R. v. Bijulisingh, 2026 ONCJ 128

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Bijulisingh, 2026 ONCJ 128 DATE: 2026-03-09 COURT FILE No.: Central West (Peel) region 998 23 31104995

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

— AND —

Michael Bijulisingh

Before: Justice R. Tomovski Heard on: January 30 and February 11, 2026 Reasons for Judgment released on: March 9, 2026

Counsel: Saul Benavides, counsel for the Crown Robert Christie, counsel for the defendant Michael Bijulisingh

Tomovski J.:

I. Introduction

1This case arises from what began as a routine traffic stop for speeding and driving with an expired licence. The situation escalated when Mr. Bijulisingh barricaded himself in his vehicle for nearly an hour, resulting in a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device (“ASD”), contrary to s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code. After the breath demand was made, Mr. Bijulisingh immediately rolled up his window, locked the doors, shook his head side to side, and declined to communicate with the officers.

2The Crown submits that Mr. Bijulisingh’s decision to barricade himself in the car was a deliberate effort to evade compliance with a lawful breath demand.

3Mr. Bijulisingh advances three defences:

1. That the officer, PC Ward, lacked the necessary grounds to issue the ASD demand;
2. That PC Ward intentionally muted his body-worn camera (“BWC”), resulting in “lost evidence” and warranting a stay of proceedings; and
3. That another officer, PC Scott-Krawczyk, provided him with incorrect legal information, giving rise to a defence of “officially induced error.”

4At trial, the Crown relied on one witness: PC Ward. His interaction with Mr. Bijulisingh, captured on BWC footage, was filed as an exhibit. Mr. Bijulisingh testified in his own defence. In assessing the evidence, I must determine the credibility and reliability of each witness, and I may accept all, some, or none of their testimony. I apply the three-step analytical framework in R. v. W.D., 1991 93 (SCC). The accused is presumed innocent, and the Crown bears the onus of proving each essential element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. Degiorgio, 2011 ONCA 527 at para. 43.

5For the reasons that follow, I do not accept Mr. Bijulisingh’s evidence on the central issues, nor does it leave me with a reasonable doubt. In contrast, I accept PC Ward’s evidence in its entirety; it was both credible and reliable. On the accepted evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved its case. I find that PC Ward had the requisite grounds to issue the ASD demand and that Mr. Bijulisingh intentionally failed to comply. I also conclude that the operative refusal occurred before PC Scott-Krawczyk became involved, rendering the defence of officially induced error inapplicable. Finally, I find that PC Ward’s decision to mute his BWC did not result in “lost evidence” and therefore did not infringe the accused’s Charter rights.

6In the alternative, even if I am mistaken regarding the timing of the operative refusal, I would nevertheless reject Mr. Bijulisingh’s remaining argument. Before and after PC Scott-Krawczyk’s involvement, Mr. Bijulisingh was made aware – through PC Ward – of his legal obligation to provide a breath sample, and he steadfastly refused to comply. His refusal was unequivocal from the outset. Although PC Scott-Krawczyk provided incorrect legal information, that misinformation did not alter Mr. Bijulisingh’s understanding of his obligation or the consequences of non-compliance. His refusal was not an “error” prompted by inaccurate advice; it was a deliberate and independent choice.

II. Analysis

A. PC Ward Possessed the Requisite Grounds to Make the ASD Demand

7On April 21, 2023, at approximately 10:00 p.m., on a dark and rainy night, PC Ward was conducting speeding enforcement in a residential area of Brampton, Ontario, using a radar device. He recorded Mr. Bijulisingh travelling 25 kilometres per hour over the posted speed limit and conducted a traffic stop.

8During the stop, PC Ward formed a suspicion that Mr. Bijulisingh had alcohol in his body. This suspicion arose from several observations, including a faint odour that he believed to be alcohol. He therefore made an ASD demand. Mr. Bijulisingh did not comply and did not provide a sample.

9Mr. Bijulisingh’s first argument is that PC Ward’s suspicion was not objectively reasonable. He maintains that the faint odour detected by PC Ward was perfume rather than alcohol and submits that the officer’s other observations fail to meet the threshold for reasonable suspicion.

