His Majesty the King v. Abel Hailu, 2026 ONCJ 110

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file:

A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:

486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences. — (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences:

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 160, 162, 162.1, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1,172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) MANDATORY ORDER ON APPLICATION — In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

486.6 OFFENCE — (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under any of subsections 486.4(1) to (3) or subsection 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Hailu, 2026 ONCJ 110

DATE: February 25, 2026

COURT FILE No.: 22-11403871

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

ABEL HAILU

Before Justice T. Lipson

Reasons for Judgment released on February 25, 2026

E. Davies counsel for the Crown

K. Stein counsel for Abel Hailu

LIPSON J.:

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Introduction

1On November 15, 2024, Mr. Hailu was convicted of the following offences: Sexual assault with a weapon (two counts); kidnapping; utter death threat; forcible confinement, harassing communication, criminal harassment, intimidation, and possession of a weapon. The charges of forcible confinement and intimidation were stayed pursuant to the principle in Kienapple.

2The Crown seeks a global custodial sentence of 12 years imprisonment with a delay in parole eligibility pursuant to s. 743.6(1). The Crown also seeks a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) for a 10-year duration. The Crown seeks the following ancillary orders: SOIRA for a duration of life, pursuant to s. 490.012(2), DNA, s. 109 weapons prohibition for 10 years, a non-communication order with the victim, L.O. and her friend F.B. and the Victim Fine Surcharge.

3Counsel for Mr. Hailu submits that a sentence in the 6-year range is fit and appropriate. It is submitted that Mr. Hailu should be credited for his pre-sentence custody. Mr. Hailu was arrested on October 17, 2022, and was in custody until his release on bail on December 1, 2022. He was rearrested on October 12, 2024, when his father revoked his suretyship and has remained in custody to the present. His total presentence custody amounts to 548 days or one year six months and one day. With enhanced credit on a 1:5:1 basis the total is 822 days (or 2 years, 3 months and 2 days). The defence also seeks Downes credit for the stringent bail restrictions Mr. Hailu was required to follow from his release date of December 1, 2022, to his re-arrest on October 12, 2024, a period of 681 days.

4The defence further submits that the Crown has not established that parole eligibility delay is warranted or that a LTSO is required for Mr. Hailu.

5I will first address the issue of the sentence proper as well as the parole delay issue and then turn to a consideration of the Crown’s LTSO application.

Circumstances of the Offences

6The circumstances of the offences are set out in detail in my reasons for judgment released on November 15, 2024. The following is a summary of the facts proven at trial:

7In the days preceding the offence, Mr. Hailu conducted multiple online searches on topics related to sexual assault and methods by which offenders are apprehended.

8On October 14, 2022, Mr. Hailu left his residence in Nepean and attended a Canadian Tire store, where he purchased a blue metallic knife. He then travelled by public transit to the Sandy Hill neighbourhood in downtown Ottawa.

9At approximately 9:30 p.m., near Wilbrod Street and Nelson Street, Mr. Hailu encountered Ms. L.O., a stranger who was using her phone. He compelled her to end her call, threatened her, and brandished the knife. He obtained her personal information, photographed her identification card, and restricted her ability to use her phone. He then forcibly led her through various locations in Sandy Hill for nearly two hours.

10Ultimately, Mr. Hailu brought Ms. L.O. behind a shed and forced her to perform oral sex on him twice. Before releasing her, he imposed conditions: she was to communicate with him via text or social media to create the appearance of consent and refrain from contacting police.

11Shortly after her release, police located Ms. L.O.. Officers had been dispatched following a call from her friend, Ms. F.B., who had been on the phone with Ms. L.O. when the attack began. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to reconnect, Ms. F.B. managed to speak briefly with Ms. L.O. and learned she was in danger. Police located Ms. L.O. and transported her to hospital for assessment.

