WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:
A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or
(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).
(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
(Toronto Region)
CITATION: R. v. A.S., 2026 ONCJ 137
DATE: 2026 03 12
Information No.: 4810 998 22 30005848
NOTE: A SECTION 486.4 PUBLICATION BAN IS IN PLACE
NAMES HAVE BEEN REDACTED
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
A. S.
Before Justice Joseph Callaghan
Pleaded Guilty and Gardiner Hearing held on November 26, 2025
Sentencing submissions heard on January 19, 2026
Reasons for Decision on Gardiner hearing and Reasons for Sentence released on March 12, 2026
P. Rutherford...................................................................................... Counsel for the Crown
M. Bartlett....................................................................................................... Counsel for A. S.
J. Callaghan J.:
1On November 26, 2025, A.S. pleaded guilty to sexual interference in relation to D.O., his young step-granddaughter. While Mr. S. admitted to putting D.O.’s hand on his penis one time, he disputed the rest of D.O.’s allegations of repeated sexual abuse. Therefore, a Gardiner hearing was held where the Crown sought to prove the totality of D.O.’s allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.
2Both D.O. and the accused testified and I heard submissions from counsel. On November 26, 2025, I indicated that I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. S. had committed the full extent of sexual interference and sexual assault as described by D.O., with reasons to follow.
3The matter went over for the preparation of sentencing materials, including obtaining a victim impact statement.
4I heard sentencing submissions on January 19, 2026, when the following exhibits were filed:
The Victim Impact Statement of D.O.
Defence Sentencing Materials which included a psychological Risk Assessment report prepared by Dr. Giorgio Ilacqua dated November 17, 2025
A letter from C.A., A.S.’ wife and D.O.’s grandmother
5I begin these Reasons for Sentence with my Reasons for Decision on the Gardiner hearing.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON GARDINER HEARING
6In a Gardiner hearing, the onus remains on the Crown to prove any aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, in order to displace Mr. S.’ presumption of innocence in relation to the facts he did not admit as part of his guilty plea, the Crown had to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
7To determine this, I had to decide the central issue in this hearing: the credibility and reliability of the witnesses who testified. I considered all the evidence and applied the test as outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.D.
8For the following reasons, I found that the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the aggravating facts of sexual abuse at the hands of Mr. S., as described by D.O.
Evidence of D.O.
9When she was between the ages of 7 and 8, about two to three days per work week, D.O.’s parents would drop her off early in the morning at her grandmother’s home.
10At some point after her arrival, D.O.’s grandmother would leave to go to work, leaving D.O. sleeping in her grandmother’s bed, with Mr. S. responsible for her care until she had to be dropped off to go to school.
11While she was sleeping, Mr. S. would come into the bed with her and take her hand and put it on his erect penis. D.O. would wake up while he was doing this and she would pull her hand away.
12While D.O. could not recall if this happened every time she was alone in the house with Mr. S., she was clear that Mr. S. had done this to her on multiple occasions, indeed, probably more than 10 times. This continued over about a year, until D.O. told her mother when she was still just 8 years old. Following this disclosure, D.O. was no longer left alone with Mr. S.
13There were other times when Mr. S. would touch D.O. During the same timeframe, Mr. S. would enter the bathroom while D.O. was getting ready for school. At this time, D.O. did not require any assistance from Mr. S. to wash herself. Despite this, while she still had her pants off, Mr. S. would have D.O. locate herself over the toilet and he would use a bucket of water and pour it over her and touch her vagina with his hand. This happened on multiple occasions. When asked to quantify how many times it happened, D.O. could recall it happening more than once but less than five times. When touching D.O.’s vagina, Mr. S. was not acting with any benevolent, care-giving purpose.
14Finally, D.O. described, during the same timeframe, sitting on the couch in the living room of her grandmother’s home watching television. Her step-grandfather was also sitting on the couch. On this one occasion, Mr. S. picked her up and put her on top of his lap where he placed her vagina on top of his erect penis. They were both wearing clothes at the time.
