WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
B.(A.R.)
Before Justice Louis P. Strezos
Heard on December 30, 2025, January 9, 2026, February 26, 2026
Written Reasons on Ancillary Orders Released March 6, 2026
Ms. A. Moser counsel for the Crown
Mr. N. Kandel counsel for the accused B.(A.R.)
Strezos J.:
1On February 17, 2026, I imposed a global sentence of twenty-three (23) months on B.(A.R.) following his guilty plea to two counts of sexual interference (s. 151(1)(a)), luring (s. 172.1(1)(b)) and extortion with intent to induce sexual activity (s. 346(1)).
2The victim, M.P. was 13. B.(A.R.) was 20. The salient facts were:
(1) In 2023 B(A.R.) lived in the same apartment building as M.P.
(2) He befriended her on social media.
(3) He exploited M.P. by coercing her to perform two acts of oral sex upon him in July 2023.
(4) He used text messages to lure and extort her. The messages are violent, coercive and offensive. He threatened to disclose them to M.P.’s brother if his increasing demands for sexual activity were not complied with. Fortunately, he did not do so. No sexual activity occurred after July 2023. The matter came to the attention of the police in December 2023. B.(A.R.) was arrested in January 2024.
3After my oral reasons for sentence were delivered, time did not permit for the parties to address ancillary orders. They appeared before me on February 26, 2026, and made submissions. This judgment addresses whether I should impose: (i) a SOIRA Order under s. 490.012(3) of the Criminal Code1 and, (ii) an internet access restriction order under s. 161(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. I advised that my written reasons would follow. These are the reasons.
I. Position of the Parties
4Ms. Moser requested that I impose a 20-year SOIRA order arguing that the presumption in favour of the order had not been rebutted given the predatory and grooming nature of the conduct underlying the offences. In short, the order is not grossly disproportionate to the public interest: see R. v. Eldon, 2025 ONCA 348 (“Eldon”). With respect to the s. 161 order, she seeks that it be imposed in accordance with the terms similar to those set out in R. v. Brar, 2016 ONCA 724.
5Mr. Kandel argues that neither order should be imposed. He submits that B.(A.R.) is a young man. He pled guilty. His prospects for rehabilitation are strong. Any chance of recidivism is minimal. A 20-year SOIRA order would be grossly disproportionate the to the public interest and would not achieve the legislative objectives: R v. A.R., 2024 ONSC 3786; R. v. M.L., 2024, ONCJ 372; R. v. H.P., 2023 ONSC 4808.
II. SECTION 490.012: ORDER TO COMPLY WITH “SOIRA”
6In October 2023, Parliament enacted the new SOIRA provisions following the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38. While B(A.R.)’s offences pre-date the October 2023 amendments, he is entitled to the benefit of them. I thus need not go through the legislative history. Instead, I will focus on recent interpretation and application.
7As I read s. 490.012(3) and the case law interpreting it, the approach to discretionary orders (as is the case here) is as follows:
SOIRA orders serve two legislatively defined purposes: (a) assisting investigations into sexual assault, and (b) prevention: (ss. 3(a)-(b)). These dual purposes are achieved by requiring annual reporting by offenders convicted of sexual offences for periods ranging from 10-20 years.
There is a presumption in favour of making the order for a primary designated offence: R. v. Eldon, para. 15. This presumption must be kept “front and centre”: Eldon, para. 52.
Displacing the presumption of inclusion is a high bar: Eldon, para. 44.
There are two alternative routes to an exemption. The offender must establish that: (i) there is no connection between making the order and the purpose of SOIRA or, (b) the impact of the order on the offender, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society: Eldon, at paras 43-44; R. v. Wiens, 2025 BCCA 162 at para. 11.
To avoid a SOIRA order, an offender needs to show that the order would not only be disproportionate to the public interest by his inclusion in the registry, but that it would be “grossly disproportionate” to that interest: Eldon, para. 63. The focus is thus on the public intertest in furthering the objectives of SOIRA.
The standard of gross disproportionality is a high one that “requires a marked and serious imbalance between the objective of the legislation and the impact of the registration on the registrant”: R. v. D.D., 2020 BCC1 169 at para. 27. In Eldon, ACJO Fairburn held at para. 62 that: “Grossly” signifies more than a minor imbalance. It means “plainly, obviously, excessively, to a startling degree, flagrantly or glaringly disproportionate: Debidin, at para. 62.”
Section 490.012(4) sets out the non-exhaustive factors that shall be considered in deciding whether an offender has rebutted the presumption. They are:
(4) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (3) in respect of a person, the court shall consider:
the nature and seriousness of the designated offence;
the victim’s age and other personal characteristics;
the nature and circumstances of the relationship between the person and the victim;
the personal characteristics and circumstances of the person;
the person’s criminal history, including the age at which they previously committed any offence and the length of time for which they have been at liberty without committing an offence;
the opinions of experts who have examined the person; and
any other factors that the court considers relevant.
These factors should be examined through the “required presumptive lens”: Eldon, paras. 53-54. The requirement is significant. Risk of recidivism is a factor, but it should not overwhelm the inquiry because by doing so, a Court may overlook the presumptive nature of the order. A.C.J.O. Fairburn highlights this potential error as follows:
54In framing her analysis in this way, the sentencing judge overlooked the presumptive nature of s. 490.012(3). Had she approached the matter through the required presumptive lens, she would have presumed inclusion in the NSOR. From there, she would have examined whether the respondent had “established” that the impact of the order on him would be “grossly disproportionate to the public interest” served by inclusion in the NSOR.