12While at the hospital, Ms. L.O. received messages from Mr. Hailu. After being medically cleared, she provided a detailed statement to police, consented to a forensic search of her phone and for an undercover officer to assume her online identity. Detective Carr, posing as Ms. L.O., engaged in text communication with the accused and arranged a meeting. Mr. Hailu attended the meeting and was arrested. His phone was seized incident to arrest, and its contents were admitted at trial.

13The core findings underlying each conviction are set out in my reasons as follows (with reference to the paragraph numbers contained in the judgment):

Counts 1 and 2: Sexual Assault with a Weapon, contrary to s. 272(2).

14There is no dispute that there was sexual contact between Mr. Hailu and Ms. L.O. on two occasions on October 14, 2022. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hailu forced Ms. L.O. to perform oral sex on two separate occasions behind a shed near the intersection of Stewart and Chapel Streets in Ottawa. Ms. L.O. was entirely credible that she did not consent to any sexual activity with Mr. Hailu. I believe that she engaged in sexual activity because she was in fear for her life. I accept her testimony that Mr. Hailu produced and showed her the knife he brought that evening. She was aware of him having the knife throughout the incident. I believe her testimony that he threatened to slit her throat if she bit his penis. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has established the essential elements of the offence of sexual assault using a weapon, contrary to s. 272.

Count 3: Utter Threat to Cause Death, contrary to s. 264.1(2).

15I accept the evidence of Ms. L.O. that Mr. Hailu told her not to bite his penis or he would slit her throat. Also, he repeatedly gave the complainant instructions to do or not do things by telling her she would “regret it” if she did not comply. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of uttering a death threat to Ms. L.O.

Count 4: Unlawful Confinement, contrary to s. 279(2).

16The Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did, without lawful authority, confine Ms. L.O.. He led her around the Sandy Hill neighbourhood of Ottawa against her will. She pleaded with him to let her go. I accept her testimony that he would either grab her arm or maintain close physical proximity to her to prevent her from leaving. He showed her a knife and carried it on his person throughout the incident. Not only did he use a weapon but also used threats to compel the complainant to accompany him and remain in his presence.

Count 5: Criminal Harassment by engaging in communications to cause L.O. to reasonably fear for her personal safety contrary to s.264(3)

17I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that after Ms. L.O. was permitted to leave the accused, Mr. Hailu sent several unwanted messages through different platforms that were threatening in nature. I have identified those messages earlier in these reasons. In these messages, Mr. Hailu did not reveal his identity. The messages were threatening in nature. One was particularly threatening. He wrote, “Because if I don’t think you arrived home safe, I might need to send some people to verify that you’re okay.” I agree with the submission of the Crown that this was clearly a threat to Ms. L.O. that unless she responded to Mr. Hailu, she and her family were not safe in their residence. He had accessed her personal information, including her address and her parents’ names. The Crown has proven the essential elements of criminal harassment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Count 6: Criminal Harassment by engaging in threatening conduct directed at L.O. contrary to s. 264(3).

18I accept the testimony of Ms. L.O. that the accused repeatedly demonstrated threatening conduct towards her in several ways. He brandished a knife. His comment about raping a Lebanese girl on October 2, 2022, was designed to threaten Ms. L.O.. He then forced her to turn off her phone. I accept Ms. L.O.’s testimony that he was touching her buttocks while they were walking amounted in the circumstances to be threatening conduct. I accept the testimony that he forced her to drink alcohol against her will which was threatening conduct. His demand that any DNA/ semen not be left behind was also implicitly threatening. These behaviours terrified the complainant who pleaded for her life and made her comply with the demands to follow him around Sandy Hill and perform oral sex on him.

Count 7: Intimidation contrary to s. 423(1)(a)

19The offence of intimidation is made out when a person intending to compel someone to abstain from doing something she has the right to do, or to do something she has the right to abstain from doing, wrongfully and without authority, uses violence or threats of violence against the person. I am satisfied that the essential elements of this offence were established beyond a reasonable doubt. I accept the testimony of Ms. L.O. that Mr. Hailu coerced her into performing non-consensual fellatio on him with threats of violence, as well as having shown her a knife earlier in the evening. He is guilty of intimidation.