15I found D.O. to be a careful, forthright and compelling witness. Her evidence was clear and sufficiently detailed. I found her to be both credible and reliable. Indeed, it is admitted by Mr. S. that one incident happened exactly as D.O. described. Mr. S. confirmed that on one occasion he entered D.O.’s grandmother’s bed while she was sleeping and put her hand on his erect penis.
16D.O.’s demeanour while testifying reflected someone who has been significantly emotionally impacted by the events she described. To be clear, her demeanour while testifying was only one factor in my overall assessment of her credibility, and I have been careful not to place undue weight on this aspect of her evidence.
17In addition, I found there to be an absence of evidence of any motive for D.O. to fabricate these allegations. I recognized that there is no burden whatsoever on Mr. S. to establish any motive for D.O. to fabricate her allegations. (Of course, Mr. S. admitted to committing one of D.O.’s allegations.) I was also aware that the absence of evidence of a motive to fabricate is simply one of many factors that a trier of fact may consider in assessing credibility. [See R. v. Gerrard, 2022 SCC 13 at para. 4; R. v. Ignacio, 2021 ONCA 69 at paras. 31-59.]
18D.O. was unshaken in cross-examination. Her testimony revealed no significant inconsistencies that could diminish her evidence.
19I did not find D.O.’s inability to precisely recall the exact number of times the various forms of sexual abuse happened to detract from her reliability. For abuse that was repeated over a lengthy period – and one year in a 7-8-year-old’s life is a long time – it is normal that specific details as to frequency would fade. It is well accepted that peripheral details of a traumatic event can be difficult to recall and accurately describe at a later date. [See R. v. G.M.C., 2022 ONCA 2, at para. 38; R. v. A.A., 2023 ONCA 174 at para. 17.]
20Further, I did not find Ms. O.'s failure, at age 8, to tell her mother everything Mr. S. did to her undermines her credibility or reliability.
(1) Firstly, what she was able to communicate at that young age was sufficiently serious to cause her parents to no longer allow their daughter to be alone with Mr. S. There is no dispute that once they were aware, her parents stopped bringing her to her grandmother’s home and leaving her alone with Mr. S.
(2) Secondly, I found D.O.’s explanation for why she did not tell her mother all the details of the sexual abuse when she made her first disclosure to be compelling and believable. She explained that at age 8, it was difficult to articulate the events to her mother. Despite their close relationship, she was still very uncomfortable to talk to her mother about what she herself did not fully understand. D.O. explained that it was not until she was older and further from the traumatic events that she had a better understanding of what happened. D.O. was better able to articulate what Mr. S. had done to her when she made her complaint to police at age 17.
(3) I found that D.O.’s explanation for her delayed and piecemeal disclosure made sense and accords with human experience, which has been recognized as normal behaviour for a child victim of sexual abuse. [See R. v. J.W., 2025 ONCA 637 at paras. 26-29; R. v. D.P., 2017 ONCA 263 at paras. 28-31; both cases referencing R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43]
Evidence of A.S.
21I did not accept Mr. S.’ denials of other sexual abuse. His evidence, when assessed in light of all the evidence, did not leave with me any doubt. I found Mr. S. to be an evasive witness who gave long, unresponsive answers.
22Critically, his evidence mutated as he testified. For example, in his evidence-in-chief, he made it clear that he was only alone with D.O. in the morning for a short 2-week window, based on his wife’s work schedule at the time as a live-in personal support worker. However, once under cross-examination, it became quite clear that he was alone in the morning with D.O. quite a bit more often: between 6 and 8 AM three times a week. Of course, Mr. S.’ secondary position accords with what D.O. described.
23This significant attempt by Mr. S. to minimize his opportunity to commit the offences as alleged by D.O. substantially undermined his credibility.
24Mr. S. made other attempts to minimize his opportunity for contact with D.O. For example, he steadfastly refused to acknowledge that he ever, even once, sat on the couch and watched TV with D.O., despite the duration of time he spent with her in his home.
25Further, when it was first suggested by Mr. Rutherford to Mr. S. that he had a sexual interest in D.O., Mr. S. denied this. However, when it was suggested again to Mr. S. a bit later in cross-examination, he conceded that “maybe he did” have a sexual interest in D.O., “but only that one time”.