III. ANALYSIS
8I consider the 490.012(4) factors through the presumptive nature of the Order and whether B.(A.R.) has established either route to an exemption.
9The nature and seriousness of the offences are significant. The Crown proceeded by indictment. The sexual interference charges have a maximum sentence of 14 years. The extortion charge is punishable by life. Factually, B.(A.R.) not only sexually exploited M.P. but he also lured and extorted her. The tone, content and violence evidenced by the texts together with the inherent violence of the sexual interference charges militate strongly in favour of the order. The impact on M.P. was profound. As I stated in my reasons for sentence:
“It is hard to image a victim impact statement more powerful and reflective of what the Supreme Court of Canada discussed in Friesen. M.P. conveys the past harm, actual harm, ongoing harm and the future harm that will accrue that she is attempting to address with therapy. See Friesen, para. 79-76.
10M.P. had just turned 13 when the sexual assaults occurred. She was vulnerable and as the texts reveal was confused by what was occurring. She attempted to resist and each time she did, B.(A.R.)’s demands upon her grew. Fortunately, she terminated contact and no further offences occurred. Nor were the texts shared with her brother.
11I also note that the relationship developed on a social platform. They were also neighbors. While B.(A.R.) was not in a position of trust, he clearly manipulated M.P. for his own gratification. The texts aggravated the existing power imbalance.
12The personal circumstances and characteristics of B(A.R.) pull against making the order. He has the support of his family. He is gainfully employed. He accepted responsibility, sought counselling and participated in a psychological examination. Hopefully that will continue both while serving his sentence and when released. Subject to an early termination of the order it will continue in force until he is 40. He had no criminal record. He was on release for a significant period of time without incident.
13While the expert evidence is generally positive, I note that Dr. Stirpe concluded that: “His risk for sexual recidivism was assessed as Average/Moderate-Low.” His risk is assessed to decline over the next 2 years.”
14Finally, I have also considered the family support that B(A.R.) had in the repeated attendances before me. That support combined with his employment history reduces his risk of recidivism. That said, the offences occurred while he was living at home and risk of recidivism is but one factor.
15B.(A.R.) has not satisfied me that he should be exempt by either route. In particular, his risk of re-offending is average to moderate/low. The offences were predatory and grooming in nature. They are serious offences. He has not satisfied me that there is no connection between registration and the purpose of SOIRA. In fact, I find there is one. In addition, his inclusion in the registry would not be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in registration relative to the impact on his privacy/liberty interests. On this issue, Eldon instructs that in order for an offender to show that the public interest does not require registration evidence is required on the impact of registration on the person: Eldon, para. 65. None was led. I find that any impact would be minimal at best. In the end, I am not satisfied that the public interest is “substantially inferior” to the impact upon either his privacy or liberty: Eldon, at paras. 64-65.
16An Order will issue requiring him to register under SOIRA for a period of 20 years.
IV. SECTION 161(d) INTERNET RESTRICTION
17A s. 161(d) order is a discretionary and punitive sanction that requires a measured approach. The liberty interests of the offender may be restricted for a substantial period. The Ontario Court of Appeal provided the following guidance in R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONCA 598 about when and how a court should exercise this discretion:
The overarching protective function of s. 161 of the Criminal Code is to shield children from sexual violence: R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, at para. 44. An order under s. 161 constitutes punishment and is not available as a matter of course: there must be an evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that the particular offender poses a risk to children; the specific terms of the order must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk; and, the content of the order must respond carefully to an offender's specific circumstances: K.R.J., at paras. 48-49. [emphasis mine]
18In R. v. Brar, 2016 ONCA 724, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision on section 161 orders in R. v. K.R.J. and explained that:
The Supreme Court emphasized that these orders are discretionary and flexible, as s. 161 "was designed to empower courts to craft tailored orders to address the nature and degree of risk that a sexual offender poses to children once released into the community" (at para. 47). Because these orders can have a significant impact on the liberty and security of offenders and can attract a considerable degree of stigma, they will be justified where the court is satisfied that the specific terms of the order are a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk the offender poses to children (J. (K.R.), at paras. 48, 54). The terms of such orders must, therefore, "carefully respond to an offender's specific circumstances" (at para. 48). [emphasis mine]
19I recognize that a restriction on internet use can have significant implications on a person’s employment, mobility and interaction with family. The order should not be counter-productive given the centrality of internet access. As my former colleague Mainville J. held in R. v. Liang, 2024 ONCJ 514:
121The Internet restrictions here in my view should not inhibit Mr. Liang’s employment or any eventual search for employment or his rehabilitation, as that would be counterproductive. It should also not erect barriers to his full participation in society, which – as recognized in K.R.J. – may result in substantial consequences both socially and economically.
122As for the appropriate length of the order, s. 161(2) provides that it may be for life or any shorter duration the court considers desirable. In S.J.H., the BC Court of Appeal commented at para. 91 that the duration must take account of the length of the offender’s sentence, the offender’s age upon release, and his prospects of rehabilitation.
20B.(A.R.) is a young man. He will be approximately 23 when released. While I have found the texts highly aggravating, the communications stopped. Once released, I am confident that he will continue with his employment, any required rehabilitation and provide for his family. I do not want to unduly interfere with his full participation in society both socially and economically. I find that a two-year order is appropriate as follows:
- That upon your release from custody, you are not to communicate or attempt to communicate with any person you know to be or who reasonably appears or represents themselves to be under the age of 16 years unless they are members of your family.
21The foregoing orders are released concurrently with these reasons.
Released: March 6, 2026
STREZOS J.
Footnotes
- The Order requires an offender to comply with the reporting requirements of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act S.C. 2004, c. 10, s. 4.