Count 8: Possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, contrary to s. 88(2)

20The Crown has established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hailu had in his possession a blue metallic folding knife when he encountered and engaged with the complainant. He possessed this knife to assist him in committing a sexual assault and to threaten Ms. L.O.. Mr. Hailu is guilty on this count.

Count 9: Kidnapping, contrary to s. 279(1.1).

21The evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hailu is guilty of kidnapping. He accosted Ms. L.O. on a public street and threatened her with a knife. He forced her to follow him through the Sandy Hill area of Ottawa. I accept the testimony of the complainant that she was not free to leave nor use her phone to obtain help. Over the course of two hours, Mr. Hailu took her to various locations against her will, including behind a shed in order to sexually assault her. She was directed from place to place. Occasionally he would grab her arm if she got too far ahead of him. Ms. L.O. described red marks on her wrists where he grabbed her for this purpose.

Circumstances of the Offender

22Mr. Hailu is 28 years of age and has no criminal record. He testified that he was at the time of this incident a student at Carleton University, studying business and Criminology. His school course records, filed as Exhibit 21, confirm his enrollment and his courses. He further testified that he was born and raised in Ottawa and was residing with his parents.

23Following his arrest on October 17, 2022, Mr. Hailu was held in custody until December 1, 2022. Mr. Hailu’s father acted as surety before he revoked his suretyship on October 14, 2024. Mr. Hailu has been held in custody at the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) since then. Counsel advised that while in detention, Mr. Hailu has, at his request, been placed in protective custody. No pre-sentence report was sought by Crown or defence. Mr. Hailu declined to be interviewed during the LTSO assessment. Mr. Hailu’s background information is therefore sparse and is derived from his testimony at trial.

Victim Impact Evidence

24The Crown did not produce a victim impact statement in this case. Ms. L.O. no longer resides in Canada. The court heard that the investigating officer was able to communicate with her. Ms. L.O. advised that “she did not feel that she had the courage to submit a Victim Impact Statement.” Ms. L.O. was 19 years of age and on a student’s visa in Canada. She returned to her homeland of Morocco and did not return to Canada to complete her studies.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Aggravating Factors

25The aggravating factors in this case are significant.

26Despite the absence of a victim impact statement in this case, I am satisfied that these offences had a profound and lasting impact on the victim, who experienced extreme fear, emotional trauma, and ultimately relocated from Canada due to ongoing concerns for her safety. This is a statutorily aggravating factor in sentencing pursuant to s. 718.2(a) (iii.1). Listening to her and observing her as she testified, it was obvious that Ms. L.O. was significantly impacted by the kidnapping and sexual assaults at knifepoint.

27At paragraphs 120, 123, 146-149 of the reasons for judgment, I made the following observations concerning the impact of these offences on the victim as they occurred:

[120] Ms. L.O. testified that she was trying to prove to the male that she was not the person he was looking for and that he had mistaken her for someone else. She showed him her Moroccan National ID to prove this. She testified that he took her to a building near a trash disposal where he examined the card. Ms. L.O. said he later photographed the card during her forced walk-through in Sandy Hill. Her testimony is corroborated by a video photo file on Mr. Hailu’s phone created at 10:06:29 p.m. and referenced in exhibit 9 that depicts Ms. L.O.’s Moroccan ID card. It should also be noted that the card also had her parents’ first and last name on it, as well as her grandparents’ names. I found Ms. L.O. entirely credible when she described feeling trapped and fearful that the male had this information. She said she didn’t know what kind of contacts the man had and “wasn’t sure if strangers would be sent by him, or if he would come himself…after knowing that I did tell on him. So, for the first while, I couldn’t even stay in Ottawa and went back to Morrocco for a few months.” While she had apparently already planned a trip to Morrocco, her evidence demonstrates the continuing fear she felt, even after the arrest of Mr. Hailu, because she had been forced to give up personal details about herself and family members, particularly her address.