10Section 320.27(1) of the Criminal Code authorizes an officer to make a lawful ASD demand where the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol in their body. This standard has been consistently affirmed: R. v. Breault, 2023 SCC 9 at para. 39; R. v. Woods, 2005 SCC 42 at para. 30; R. v. Bernshaw, 1995 150 (SCC) at para. 49; R. v. Khandakar, 2024 ONCA 620 at para. 13.

11Reasonable suspicion requires that the officer’s subjective belief be supported by objectively ascertainable facts. The standard is concerned with reasonable possibilities, not probabilities, and does not require the elimination of all innocent explanations or that the officer’s inference be the only reasonable one: R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49 at paras. 22, 26-27, 29, 32-34.

12An odour of alcohol coming from within a vehicle where the driver is the sole occupant may, on its own, provide reasonable suspicion that the driver has alcohol in their body: R. v. Doyle, 2017 ONSC 1826 at paras. 32-33; R. v. Muller, 2016 ONCJ 275 at para. 27; R. v. Mason, 2013 ONCJ 328 at para. 9.

13The events leading up to the ASD demand are set out below and demonstrate that PC Ward’s subjective suspicion that Mr. Bijulisingh had alcohol in his body was objectively reasonable.

14After stopping Mr. Bijulisingh’s car, PC Ward approached the driver’s side at 10:02 p.m. Mr. Bijulisingh was alone in the car. When directed to roll down his window, he did so only by about an inch. After explaining the reason for the stop and requesting his driver’s licence, Mr. Bijulisingh held the licence up to the window rather than handing it over. When told he was required to physically surrender the licence and that refusal could result in arrest, Mr. Bijulisingh continued to refuse. Using his flashlight, PC Ward confirmed that the licence was expired; Mr. Bijulisingh insisted it was not. Throughout several minutes in which PC Ward calmly and patiently explained the requirement to surrender his licence, Mr. Bijulisingh remained openly defiant, at one point responding, “it can’t be a demand from my point of view.”

15PC Ward testified that, in hundreds of traffic stops, he had never encountered anyone who refused to provide their documents following a demand. Unsure how the interaction would unfold, he requested assistance. PC Arora arrived at 10:07 p.m. and tested the driver’s door, discovering it was unlocked. When he opened it, both officers observed Mr. Bijulisingh playing a video game on his phone. When asked, he offered no explanation for this unusual behaviour and made no effort to turn off the game.

16PC Ward again calmly explained the reason for the stop and the requirement to provide his licence. After some hesitation, Mr. Bijulisingh finally surrendered it.

17The BWC footage demonstrates that throughout the interaction Mr. Bijulisingh understood what was being communicated. He nodded affirmatively on several occasions and shook his head to signal disagreement. For example, he looked directly at the BWC and nodded when told he was being recorded but shook his head side-to-side when asked to provide his licence. Although he sometimes remained silent or stared blankly, nothing in his behaviour suggested fear, confusion, or an inability to comprehend. When he did speak, his responses indicated full comprehension of what was being said.

18PC Ward informed Mr. Bijulisingh that he would print the traffic notices in his cruiser. At 10:10 p.m., he closed the driver’s door and walked over to PC Arora, who was speaking with PC Scott-Krawczyk, newly arrived and positioned out of earshot of Mr. Bijulisingh’s car. PC Ward muted his BWC for approximately 15 seconds while conferring with the officers. He testified that he told them he was taken aback by Mr. Bijulisingh’s unusual behaviour and that he had detected an odour he suspected might be alcohol. He then retrieved an ASD from the cruiser.

19PC Ward testified that, considering the entire interaction, the cumulative effect of his observations led him to suspect that the odour was alcohol and that Mr. Bijulisingh was driving with alcohol in his body. These observations included: (a) driving 25 km over the speed limit in rainy conditions in a residential area; (b) repeated non-compliance, including refusing to fully roll down the window and refusing to hand over his licence; (c) unexplained silences; (d) a blank stare; and (e) playing a video game during the stop, which he considered inappropriate in the circumstances.

20In cross-examination, the defence did not put to PC Ward that the odour was perfume rather than alcohol or that he fabricated his evidence regarding the odour. Instead, the suggestion was merely that the odour could have been either. However, PC Ward was not required to conclusively determine which scent he detected or rule out perfume. Based on the cumulative circumstances – including an odour that could reasonably be interpreted as alcohol emanating from a car with a lone driver – it was an available and reasonable inference that the odour was alcohol. I am satisfied that PC Ward’s suspicion that Mr. Bijulisingh had alcohol in his body was objectively reasonable.

