Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County v. T.S., 2026 ONCJ 148

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

CITATION: Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County v. T.S., 2026 ONCJ 148

DATE: March 16, 2026

COURT FILE NO. C0023/26

ARNAB QUADRY, for the APPLICANT

and -

T.S. and G.R.

MATTHEW POOLE, for the RESPONDENT, T.S.

HEARD: MARCH 13, 2026

Part One – Introduction

1The applicant, Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington County (the society), has brought a notice of motion, within its protection application, seeking to place the subject child, M., (age 5 months) (the child), in its temporary care and custody, with access to his parents, T.S. (the mother) and G.R. (the father) to be in its discretion, with the child to have a minimum of two supervised visits each week, for two hours each visit, with one visit to be without G.R.

2The mother seeks a temporary order placing the child in her temporary care and custody. In the alternative, she seeks two weekly visits with the child, one on Mondays for four hours. She also seeks an order that the society pay for her transportation costs.

3The father filed no material for the motion. He came late to the hearing and did not take a position. He declined to make submissions.

4The child was removed from the care of the mother and brought to a place of safety on February 11, 2026.

5On February 13, 2026, unopposed, the court ordered that the child be placed in the temporary care and custody of the society. Supervised access with the parents was ordered. The order was made without prejudice.

6The court relied on the September 29, 2025 temporary care and custody decision of Justice Sarah Cleghorn, regarding the mother’s two other children, A. (age 2)¹ and S. (age 4). Justice Cleghorn ordered that both children be placed in the temporary care and custody of the society, with supervised access with the mother twice each week.

7The court also read two affidavits filed by society workers and an affidavit filed by the mother.

8The issues for this court to decide are:

a) Are there reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if the child is returned to the care of the mother, it is more probable than not that he will suffer harm?

b) If so, can the child be adequately protected by terms or conditions of a temporary supervision order with the mother?

c) If not, what access orders are in the child’s best interests?

d) Does the court have jurisdiction to order the society to contribute towards the mother’s transportation costs for attending access visits with the child?

e) If so, should the court order the society to contribute towards those costs?

Part Two – Legal considerations for placement on a temporary care and custody hearing

9The legal test for the court to apply on a temporary care and custody motion is set out in subsections 94 (2), (4), and (5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act) that read as follows:

94 (2) Where a hearing is adjourned, the court shall make a temporary order for care and custody providing that the child,

(a) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under this Part;

(b) remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person referred to in clause (a), subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate;

(c) be placed in the care and custody of a person other than the person referred to in clause (a), with the consent of that other person, subject to the society’s supervision and on such reasonable terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate; or

(d) remain or be placed in the care and custody of the society, but not be placed in a place of temporary detention, of open or of secure custody.

Criteria

(4) The court shall not make an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order under clause (2) (a) or (b).

Placement with relative, etc.

(5) Before making a temporary order for care and custody under clause (2) (d), the court shall consider whether it is in the child’s best interests to make an order under clause (2) (c) to place the child in the care and custody of a person who is a relative of the child or a member of the child’s extended family or community.

10The onus is on the society to establish, on credible and trustworthy evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a real possibility that if the child is returned to the care of either parent, it is more probable than not that they will suffer harm. Further, the onus is on the society to establish that the child cannot be adequately protected by terms or conditions of a temporary supervision order. See: Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. T., [2000] O.J. No. 2273 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). Simply stated, this is a two-part test that the society has to meet with respect to the mother.

11A court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection of the children (subsection 1 (2) of the Act). See: Children's Aid Society of Hamilton v. B.D. and F.T.M., 2012 ONSC 2448.

12The degree of intrusiveness of the society's intervention and the interim protection ordered by the court should be proportional to the degree of risk. See: CCAS of Toronto v. J.O.1, 2012 ONCJ 269.

13The Divisional Court has held that a Children’s Aid Society seeking an order for temporary society care at this early stage of a case has only to demonstrate that it has reasonable grounds to believe that there is a protection risk for the child that justifies society intervention. See: L.D. v. Durham Children’s Aid Society and R.L. and M.L., [2005] O.J. No. 5050 (Ont. Div. Ct.). The burden on the society at this stage does not go as high as showing that on the balance of probabilities there is an actual risk to the child in the parent’s care. See: CCAS of Toronto v. M.L.R. 2011 ONCJ 652; The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.G., 2021 ONSC 2260.

