WARNING
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notices be attached to the file:
This is a case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and is subject to subsections 110(1) and 111(1) and section 129 of the Act. These provisions read as follows:
IDENTITY OF OFFENDER NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.
IDENTITY OF VICTIM OR WITNESS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED —(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
NO SUBSEQUENT DISCLOSURE — No person who is given access to a record or to whom information is disclosed under this Act shall disclose that information to any person unless the disclosure is authorized under this Act.
Subsection 138(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply with these provisions, states as follows:
- OFFENCES — Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published) . . . or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) . . .
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
D.P. (Young Person)
Before Justice Seth Weinstein
Heard on December 15, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on January 9, 2026
Jasmyn Mahal counsel for the Crown
Annamaria Enenajor and Heather Gunter counsel for D.P.
WEINSTEIN J.:
1On August 26, 2024, D.P. was charged with causing unnecessary harm to a racoon. Four days later, he was charged with causing death to a cat, failing to comply with a release order and two additional counts of causing unnecessary harm to a racoon.
2The Crown has since withdrawn two charges of causing unnecessary harm to a raccoon. D.P.’s trial on the remaining counts is scheduled to begin on February 9, 2026 and conclude on February 20, 2026. The time between the swearing of the Information and the anticipated completion of the trial is 17 months and 20 days, ten days shy of the presumptive Jordan ceiling.
3D.P. applies for a stay of proceedings, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter has been infringed. He argues that the Crown’s failure to provide essential disclosure within a reasonable time caused unacceptable delay. The defence submits that it took sustained and meaningful steps to expedite the matter, and that the delay in disclosure resulted in the case taking markedly longer than it reasonably should have.
Analytical Framework
4Every actor in the justice system is responsible for ensuring that criminal proceedings are carried out within a reasonable time. No party is permitted to remain passive in the face of delay.
5In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the framework for analyzing whether an accused person’s right to a trial within a reasonable time has been violated. Delay beyond the 18-month ceiling is presumptively unreasonable.
6The Jordan ceilings apply equally to young persons tried under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA): R. v. K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55. However, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to be tried within a reasonable time has “special significance” for youth, and delays should therefore be minimized. The Court recognized that although youths do not have a special constitutional guarantee to be tried faster than adults, they nonetheless should be tried quicker.
7Where, as here, the delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the defence to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the delay is unreasonable. To do so, the defence must show that it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have. The Supreme Court in Jordan expressed an expectation that stays beneath the ceiling will be rare and limited to clear cases: Jordan at paragraph 48.
8On August 26, 2024, D.P. was charged with causing unnecessary harm to a raccoon. He was released on a house arrest bail the same day.
9On August 29, 2024, a search warrant was executed at D.P.’s home. Several items were seized, including a cell phone, a computer tower, clothing and a notebook.
10On August 30, 2024, D.P. was charged with causing death to a cat, failing to comply with a release order, and two additional counts of causing unnecessary harm to a raccoon. The Information was sworn that day.
11On September 3, 2024, defence counsel made an oral request for disclosure, which was followed by a written request the next day.
12Initial disclosure was provided on October 3, 2024, consisting of approximately 442 pages of documents. This package was missing several essential items, such as witness statements, search warrant materials, photo and video evidence, and numerous officers’ notes and body‑worn camera footage. At the set‑date appearances on October 23 and November 13, 2024, the Crown did not oppose the defence requests for adjournments to review disclosure and pursue the outstanding items.
13On January 8, 2025, defence counsel sent a seven‑page letter with an itemized list of the outstanding disclosure. At set‑date appearances on January 8 and January 29, 2025, defence counsel requested adjournments as this essential disclosure remained outstanding. The Crown consented to these requests.
14On February 4, 2025, the Crown provided a second wave of disclosure, consisting primarily of approximately 23 hours of video footage. On February 26, 2025, the defence requested additional time to review this material.
15On March 11, 2025, the defence sent another detailed written request for the outstanding disclosure which included the notes of the officer in charge and twenty-five other officers, body‑worn footage from six officers, statements from twenty witnesses, SOCO photos, the results of any forensic testing, video canvass information, and copies of two ITOs. Given the volume and nature of the outstanding disclosure, counsel proposed a call with the assigned Crowns on March 14, 2025, and followed up by email on April 3, 2025.
