A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,
(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or
(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).
(2) Mandatory order on application.— In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 Offence.—(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE No.: 25 50009433
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
J.E.
Sentencing Judgment
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on February 23 and March 6, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on March 13, 2026
H. Lamourie......................................................................................... counsel for the Crown
M. Rozik............................................................................................................. counsel for J.E.
Jones J.:
Introduction
1J.E. pleaded guilty to one count of failing to comply with a term of a long-term supervision order (“LTSO”), contrary to Criminal Code section 753.3(1). The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.
Facts In Support of the Guilty Plea and Background Information
2J.E. was designated a dangerous offender by Justice Allen of the Ontario Court of Justice on June 28, 2017. The court accepted the parties' joint position for a 10-year determinate sentence followed by a 10-year LTSO. After granting him credit for 810 days of pre-sentence custody, J.E. was sentenced to seven years, nine months and 15 days in prison. The warrant of committal expired on April 11, 2025.
3The index offences that resulted in the dangerous offender designation consisted of one conviction for assault (Criminal Code section 266), three convictions for sexual assault (Criminal Code section 271) and three convictions for choking to overcome resistance (Criminal Code section 246(a)). The victim of all offences was Ms. B.B., who was J.E.’s intimate partner.
4J.E. accepted facts for the index offences during the guilty plea proceeding. He and B.B. had been involved in a romantic relationship for five years. They have two children together. J.E. has two other children from previous relationships.
5In the summer of 2012, B.B. and J.E. resided together at an address in Cambridge, Ontario. The parties argued about access to their son, D. J.E. then grabbed B.B. by the throat, slammed her against a wall, and held her off her feet. She experienced difficulty breathing, and J.E. told her that nobody would stop him from taking his son. He stated that only over his “dead body” would [B.B.] get D. back. During this assault, D. was sitting in his stroller and witnessed it.
6In early 2015, the parties moved to an address in Kitchener, Ontario. One evening, they were engaged in consensual sexual activity when J.E. began to strangle B.B. with his hands. She did not consent to being strangled. She asked him to stop, and he eventually did, but would proceed to strangle her again. This happened three times.
7She told him he was hurting her and that she could not breathe. He responded that he enjoyed watching her struggle to breathe and wanted to hear her gag. He applied more pressure to her throat on each occasion. Afterwards, he apologized to B.B. and told her he knew he needed help. He also said that he was “one step away from being a necrophiliac.”
8Between February and the end of March 2015, another incident occurred. B.B. was sleeping and awoke to find J.E. on top of and behind her. He’d placed a bandana around her throat and was strangling her with it. He inserted his penis into her vagina and forced intercourse with her. She told him no, and he responded that he liked to see her struggling for breath.
9By early April 2015, the parties had agreed that each of them could have sex with another person. On April 6, 2015, B.B. returned home after having sex with a man of her choosing. She found J.E. sitting in the dark. She learned that J.E.’s desired alternative partner had declined his advances. He demanded sex from B.B.
10B.B. told him no. He grabbed her by the throat with both hands and pushed her onto the bed. He ripped off her pyjama bottoms and proceeded to force vaginal intercourse upon her while squeezing her throat with his hands. She told him to stop and that he was hurting her. She struggled to breathe. He told her, “You’re going to take it, bitch.” She had difficulty speaking and told him, “You’re killing me.” In response, he smiled and squeezed harder.
11While the assault continued, their son, D., who was four years old at the time, poked his head into the bedroom and asked for his mother. J.E. instructed B.B. to tell D. to leave, which she did. After D. left the room, J.E. grabbed her throat even harder and continued until he ejaculated. B.B. thought the assault was over and crawled across the bed to reach for her pyjama bottoms. However, J.E. began strangling her again with her bandana.
12J.E. forced vaginal intercourse upon her while she gasped and struggled for breath. Eventually, he stopped and fell asleep.
13B.B. reported the sexual assault to the police on April 10, 2015. J.E. was arrested. He was interviewed by a detective. He told the detective that he was sexually turned on when B.B. struggled for air as he strangled her. He stated that, “[t]he next step I go is murder.” He added that he felt he may be on the verge of becoming a serial killer and can’t get the thoughts of death and hurting others out of his mind.