[123] However, it was very clear that the main reason she did not run was because she was overwhelmed with fear. Moments earlier, the male had brandished a knife, threatened her, grabbed her arm and had obtained personal information about her and her family. When asked how the fact that she had been shown a knife earlier, and that the male had obtained her family information, caused her to feel, Ms. L.O. responded, “Well… it made me feel scared for my life, and I was really in a kind of state of survival, where I was just trying my best to make it out alive of (sic) the situation because I really thought that if I did anything that he wasn’t happy with, I …would have died there.” I believe Ms. L.O. was accurately and honestly describing her state of mind during the entire incident.

[146] Once in the police car, Ms. L.O. sat low in the seats because she was afraid, they might drive by the male. “I wasn’t sure that the knife was the only arm in his possession, so I didn’t want to risk anything.” Even though she was with the police, Ms. L.O. was worried about her safety.” She worried what would happen “if he would find out that I did speak to the police, what kind of consequences I would be facing, especially with my mom…at my place and me not being there.” The evidence of the officers who located Ms. L.O. and then spoke to her after she was put in an ambulance described her as upset and fearful and emotional, particularly when speaking about the intimate details of the sexual assault. She said she had a few scratches on her knees and a few red marks on her wrists from being grabbed.

[147] Another officer, Constable McGoff, spoke to Ms., L.O. who appeared overwhelmed with emotion. Her hands were shaking, and her eyes were filled with tears. Her distraught condition is further evidence that her encounter with Mr. Hailu was non-consensual.

[148] While at the hospital Ms. L.O. received messages from Mr. Hailu which frightened her and made her feel threatened. She followed police instructions not to respond. Ms. L.O. was right to feel threatened, given their tenor and content.

[149] The messages Mr. Hailu sent the complainant were menacing. “Did you forget what we talked about last night”, “Because if I don’t think you arrived home safe, I might need to send some people to verify that you’re ok.”, You don’t remember the agreement? Also, do not block this account and accept the request that I sent you.” While he was trying to communicate with her, Mr. Hailu was also doing searches about the area of Ottawa, her specific address, her name and her father’s name. I agree with the Crown’s submission that these messages were not sent out of concern for Ms. L.O.’s safety but, rather, to instill fear in her and ensure her continued compliance about not going to the police. Mr. Hailu was attempting to continue his control over Ms. L.O.. It is also noteworthy that Mr. Hailu never called her or used his real identity in his messages.

28The nature and gravity of the offences elevate their seriousness. This was a stranger abduction involving sexual assault with a weapon, coupled with threats to kill, intimidation, and criminal harassment. The kidnapping was prolonged, lasting nearly two hours, during which the victim was forcibly led through various locations before being sexually assaulted twice. The victim was further harassed by text messages from the accused after he let her go.

29Mr. Hailu’s moral blameworthiness is very high. The evidence demonstrates extensive planning and premeditation, including internet searches on rape and methods to avoid detection, as well as the deliberate purchase of a knife on the day of the offences. He brandished this weapon throughout the incident to exert control and terrorize the victim, threatening to slit her throat if she resisted. The use of a weapon to exert fear and control over the victim is an additional aggravating factor. The cruelty of conduct is underscored by Mr. Hailu’s own admissions that he enjoyed the sexual acts and sought to toy with the victim, intentionally instilling fear and confusion. His efforts to maintain control persisted after the assault through menacing messages designed to intimidate and prevent police involvement. In cross-examination, Mr. Hailu admitted that he enjoyed his sexual interaction with the victim as he portrayed the event as completely consensual. These factors, combined with expert evidence of the accused’s elevated risk of reoffending and his refusal to engage in any rehabilitative assessment, place this case at the highest end of moral culpability and demand a sentence that strongly reflects denunciation and deterrence.