14In making its assessment, the court should also consider the emotional risks to the child from being removed from the significant caregivers in their lives. See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.S., 2012 ONCA 783; Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.I., 2022 ONCJ 612, per: Justice Danielle Szandtner.

15Subsection 94 (10) of the Act permits the court to admit and act on evidence that the court considers credible and trustworthy in the circumstances. In determining what evidence is credible and trustworthy, the evidence in its entirety must be viewed together. Evidence that may not be credible and trustworthy when viewed in isolation might reach that threshold when examined in the context of other evidence. See: Jewish Child and Family Services of Toronto v. A.K., 2014 ONCJ 227 at paragraph 18; CAS of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. S.S.H., 2019 ONSC 5365.

Part Three – Justice Cleghorn’s decision

16Section 93 of the Act addresses past parenting evidence in a child protection case. It reads as follows:

Past conduct toward children

93 (1) Despite anything in the Evidence Act, in any proceeding under this Part,

(a) the court may consider the past conduct of a person toward any child if that person is caring for or has access to or may care for or have access to a child who is the subject of the proceeding; and

(b) any oral or written statement or report that the court considers relevant to the proceeding, including a transcript, exhibit or finding or the reasons for a decision in an earlier civil or criminal proceeding, is admissible into evidence.

17The Reasons for Decision dated September 29, 2025, delivered by Justice Cleghorn, are admissible in this matter under clause 93 (1) (b) of the Act. They are very relevant to this decision about the child, given how recently they were delivered. Justice Cleghorn set out the following background facts in her decision:

a) The society was involved with the mother in 2016. The protection concerns were about her mental health, capacity to parent, neglect, transiency and intimate partner violence.

b) The current protection concerns involve intimate partner violence. Additional concerns include food security, housing and parenting capacity.

c) In September 2024, the mother and the children went to a shelter. The mother then reconciled with the father.

d) The worker went to the parents’ home. It was cluttered and dirty, and the animals were infested with fleas. The children were unkempt and the youngest child’s vagina was red/sore from being in dirty clothes. A. was sleeping in a swing. She had a rash under her chin.

e) The mother told the worker she believed S. had been sexually abused by her father at a young age. He is not allowed to be around children. She believed her father had access to S. while she was working. She did not report this to the police. The worker asked the mother to take the child for a medical exam. She did not do this.

f) The mother had not taken S. to get tubes in her ears. This may have affected the child’s balance. S. is delayed in speech. A nurse practitioner told the worker there are issues of neglect.

g) The mother was on the verge of being evicted.

h) The mother was observed not to engage with the children during access. S. has been observed to eat food out of the garbage.

18Justice Cleghorn wrote the following regarding events that took place after the children were brought to a place of safety:

a) The parents are living together and are expecting a child. They plan to co-parent the new child.

b) The mother disagreed that there was any need for domestic violence counseling. She said that even though she is living with the father they are not in a relationship.

c) The mother told the worker that the father does not allow her to do things on her own. The worker has been unable to meet with the mother privately because the mother is concerned that the father will question her.

d) The parents could not arrange their schedules in July 2025 to meet with the worker.

e) The mother has kept her home clean since February 2025.

f) The mother does most of the parenting at access visits. There are concerns that after two hours, the parents’ ability to meet the children’s needs declines.

g) The mother started cognitive behavioural therapy on July 23, 2025, on zoom. She completed the Circle of Security program and started working with the clinical support worker from the society on July 31, 2025.

h) The mother did not complete the intake form for one service and missed appointments for another service. She was removed from its waitlist.

i) The clinical support worker noted attachment-related concerns.

j) The society worker has been unable to contact the individuals the mother listed as her supports.

19Justice Cleghorn made the following findings based on this evidence:

a) There remains a possibility that the children will suffer harm if returned to the mother’s care.

b) The mother must engage in domestic violence counseling so she can understand the cycle of violence. The counseling should be in person without the father present.

c) The court cannot assess if the children would be safe living in the home with the father since he chose not to participate in the litigation.

d) It is a red flag that the mother has not met with the worker on her own. This is evidence of a controlling relationship by the father.

e) The children should remain in the temporary care and custody of the society.

f) The decision might have been different if the mother was not living with the father.

Part Four – Brief statement of facts since the child’s birth.

20The child was born a few days before Justice Cleghorn’s decision.