14J.E. was assessed by Dr. Woodside. Dr. Woodside concluded that J.E. met the criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and that he presents with significant psychopathic personality traits and features. J.E. appeared to suffer from a non-consenting, coercive sexual preference with elements of sexual sadism. Dr. Woodside also diagnosed J.E. with multiple severe substance use disorders, primarily relating to alcohol and marijuana.
15During the interview process with Dr. Woodside, J.E. reported beginning marijuana use at the age of 11 or 12, and daily use of it at age 14. He would consume two to three joints per day. He began using alcohol at 15. He also experimented with drugs such as cocaine by the age of 16. At 18, he used heroin. He indicated to Dr. Woodside that he would take treatment if required for his drug use. Dr. Woodside concluded that J.E.’s use of alcohol and cannabis was problematic for him, contributing to his extensive legal involvement and negatively impacting his interpersonal relationships.1 One of his criminogenic variables was determined to be cannabis-use disorder.2
16Dr. Woodside’s opinion was that J.E. was at a “very high risk for pure violent recidivism and above average risk for sexually violent recidivism”. If J.E. were to reoffend in the future, it would “probably” be as a result of his returning to using drugs and alcohol, as he has limited behavioural controls, and this would further disinhibit him.3 Importantly, if J.E. were to enter into another romantic relationship, his partner “would be at significant risk of coercive nonconsensual sexual violence”.4
17J.E. began serving his sentence on June 28, 2017. While serving his sentence in a federal penitentiary, J.E. incurred serious institutional charges. For example, on August 14, 2019, three litres of “brew” were seized from his cell. On December 17, 2019, he was charged with possessing drug paraphernalia. Evidence was uncovered during a search of his cell on October 13, 2020, that suggested marijuana consumption. He provided a urinalysis sample that tested positive for THC on October 14, 2020.
18J.E. was eligible for statutory release on September 6, 2022. A psychological risk assessment dated January 12, 2022, noted some progress had been made J.E.’s risk factors. The report included recommendations for his release, which included that he avoid all substance use. He required monitoring to ensure compliance.
19He was released to the Downtown Toronto Parole office on December 11, 2024, on a “One Chance Statutory Release” with a residency condition.
20He displayed continuous problematic behaviour while on statutory release. He immediately reported institutional use of non-prescribed medication of Gabapentin. He also reported using cannabis while he was in custody, prior to his release into the community. This was in violation of the terms of his release as established by the Parole Board of Canada (“PBC”). On January 10 and 13, 2025, J.E. was tested for drug use. Both tests returned positive for THC. These were clear violations of the PBC's rules.
21In a disciplinary meeting, J.E. admitted to receiving THC gummies and Shatter from another resident. A decision was made to maintain his release in the community.
22On March 12, 2025, another urinalysis sample tested positive for THC. J.E. admitted to consuming cannabis.
23On March 31, 2025, J.E. and another offender had been inside a washroom at the community residential facility (“CRF”) where they were staying. After they left, the staff noticed a strong smell of chemicals, which they believed were consistent with drug use. A broken pen that appeared to have been used as a makeshift pipe was found in the washroom. A warrant was issued for J.E. He was apprehended by the Repeat Offender Parole Enforcement (“ROPE”) team.
24Another urinalysis sample tested positive for THC on April 2, 2025. On April 4, during a suspension interview, J.E. admitted to using THC a week prior. He confirmed that he received Shatter from another resident and smoked it on his way to a grocery store. As the interview continued, he admitted to using THC over 20 times since December 2024. He confessed to using Shatter in the bathrooms of the CRF at least five times. He said he used drugs “due to impulse control”.
25When asked if he understood why he was ruled unable to use THC, he eventually responded that it would be a gateway towards potential sexual reoffending. He explained that he knew he should “stop smoking weed.” He was reminded that upon commencement of his LTSO, violation of his conditions could result in a criminal charge. He stated that he did not take his statutory release seriously and saw the consequences of his actions as a “slap on the wrist”. He further stated that he had continued to use manipulation to get his way, regardless of his positive THC results.