26This was a preposterous answer – that his sexual attraction to 7 or 8-year-old D.O. was only limited to one day. It was clear to me that Mr. S. was avoiding the truth – that he was sexually attracted to D.O. and that he acted on that attraction repeatedly when he had the opportunity to do so.
27I accepted the evidence of D.O. I rejected the denials of Mr. S. His evidence, in the context of all the evidence, did not leave me with any doubt as to his guilt.
28After benefitting from the submissions of counsel, and a consideration of all the evidence, I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. S. repeatedly sexually abused D.O. as she described. The acts described amounted to both sexual interference and sexual assault.
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCES
29Based on my findings on the Gardiner hearing, I found the following facts:
(1) Beginning when D.O. was 7 years old, her parents would drop her off at her grandmother’s house in the morning before school. A.S. was living with her grandmother at the time and was the only grandfather D.O. ever knew.
(2) When her grandmother would leave to go to work, D.O. would be left in the care of Mr. S., her step-grandfather.
(3) D.O. would go back to sleep in her grandmother’s bed after arriving. On multiple occasions, Mr. S. came into bed with her, removed his pants and put D.O.’s hand on his erect penis. She would wake up in the middle of Mr. S. doing this and pull her hand away. Mr. S.’s sexual abuse began when D.O. was 7 years old and ended when she was 8 years old. This occurred more than 10 times.
(4) In addition, during this same timeframe, when she was getting ready to go to school, she would go to the bathroom and change and get washed up. Mr. S. would enter the bathroom and while D.O. was over the toilet with her pants off, he would use a bucket of water and pour it over her, touching her vagina with his hand. This happened at least twice.
(5) Finally, on one occasion during the same timeframe, D.O. was sitting on the couch in the living room of her grandmother’s home when Mr. S. put her on top of his lap while they were both fully clothed, putting her vagina on top of his erect penis.
(6) After enduring about a year of the sexual abuse, it ended when she told her parents and D.O. stopped going to her grandmother’s home.
IMPACT ON D.O.
30Our Court of Appeal has recognized the devastating impacts of sexual abuse on victims:
All sexual assaults are serious acts of violence. They reflect the wrongful exploitation of the victim whose personal autonomy, sexual integrity, and dignity are harmfully impacted while being treated as nothing more than an object. Whether intimate partners or strangers, victims of sexual violence suffer profound emotional and physical harm, and their lives can be forever altered. So too can the lives of their loved ones. [See R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487 at par. 74]
31Often, the damage caused by sexual assault is not so much physical harm but rather, psychological and emotional harm:
…Sexual violence can interfere with children's self-fulfillment and healthy and autonomous development to adulthood precisely because children are still developing and learning the skills and qualities to overcome adversity…For this reason, even a single instance of sexual violence can "permanently alter the course of a child's life"…
… Taking the harmfulness of these offences against children into account ensures that the sentence fully reflects the "life-altering consequences" that can and often do flow from the sexual violence…Courts should also weigh these harms in a manner that reflects society's deepening and evolving understanding of their severity…
[See R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at paras. 58 and 74
32Given that the vast majority of sexual offences against children are committed by adults who they know and trust, the Supreme Court noted:
Sexual violence causes additional harm to children by damaging their relationships with their families and caregivers. Because much sexual violence against children is committed by a family member, the violence is often accompanied by breach of a trust relationship…
The ripple effects can cause children to experience damage to their other social relationships. Children may lose trust in the communities and people they know. They may be reluctant to join new communities, meet new people, make friends in school, or participate in school activities… [See Friesen at paras. 60 and 61
33The life-altering impacts of child sexual abuse, as described by the Supreme Court, are reflected in D.O.’s powerful victim impact statement. Mr. S.’s predatory conduct towards his step-granddaughter devastated D.O., sending her spiralling down a path of fear, depression, trauma and self-harm that cost her years of her life, robbing D.O. of her adolescence.
34D.O. described the paralyzing fear she has experienced because of what Mr. S. did to her:
For years, I was afraid to sleep alone. The idea of being by myself in a dark room filled me with paralyzing fear. Most children outgrow that, but I didn’t. Not because I was immature or dramatic, but because something had been stolen from me: my sense of safety. Darkness didn’t just mean night, for me it meant danger, memories, and harm. I found myself bracing for the unknown, consumed by fear.