Mitigating Factors

30Mr. Hailu is a 28-year-old first offender who had a pro-social upbringing in the suburbs of Ottawa. He has spent 548 days of actual pre-sentence custody. With enhanced credit at 1.5:1, Mr. Hailu has served the equivalent of 822 days. He was on a house-arrest type of bail for approximately 1year, 10 months and 16 days. He could enter the community only when accompanied by his father and was subject to GPS monitoring.

What is a fit and appropriate sentence?

31I begin the analysis to determine a fit and appropriate sentence by first identifying the applicable sentencing principles and objectives in this case

32Section 718 of the Criminal Code establishes that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. This is achieved by imposing just sanctions that reflect the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s moral culpability. In this case, proportionality is paramount given the extreme harm inflicted on the victim and the high level of planning and deliberation demonstrated by Mr. Hailu.

33Proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing, codified in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. It requires that a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. As emphasized in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras. 74 and 95-97, proportionality ensures fairness and parity by calibrating the sentence to reflect both the harm caused and the offender’s moral culpability. Similarly, R. v. Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363, underscores that proportionality is the governing principle that prevents arbitrary or excessive punishment. In this case, the offences—stranger abduction, prolonged confinement, sexual assaults with a weapon, and ongoing intimidation—represent conduct at the most serious end of the spectrum. Mr. Hailu’s planning, deliberate cruelty, and continued efforts to instill fear elevate his moral blameworthiness to an exceptional level. A proportionate sentence must therefore be severe enough to reflect these factors while remaining consistent with established jurisprudence and the principle of parity.

34The principle of restraint, codified in s. 718.2(d) and (e), directs courts to impose the least restrictive sentence necessary to achieve the objectives of sentencing and to consider alternatives to incarceration where reasonable. Restraint reflects the need to avoid unnecessary harshness and to promote rehabilitation where possible. However, restraint cannot override the need for denunciation and deterrence in cases involving grave offences of violence. In this matter, the seriousness of the crimes, the high degree of planning, the use of a weapon, and the prolonged nature of the confinement place the offences at the highest level of severity. A non-custodial sentence or a short custodial term would fail to meet the objectives of denunciation, deterrence, and public protection. While restraint cautions against excessive punishment, it does not preclude imposing a lengthy penitentiary term where required by proportionality and public safety.

35Together, proportionality and restraint operate to ensure that sentences are just, fair, and effective. Proportionality demands a sentence that reflects the gravity of the offence and the offender’s culpability, while restraint ensures that punishment is not arbitrary or unduly harsh. In cases such as this, where the harm to the victim is profound and the offender’s conduct demonstrates exceptional moral blameworthiness, proportionality requires a significant custodial sentence. Restraint, though relevant, cannot diminish the weight of denunciation and deterrence, which are paramount in addressing sexual violence and kidnapping. Sentencing must balance these principles without compromising public confidence in the administration of justice.

36The applicable objectives under s. 718 include denunciation of unlawful conduct, deterrence of the offender and others, separation of the offender from society where necessary, and rehabilitation. While rehabilitation is always a consideration, denunciation and deterrence assume primary importance in cases involving serious violent offences, particularly sexual assaults and kidnappings. These crimes strike at the heart of personal autonomy and public safety, and the sentence must send a clear message that such conduct will attract severe consequences.

37Denunciation and general deterrence are especially significant here because the offences were not impulsive but involved extensive premeditation, the use of a weapon, and prolonged confinement. The offender’s conduct was calculated to instill terror and exert control over the victim and continued even after the assault through menacing communications. These factors elevate his moral blameworthiness to the highest level and demand a sentence that reflects society’s condemnation of such acts.

38In the determination of a fit sentence, it is helpful to situate this case within the framework of sentencing decisions in similar cases.