26On April 11, 2025, the warrant of committal expired, and J.E. was released into the community while serving his 10-year LTSO. One of the terms of the LTSO stated that he was not to “purchase, possess or consume cannabis in any form unless approved by a psychiatrist.” On May 13, 2025, the Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”) made a demand for urinalysis. A few days later, on May 16, the results returned positive for THC. J.E. was arrested and held in custody. The information charging him with failing to comply with his LTSO was sworn to on May 23, 2025.
Prior Criminal Record
27J.E. was found guilty as a youth of assault causing bodily harm in 2005. He subsequently incurred 13 adult convictions on three distinct sentencing dates (not including the index offences that resulted in a dangerous offender designation). He has no prior convictions for failing to comply with an LTSO term.
Additional Efforts at Rehabilitation
28In February 2025, J.E. commenced the Community Maintenance Program. He engaged in psychological counselling. His psychologist, Dr. Gallo, was of the opinion that J.E. did not suffer from acute mental health concerns and that his risk factors could be addressed through appropriate programming. J.E. attended the Sexual Behavioural Clinic at CAMH for an assessment. He was recommended sex drive-reducing medication, but he opted not to take it.
29J.E.’s correctional plan from the CSC, dated April 15, 2025, noted that he had been working with Dr. Gallo on trauma, violence, emotional regulation, problematic sexual behaviour, and reintegration stressors. They had weekly sessions since he was placed on statutory release. Dr. Gallo concluded that J.E.’s risk factors were behaviour-related. Dr. Gallo went on leave and recommended that J.E. be referred to another CSC psychologist if necessary.5
Business Records from Apollo Cannabis
30Mr. Rozik had business records from Apollo Cannabis entered as an exhibit. They confirm that J.E. met with a physician – although not a psychiatrist – on April 1, 2025, to obtain a prescription for marijuana. The marijuana prescription was provided to address anxiety, among other concerns.
Letters of Support
31Mr. M.E. and his wife wrote a letter that was filed as an exhibit. M.E. is J.E.’s father, and his wife is E.J.’s stepmother. They described him as a quiet, polite and good child. He was a “peacemaker” within their family. His absence has left a considerable void. His children have expressed a desire to see him again.
32They were shocked and saddened to learn of his involvement with the criminal justice system. Regarding his recent breach allegation, they believe he was attempting to purchase marijuana lawfully by obtaining a prescription from a doctor.
33Upon his return to the community, M.E. and his wife are fully prepared to support J.E. and provide a stable home environment.
34A second letter was filed by Ms. S.M., J.E.’s sister. She believes that during his time in prison, he has demonstrated personal growth. He has matured. He took meaningful steps to work on his mental health and took advantage of resources related to emotional regulation. He is trying to change.
35She, too, believes that her brother thought he was obtaining marijuana lawfully. He has used marijuana in the past as a coping mechanism for symptoms related to anxiety.
J.E.’s Affidavit
36J.E. swore an affidavit. He had been incarcerated at the Toronto South Detention Centre (“TSDC”) for 294 days.6 He had been triple-bunked for the vast majority of his time. He described the difficult conditions of incarceration. He was often denied basic amenities such as a daily shower or access to the telephone. He had difficulty accessing adequate health care. He was only able to sleep two to three hours per night. Overcrowding at the jail was a constant problem.
37He has lost contact with the outside world. The entire experience of being incarcerated has taken a severe toll on his mental health.
38Upon his release, he hopes to live with his father. He wants to obtain his high school diploma and seek stable employment. He also wishes to see his children again and be present in their lives. His family is a source of support and stability in his life.
Positions of the Parties
39On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Lamourie submits a sentence of two years less a day in custody is appropriate. Any credit for the time J.E. has already served should be credited at 1:1, as he has been serving a sentence (his LTSO) while in custody.
40Ms. Lamourie emphasizes that this case must start from the premise that J.E. has already been designated a dangerous offender. His initial offences were very serious, and there is a direct connection between his cannabis-use disorder and his potential to reoffend violently or sexually. He admitted he was intoxicated at the time of the underlying sexual assaults and has demonstrated a poor record of abstaining from substances since his sentencing by Justice Allen. Indeed, she described his conduct to date as nothing short of a “blatant disregard” for the conditions imposed on him by the PBC.
