P.S. v. T.O., 2026 ONCJ 151

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: P.S. v. T.O., 2026 ONCJ 151

DATE: March 13, 2026

COURT FILE No.: Toronto DFO-26-000120-00

BETWEEN:

P.S.

Applicant

— AND —

T.O.

Respondent

Before Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin

Heard on March 10, 2026.

Reasons for Judgement released on March 13, 2026

Barry Nussbaum counsel for the applicant

Ayesha Hussain counsel for the respondent

DAUDLIN J.:

Part One – Introduction

1This is an urgent interim motion brought by the applicant, P.S., (“the father”), seeking to change the final parenting order of Justice Khemani dated December 14, 2018, on an interim basis. He seeks orders including:

(1) Sole decision‑making responsibility respecting the child, A.’s (“the child”), education and health.

(2) Authority to change the child’s school, or, in the alternative, as amended on March 9, 2026, an order that the child remain in her current school until the end of the semester but reside primarily with him on an interim basis.

(3) The appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

2The respondent, T.O., (“the mother”) opposes the substantive relief sought by the father and asks that the motion be dismissed, with the existing orders remaining in force. She does, however, consent to the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Part Two – Background

2.1 Family Background

3The father is 39 years old.

4The mother is 35 years old.

5The parties are the parents of one child, A., who is now 12 years old.

6The parties separated in 2014 and were previously before the court, resulting in final parenting and support orders made on consent by Justice Khemani on August 2, 2018, and December 14, 2018 (together referred to as “the final orders”). Under those final orders, the mother had the child’s primary residence and sole decision‑making responsibility, subject to notice provisions, and the father exercised parenting time pursuant to a defined schedule, together with child support and related financial obligations.

7The present proceedings arise out of events beginning in November 2025, when concerns were raised regarding the child’s exposure to sexualized online content, her interactions with peers at school, and related issues of supervision, safety, and emotional wellbeing.

8On November 8, 2025, during his parenting time, the father discovered explicit sexual images and messages with a male peer involving the child on her phone. He raised these concerns with the mother later that day and followed up on November 9, 2025.¹

9In the weeks that followed, the parties disagreed about the seriousness of the November 8 incident and the appropriate response. The father proposed a number of immediate measures, including restrictions on phone use, increased supervision, and school‑based intervention.

10On November 29, 2025, the father contacted the child’s school to raise concerns, and a meeting with school officials took place on December 1, 2025. Following that meeting, the school implemented measures to limit contact between the child and the male peer in question and to increase supervision, and provided both parents with resources relating to online safety and mental‑health supports.

11An additional incident involving contact between the child and the same male peer occurred later in December 2025, after which the parties’ disagreements continued.

12The father took the position that these events, viewed cumulatively, together with the parties’ inability to agree on how they should be addressed, constituted a material change in circumstances since the making of the 2018 consent orders.

2.2 Procedural Context

13On January 23, 2026, the father simultaneously issued a Motion to Change and brought a Form 14B motion, seeking leave to proceed on an urgent basis or, in the alternative, to have the matter scheduled for an urgent conference. He asserted that there had been a material change in circumstances since the making of the final orders and sought significant variations to the existing parenting regime, including sole decision‑making responsibility, authority to change the child’s school, primary residence of the child, and a reversal of the child support orders if successful on the parenting regime sought.

14The father also requested the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

15The Form 14B motion came before the court that same day. The court was satisfied that the issues raised warranted urgent attention and directed that an urgent case conference be scheduled.

16An urgent case conference was held on February 12, 2026. There, the parties agreed and the court ordered that:

(1) The child should be registered with a counsellor, and the court made orders setting out timelines and responsibilities to give effect to that agreement.

(2) The court also directed that a request be made to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

17The matter was adjourned to return before the court by way of motion or further conference, with timelines established for the exchange of materials.

18Following that conference, the mother retained counsel, and the matter was briefly adjourned to permit counsel to come on record and file materials.

19On March 9, 2026, shortly before the scheduled hearing of the motion, the father amended the relief sought. While he continued to seek authority to change the child’s school and sole decision‑making responsibility respecting education and health, he added alternative interim relief. In the alternative to an immediate school transfer, the father sought an order that:

(1) The child remain enrolled in her current school until the end of the semester but reside primarily with him on an interim basis, with the mother to exercise parenting time on weekends.

20The matter returned before the court on March 10, 2026. On that date, the court was advised that no further agreement had been reached. The father’s motion proceeded and was argued on the interim relief sought. These reasons address the father’s urgent motion in that procedural context.

Part Three – Legal Considerations

21A request to change a final parenting order, whether on an interim or final basis, is governed by section 29 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act), which requires the court to be satisfied that there has been a material change in circumstances affecting, or likely to affect, the child’s best interests.