39Kidnapping is among the most serious offences in the Criminal Code because it strikes at the core of personal liberty and public safety. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that when kidnapping is combined with sexual assault—particularly with aggravating factors such as planning, weapon use, and threats—the sentencing range escalates significantly.

40As the Manitoba Court of Appeal observed in R. v. Cook (N.), 2014 MBCA 29, kidnapping is a continuing offence and the overarching charge when sexual assaults occur during captivity. In Cook, the offender attacked a stranger, dragged her into a residence, barricaded her, and repeatedly choked and sexually assaulted her. The Court upheld a global sentence of nine years, stressing that sentences for sexualized kidnappings can reach 12 to 18 years where aggravating factors such as planning, weapons, prolonged confinement, and extreme violence are present. (Paras. 29-33, 48-49, 57)

41Ontario courts have adopted this approach. In R. v. Moore, [2025] O.J. No. 3761, the offender kidnapped a woman at gunpoint, held her captive for nearly twelve hours, and sexually assaulted her. A Good Samaritan attempting to intervene was shot at. The Court imposed 13 years for kidnapping with a firearm, with concurrent sentences for sexual assault with a firearm. Denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the planning, weapon use, and prolonged captivity.

42In R. v. Levy, [2024] O.J. No. 1091 (S.C.J.), the Court surveyed ranges for kidnapping, noting that sentences of 6 to 10 years represent the low end for cases without significant aggravation, while 10 to 14 years are common for serious cases involving violence or ransom. Sentences at the highest end—16 years to life—are reserved for cases with extreme aggravation such as planning, weapons, and gratuitous violence. (Paras. 20-24)

43The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Brown, 2020 ONCA 657, reaffirmed the heightened gravity of sexual assault offences and the need for sentences to reflect society’s evolving understanding of harm. Even first-time offenders in serious sexual assault cases warrant significant penitentiary terms.

44Other authorities illustrate the upper range for sexualized kidnappings with weapons. In R. v. Assing, [2008] O.J. No. 4527, the offender threatened a victim with a knife, dragged her to a townhouse, bound her, and forced intercourse twice, also committing robbery. As a first offender, he received a global sentence of nine years. Similarly, R. v. Evans, 2024 ONCJ 658, involved sexual assault at knifepoint in a restaurant washroom; the offender received five years and a ten-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

45In R. v. Ouedraogo, [2023] O.J. No. 1374; upheld 2025 ONCA 566, the offender attacked a victim while disguised, threatened to kill, and attempted penetration. The Court imposed six years for sexual assault with a weapon and a ten-year LTSO. Likewise, R. v. Sohal, 2019 BCSC 2271, involved sexual assault with an imitation firearm and unlawful confinement; the offender received six years and a ten-year LTSO.

46Finally, R. v. Bermudez-Rivera, 2010 ONCA 653, underscores that even attempted kidnappings warrant lengthy custodial terms. There, the offender accosted a young woman and tried to force her into his car; he was later found with a blindfold, handcuffs, a dildo, and a machete. A five-year sentence was upheld on appeal following a guilty plea.

47Taken together, these authorities confirm that the governing principles under s. 718 and s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code require sentences for kidnapping combined with sexual assault to prioritize denunciation, deterrence, and public protection. As emphasized in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, and A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, all sexual assaults are serious acts of violence, and outdated ranges must be adjusted to reflect contemporary understanding of harm. Where aggravating factors such as planning, weapon use, prolonged confinement, and threats are present—as in the authorities cited—the appropriate range for global sentences lies at the upper end of the spectrum, typically 10 to 14 years, and may extend to 12 to 18 years in cases of extreme aggravation.