41Little to no weight should be attached to the fact that J.E. obtained a prescription for marijuana after he began serving his LTSO. He was required to obtain one from a psychiatrist, which is qualitatively very different. He was attempting, in her view, to circumvent the term of the LTSO.
42On behalf of his client, Mr. Rozik argues that a one-year jail sentence is sufficient. He requests that additional credit be given for difficult pre-sentence conditions, which would result in J.E. serving his time. He points to the harrowing conditions described in his client's affidavit and the lockdown records from the TSDC.
43J.E. has a strong family support network available to him upon his release from custody. Mr. Rozik submits that his client will benefit greatly from this support network. He has demonstrated a commitment to his rehabilitation and has done well while in custody overall.
44While he does not dispute that J.E. violated the condition on his LTSO regarding the consumption of marijuana, Mr. Rozik argues that his client’s moral responsibility is diminished because he did obtain a prescription from a doctor. That should influence my final sentencing decision.
The LTSO Regime and Prior Sentencing Authorities
45In R. v. Crane, 2025 ONCJ 652, I sentenced another offender for the offence of breaching a term of his LTSO due to the consumption of drugs. I reviewed the applicable law in that decision. I reproduce some of my analysis for this judgment, as I am not aware of any notable developments in the jurisprudence in this area (particularly, from appellate courts), since I released Crane. I wrote the following at paras. 57-61 in my prior decision:
57In R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the administration of LTSOs at para. 45:
LTSOs are administered in accordance with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (“CCRA”). LTSOs must include the conditions set out in s. 161(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620. In addition, the National Parole Board (“NPB”) may include any other condition “that it considers reasonable and necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the offender” (CCRA, s. 134.1(2)). A member of the NPB may suspend an LTSO when an offender breaches any of the LTSO conditions, or where the NPB is satisfied that suspension is necessary and reasonable to prevent such a breach or to protect society (CCRA, s. 135.1(1)).
58The Supreme Court held that the purpose of an LTSO is twofold: (1) to protect the public, and (2) to rehabilitate offenders and reintegrate them into the community. Breaches of an LTSO should be taken far more seriously than breaches of other court orders, such as a probation order, given the lengthy maximum sentence of 10 years Parliament has created for this offence: see para. 54. The sentence for a breach of an LTSO should consider the following factors, as per Ipeelee para. 52, and R. v. Matte, 2012 ONCA 504, at paras. 34-7:
The nature of the condition breached and its importance to the protection of the public, having regard to the offender’s history;
The role that the condition played in managing the offender’s risk of re-offending;
The circumstances of the breach;
Any prior breach of an LTSO conviction on the offender’s record;
The offender’s history of compliance or lack of compliance with supervision generally; and
The offender’s amenability or lack of amenability to treatment.
59In Ipeelee, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge must apply all principles mandated by ss. 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code, including rehabilitation when sentencing an offender for breaching an LTSO. It is also the sentencing judge's duty to apply section 718.2(e) for an Indigenous offender.
60Importantly, the Supreme Court held that rehabilitation is a key feature of the long-term offender regime. This feature differentiates it from the dangerous offender regime, which focuses on public safety: see para. 50. Ipeelee (and the companion case of Ladue) was decided based on facts related to an offender who was sentenced before the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code. Those amendments introduced the current two-stage approach to dangerous offender proceedings that grants courts discretion during the penalty phase: see R. v. Boutilier, 2017 SCC 64, at paras. 18-23. Previously, a designation as a dangerous offender meant an automatic indeterminate sentence. Now, a designation as a dangerous offender does not compel any particular sentencing outcome. Rather, an offender may receive a standard sentence, a determinate sentence of incarceration of at least two years followed by an LTSO of up to 10 years, or a sentence of an indeterminate period of incarceration: see Criminal Code section 753(4). The sentencing court may consider an indeterminate sentence only if it determines that lesser sentencing options have been ruled out as inappropriate.
61The distinction between a dangerous offender designation and a long-term offender designation was critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Ipeelee. It remains highly significant in a sentencing hearing for a breach of an LTSO under the present regime when the offender has been designated a dangerous offender, as I will explain.