35Mr. S.’s breach of trust had a particularly traumatic impact on D.O.:
My perception of men and any relationship with them has been deeply skewed. People often tell me to ‘just relax’ or ‘not all men are like that’. But how can I believe that when the person who hurt me wasn’t a stranger? He was family. He was someone I trusted, someone my whole family trusted. He was my grandmother’s husband, my father’s stepdad. My step grandfather. If harm can come from someone that close, someone who was supposed to protect me, then how could I ever feel safe with anyone else?
36As D.O. compellingly explained, Mr. S. stole the light from her life:
My friends and family watched me slowly decay from the inside out. They saw the light in my eyes fade; the spark in my personality dim. I wasn’t myself anymore. I was distant, withdrawn, and barely present.
37Despite her years of struggle, D.O. has demonstrated remarkable resilience and a real commitment to healing and self-improvement. When she testified before me, D.O. was in her third year of her studies to become a nurse.
BACKGROUND OF A.S.
38A.S. is 72 years old and he has no prior criminal record. He was age 59 to 60 when he committed the offences. Mr. S. has no physical limitations or disabilities.
39Mr. S. meets the criteria for mild cognitive impairment, likely due to a progressive age-related decline. [See Exhibit 2, Report of Dr. Ilacqua, at p. 13]
40Mr. S. immigrated to Canada from the Philippines and has been a Canadian citizen since 1998.
41Mr. S. has been married to C.A., D.O.’s grandmother, for 27 years. Ms. A., who suffers from several serious health conditions that limit her mobility, currently depends on Mr. S. to help transport and care for her. [See Exhibit 3]
42Mr. S. has 6 adult children, with two children living in the Philippines, one living in Toronto and the others living around the world. He has 8 grandchildren in the Philippines.
43Mr. S. has a grade 9 education. While he has been retired for over a decade, he held consistent employment throughout his adult life, including as a moto-taxi driver in the Philippines and as a manual labourer and janitor in Canada.
44Ms. S. is an active member of his church community.
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
45Mr. Rutherford, on behalf of the Crown, sought a penitentiary sentence of 3 years plus the following ancillary orders:
An order requiring that Mr. S. provide a sample of his DNA for the national DNA databank,
An order pursuant to section 490.012 of the Criminal Code that Mr. S. comply with the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years,
A s. 161 prohibition order for 20 years, and
A s. 109(1)(a) order for 10 years.
46While reasonably acknowledging the mitigating factors in this case, the Crown highlighted the young age of D.O., the egregious breach of trust, the invasive and repeated nature of Mr. S.’ sexual abuse of D.O. that spanned a year of her childhood, and the profound impact that Mr. S.’ offending behaviour had on D.O.
47Mr. Bartlett, on behalf of Mr. S., has asked me to impose a conditional sentence of maximum duration. He took no issue with the ancillary orders sought by the Crown other than submitting that a 20-year SOIRA order would be grossly disproportionate in Mr. S.’ circumstances.
48While fairly acknowledging the many aggravating factors in this case, Mr. Bartlett pointed to the mitigating factors including Mr. S.’ age, his lack of a criminal record, his role as a caregiver for his wife and the collateral consequences his incarceration will have on her.
PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING
49The fundamental purpose of any criminal sentence is to protect society, contribute to respect for the law and help maintain a just, peaceful, and safe society.
50Sentencing judges attempt to achieve this goal by imposing just sanctions that address one or more of the sentencing objectives enumerated in the Criminal Code, including denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation from society where necessary, rehabilitation and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgment of the harm they have caused.
51The fundamental principle of sentencing is to impose a sanction that is proportionate to the gravity of the offences committed, and the degree of responsibility of the person who committed them.
52The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation. It involves a variety of factors that are difficult to define with precision. [See R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 58]
Denunciation and Deterrence
53The primary sentencing objectives when sentencing an individual for sexual interference must be denunciation and deterrence. There are few greater violations of one’s personal dignity and bodily integrity than sexual assault and in the case of a child, sexual interference.