B. The Muted BWC Did Not Breach Mr. Bijulisingh’s s. 7 Charter Rights

21Mr. Bijulisingh’s second argument is that PC Ward intentionally muted his body-worn camera during a brief discussion with PC Arora and PC Scott-Krawczyk, and that this deliberate muting resulted in “lost evidence” warranting a stay of proceedings. I do not accept this submission.

22Although no specific authority was relied on by the defence, its position closely resembled R. v. Azfar, 2023 ONCJ 241. In Azfar, the police deliberately muted their BWC shortly before making an ASD demand in order to conceal the grounds for the demand. The court found this to be a deliberate suppression of evidence, constituting a breach of s. 7 of the Charter: at paras. 22-25, 30, 34.

23However, several Ontario decisions considering Azfar have reached different conclusions. These cases hold that intentionally muting a BWC during police interactions with accused generally does not constitute a breach of s. 7 or amount to lost evidence. They identify several principles:

1. There is no constitutional or common-law obligation to create evidence through audio or video recordings, and evidence that never existed cannot be “lost”: R. v. Aim, 2023 ONSC 98377 at paras. 49, 56; R. v. Swaby, 2024 ONSC 4004 at paras. 67-70, 76; R. v. Sherif, 2024 ONSC 4098 at paras. 86, 95; R. v. Palden, 2025 ONSC 500 at para. 41; R. v. Dunn, 2023 ONCJ 562 at para. 35; R. v. Habte, 2025 ONCJ 216 at para. 86.
2. A police service’s internal policy requiring BWCs to remain unmuted does not create a statutory duty or a constitutional right: Swaby, at para. 61; Palden, at para. 42.
3. No prejudice arises where the muted conversation occurs outside the accused’s presence and the account of the conversation is not meaningfully disputed: Swaby, at paras. 86-88; Sherif, at paras. 92, 97; Palden, at para. 43.
4. The absence of bad faith in the decision to mute weighs against finding a Charter breach: Sherif, at para. 96; Palden, at para. 41.
5. A deliberate muting may be relevant to an officer’s credibility, where challenged, but does not in itself amount to a constitutional violation: Aim, at para. 57; Swaby, at paras. 74-75, 88.

24The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from Azfar. Although PC Ward intentionally muted his BWC during a short discussion with PC Arora and PC Scott-Krawczyk before making the ASD demand, several factors lead me to conclude that s. 7 is not engaged and that his credibility is not compromised.

25Unlike in Azfar, I find that PC Ward did not mute the BWC to conceal the basis for the ASD demand or to suppress evidence. His purpose, as he explained, was to briefly discuss his concern about Mr. Bijulisingh’s unusual behaviour and his perception of an odour that he suspected to be alcohol, which contributed to his reasonable suspicion.

26PC Ward made notes of the discussion, and these notes were disclosed to the defence. The defence did not suggest any improper motive or challenge his credibility or the accuracy of his account. I find no bad faith in his decision to mute the BWC.

27Although PC Ward acknowledged that muting the BWC was “inappropriate,” the defence led no evidence establishing whether any applicable BWC policy existed at the time, nor did it explore possible exceptions or the policy’s relevance. PC Ward testified that he was unaware of any such policy during the incident. On this record, there is no basis to conclude that any policy was breached in a manner engaging constitutional rights. In any event, an internal police policy does not create a statutory or constitutional obligation.

28The muted portion lasted approximately 15 seconds and occurred entirely outside Mr. Bijulisingh’s earshot. The content of the conversation is accurately documented, uncontroverted, and not the subject of any live dispute. In the absence of any legal duty to create an audio recording, no evidence was lost. Mr. Bijulisingh has suffered no prejudice.

29I therefore conclude that PC Ward’s decision to mute his BWC did not breach Mr. Bijulisingh’s s. 7 Charter rights, nor does it adversely affect my assessment of his credibility.

C. The Operative Refusal Crystalized Prior to PC Scott-Krawczyk’s Involvement

30For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the operative refusal occurred before PC Scott-Krawczyk became involved.