48Many of the significant aggravating factors set out in Cook and Levy which call for lengthy penitentiary sentences in the higher range in kidnapping cases are found in this case. They include:

• Significant premeditation: the accused did internet searches researching sexual assaults with a weapon, how to avoid police detection and the purchase of the knife.
• The length of the kidnapping: almost two hours
• Cruelty to the victim: Mr. Hailu’s text to Detective Carr that he wanted to toy with the victim and wanted her to experience a range of emotions, including fear.
• Threats to the victim: Mr. Hailu threatened to slit the victim’s throat if she did not commit fellatio on him. He threatened her by text that he might have to send others to check on her if she did not respond to his messages.
• The purpose of the kidnapping was to sexually assault the victim and instill fear in her.
• A knife was used.
• The victim had to plead for her life. Ms. L.O. had to convince Mr. Hailu she would not go to the police and would agree to further communicate by text messages to be able to escape.

49The offences committed by Mr. Hailu are extremely grave. Ms. L.O. was simply walking to her friend’s house when she was accosted by the accused, a stranger. He brandished a knife, threatened and then kidnapped her, leading her around an Ottawa neighbourhood for almost two hours and forced her to perform fellation on him on two occasions, threatening to slit her throat if she did not comply. The victim was further harassed by text messages after the kidnapping. I agree with the Crown’s submission that that this is the type of “stranger danger” offence that cause women fear and to change their behaviour when out in public. The offences committed by the accused must attract a significant denunciatory sentence.

50I also agree with the Crown’s submission that the sentence for criminal harassment should be consecutive to that of the other offences. The criminal harassment is distinctive enough such that it should attract a consecutive sentence. I say this because before letting her go, Mr. Hailu had obtained the victim’s address and contact information which only served to prolong the terror Ms. L.O. had experienced. She was afraid that he would come to her house to harm her or her roommate. Mr. Hailu continued his efforts to control the victim by sending her texts after the kidnapping including one that said he might need to get someone to come check on her. As submitted by the Crown, the actions of Mr. Hailu were designed such that even after the assault, the accused was seeking to have the victim be fearful, even in her own residence and beyond the assault itself. Mr. Hailu was well aware that the victim was fearful. In his texting with Detective Carr, posing as the victim, he wrote, “I was never going to hurt you…I realized that you weren’t who I was looking for, but I still decided to toy with you.” He also texted this to Detective Carr, “I can play with people’s mind…I wanted you to feel a wide range of emotions from fear…then to making you feel at ease when I laughed and listened to what you had to say…then confusion when I had you walking aimlessly thinking I was taking you to Nelson Street, then fear again.” In another text, he acknowledged that the victim asked him, “Will you let me live?”

51There is both a temporal and physical disconnect between the criminal harassment and the kidnapping and sexual assaults. A consecutive sentence for the criminal harassment charge is therefore justified.

52Applying these authorities, the appropriate range for Mr. Hailu falls at the upper end of the spectrum for kidnapping with sexual assault. The aggravating factors—planning and premeditation, use of a knife, prolonged confinement, threats to kill, post-offence intimidation, and absence of mitigation—demand a sentence that strongly reflects denunciation and deterrence. A global sentence in the range of12 years, as proposed by the Crown, aligns with proportionality, parity, and totality principles. This range is consistent with Cook, Moore, and Levy, and accounts for the cumulative gravity of the offences without imposing a crushing sentence. However, I must also bear in mind that Mr. Hailu is a first offender and the principle of restraint must be taken into account.

DOWNES Credit

53In determining a proportionate sentence, I must consider the offender’s period of pre‑sentence bail under house arrest conditions. The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that stringent bail—particularly where it closely resembles house arrest—constitutes a mitigating factor, and a sentencing judge who fails to consider such restrictions commits an error in principle. In R. v. Downes, the Court recognized that extended residential confinement carries a materially punitive impact, and in that case 18 months of house arrest warranted a five‑month reduction in sentence. The Court has further emphasized that restrictive bail must be assessed in light of its actual effects, including the degree to which it restricts liberty, movement, employment, relationships, and day‑to‑day life. A sentencing judge must evaluate the stringency and intrusiveness of the conditions and give meaningful weight where those conditions approximate detention.