54In Friesen, the Supreme Court sent a strong message that sexual offences against children cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Accordingly, sentences for such offences must increase to match Parliament’s view of their gravity and must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes. Substantial sentences are required, and it is not open to sentencing judges to elevate other sentencing objectives to an equal or higher priority than those of denunciation and deterrence. [See Friesen, at paras. 5, 101, 116, 145 and 151]
55The sentence required in this case must send a strong message of denunciation to deter others and to express society’s abhorrence of Mr. S.’ predatory conduct. It must communicate to Mr. S. and others who choose to abuse the trust of children and sexually violate them that they will face severe consequences.
Sentencing range
56Sentencing ranges or starting points for certain types of offences can assist sentencing judges in their application of all relevant principles and objectives, including parity and proportionality. It is important to note that such ranges or starting points are guidelines and not hard and fast rules. As the Supreme Court explained in Lacasse, at para. 51, there will be circumstances where a departure from the range, either above or below, is entirely appropriate. [See also A.J.K., at para. 77; R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 608 at paras. 22-29; R. v. S.W., 2024 ONCA 173 at paras. 34-51; Friesen at paras 30-39.]
57As far back as 2002, in the case of R. v. D.D., 2002 CanLII 44915 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 1061 (ONCA), Justice Moldaver, when he was presiding in the Ontario Court of Appeal, stated, “as a general rule, when offenders, in a position of trust, sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular basis over a persistent period of time, they can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms”. This statement was adopted with approval by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. I.F., 2011 ONCA 203.
58More recently, the Supreme Court noted the following with respect to the sentencing range for child sexual abuse, without setting binding or inflexible quantitative rules:
D.D., R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, R. v. J.S., 2018 ONCA 675, and this Court's own decisions in R. v. C.A.M., 1996 SCC 230 and R. c. L.M., 2008 SCC 31, make clear that imposing proportionate sentences that respond to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of offenders will frequently require substantial sentences. …[I]t is incumbent on us to provide an overall message that is clear (D.D., at paras. 34 and 45). That message is that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. We would add that substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or a single victim, as in this case, Woodward, and L.M. …[See Friesen at para. 114]
59Further, it is clear that sexual offences against children should be punished more severely than similar offences against adults. [See Friesen at para. 116] Indeed, the fact an offender abused a person under the age of 18 is a statutorily aggravating factor on sentence. [See s. 718.2(a)(ii.1) of the Criminal Code]
Rehabilitation
60Prioritizing denunciation and deterrence does not mean that rehabilitation can be ignored, nor does it mean that proportionality in sentencing is no longer an applicable principle. Sentencing is a highly individualized process and particular circumstances relating to blameworthiness, prospects for rehabilitation and the like must always be taken into account. This is particularly true where an offender, like Mr. S., has no criminal record.
Restraint Principle
61Sections 718.2(d) and (e) of the Criminal Code require me to consider the principle of restraint when sentencing Mr. S.
62The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasized the critical role that the restraint principle plays when sentencing a first-time offender. In applying the restraint principle, sentencing judges “should seek the least intrusive sentence and the least quantum which will achieve the overall purpose of being an appropriate and just sanction”. While the objectives of denunciation and deterrence must be given adequate weight, they should rarely be the sole determinants of the length of a first jail sentence. [See R. v. Francis, 2022 ONCA 729 at para. 80; R. v. D.W., 2024 ONCA 516 at para. 19]
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
63In determining an appropriate sentence, it is necessary to consider any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Aggravating Factors
64I will start with the aggravating factors:
(1) It is aggravating that Mr. S. repeatedly sexually violated his very young step-granddaughter over a prolonged period.
(2) Young children are exceptionally vulnerable. It is highly aggravating that when Mr. S. began sexually abusing D.O., she was just 7 years old. The moral blameworthiness of sexually abusing such a young child is very high.
(3) Mr. S. was the only grandfather D.O. ever knew. He was trusted by his wife, D.O. and her parents to nurture and care for D.O. when she was repeatedly left in his charge. It is profoundly aggravating that Mr. S. breached that relationship of trust. [See s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code]
(4) The nature of Mr. S.’ offending behaviour is very aggravating, which included repeated incidents of forcing D.O. to masturbate his penis, as well as rubbing D.O.’s naked vagina on multiple occasions. Mr. S.’ offending conduct amounted to gross violations of D.O.’s sexual and bodily integrity, at a very impressionable young age.