31At 10:12 p.m., after retrieving the ASD, PC Ward returned to Mr. Bijulisingh’s window with the device in hand. The window remained open only an inch. PC Ward testified that he read the ASD demand verbatim from his notebook. Realizing that his BWC was muted, he unmuted it and re-read the demand verbatim. The BWC footage captures PC Ward reading the demand loudly and clearly, and warning that failure to comply is an arrestable offence. The footage also shows Mr. Bijulisingh nodding his head side-to-side several times as the demand was read, including at the words requiring him to provide a breath sample and accompany PC Ward for that purpose. Immediately upon PC Ward finishing the demand, Mr. Bijulisingh rolled his window fully up, locked the doors, and, literally, began his sit-in. The time was 10:13 p.m. When PC Arora tried the handle, this time the door was locked. When told to open the door, Mr. Bijulisingh again shook his head side-to-side.

32From that point forward, the officers discussed how to safely remove Mr. Bijulisingh to effect the arrest. At 11:10 p.m., he was finally removed after a tow-truck operator unlocked the car by lifting the interior handle with a metal tool inserted between the window and frame.

33Mr. Bijulisingh was arrested approximately one hour after the demand was made and after the sit-in began. Throughout that period, officers repeatedly and calmly urged him to exit the vehicle. He continued to refuse, both verbally and non-verbally.

34As noted in Breault, the remedial purpose of s. 320.27(2)(b) is to “detect dangerous drivers quickly and get them off the road,” and breath-sample procedures are intended to be brief: paras. 6, 45.

35A driver must provide a breath sample into an ASD “immediately,” not “when the driver sees fit”: Woods, at paras. 14, 45; Breault, at paras. 2, 7-9, 24, 30-31; Khandakar, at para. 37. A sample must be provided at the moment the officer is able to receive it: Woods, at para. 50; Breault, at para. 36; Khandakar, at paras. 2, 14, 50, 61. Although “unusual circumstances” may justify short delays, such circumstances are determined on a case-by-case basis: Breault, at paras. 7-8, 32, 48, 54, 61-69; Khandakar, at paras. 40, 58.

36Once PC Ward read the demand at 10:12 p.m., ASD in hand and ready to receive a sample, Mr. Bijulisingh was legally required to provide one immediately. He did not. His refusal crystallized at that point. The only impediment to providing a sample was Mr. Bijulisingh’s deliberate decision to barricade himself in his car. At that moment, the refusal was unequivocal and the offence was complete.

37Throughout the stop, Mr. Bijulisingh used head-shaking to signal refusal to comply with police directions (e.g., unlocking the door, lowering the window, providing his licence). I interpret his side-to-side head-shake at the time of the ASD demand similarly – an unambiguous refusal. Coupled with his immediate act of rolling up the window and locking the doors, there is no reasonable alternative explanation. I also reject his evidence that he locked the doors out of fear; I address this further below. His non-verbal conduct at 10:12 p.m. constituted an unequivocal refusal to comply with a lawful demand.

38Barricading oneself in a car – whether for a minute or an hour – is not an “unusual circumstance” within the meaning of Breault that could justify delaying the provision of a breath sample. To conclude otherwise would be absurd. As noted in R. v. Recoskie, 2020 ONSC 7056 at para. 80, a person cannot create an unreasonable situation and rely on it to excuse delay in providing a breath sample.

39Mr. Bijulisingh was read a valid demand at 10:12 p.m. He did not testify that he failed to understand the demand or the requirement to provide a sample. He gave no legitimate reason for failing to comply. In cross-examination, he agreed he understood the demand and the legal obligation to provide a sample and also agreed he chose not to comply. He had four minutes – before PC Scott-Krawczyk was involved – during which PC Ward possessed the ASD and was able to receive a sample. He chose not to provide one.

40As Woods and Khandakar emphasize, drivers do not control the timing of compliance. They are not free to provide a sample when they see fit. Mr. Bijulisingh was required to provide the sample then – not later. That is when the refusal crystallized. He did not voluntarily exit the car; he was removed only through mechanical means. It is unknown how long his sit-in would have continued had the tow-truck operator not intervened.

41This is a case of unequivocal refusal, bearing directly on both the actus reus and mens rea. It is not a “change of mind” case such as that discussed in Khandakar. Nonetheless, Khandakar is instructive on the immediacy requirement even in unequivocal-refusal situations.