21The society and the mother reached an agreement. If the mother moved with the child into Ramoth House, a supportive maternity home in Mount Forest, it would not bring the child into care.

22From November 2025 to January 2026, the Director of Ramoth House (the Director) expressed several concerns to the society about the mother’s parenting and unwillingness to follow its rules.

23On January 26, 2026, the Director informed the society that the mother would not move to the next level of the program due to concerns about her parenting, emotional regulation and her administration of unnecessary medication to the child.

24On February 5, 2026, the Director provided the mother with a written warning that she may be removed from the program if she continues to disregard its rules.

25On February 10, 2026, the Director advised the society that Ramoth House would no longer support the mother’s plan to parent the child.

26On February 11, 2026, the mother advised the society she intended to move back into the home where the father was living. The society brought the child to a place of safety that day.

27The mother has moved to Exeter Ontario. She is living there with a relative and his child.

Part Five – The mother’s narrative

28The mother’s narrative is summarized as follows:

a) She has a close and loving relationship with the child.

b) She can meet the child’s needs.

c) It is in the child’s best interests to be in her care.

d) She did her best to follow the rules at Ramoth House but was set up to fail.

e) She has not been in a relationship with the father since September 2024.

f) She is living with S.’s cousin in Exeter. He has a one-year-old child in his care.

g) She has a clean home. She has her own bedroom and all the necessary supplies for the child.

h) She is working full-time. She plans to put the child in daycare. Her cousin will also help her with the child when she is working.

i) She has a family doctor for the child. The child has received his vaccinations and has no major medical issues.

j) She does not consume alcohol or drugs.

k) She completed the Bounce Back program offered through CMHA (the Canadian Mental Health Association) in June 2025.

l) She completed the society’s Circle of Security program in June 2025.

m) She took part in the society’s clinical support program.

n) She has many people who can support her parenting. She listed them in paragraphs 25 to 31 of her affidavit.

o) Her access visits are positive. All the children are happy to see her.

29The mother submitted that the court should give little weight to the society’s evidence because most of it is hearsay from the Director.

30The court agrees with the mother that the society should have obtained an affidavit from the Director. However, under subsection 94 (10) of the Act, the court can rely on evidence it finds credible and trustworthy. The court finds the evidence attributed to the Director is credible and trustworthy for the following reasons:

a) Ramoth House prepared a comprehensive end of program summary. This was attached to the worker’s affidavit. It is consistent with the information the worker said that the Director was providing to her on an ongoing basis.

b) Ramoth House gave a warning letter to the mother, dated February 5, 2026. It detailed the program’s concerns and stated that the mother would be removed from the program if the issues continued. The mother acknowledged receipt of this letter.²

c) The mother did not deny that these concerns were being raised with her. She did not deny many of the concerns raised by the Director.

Part Six – Placement analysis

31The society met its onus on both parts of the two-part test for not returning the child to mother’s care. There are reasonable grounds to believe that if any child was returned to her care that it is more probable than not that the child would suffer harm. Supervision terms would be inadequate to protect the child from these risks. The court makes these findings for the following reasons:

a) The mother is not currently able to safely parent the child on a sustained basis. Multiple concerns were noted by the Director, including:

i) The mother had to be prompted to give the child medication. At other times, she administered unnecessary medication for the child. The mother did not deny this.

ii) The child has developmental delays in his gross and fine motor skills. He has a tight neck and some flattening of his head. The mother has not administered “tummy time” consistently, as often requested by staff, to assist the child’s development. She refused to do this from February 5 to February 9, 2026, and staff had to do this for the child.

iii) The mother would often get emotionally escalated in front of the child. She would often be overwhelmed. Ramoth House put in place volunteers who could care for the child for an hour when the mother was too escalated. During these outbursts, the mother would often leave Ramoth House. The mother did not deny this.

iv) The mother had difficulty maintaining feeding intervals for the child and required constant intervention by staff to do so. There was one very concerning example. The mother fed the child at 8 p.m. on February 5, 2026 and did not feed him again until 7 a.m. the next day, despite the efforts of staff to wake her up. The child’s food intake the previous day was 22.5 ounces, which is below his usual 30 ounces. Staff were put in place to ensure the child was properly fed. The mother did not deny the February 5-6 incident.

v) As of February 9, 2026, the mother had not bathed the child for 6 days. She had refused to bathe him, despite prompts from staff. She did not deny this.