22An excellent review of the governing legal principles is set out by Justice Pazaratz in F.K. v. A.K.² As summarized in that decision, a party seeking to change an existing parenting order must satisfy the two‑part test articulated in Gordon v. Goertz.³

(1) First, the moving party must establish that there has been a material change in circumstances since the making of the last order. This requires a change in the condition, means, needs, or circumstances of the child and/or the parents that materially affects the child, was not foreseen or reasonably contemplated at the time of the prior order, and is substantial and continuing. A finding of a material change is a threshold requirement. If no material change is established, the court lacks jurisdiction to change the order and the inquiry ends.

(2) Second, if a material change is found, the court conducts a fresh, child‑centred best‑interests analysis. At this stage, there is no presumption in favour of the existing arrangement or either parent. The court must determine what parenting arrangement now best serves the child’s best interests, having regard to all relevant circumstances and focusing on the child’s needs rather than the parents’ preferences, having regard to the factors set out in section 24 of the Act.

23Where, as here, a party seeks a temporary change to a final parenting order, the analysis is even more stringent. Courts must exercise particular caution before changing an arrangement to which a child has become accustomed, especially where that arrangement has been determined by court order, which is presumed to be correct.⁴ That caution is heightened where the court is asked to change a final order on a temporary basis. Although the court has jurisdiction to grant such relief in appropriate circumstances⁵, the evidentiary foundation must be compelling.

24In addition to satisfying the two‑stage material‑change analysis, a party seeking a temporary change must demonstrate that the changed circumstances have created a situation of actual or potential harm, danger, or prejudice to the child of such magnitude that immediate intervention is required. The onus is onerous. The moving party must establish that the existing order has become untenable or intolerable, jeopardizing the child’s physical and/or emotional wellbeing, and that delay is likely to continue or exacerbate that harm. The court must be satisfied that an immediate change is required to protect the child, that the existing order has become demonstrably contrary to the child’s best interests, and that the proposed temporary arrangement is so necessary and beneficial that it would be unfair to delay its implementation. Given the limitations of affidavit evidence on a motion, the court must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that a clear and compelling need for immediate change has been established.

25As the Divisional Court confirmed in S.H. v. D.K.⁶, the imposition of a stringent test for the temporary change of a final parenting order is sound in principle and consistent with authority. Before embarking on a best‑interests analysis, the court must be satisfied that circumstances exist of a compelling and exceptional nature requiring immediate change, while recognizing that such circumstances may arise beyond those specifically described in F.K. v. A.K.

26Finally, the importance of stability and the status quo on interim motions has been repeatedly emphasized. In Southorn v. Ree⁷, the court observed that it is presumed that a time‑sharing arrangement agreed to by the parties reflects their assessment of the child’s best interests, and that interim changes risk subjecting a child to multiple disruptions. Courts are therefore hesitant to disturb a long‑standing arrangement absent compelling circumstances.⁸ As noted in Grant v. Turgeon⁹, interim changes to custody or parenting arrangements are reserved for exceptional circumstances where immediate action is mandated.

Part Four – Analysis and Conclusion

27Against that legal framework, the court turns to the parties’ positions and the application of the law to the facts of this case.

28The father’s position on this motion is that the events beginning in November 2025, including the child’s exposure to sexualized online content, subsequent incidents at school, and the parties’ inability to agree on appropriate protective measures, including obtaining a counsellor for the child, constitute a material change in circumstances since the making of the 2018 final orders. He submits that the child is in crisis, that the current parenting arrangement has become untenable, and that immediate interim intervention is required to safeguard the child’s physical and emotional wellbeing. He argues that without an interim change to decision‑making, schooling, or primary residence, the child remains at ongoing risk.

29The mother does not minimize the seriousness of the issues that have arisen. She acknowledges that the child is struggling and requires support. However, she disputes the father’s characterization of the events and submits that the existing orders have not become intolerable or unsafe. The mother argues that the relief sought by the father represents a fundamental reordering of a long‑standing, final parenting arrangement made on consent, based on disputed affidavit evidence, and that the stringent test for a temporary change has not been met. She submits that stability should be maintained pending further assessment, counselling, and the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, to which she consents.

30A central feature of this case is the high level of parental conflict, which has itself become a risk factor for the child. The evidence reflects a dynamic in which both parents have, at times, responded to the child’s needs through the lens of their conflict with one another, rather than through coordinated, child‑centred problem‑solving that would permit timely and effective decision‑making. The mother alleges a pattern of harassing, intrusive, and controlling communications by the father that have undermined respectful co‑parenting and contributed to communication breakdowns. The father, for his part, describes repeated difficulty obtaining timely engagement from the mother in relation to what he viewed as urgent safety concerns, and points to communications that he says reflect an entrenched “two households, two rules” approach and a dismissal of his role as a parent.

31The court is not in a position on this motion to resolve disputed allegations about the parties’ conduct or motivations. However, it is apparent from the record that the conflict has interfered with the parents’ ability to implement consistent boundaries, to communicate effectively, and to jointly mobilize supports for the child in a timely manner. That is precisely why the court, at the urgent case conference, identified the need for independent, child‑focused assistance and directed that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer be requested.