16After receiving the March 11th disclosure request, the assigned Crown personally completed video redactions to accelerate production and arranged an in‑person meeting at 55 Division with a USB device in an effort to avoid the problems the police were having in uploading the material. The Crown also engaged the internet child exploitation unit to assist with reviewing and extracting data from D.P.’s phone and coordinated with multiple Toronto police divisions to follow up on disclosure items.
17On April 14, 2025, a CPT was held where counsel presented the Crown with a six‑page chart categorizing and prioritizing the outstanding disclosure. Importantly, the Crown did not dispute the existence of the items listed.
18Additional disclosure was provided on April 29, April 30, and May 1, 2025, but essential materials remained outstanding. On May 12, 2025, the defence emailed the Crown to inquire about the next wave of disclosure. The Crown responded that substantial disclosure would follow shortly.
19On June 2, 2025, the disclosure had still not been provided and, as such, the defence requested a JPT. JPTs were held on June 16, 2025 and July 10, 2025 to discuss the outstanding disclosure. In advance of the second JPT, the defence filed a brief detailing the disclosure that remained outstanding and explaining why trial dates could not be set until disclosure was complete.
20On August 12, 2025, the Crown advised for the first time that several of the requested items did not exist. This included statements from individuals who allegedly found the deceased cat and its collar, certain duty notes and body‑worn footage, social‑media records, and video canvass information.
21The notes of the officer in charge were not disclosed until August 17, 2025. In an affidavit filed in response to this application, PC Kathryn Ferguson explained that the delay in providing her notes was an oversight. When she transitioned out of her role as OIC, she believed her notes had already been uploaded to the electronic disclosure system and provided to the Crown. PC Ferguson indicates that she was managing multiple investigative tasks at the time and did not realize that her notes had not been properly transmitted. It was only after repeated defence requests and direct follow‑up from the Crown that she learned that the notes had not been disclosed. No explanation has been offered as to why, despite defence requests dating back to October 2024, this oversight was not identified until August 17, 2025.
22On August 19, 2025, the Crown took the position that disclosure was complete and trial dates could be set. Although significant disclosure remained (and still remains) outstanding, the defence agreed to set trial dates. JPTs were held on August 20, 2025 and September 3, 2025 to finalize trial estimates.
23At the August 20th JPT, the Crown disclosed for the first time that many items seized from D.P.’s home had never been sent for forensic testing. No explanation has been provided as to why, despite defence requesting disclosure of any forensic testing since August 2024, it took a full year to confirm that the items were never submitted.
24On September 5, 2025, trial dates were set for February 9–11, 13, and 17–20, 2026. The court offered earlier dates in December but neither the Crown nor defence were available.
25Although trial dates have been set, significant disclosure remains outstanding. Specifically, photos of the deceased cat and the results from the search of D.P.’s computer have not yet been provided. The Crown cannot say when this disclosure will be ready. Given these outstanding items, defence counsel has advised they cannot proceed to trial.
Impact of the Delay on D.P.
26The allegations against D.P. attracted significant public attention. His name and home address were published on social media, prompting calls for his incarceration and encouraging vigilante violence. Journalists attended the family home seeking comment, and D.P.’s mother lost her job after her connection to the case became known. The family endured repeated harassment, including threats delivered to their mailbox, individuals shouting outside their home, and acts of vandalism such as throwing eggs and dog excrement.
27On February 21, 2025, a masked intruder broke into the family home, brandished a knife, and threatened the family. Shortly afterward, a fire was set on a neighbour’s porch. On March 4, 2025, the same neighbour was assaulted by an intruder claiming to be looking for D.P. Police later discovered handwritten threats posted in the neighbourhood referencing D.P. and the cat involved in one of the charges. These events led police to advise the family to leave Toronto for their safety. The family ultimately sold their home and relocated.
28D.P.’s release conditions required him to live apart from his parents for over a year, causing prolonged family separation and disruption to his education. He missed school, fell behind academically, and was unable to participate in normal high school experiences. His parents observed significant changes in his mental health, including increased anxiety, fearfulness, and social withdrawal.
29The Crown was aware of the publicity surrounding the charges and the threats faced by D.P. and his family. Defence counsel reported incidents of harassment and vigilante activity to the Crown, and the family reported them to police. Although the Crown agreed to bail variations, disclosure remained incomplete for many more months.
Positions of the Parties
30For the purposes of this application, the parties agree that there is no defence delay.
31Counsel for D.P. submits that they demonstrated a sustained commitment to expedite the matter. This was not a complex case, and that 17 months and 20 days far exceeds the time reasonably required to complete the trial.