vi) The mother often left the child with other residents to go outside and smoke. She did not deny this.

vii) The mother showed poor judgment by insisting on taking the child outside for walks when it was -30 degrees Celsius, against the advice of workers at Ramoth House. She did not deny this.

viii) The mother showed periods of effort and engagement. However, these periods were inconsistent and not sustained. As the program progressed, she increasingly struggled to provide guidance, keep routines, and independently meet the expectations of the program.

b) The mother did not facilitate an orderly transition of the child being placed into society care. Instead, she packed a bag for the child, told the society to pick him up and moved to Exeter, Ontario.

c) The society has offered multiple in-person visits to the mother. She has missed five visits. On March 9, 2026, she had a scheduled four-hour visit. She tried to end the visit after one hour stating the child was fussy.

d) The mother’s two other children are still in the society’s care. She has supervised access with them. The society continues to have concerns about the mother and A. and S. It notes that:

i) She is not coming with healthy snacks for them at visits.

ii) She is not regularly attending the children’s occupational therapy appointments.

iii) She is not regularly attending S.’s speech therapy appointments. The society observes that she is spending limited time on S.’s speech.

e) The mother has not provided a workable plan to care for the child outside of Ramoth House. The evidence informs the court she would need substantial supports to safely parent the child. She deposed she is living in Exeter, Ontario with a relative named Patrick and his child. She did not provide Patrick’s last name. The society is unable to check if he has a child protection or criminal history. The security of this housing is unclear.

The mother does not appear to be in any current programming. The society ended its clinical assist program with her due to her lack of engagement.

The society worker followed up with the mother’s supports. One said he lived in Breslau Ontario, not in Guelph, and he could not help with transportation because of a knee injury. Another said he lives in Kitchener. The mother had not told the worker of two other supports prior to serving her affidavit.

f) Supervision terms are inadequate to protect the child in the care of the mother. The child is very young and vulnerable. He needs constant and attentive care. The mother has been unable to show that she can safely parent him and consistently meet his basic needs. Despite being given an opportunity to parent the child, she was unable to follow the expectations of Ramoth House and was removed from the program.

32The child shall be placed in the temporary care and custody of the society. The court finds that this is the least disruptive order consistent with his best interests.

Part Seven – Access

7.1 Legal considerations

33Subsection 94 (8) of the Act provides that where an order is made under clause (c) or (d) of subsection 94 (2), the court may order access on any terms that it considers appropriate. In determining what order is appropriate, the court should consider the paramount purpose of the Act, being the best interests, protection and well-being of children and the secondary purposes of maintaining the integrity of the family unit, assisting families in caring for their children and recognizing the least disruptive action consistent with the best interests of the children (subsections 1 (1) and (2) of the Act). In assessing best interests, the court should consider the relevant factors set out in subsection 74 (3) of the Act. See: JFCS v. H.B.S. [2012], O.J. No. 5055 (OCJ).

34Courts should give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.M., 2024 ONCJ 607.

35The party who seeks to reduce normal access will usually be required to provide a justification for taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. C.P.I., 2020 ONCJ 304; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.M., supra.

36In C.A.S. v. C.F., 2020 ONSC 37555, Justice Heather McGee wrote about the nature of access and supervised access in child protection cases as follows:

32Access is the right of a child. As stated by Justice Blishen in V.S.J. v. L.J.G., “there is a presumption that regular access by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of children. The right of a child to visit with a non-custodial parent, to know and maintain or form an attachment to a non-custodial parent is a fundamental right and should only be forfeited in the most extreme and unusual circumstances.”

33A child’s right to access with a parent invites a further layer of complexity in a child protection proceeding. Court must engage in a careful balancing of the benefit of a parent’s care, the specific risk of harm to the child while in that parent’s care, and the measures in place for risk reduction.

34Supervised access is a critical tool in that engagement. Supervision provides a safer bridging period during which parental deficits can be assessed and whenever possible: repaired. Supervised access is clearly indicated when parenting judgement is impaired, there is a history of violence and other harmful behaviour directed toward the primary caregiver and/or evidence of abuse or neglect of the child.

7.2 Analysis

37The father did not contest the access order sought by the society. It will be ordered.

38The society is seeking fully supervised access for the mother with the child twice each week. The mother also seeks access twice each week. She asks for a four-hour visit on Mondays.