42The defence briefly asked PC Ward why Mr. Bijulisingh was not given a “last chance” to blow after his arrest. Even though this is an unequivocal refusal case, I address the point. At no time did Mr. Bijulisingh indicate any change of mind. He never sought a second – or even a first – opportunity to provide a sample. His intention remained constant: he would not comply. The defence, correctly, did not pursue a “change of mind” argument for this reason.

43I turn briefly to Mr. Bijulisingh’s asserted fear of the police. Although not formally advanced as a reasonable excuse, it was suggested that fear explained his refusal to exit the vehicle and provide a breath sample.

44I do not accept this evidence, nor does it raise a reasonable doubt. It does not amount to a reasonable excuse for refusing to provide a sample.

45Mr. Bijulisingh testified that when he was 17 years old – 32 years ago – he had a negative experience with police that caused him to fear exiting his car in this case. I reject this evidence for several reasons:

1. He provided no meaningful detail about the past incident beyond saying the officers were “physical”. The account lacked context and did not support any connection to this traffic stop.
2. The incident was remote in time, and he acknowledged having no issues with the police in the intervening 32 years.
3. He agreed that PC Ward was respectful, calm, and polite.
4. The BWC footage confirms that PC Ward’s manner was patient, polite, and non-threatening, which would have dispelled any genuine fear.
5. Nothing in Mr. Bijulisingh’s tone, mannerisms, or behaviour suggests fear. The only moment he appeared surprised was when PC Arora opened the door; surprise, however, is not fear.
6. His decision to play a video game during the stop – and continue doing so while an officer spoke with him – signals indifference or audacity, not fear.
7. His overall interactions with the officers indicate defiance rather than apprehension. He refused multiple lawful directions while remaining calm, articulate, and willing to debate matters with the officers.

46I find that Mr. Bijulisingh never intended to provide a breath sample. His refusal was unequivocal from the moment the initial ASD demand was made. He did not waver or reconsider. The Crown has proven all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

D. Mr. Bijulisingh’s Refusal was not the Result of an Officially Induced Error

47My conclusion that the operative refusal occurred before PC Scott-Krawczyk became involved is sufficient to dispose of the case. However, for the sake of completeness, I address Mr. Bijulisingh’s final argument.

48Mr. Bijulisingh submits that he relied on incorrect legal information provided by PC Scott-Krawczyk in choosing not to provide a breath sample, and that this should excuse his refusal on the basis of officially induced error. I reject this argument for the reasons that follow.

49I begin by summarizing the relevant evidence.

50PC Scott-Krawczyk’s interaction with Mr. Bijulisingh was extremely short. It began at 10:16 p.m. and lasted approximately 30 seconds.

51Before she arrived, PC Ward had already read the ASD demand twice to Mr. Bijulisingh – at 10:12 p.m. – after which Mr. Bijulisingh immediately began his sit-in. Four minutes later, PC Scott-Krawczyk approached PC Ward, who remained at the car, and was told that Mr. Bijulisingh was refusing to open the door or provide a breath sample.

52PC Scott-Krawczyk then addressed Mr. Bijulisingh through the closed window, stating:

“You have been read a breath demand. You have been read an ASD breath demand. Right now, you are refusing. Regardless, if you refuse, your car is being impounded for 90 days, sorry for 7 days and your licence is suspended for 90. This goes the exact same way as impaired. Even if you blow a zero, you’re still getting charged with an impaired. That’s how an ASD breath demand works. So, roll down your window.”

53Mr. Bijulisingh refused to roll down the window.

54PC Ward acknowledged that part of PC Scott-Krawczyk’s statement was incorrect. He confirmed that he did not have reasonable grounds to arrest for impaired driving and that this was why an ASD demand was being made.

55Within seconds, PC Ward corrected the information, advising:

“If you don’t blow into the ASD, an approved screening device – it’s just to give me an analysis of your breath to determine if you’re over or under the legal limit. If you refuse, it carries the same weight.”

56At 10:18 p.m. and again at 10:25 p.m., PC Arora told Mr. Bijulisingh that refusing to open the window would be taken as a refusal and that he will be arrested for obstructing police.

57At 10:26 p.m., PC Ward told PC Arora that when Mr. Bijulisingh rolled up his window, shook his head “no”, and (as he testified) verbally said “no” in response to the initial demands at 10:12 p.m., he understood this as a refusal to comply.

