WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

CITATION: R. v. Albert, 2026 ONCJ 156

DATE: March 2, 2026

Information No. 4011-998-19-1256-00

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

v.

MICHEL ALBERT

R U L I N G O N A P P L I C A T I O N (A m i c u s)

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE L. KIM

on March 2, 2026, at SUDBURY, Ontario

APPEARANCES:

K. Abbott Counsel for the Crown

Michel Albert Self-Represented

MONDAY, MARCH 2, 2026

R U L I N G O N A P P L I C A T I O N (Amicus)

KIM, J. (Orally):

I was assigned as the trial judge for the remainder of this case on February the 18th, 2026, due to Justice Buttazzoni's retirement. The Crown brought a formal application to have amicus appointed to assist the accused, Mr. Michel Albert, in these proceedings. He brought forward this application on February the 18th, 2026, in anticipation that he would fire his then lawyer, Mr. Denis Michel. The Crown's expectation proved to be correct, as on that date, Mr. Albert formally discharged his lawyer. He now finds himself to be self-represented to defend himself in the context of a complex dangerous offender proceeding that will include expert evidence in layers of evidence spanning over the course of many years, not just in the current case, but in other cases in which he was convicted.

In rare circumstances, the appointment of amicus is necessary to avoid perceived or actual unfairness by discharging adversarial functions typically performed by defence counsel. The scope of the role of amicus is broad enough to encompass such adversarial functions, but also is limited. The scope of permissible functions for amicus is limited by their fundamental role as a friend of the court. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers Association of Ontario, 2013 SCC 43, there are two constraints that emerge from the nature of the role of amicus who is a friend of the court. Firstly, counsel appointed as amicus cannot uphold a simultaneous duty of loyalty to the accused. Counsel acting as amicus cannot be expected, at the same time, to uphold a duty of loyalty to Mr. Albert and a duty to the court. This prevents amicus from forming a solicitor-client relationship with Mr. Albert. This means that once I appoint amicus, they cannot maintain any solicitor-client relationship with Mr. Albert. They can still advocate in the interest of him to provide a balanced narrative to the court, but they cannot represent him in these proceedings. Accordingly, amicus cannot be given functions that would undermine the court's duty of impartiality.

A second constraint that emerges from the nature of the role of amicus, and that is when appointing amicus, I must tailor the scope of the appointment with particular sensitivity to the limitations imposed by Mr. Albert and his right to control his own defence. As a constitutional right, Mr. Albert has control over key litigation decisions which advance trial fairness by preserving societal respect for his individual autonomy. The right to self-representation also means that Mr. Albert, so long as he is fit to stand trial, can make strategic decisions that may be seen as unwise or even detrimental to his own defence. An amicus does not take instructions from Mr. Albert and cannot be dismissed by him. Although amicus can advocate in ways that advance Mr. Albert's defence, they do not represent him in these proceedings.

The Crown is requesting the appointment of amicus for the following reasons identified in their factum. Firstly, concerns with respect to the length of time that Mr. Albert's matters have been before the court. It has been several years since Mr. Albert was first charged, had his trial and was convicted by the previous trial judge. The first sentencing hearing that was scheduled for 10 days was expected to commence in December 2024. However, just prior to commencement, Mr. Albert brought an application to adjourn that was opposed by the Crown. The matter was ultimately rescheduled for another 10-day hearing expected to take place May the 25th to June the 5th, 2026. On February 18th, 2026, the first time I presided in this case, Mr. Albert indicated to me that he was seeking another adjournment to permit the Court of Appeal to adjudicate a number of his appeals that he has filed in that court. One of those appeals concerns this current case at bar.

A second reason why the Crown is requesting amicus is because of the legal complexity of a dangerous offender hearing. Mr. Albert has also expressed his intention to pursue a Charter application under section 11(b), and although not yet perfected, he has filed a notice to that effect on the last date. Both the dangerous offender hearing as well as the Charter application will be lengthy and complex.

Thirdly, the Crown wishes to have amicus appointed because of the potential jeopardy that Mr. Albert faces in a dangerous offender application. He is facing a potential indeterminate sentence.

Fourthly, the Crown is concerned about Mr. Albert's behaviour in the proceedings, and finally the potential for Mr. Albert to directly cross-examine the complainant or her family if they wish to file a Victim Impact Statement.