(5) As I have already explained, Mr. S.’ actions have had profound, lasting and devastating impacts on D.O.
(6) The fact that Mr. S. repeatedly sexually abused D.O. in her grandmother’s home, indeed, in her grandmother’s bed, a place of refuge and comfort, where she was sleeping and should have been safe and secure, is aggravating.
Mitigating Factors and Family Separation Collateral Consequences
65I now turn to the mitigating factors, which include:
(1) Mr. S. has no prior criminal record.
(2) Mr. S. has a supportive wife and family.
(3) Ms. S. regularly volunteers at his church.
(4) Advance age is usually a mitigating factor on sentence. [See R. v. A.R., 1994 CanLII 4524 (MB CA), [1994] M.J. No. 89 (MBCA) at para. 35] I recognize that serving a jail sentence in an institution will be harder for Mr. S. than for a much younger offender. Although he does not currently suffer from any physical limitation or disability, he meets the criteria for mild cognitive impairment. [See Exhibit 2, Report of Dr. Ilacqua, at p. 3 and 13-15]
- I should add that Mr. S. should receive no benefit from the fact that he is being sentenced many years after he committed his offences against his step-granddaughter. Even if I assume that specific deterrence may not be a factor for A.S., this is the kind of case where the abusive conduct was so serious over a prolonged period of time that the applicable sentencing principles demand a severe sentence regardless of when the offences were committed and the current age of Mr. S.
(5) Mr. S. has expressed some remorse for his actions, although I found that he minimized his offending behaviour when he testified. While offenders in cases involving child victims can be accorded significant mitigation for their guilty pleas, the mitigation in this case is reduced given the fact that D.O. still had to testify about Mr. S.’s sexual abuse in the Gardiner hearing.
I am concerned with Mr. S.’ limited insight into his offending behaviour. He has indicated that he does not believe he needs treatment despite telling Dr. Ilacqua that he could not stop his [sexually abusive] behaviour even though he tried. [See Exhibit 2, Report of Dr. Ilacqua, at p. 11]
I understand that Mr. S. has expressed a willingness to participate in psychological treatment, including at his church, although I am mindful of the potential obstacles to successful psychotherapy. [See Exhibit 2, Report of Dr. Ilacqua, at p. 15]
(6) Mr. S. has been an important support and caregiver for his 79-year-old wife, who has a number of serious medical afflictions. [See Exhibit 3]
Caring and providing for family members is a mitigating factor that shows good character and can increase rehabilitative prospects. Further, the pain of being unable to care and provide for family members while incarcerated is a collateral consequence that increases the severity of incarceration and can jeopardize rehabilitation. [See R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736, at paras. 41-42; R. v. L.C., 2022 ONCA 863 at paras. 23-34 and R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at para. 47]
In sentencing Mr. S., I must recognize the significant impact Mr. S.’ incarceration will have on his wife, and my sentence must therefore “preserve the family as much as possible”. [See R. v. Spencer, 2002 (2004), 2004 CanLII 5550 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 47 (C.A.) at paras. 46-47; Habib at paras. 42-44]
That being said, the sentence I impose cannot give the family separation collateral consequences undue weight [See R. v. Dent, 2023 ONCA 460 at paras. 124-126], nor can their consideration result in a sentence that does not reflect the proportionality principle. [See R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 at para. 14-18; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34 at para. 56; L.C., at paras. 20-24]
APPROPRIATE SENTENCE
66Trust, respect, kindness, and love should be the foundation of a healthy and nurturing grandfather/granddaughter relationship. Mr. S.’ repeated violations of D.O.’s dignity and sexual integrity ruptured this foundation and left D.O. reeling in fear, depression, and trauma.
67A strong message must be sent to Mr. S. and the community that this type of abhorrent conduct that inflicts profound physical and psychological harm on children will not be tolerated in our society. Having considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, the helpful submissions of counsel and the caselaw provided, I find that a 3-year penitentiary sentence is appropriate and necessary to reflect the relevant sentencing principles. This sentence should bring home to Mr. S. and to members of the public that perpetrators of sexual abuse on children will face severe consequences.