32The Crown agrees that the delay in setting trial dates resulted entirely from its failure to provide sufficient disclosure. It also concedes that trial dates could not be set until disclosure was provided. However, the Crown submits that a stay is not justified. It is submitted that the defence did not take meaningful steps to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings and that, given its complexity, the matter did not take markedly longer than reasonably necessary. The Crown further asserts that it acted proactively to mitigate delay through disclosure efforts and case management steps.
Analysis
The Crown’s Duty to Provide Disclosure
33It is well settled that the Crown has a constitutional obligation to disclose all material it proposes to use at trial and all evidence which may assist the defence even if the Crown does not intend to adduce it: R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.R. 45, at para. 18. The Crown must also obtain from the police any relevant information it is aware of and must take reasonable steps to inquire about such information. R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, at para. 17.
34It is also well settled that defence counsel cannot wait for “every last bit of evidence” to be disclosed before attending for pre-trials and setting trial dates: R. v. Kovacs-Tator (2004), 2004 42923 (ON CA), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 91 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 47.
35The entirety of investigative steps for this matter were completed within a week of D.P.’s arrest. Much of the disclosure being sought in this case could, and should, have been provided to the accused within one-two months of the charges being laid. There is no reasonable basis for these items to have taken more than eleven months to provide. Moreover, it is inexcusable for it to have taken more than eleven months for the police to tell the Crown that much of the requested material did not even exist. The pace of disclosure in this case is incompatible with the Crown and police obligation to move cases forward expeditiously. Rather, it reflects the culture of complacency that the Supreme Court of Canada condemned and sought to confront in Jordan.
Did the Defence Take Meaningful Steps to Expedite the Proceedings?
36Assessing the conduct of the defence is not an opportunity for trial judges, with the benefit of hindsight, to question every decision made by defence counsel. The Court is to consider what the defence could have done, and what it did do to get the case heard as quickly as possible. The defence is required to act reasonably, not perfectly: Jordan at para. 85.
37From the outset, defence counsel took sustained and proactive steps to expedite disclosure. Immediately after the charges were laid, counsel made oral and written requests for disclosure. When the material was not forthcoming, counsel sent a seven-page itemized disclosure letter. When those efforts failed, counsel scheduled a Crown pre-trial and provided a prioritized chart of outstanding items. When disclosure remained incomplete, the defence initiated two judicial pre-trials and submitted a written brief explaining why trial dates could not prudently be set until essential disclosure was provided. Ultimately, the defence set trial dates despite substantial disclosure remaining outstanding.
38The Crown argues that the defence’s actions reflect routine diligence expected of counsel and that the defence must show that their efforts “above and beyond” what diligent counsel would normally undertake: R. v Dass and Lazore, 2024 ONSC 5578. I disagree. “Above and beyond” means more than being a passive participant; it requires actively working to have the matter heard promptly. Even accepting the Crown’s interpretation of the standard, the defence’s efforts far exceeded what is expected of diligent counsel. Short of personally retrieving disclosure from the police, it is hard to imagine what more defence counsel could have done to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings.
39It bears noting that at no point did the Crown or the judicial pre-trial justice suggest setting trial dates while disclosure issues remained unresolved. Nor did they indicate that the defence should have done more or that its position that trial dates could not be set until disclosure was complete was unreasonable. All parties agreed that disclosure was necessary for the defence to assess the strength of the Crown’s case and make informed decisions regarding pleas and pre-trial applications.
Has the Case Taken Markedly Longer than it Should Have?
40Determining whether a case took markedly longer than it otherwise reasonably should have requires an assessment of several factors including (i) local considerations, (ii) the complexity of the case, and (iii) the Crown’s efforts to expedite the proceedings; Jordan at para. 87.
41Whether the time a case has taken markedly exceeds what was reasonably required is not a matter of precise calculation. Trial judges should not parse each day or month to assess whether each step was reasonably required. Instead, trial judges should step back from the minutiae and adopt a bird’s-eye view of the case. Ultimately, the issue is whether the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have: K.J.M., at para 10. In assessing a below-the-ceiling stay, the Court is to start from the position that the state brought D.P. to trial within a presumptively reasonable time, and from there, ask whether the presumption of reasonableness has been rebutted: R. v. S.A., 2024 ONCA 737 at para 35.