58At 10:27 p.m., PC Ward demonstrated how to blow into the ASD and explained:

“This is the demand I am reading you. This is literally just a roadside breath test. If you’re under, it’s calibrated for 100 milligrams. If you’re under that, then it will just be a warn. If you’re under 50 milligrams, it’s nothing. You’re allowed to be. Even if you’ve had a couple of drinks, it doesn’t matter.”

59PC Ward testified he informed Mr. Bijulisingh that failing to open the door would constitute a refusal. At 10:29 p.m., he stated “at this point, it’s a refuse”. The officers then arranged for a tow-truck operator to assist in opening the door. At 10:37 p.m., PC Ward formally advised Mr. Bijulisingh that he was under arrest for refusing to comply and read his rights to counsel and caution, again referencing the initial demand at 10:12 p.m.

60The tow-truck operator eventually opened the door, and Mr. Bijulisingh was removed and arrested at 11:10 p.m. Throughout the hour-long sit-in, Mr. Bijulisingh repeatedly shook his head “no” in response to requests to open the window, unlock the door, or provide a sample.

61A finding of officially induced error may excuse a deliberate failure to provide a breath sample where the accused reasonably relied on incorrect legal information provided by an officer: R. v. Halloran, 2010 ONSC 4321 at para. 6. The remedy, only in the clearest of cases, is a stay of proceedings: R. v. Jorgensen, 1995 85 (SCC) at para. 37.

62In R. v. Fernandes, 2016 ONCJ 180 at para. 26, the essential elements of officially induced error were set out:

1. An error of law or mixed fact and law
2. The accused considered the consequences and sought advice
3. The advice came from an authorized state representative who was responsible for the relevant law
4. The advice was erroneous
5. The accused relied upon the advice
6. The reliance was reasonable

63Although PC Scott-Krawczyk did not provide “advice” in the technical sense, I accept that her statement – that Mr. Bijulisingh would be charged with impaired driving even if he blew zero – was legally incorrect. PC Ward appropriately acknowledged this. Even a person blowing below 50mg would not face an impaired driving charge.

64Despite this error, I do not accept, nor am I left in reasonable doubt, that Mr. Bijulisingh relied on PC Scott-Krawczyk’s comments in deciding to refuse. They did not influence his decision. He understood the ASD demand, was not confused, and made a deliberate choice not to comply. This finding is dispositive.

65Mr. Bijulisingh asserted that PC Scott-Krawczyk’s incorrect information left him feeling “stuck,” in a “no-win situation,” and believing he would be charged regardless of whether he provided a sample. He further claimed that nothing said afterwards – including PC Ward’s clarification that he would not be charged if he blew under 50mgs, which he acknowledged understanding – impacted his decision-making. I do not accept this evidence. His conduct from the outset was aimed at thwarting the ASD demand, which he understood to be a legal requirement. His refusal began before PC Scott-Krawczyk spoke and persisted unchanged afterwards.

66I also reject his evidence that he would have complied had he been told he would not be charged if he blew zero. His own cross-examination contradicted this claim: he agreed that PC Ward explained he would not be charged if he blew under 50mgs. His credibility on this and other core issues is lacking.

67The incorrect information did not retroactively invalidate PC Ward’s otherwise lawful demand. Moreover, PC Ward’s subsequent explanations reaffirmed the correct legal consequences, which Mr. Bijulisingh acknowledged he understood.

68I also reject Mr. Bijulisingh’s assertion that he assumed PC Scott-Krawczyk outranked PC Ward and relied on her legal statement for that reason. This assumption finds no support in the evidence. PC Ward testified she was not his superior; no officer represented her as such; nothing about her attire or interaction suggested higher rank; and PC Ward, not PC Scott-Krawczyk, made the breath demand and conducted the hour-long interaction. It would not have been reasonable for Mr. Bijulisingh to treat her comments as authoritative over PC Ward’s.

69Accordingly, the defence has not established officially induced error on a balance of probabilities: Jorgensen, at para. 38.

III. Conclusion

70I am satisfied that the Crown has proven all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. On April 21, 2023, Mr. Bijulisingh was operating a conveyance; PC Ward made a lawful ASD demand; and Mr. Bijulisingh intentionally refused to comply. He had no reasonable excuse, nor was his refusal the product of an officially induced error.

71Accordingly, I find Mr. Bijulisingh guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.