud in R. v. Mann, [2025] O.J. No. 4145 at paragraph 34:
[34] It is hard to know whether this is driven by a sense of indifference, a feeling of impunity, confidence in concealment, or a sentiment that gun crime is not treated severely enough to sufficiently deter individuals from possessing them. I doubt the courts will ever come to sufficiently understand or deter some individuals' willingness to commit these crimes despite the most severe of sentences or while on court orders not to do so.
49Perhaps it is time that the paramount principle of sentencing when it comes to firearms offences – possession and use – becomes protection of the public as opposed to general deterrence and denunciation. The latter don’t seem to be working, so perhaps it is time for the former to step up.
Conclusion
50Based on all the circumstances, the background of Mr. Kristesiashvili, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the principles of sentencing as outlined in the Criminal Code and in the common law specifically with respect to firearms offences, I find the appropriate sentence for Mr. Kristesiashvili on all counts is as follows:
Count #1 – 3.5 years custody;
Count #2 – Stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple;
Count #3 – 2 years plus one day custody, concurrent to Count #1;
Count #4 – Stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple;
Count #5 – 2 years plus one day custody, concurrent to Count #1;
Count #6 – 6 months custody, concurrent to Count #1; and
Count #7 – 6 months custody, concurrent to Count #1.
51Given my findings above with respect to the application of credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody, and time spent on restrictive bail conditions, 6 months credit will be deducted from the overall concurrent sentence. This leaves 3 years remaining to serve in custody.
52I will also impose a s.109 Order for life, and a DNA Order on the s.95(2) offence as it is a secondary designated DNA offence.
Released: March 20, 2026
Signed: Justice M. Townsend