68Given my determination that a penitentiary sentence is required, a conditional sentence is not available. Further, I find that a conditional sentence would be woefully inadequate as it would not reflect the gravity of the offending behaviour committed, and the degree of responsibility of Mr. S. In the circumstances of this case, a conditional sentence would also fail to reflect the Supreme Court’s clear direction to sentencing judges that sentences for sexual offences against children must increase to recognize the real and lasting harm caused by these offences. [See Friesen at para. 5]
69Mr. S., please stand. I am sentencing you to serve 3 years in the penitentiary.
ANCILLARY ORDERS
70In addition to the sentence imposed, I am making the following ancillary orders:
DNA Order
(1) Sexual interference is a primary designated offence for which I must make an order pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code. I therefore order that you provide samples of bodily substances reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis to be used in accordance with the DNA Identification Act.
SOIRA Order
(2) Given the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38, I have discretion not to make an otherwise mandatory order pursuant to s. 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, I am applying the provisions of sections 490.012(3) and (4) in order to determine whether Mr. S. has shown that the public interest in his presumptive inclusion in the National Sex Offender Registry (NSOR) is “clearly and substantially” outweighed by the impact of the order on him, “including on [his] privacy or liberty” interest. [See R. v. Eldon, 2025 ONCA 348, at paras. 63-72]
Sections 490.012(3)(b) and 490.012(4) were the focus of Mr. Bartlett’s submissions urging me not to make the order. He did not suggest that there was no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders.
In determining whether to make an order I have considered the following factors set out in s. 490.012(4):
a) The very serious and repeated nature of Mr. S.’s offending behaviour
b) The fact that the victim in this case was just 7 and 8 years old when Mr. S. repeatedly sexually abused her
c) The fact that Mr. S. committed a serious breach of trust in sexually violating his step-granddaughter
d) The fact that Mr. S. is 72 years old
The fact that if the order is made, Mr. S.’ routine of regularly visiting his family in the Philippines for long durations may be impacted
e) The fact that Mr. S. has no other criminal record and has not offended since 2013, including while on an undertaking since February 2023
f) Dr. Ilacqua’s opinion that Mr. S. poses a low risk to re-offend [See Exhibit 2, Report of Dr. Ilacqua, at pp. 14-15]
On balance, I do not find that the reporting requirements of SOIRA will have a grossly disproportionate impact on Mr. S. I therefore make the order, sir, that you be subject to the requirements of SOIRA for the mandatory statutory term of 20 years. I note that you may apply for a termination order in 10 years pursuant to s. 490.015(1)(b). [See Eldon at para. 72; R. v. Thring, 2025 ONCA 389 at paras. 5-9]
Weapons Prohibition Order
(3) In addition, pursuant to s. 109(2) of the Criminal Code, I am prohibiting you from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance for a period of 10 years.
Section 161 Order of Prohibition
(4) Given the nature and circumstances of your offending behaviour, and considering your age, I am making an order of prohibition pursuant to s. 161(1) of the Criminal Code for a period of 10 years. The terms of that order are as follows:
You must not attend any public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre.
You must not be within 200 m of any dwelling house where D.O. ordinarily resides.
You must not be in the immediate presence of a child under the age of 16 unless their parent or other adult guardian is present
Pursuant to s. 161(2)(b), this prohibition order begins on the date when you are released from imprisonment, which includes release on parole, mandatory supervision, or statutory release.
Section 743.21 non-communication order
(5) I am also making an order pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code prohibiting you from having any contact or communication, direct or indirect, by any means, with D.O. while serving your sentence.
VSF
(6) Finally, considering that I am sentencing you to a lengthy period of custody, I am waiving the VFS.
71Mr. S., you have committed a grave offence for which you must serve your time in custody. I hope that while serving your sentence you take advantage of the programming made available to you to better equip you for your eventual release back into the community and to your family. You are fortunate that you have a loving and supportive wife and family to help you in your rehabilitation. I wish you well.
Released: March 12, 2026
Justice Joseph Callaghan