46In Crane, I also reviewed prior sentencing decisions for this offence. I consider them again today. The range for failing to comply with a term of an LTSO varies depending on the nature of the breach, the relationship of the breach to the purposes of the LTSO provisions, and the offender’s personal circumstances. Sentences typically begin in the one-year range (e.g. Ipeelee) but can be as high as four to five years when the Crown proceeds by indictment (see Justice Greene’s decision of R. v. Middleton, 2019 ONCJ 280, at para. 42).
47One recent decision released after Crane and warranting commentary is R. v. Watts, 2025 ONCA 885. The offender was found guilty of breaching a term of his LTSO that prohibited him from being in the presence of girls under the age of 18 unless supervised by an approved person who was familiar with his criminal history. He worked at a garden centre that employed female high school students. For this breach, he was sentenced to three years’ incarceration, which was upheld on appeal: see para. 3.
48At first blush, a failed urinalysis test for cannabis consumption may not seem to be a significant offence. But J.E.’s breach must be placed in the full context of his dangerous offender designation, his criminogenic risk factors, and his history of drug consumption after he was sentenced by Justice Allen in 2017. Even a single act of using drugs, viewed with this background in mind, is indeed quite serious. And J.E. has used drugs unlawfully far more than just once since he was designated a dangerous offender.
49By way of a suitable comparison, in Matte, the trial judge imposed a sentence deemed to be the functional equivalent of two years for a first breach of an LTSO: see para. 25. The appellant was a long-term offender who admitted he took a pill held out to be Dilaudid by another resident of the Community Correctional Facility (“CCF”) where he was residing. A term of his LTSO required him to abstain from non-prescribed drugs. The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant’s response to long-term supervision had been “tepid, characterized by minimal effort, negligible motivation and spotty and superficial participation”: see para. 45. Mr. Matte had a lengthy history of drug abuse that was “inextricably interwoven with his equally lengthy history of crime," including violent offences. Managing that risk was linked to abstinence from drugs, making the consumption of a single pill more serious than it might otherwise seem: see para. 42. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s sentence.
Conclusion
50This was not a trivial breach of J.E.’s LTSO. He has demonstrated a complete disregard for the conditions placed upon him by the CSC and the PBC (prior to the commencement of the LTSO) and then breached the terms of his LTSO within approximately one month. He has used drugs at least five times since he was incarcerated, as documented in urinalysis tests that returned positive for THC. But those incidents alone do not paint the full picture. J.E. admitted to the author of the correctional plan to using cannabis over 20 times since December 2024 while he was residing at the CRF and while on statutory release, even if they were not corroborated by independent testing.
51The CSC determined that a high level of intervention was required to address J.E.’s substance abuse problems. J.E. has acknowledged that he was under the influence of alcohol or illicit drugs during the commission of the offences that resulted in him being designated a dangerous offender. The totality of the evidence presented at these hearings leads to the inescapable conclusion that there is a link between J.E.’s substance use and his prior and potential future offending. J.E. has been warned about this linkage in the past and yet has continued to use drugs at every opportunity despite being subject to a federal sentence of imprisonment, while on statutory release, and now while subject to an LTSO. His moral culpability for this offence is therefore extremely high.
52The risk that is posed by J.E. consuming drugs is that his difficulties with behavioural control will become even worse, and while disinhibited on drugs, he is at an increased risk of violently assaulting another person. That includes the increased risk that he might sexually assault a woman in an extremely dangerous manner, as he has in the past. I conclude he does not have sufficient insight into the dangers posed by his consumption of drugs, or he simply does not care. In his own words, the punishments he has received in the past for such misconduct have been the equivalent of a “slap on the wrist.”
53The terms of J.E.’s LTSO were explained to him, as was the rationale behind them. He understood why consuming drugs elevated his risk of reoffending violently. The terms of an LTSO will only reduce J.E.’s significant risk to the public if he demonstrates a commitment to following them: see Matte, at para. 48. Furthermore, it is vital to consider that J.E. was designated a dangerous offender. In Crane, I wrote the following at para. 83, which I adopt again for today’s decision:
At the same time, it is worth reiterating that Mr. Crane has been designated a dangerous offender, not a long-term offender. The “overriding purpose” of the dangerous offender and long-term offender regimes is the protection of the public from the risk of violent harm: see R. v. Johnson, 2003 SCC 46, at para. 29; R. v. A.R., 2022 ONCA 553, at para. 33. That purpose takes on even greater significance when sentencing dangerous offenders, and rehabilitation as a principle must be given much less weight in the final balancing accordingly: see Ipeelee at para. 50. Protection of the public is an “enhanced sentencing objective” in these cases: see R. v. J.W., 2025 SCC 16, at para. 61.