42In K.J.M., the Supreme Court clarified the nature of the “ceilings” established in Jordan at para. 69:
While the presumptive ceilings are a significant chapter in Jordan, they are not the whole story. Jordan established ceilings, not floors. While the ceilings offer a bright-line approach, they are supplemented by a more flexible, case-specific approach to delay below the ceiling. In this way, Jordan marries uniformity with flexibility.
43The presumptive ceiling is not an aspirational target. Eighteen months is still a long wait for justice, and most cases can and should be completed sooner: Jordan, at paras. 56–57. To address this, the Ontario Court of Justice introduced a Jordan-compliant scheduling directive on November 1, 2023, requiring all cases to be heard within 15 months. The directive also sets an expectation that matters will be resolved or scheduled for trial within six months, aiming to shorten the time to trial.
44The directive provides that at the first court appearance following six months from the Information sworn date, both parties should have addressed disclosure. If any discrete disclosure items remain outstanding, the parties are expected to take steps to resolve them. Ultimately, only the Crown can remedy the outstanding disclosure issues: R. v. Ferguson, 2025 ONCJ 627.
45When assessing whether a case took markedly longer than reasonably necessary, the fact that it involves a youth is an important consideration. In K.J.M., the Supreme Court of Canada identified several reasons why delay has heightened consequences for youth, including greater psychological impact, disruption to education and social development, and the risk of impairing a young person’s ability to make full answer and defence (e.g., fading memories among young witnesses and diminished resilience to prolonged proceedings).
46The Court also recognized that delay has greater psychological impact and disrupts education and family life. That imperative tightens the tolerance for state‑caused delay in producing disclosure.
47Youth justice courts must therefore be mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition in K.J.M. that it remains the responsibility of all justice system participants to ensure that youth criminal cases “proceed expeditiously,” recognizing the “enhanced need for timeliness in youth matters”: K.J.M. at paras. 52 and 149. Section 3(1)(b)(v) of the YCJA explicitly states that the youth criminal justice system must emphasize “the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this Act must act, given young persons’ perception of time”.
Application of Principles
48Within days of the charges, D.P. retained counsel, who immediately requested disclosure orally and in writing. For the next eleven months, they waited. However, they did not remain passive. The defence went beyond voicing concerns. They submitted detailed disclosure requests, escalated the issue to a Crown pre-trial by mid-April, and to judicial pre-trials in June and July when disclosure remained incomplete. Counsel prepared prioritized matrices of outstanding items, convened pre-trials focused on disclosure and explained the reasons why trial dates could not be set. These were organized, persistent efforts beyond routine follow-ups. Once the Crown claimed that disclosure was complete the defence immediately scheduled trial dates, even though disclosure remained, and remains, outstanding.
49The Crown, relying on Constable Ferguson’s affidavit, argues this was a particularly complex case that justified the pace of disclosure. In my view, there was no investigative or legal complexity that could reasonably explain the months-long delay in producing or clarifying the existence of essential disclosure. The explanations in Constable Ferguson’s affidavit reveal no genuine complexity; rather, they reflect an investigation plagued by disorganization, a lack of resources, oversights and indifference to the disclosure process.
50Complexity is a functional inquiry into whether case features reasonably required extra time for core disclosure and progression. While I accept that the officers carried a heavy workload, that does not make this investigation or trial inherently complex. Constable Ferguson’s reference to multiple occurrences and multi‑agency coordination do not explain why essential items such as her complete notes or confirmation of non‑existent witness statements and video canvass results were only provided more than eleven and a half months after the Information was sworn. This delay is even more inexplicable given the defence’s persistent requests and case management efforts.
51Constable Ferguson’s claim that the investigation involved multiple investigative agencies is belied by what I am told really happened. It appears that there was a single phone call placed to the sex crimes unit and no involvement of other agencies. In any event, there is no evidence that the involvement of these agencies contributed at all to any of the disclosure delay. There is no connection between other investigative agency responsibility and the complete inaction of disclosure in the months after charges were laid.
52Constable Ferguson also maintained that the complexity of the matter was exacerbated by public safety concerns, including safety concerns about D.P.’s sister. However, any safety concerns in relation to D.P.’s sister were addressed within two weeks of charges being laid. In my view, these safety concerns did not increase the complexity of the investigation or raise any complex legal issues for the trial. Although the public safety concerns may have impacted police resources, there is no causal connection between the delay in disclosure and police navigating the safety issues.