Prior to adjourning on the last date, I provided Mr. Albert with the leading case on the appointment of amicus from the Supreme Court of Canada, and that case is Kahsai, 2023 SCC 20. I had expressed to him that I was contemplating appointing amicus and granting the Crown's application, because I felt that he could benefit from some assistance in conducting his own defence, although he would ultimately choose his own defence, but that amicus could provide him with some procedural and legal advice to advance his arguments. Mr. Albert indicated that he would consider the Crown's application and my comments, and wanted an opportunity to think about whether the appointment of amicus is something he would consent to. He was quite adamant that he wished to represent himself in these proceedings. I expressed concern to him given the complexity of the case, and I asked him to refer to the decision from the Supreme Court that I provided him, that might shed some light on how amicus can assist him in conducting his own defence. Notably, although the Crown has served the application to appoint amicus upon Mr. Albert's previous counsel, Mr. Albert himself was not provided a copy of the Crown's application until after Mr. Albert fired his lawyer, and the case was made returnable before me on February the 18th, 2026. Earlier today, Mr. Albert has made it clear to me that he does not wish to have amicus appointed by the court to assist him in any way.

In our system of justice, the trial judge retains broad discretion to appoint amicus where necessary to ensure trial fairness and the proper functioning of the court. A judge may appoint amicus when it is necessary to secure trial fairness, particularly where the accused is self-represented and unable or unwilling to advance a meaningful defence. The Supreme Court in Kahsai emphasized an amicus can be used as a flexible tool to maintain fairness in an adversarial system. The use of an amicus is therefore to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. I must balance Mr. Albert's constitutional right to control his own defence, his right to a fair trial, and my need to ensure that I can fulfil my duty and fairly administer justice by the correct disposal of the case.

Having considered the Crown's application and materials in support of the application to appoint amicus for Mr. Albert, I am of the view that appointment of amicus is necessary to permit me to ensure a fair proceeding in this case. This is not a standard sentencing hearing. Mr. Albert is facing a risk of a dangerous offender designation and potentially an indeterminate sentence. His liberty is at risk, and the evidence against him is complex, and comes in the form of expert evidence, and spans many years in multiple proceedings. For even a very well seasoned criminal lawyer, this is a difficult case, and for Mr. Albert who is not legally trained and is self-represented, I am concerned that without the appointment of amicus, that my duty to ensure that he has a fair proceeding would not be fulfilled.

Additionally, given the complexity and history of these proceedings, there is an increased likelihood that I will be brought into the fray in this adversarial process. While I appreciate that Mr. Albert is well-spoken and expresses himself in written form effectively, this is a complex case that requires a significant amount of judicial resources and will overlap with a lengthy history and complex legal principles. I am mindful that the file is voluminous, complex, and that his status as a self-represented litigant was only formalized two weeks ago. I am concerned that with this rapidly approaching hearing date at the end of May 2026 that Mr. Albert may not prepare effectively for what may be an extremely difficult, lengthy, and complex hearing involving expert evidence.

The court benefits in the adversarial process by hearing able arguments made from both ends of the counsel table. In order for me to have all of the information and relevant legal arguments brought to my attention in these proceedings that protect Mr. Albert's full answer and defence rights, amicus must be appointed to assist the court. Because the mandate of amicus is to act as a lawyer for the court, they cannot be given functions that would essentially undermine the court's duty of impartiality, for example, by advising Mr. Albert on strategic litigation decisions.

In this case, I am persuaded that amicus should be appointed to assist the court as follows: to advise Mr. Albert about points of law and legal issues; to advise Mr. Albert on the rules of criminal procedure and rules of the Ontario Court of Justice; to advise Mr. Albert on case management issues and attend case management appearances; to discuss legal issues with the Crown on behalf of Mr. Albert; to cross-examine the complainant or relative of the complainant who is required to provide evidence during the sentencing hearing; and, finally, to speak to the court on behalf of the accused in relation to legal issues. Accordingly, I am appointing a counsel as amicus in these proceedings. Mr. Abbott, did you indicate that Mr. Stickland is prepared to take on this responsibility?

K. ABBOTT: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Accordingly, Mr. Wayne Stickland shall be noted as amicus counsel in this case. Amicus counsel agrees to abide by Legal Aid Ontario's policies and procedures, including authorization for disbursements, budget setting, monitoring, and review of accounts, billing practices and payment rules. Amicus counsel shall promptly provide Legal Aid Ontario with a copy of this order. Amicus counsel agrees to promptly advise Legal Aid Ontario if this court subsequently alters the scope of this appointment. And Legal Aid Ontario shall manage funding of amicus counsel in accordance with this order and Legal Aid Ontario's policies and procedures, including authorization for disbursements, budget setting, monitoring and review of accounts, billing practices, and payment rules.