54J.E. has made some effort to engage with rehabilitative programming while serving his sentence, but he has demonstrated, through his actions, that he has an intractable problem with substance abuse.7 His use of substances is directly linked to his risk of reoffending. The sentence I impose today must protect the public and reflect the paramount importance of both general and specific deterrence.
55Regarding Mr. Rozik’s submission that his client’s moral culpability is somewhat diminished because he sought out a prescription for marijuana from Apollo Cannabis, I respectfully disagree. J.E. knew the terms of his LTSO and the need to see a psychiatrist, specifically, not a medical practitioner more generally. Furthermore, to show a true commitment to following through with the terms of an LTSO and the rehabilitative goals associated with it, J.E. should have not only sought out a psychiatrist but also explained why he needed that level of approval to consume cannabis lawfully. That is, he would be expected to be frank and forthright with any future psychiatrist about what has occurred in his life to have him subject to an LTSO. Armed with that knowledge, presumably any psychiatrist would factor it into a decision to potentially prescribe marijuana to J.E. It is important background information that must be considered when weighing the risks and benefits of prescribing an intoxicating drug.
56I agree with Ms. Lamourie that J.E. remains responsible for his decisions. Being subject to the terms of an LTSO is not a game. Offenders must demonstrate a commitment to follow both the letter and spirit of these provisions, and they must be rigorously enforced. One of their fundamental purposes is to ensure adequate protection for the public against future serious criminal activity.
57In my judgment, the Crown’s position is entirely reasonable in these circumstances, even if J.E. has never been convicted of breaching his LTSO before. The message must get through to him today that if he continues to use drugs unlawfully, the penalties he will face will be severe and only increase in the future. His breach undermined both the public safety and rehabilitative goals of the LTSO.
58I impose a sentence of two years less a day in jail, reduced by credit for the time J.E. has already spent in custody. I can only consider the period between the date the information was sworn and today’s date. Time spent in custody prior to the date the information was sworn was not “as a result of the offence”: see R. v. Kubesch, 2025 ONCA 763, at para. 3; R. v. Wilson, 2010 BCCA 65, at paras. 13-22, leave to appeal refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. 108; Criminal Code section 719(3).
59That amounts to 294 days. The amount of credit to be awarded for this period is discretionary: see R. v. Bourdon, 2012 ONCA 256, at para. 21. It should be kept in mind that the LTSO continues to operate while the offender is in custody, until they begin serving a sentence: see Criminal Code section 753.4. I have considered the records from the TSDC respecting the number of days J.E. faced triple-bunking and the difficult conditions J.E. experienced at the TSDC. Those conditions are deplorable and remain a stain on the administration of justice. While that is a factor to consider, it does not demand further credit. I decline to award more than 1:1 credit accordingly: Watts, supra. J.E. must be separated from society for the time I have identified, and he must understand the consequences of failing to abstain from drug consumption. Thus, he will be sentenced to 435 days from today’s date.8
60The victim fine surcharge is waived.
Released: March 13, 2026
Signed: Justice Brock Jones
Footnotes
- Report of Dr. Woodside, December 3, 2016, at page 75.
- Ibid, at page 78.
- Ibid, at page 83.
- Ibid.
- Correctional Plan of the CSC for J.E., at page 12.
- On the day I delivered this judgment in court, he had been transferred to the Central North Correctional Facility.
- In Boutilier, the trial judge inferred the depth and intractability of the appellant’s addiction in part from the fact that he continued to use drugs while in custody. That finding was held to be reasonable by the Supreme Court: see paras. 86-88.
- 729 days (2 years less a day) – 294 days (1:1 pre-sentence custody credit) = 435 days remaining to be served.