53Although a large amount of disclosure was provided, volume alone does not equate to complexity. Complexity must arise from case‑specific factors such as novel legal issues or structural challenges, not merely the number of documents disclosed. It also cannot be used as a shield for Crown complacency. Complexity does not relieve the Crown of its obligation to take meaningful steps to ensure timely progress. Where disclosure is voluminous, the Crown must show that it managed the case efficiently and took reasonable steps to mitigate delay. Simply pointing to the size of the file, without evidence of proactive case management, does not transform ordinary diligence into complexity: R. v. Singh 2025 ONCA 843.
54None of the hallmarks of complexity are present here. This case involves a single accused and a brief police investigation. There was no forensic testing and no investigative steps that added complexity. The sole reason the case did not proceed more expeditiously was the failure of the Crown and police to coordinate their efforts to provide necessary disclosure. It was a product of complacency and indifference towards constitutional disclosure obligations.
55While delay caused by police is attributed to the Crown for s. 11(b) purposes, it should be noted that Crown counsel assigned to this matter made some genuine efforts to protect the applicant’s s. 11(b) rights. She worked to expedite the process and minimize any prejudice resulting from late disclosure. Those efforts, however, did not overcome the police’s failure to provide essential disclosure, which remained incomplete for another five months after the Crown’s intervention.
56The indifference to the disclosure process is particularly aggravating in this case where the Crown and the police were aware of the prejudice and hardship being endured by D.P. and his family. While K.J.M. confirms that youth do not have a separate constitutional ceiling, it makes clear that the reasonableness analysis must account for youth-specific prejudice. In practical terms, there is an elevated obligation to ensure that essential disclosure is provided expeditiously so that youth files can be case‑managed and scheduled promptly, consistent with the policy and statutory objectives reflected in the s. 3(1)(b)(iv) of the YCJA.
57Essential items were late or only clarified as non-existent in mid-August 2025. That delay prevented earlier trial scheduling and prolonged the period during which D.P. remained under restrictive conditions and subject to severe public scrutiny. On these facts, and applying K.J.M., I conclude it was incumbent on the police to move disclosure more swiftly; their failure to do so made this case markedly longer than reasonably necessary in a youth context.
58In K.J.M, the Court stressed that youth are particularly vulnerable to the psychological burden of unresolved criminal allegations and attendant restrictions. That concern is amplified in this case. D.P., then 16, experienced extended separation from his family under bail, interruptions and delays in schooling, and social isolation. Those ordinary youth impacts recognized in K.J.M were compounded by extraordinary, case‑specific prejudice: intense public scrutiny, illegal publication of identifying information, threats, vandalism, and vigilante incidents escalating to home invasion and property damage. These harms were contemporaneously known to the Crown and police. Against that backdrop, the duty to provide essential disclosure promptly and clarify about what items did or did not exist was necessary to reduce the psychological and developmental harm that protracted proceedings inflict on youth.
59K.J.M also emphasizes that youth delay analysis must consider the practical burdens on young persons during the prosecution. D.P.’s academic setback, inability to engage in normal high‑school activities, prolonged family separation, and anxiety amid public attention are precisely the harms K.J.M. seeks to mitigate through expeditious proceedings. When disclosure is allowed to linger for months despite organized defence efforts, the result is a youth matter that has taken markedly longer than it reasonably should. In a youth file with ongoing, known prejudice, those delays are unreasonable even if the net time falls below the Jordan ceiling.
60The seriousness of the charges made it even more important for police to respect the Crown’s disclosure obligations. As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 84, “while the public has a heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence charged is serious, it also has a vital interest in having a justice system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for the accused are high.” In the s. 11(b) context, this means that “the public interest is best served, by trying serious charges on their merits in a timely fashion. These are precisely the cases that should be heard promptly, on the strongest possible evidence”: R. v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741, at para. 36.
61Neither the Crown nor the police heeded to the admonition of the Supreme Court in K.J.M. Despite the need to expedite youth matters and in the face of specific prejudice being suffered by D.P., the police placed no priority to this case. This is evident by the fact that there is still no word on when disclosure of the computer tower will be provided or whether the tower has even been analysed.
Conclusion
62In considering these issues, I must take a “bird’s eye view of the case” and avoid “failing to see the forest for the trees”: Jordan, at paras. 37, 91; R. v. Zahor, 2022 ONCA 449, at paras. 92-93. From that perspective, the delay in setting this matter down for trial was entirely due to the failure to provide timely disclosure, which caused the case to take markedly longer than it should have.
63The application is granted and the charges are stayed.
Released: January 9, 2026
Signed: Justice Seth Weinstein