32The court accepts that this child is experiencing a period of significant difficulty and requires timely, professional support. The record discloses a child who has been exposed to age‑inappropriate content, who has been drawn into her parents’ conflict, and who is struggling emotionally. These concerns are serious and warrant careful, child‑centred attention. At the same time, the issue before the court on this motion is not whether the child requires assistance, but whether the father has met the onerous burden required to justify a temporary change to final parenting orders.

33Having regard to the stringent legal framework set out above, the court is not satisfied that the evidentiary record establishes circumstances of such a compelling and exceptional nature that immediate interim changes to decision‑making, schooling, or primary residence are required. The evidence is contested, the events are relatively recent, and the court is being asked to make far‑reaching interim orders that would significantly disrupt the child’s living arrangements and routine, based solely on affidavit evidence. The court is not persuaded that the existing orders have become so untenable or intolerable that immediate restructuring is necessary to protect the child from imminent harm.

34Importantly, the urgency of the child’s needs has already been addressed through the court’s earlier intervention. At the urgent case conference on February 12, 2026, the parties consented to the immediate involvement of a counsellor for the child, and the court made detailed orders to ensure that counselling was put in place without delay. The court also directed that a request be made to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, recognizing that independent, child‑focused assistance is required in light of the seriousness of the allegations and the parties’ entrenched conflict. Those steps were specifically designed to address the child’s immediate needs while preserving stability pending further assessment.

35While the court appreciates the father’s sense of urgency and his genuine concern for the child, the relief sought on this motion goes beyond what is appropriate on an interim basis at this stage. The proper course is to allow the counselling process to proceed, to await the response of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, and to address the parties’ competing positions within the structured framework of the Motion to Change and ongoing case management.

36For these reasons, the father’s motion for interim relief is dismissed, without prejudice to the determination of the Motion to Change on its merits. The existing parenting orders remain in effect.

37This dismissal should not be understood as a finding that the concerns raised are unimportant or unfounded. Rather, it reflects the court’s conclusion that the stringent threshold for interim intervention has not been met, and that the child’s best interests are presently served by stability, immediate access to services, and further informed assessment.

Part Five – A Roadmap Forward

38What this child needs most from her parents at this time is not further conflict or competing narratives, but calm, consistent, and child‑focused parenting. She requires reassurance, emotional safety, and the confidence that the adults in her life can work together to support her. This includes limiting her exposure to adult disagreement, maintaining clear and consistent safety expectations across both households, and communicating with one another in a measured and respectful manner. The child’s stability and capacity to benefit from professional supports will depend, in significant part, on the parents’ ability to reduce conflict, place her needs ahead of their own disputes, and engage constructively in decisions that affect her wellbeing.

39In that context, the court expects both parents to align their conduct with the child’s needs by engaging constructively with supports, reducing conflict, and demonstrating a sustained commitment to child‑focused cooperation going forward.

Part Six – Orders and Costs

40For the reasons outlined above, the following orders shall issue:

(1) The father’s motion is dismissed.

(2) The scheduled court date on March 16, 2026, is vacated.

41The court strongly encourages the parties to make every reasonable effort to resolve the issue of costs by agreement. If the parties are unable to do so, and a party seeks costs, that party shall serve and file written costs submissions within 14 days of the date of this order. Any responding costs submissions shall be served and filed within 7 days thereafter. Submissions shall be no longer than three pages, double‑spaced. Any reference to case law shall be provided by hyperlink within the submissions. The moving party shall attach any relevant offers to settle and a bill of costs, and the responding party may do the same. No reply submissions shall be permitted unless directed by the court.

Footnotes

1. 1The father also alleges that, approximately two days prior to November 8, 2025, the mother went to dinner with the child and the same male peer, which he relies on as part of his broader concerns. The mother does not accept the significance attributed to it by the father.
2. 22020 ONSC 3726.
3. 3(1996) 1996 191 (SCC), 19 R.F.L. (4^th) 177 S.C.C.
4. 4Montgomery v. Montgomery (Ont. C.A.); Gordon v. Gordon, 2015 ONSC 4468 (SCJ); Oickle v. Beland, 2012 ONCJ 778 (OCJ).
5. 5Stokes v. Stokes, 2014 ONSC 1311 (SCJ); Huliyappa v. Menon, 2012 ONSC 5668 (SCJ); Clements v. Merriam, 2012 ONCJ 700 (OCJ).
6. 62022 ONSC 1203 (Div. Ct.).
7. 72019 ONSC 1298.
8. 8Ceho v. Ceho, 2015 ONSC 5285; Batsinda v. Batsinda, 2013 ONSC 7869; Green v. Cairns (Ont. S.C.J.); Papp v. Papp (Ont. C.A.).
9. 92000 22565 (Ont. S.C.J.).