39The evidence informed the court that the mother has some parenting strengths. She is loving and affectionate with the child. She sings and talks to him when feeding him. She wants to be a good mother for him.

40The protection concerns relate more to the mother’s ability to meet the child’s needs on a sustained basis rather than her ability to meet his needs on a short-term basis.

41This case does not require a binary decision – either that the child is returned to the mother or the child remains in the society’s care with a supervised access order. The facts of this case don’t support going from the child being in the full-time care of the mother to only having supervised access with her. A more nuanced approach is in the child’s best interests.

42The court finds it is in the child’s best interests to have a mix of supervised and unsupervised access with the mother. The supervised access can be at the same time as the mother is exercising her access with the child’s siblings. This gives the siblings the chance to spend time together. It also gives the society the opportunity to assess the mother’s parenting of the child and to give her feedback.

43It is also in the child’s best interests to spend some extended time with the mother, away from the pressure of constant scrutiny. The court will order that the mother have one unsupervised visit each week with the child. For the first six weeks, it will be for two hours and shall take place in the community. After six weeks, the visits will increase to 4 hours and shall take place in the community.

Part Eight – Does the court have the authority to order the society to contribute towards the mother’s transportation costs to exercise access?

44The mother lives in Exeter, Ontario. This is over one hour away from the society’s offices. The mother seeks an order that the society arrange transportation for her access visits or contribute to her transportation costs. She said it is difficult for her to arrange transportation.

45The society submits that the court has no authority to order it to contribute towards the mother’s transportation costs. In the alternative, it opposes the court making this order because it was the mother’s choice to move to a rural community far from Guelph.

46Subsection 94 (8) of the Act permits the court, when making an order under clause (2) (c) or (d) of the Act to make access orders on such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate. It does not contain the same statutory language prohibiting the court from ordering financial terms as the section respecting a supervision order does.³ See: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. S.T., 2017 ONCJ 833, per: Justice Alex Finlayson.

47There is appellate authority that addresses this statutory distinction. In Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. L.S. [2009] O.J. No. 46 (SCJ), the court ordered the society to pay for access transportation costs to ensure the parent saw the child. The society appealed but the appeal was dismissed. The court wrote at paragraph 29:

In my view it is apparent that the wording of subsection 58 (1) giving the court the power to “impose such terms and conditions on the order as the court considers appropriate” confers a broad discretion of the judge who hears a motion for access. Specifically, there is nothing in that section of the CFSA that would restrict the terms and conditions to non-financial terms and conditions. Therefore, I express the same view as that expressed by Justice Pardu in the Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. Y. (K.B.), wherein Justice Pardu indicated there was no reason to narrowly construe s. 58 (1).

48The court further wrote at paragraph 31:

Accordingly, I find that an OCJ judge does have jurisdiction to make an order that the CAS pay transportation costs for the purpose of exercising access as a term and condition of access.

49This distinction between access orders and supervision orders, in determining if there is jurisdiction to order the society pay for services, was also noted by an appeal court in Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel v. S.C., 2023 ONSC 1838.

50In S.T., supra, Justice Finlayson wrote that the reasoning in Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. L.S., was not limited to orders requiring the payment of transportation costs to ensure access. Rather, payment orders are an available tool to ensure access happens. The court wrote it would consider a request for the society to pay housing costs for a parent to facilitate his access.

51This court notes that if the legislature had intended to prohibit the court from ordering the society to pay for services related to access, it could have expressly done so under subsection 94 (8), as it did in subsection 94 (6) regarding supervision orders. The court finds the distinction is intentional.

52The distinction is consistent with the purposes of the legislation. In determining what order is appropriate, the court should consider the paramount purpose of the Act, being the best interests, protection and well-being of children and the secondary purposes of maintaining the integrity of the family unit, assisting families in caring for their children and recognizing the least disruptive action consistent with the best interests of the children (subsections 1 (1) and (2) of the Act).

53Under section 101(2) of the Act, the court is specifically directed to inquire into the efforts made by the society and other community services to assist the child and the parent. This inquiry is not limited to the time frame prior to the litigation. It also includes an inquiry into the society’s efforts after the removal of the child. The facilitation of access is an important component of this obligation.

54The court finds it has the authority to order the society to contribute to the mother’s transportation costs.

Part Nine – Should the court order the society to contribute to the mother’s transportation costs?

55In the Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. LS., supra, the court wrote at paragraph 32:

I would like to add that by finding that a judge has the jurisdiction to make an order for transportation costs does not mean that such orders should become routine. The CAS is responsible for the administration of services within its mandate. A motions judge usually is not familiar with all of the administration matters that must be balanced by the CAS and the effect that any order for payment of expenses would have on the finances of the CAS. Therefore, orders for transportation costs as a condition of access should not be commonplace.

56The mother is struggling to attend access visits because she does not have reliable transportation. It is over one hour to travel from Exeter to the society’s office for visits. The society claims this is too long a distance to arrange drivers for visits.

57The society argues that the mother did not need to move to a rural community in Exeter. It feels she acted rashly. She could have worked through the housing issue with the society worker and found a residence in Guelph. It submits it should not be required to subsidize this poor decision.

58The court finds this position to be somewhat harsh. The mother was aware her child was likely going to be brought into care by the society. She had to arrange housing quickly. She looked for housing she felt would give her the best opportunity to have the child returned to her care.

59In making this decision, the court’s focus is on the child. We are at an inflection point in this case. If there is to be any chance of the child being parented by the mother, he needs to have meaningful access with her now. This opportunity should not be compromised by disputes over transportation costs. The mother and the society both have a responsibility to the child to make sure that the access ordered in this decision happens.

60The court finds that it is in the child’s best interests for the society to contribute to the mother’s transportation costs. The court will order the society to fund these costs for one of the two weekly visits. It can either arrange a driver for the visits, or it can reimburse the mother for her reasonable transportation costs to and from that visit.⁴

Part Ten – Roadmap

61One of the functions of a case management judge is to provide a roadmap for the parties moving forward.

62The mother should do the following:

a) Attend all visits on time.

b) Attend a parenting program to help her with skills around feeding, child development and scheduling.

c) Provide the society with the full names and contact numbers of the persons staying in her home.

d) Allow the society to do a home visit and encourage any other adult members of her household to provide the society with criminal record checks.

e) Show that she can accept and incorporate parenting feedback from society workers at visits.

f) Attend all plan of care meetings for the child.

g) Have a plan of where she will take the child if the weather is poor during one of her unsupervised visits. For instance, she can take the child to a community centre, a library, a mall or even stay at the society office.

63The society should do the following:

a) Provide the mother with a list of expectations of what she needs to do to have the child returned to her care.

b) Conduct a home visit.

c) Complete the necessary criminal record and child protection checks on any adult member of the mother’s household.

d) Provide the mother with recommendations for a parenting program.

e) Provide the mother with constructive parenting feedback during her supervised access visits.

Part Eleven – Conclusion

64A temporary order shall go on the following terms:

a) The child is placed in the care and custody of the society until further order.

b) The child’s access with the mother shall be twice each week. One of the visits shall take place together with A. and S. at the society’s offices. The second visit shall be unsupervised. The first six unsupervised visits with the child will be for two hours. After that, the unsupervised visits shall increase to four hours. The unsupervised visits shall take place in the community.

c) The society shall pay the mother’s transportation costs for one of the access visits each week. It may arrange for a driver to transport her to and from access visits, or it may reimburse her for her reasonable transportation costs.

d) The father’s access shall be in the society’s discretion, supervised, a minimum of once a week. His visits shall not take place at the same time as any of the mother’s visits.

65This matter has been scheduled for a case conference on May 12, 2026. The society should circulate a draft Statement of Agreed Facts regarding the statutory findings and the finding in need of protection. Those issues should not be contentious.

66The court thanks counsel for their excellent presentation of this motion.

Released: March 16, 2026

Justice Stanley B. Sherr

Terms and conditions in order

(6) A temporary order for care and custody of a child under clause (2) (b) or (c) may impose,

(a) reasonable terms and conditions relating to the child’s care and supervision;

(b) reasonable terms and conditions on the child’s parent, the person who will have care and custody of the child under the order, the child and any other person, other than a foster parent, who is putting forward a plan or who would participate in a plan for care and custody of or access to the child; and

(c) reasonable terms and conditions on the society that will supervise the placement, but shall not require the society to provide financial assistance or to purchase any goods or services.

Footnotes

G.R. is A.’s father. S. has a different father.
The court is not finding she agreed with these concerns. She either had to sign the letter or leave the program.
Subsection 94 (6) of the Act reads as follows:
Reasonable costs include paying for gas, a bus, a taxi, or a ride-share, such as Uber or Lyft.