54However, the offender bears the burden of proof to establish, on a balance ofprobabilities, the nature and impact of those restrictive conditions, including any individualized hardship arising from them. This requirement applies where the Crown disputes the extent or effect of the restrictions, and the offender must provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation to justify mitigation under s. 724(3) of the Criminal Code. Having reviewed the evidence presented, I am satisfied that the offender’s near‑complete residential confinement, coupled with limited movement, strict supervision, and significant interference with ordinary activities, imposed substantial restraint on liberty. At the same time, Mr. Hailu’s father had to revoke his suretyship. Prior to that event, police were called to attend at the Hailu residence at the request of his father because the accused was refusing to charge the battery of his GPS ankle bracelet. Taking all of these facts into consideration, I am satisfied that there should Mr, Hailu should be afforded a modest Downes credit in determining the appropriate sentence. I would therefore reduce Mr. Hailu’s sentence by four months.

55Having considered the aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the relevant sentencing objectives in this case, I have determined that a fit and appropriate global sentence in this case to be 10 ½ years and apportioned as follows:

Count 9: Kidnapping – 9 years

Count 1: Sex assault with a weapon – 5 years concurrent

Count 2: Sex assault with a weapon – 5 years concurrent

Count 3: Utter Death Threat – 90 days concurrent

Count 5: Harassing communications – 90 days concurrent

Count 8: Possession of a weapon – 90 days concurrent

Count 6: - Criminal harassment – 18 months consecutive

56Mr. Hail is entitled to credit for presentence custody of 822 days. I am satisfied that the accused’s release conditions were very restrictive and had a significant effect on his educational pursuits. On a sentence of 10.5 years, after credit for 822 days of pre-sentence custody and a further Downes reduction of four months, Mr. Hailu has 7 years, 11 months and 3 days remaining to be served.

57The ancillary orders are as follows: SOIRA for life; DNA; s. 109 Weapons Prohibition for 10 years and s.743.21 non communication order with the victim, her family members and F.B. Given the sentence, I decline to impose the victim fine surcharge

Delayed Parole

58The Crown applies under s. 743.6(1) of the Criminal Code to delay Mr. Hailu’s eligibility for full parole to one‑half of the custodial sentence. The application engages an exceptional power that must be exercised with restraint, but one that Parliament has made available when denunciation and deterrence cannot adequately be achieved by the custodial term alone: R. v. Zinck, 2003 SCC 6.

59A necessary starting point in determining this application is to consider the following principles of sentencing.

60Sentencing must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s moral culpability, applying the objectives in Criminal Code s. 718: denunciation, deterrence, separation, rehabilitation, reparation, and responsibility.

61Sexual assault is an inherently violent crime with life‑altering consequences. The Ontario Court of Appeal has emphasized that contemporary ranges must reflect society’s deepened understanding of the profound harms, and that penetration is not a sentencing proxy: A.J.K., at para. 74.

62In matters of kidnapping, denunciation, deterrence, and protection of the public are primary objectives. Kidnapping is a continuing offence, often the “overarching charge” when other violence occurs during captivity: R. v. Cook (N.), 2014 MBCA 29, at paras. 29‑33, 48‑49, 57; see also R. v. Vu, 2012 SCC 40, at para. 25. Ontario courts have adopted this approach in recent cases: R. v. Moore, [2025] O.J. No. 3761, at paras. 64‑65.

63Section 743.6(1) authorizes the Court to order that the offender serve one‑half of the sentence before full parole if, on the same facts that support the custodial term, such an order is necessary to express society’s denunciation and to achieve general or specific deterrence. Rehabilitation is subordinate to these objectives in this inquiry: Zinck, supra, paras.24,29-33.

64The court is required to engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine a fit sentence under s. 718 principles without considering parole. Second, the court must assess whether, based on the same facts, denying parole is required to meet the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

65The power is exceptional and not routine. It should be applied only where the custodial sentence alone would be insufficient to achieve denunciation and deterrence proportionate to the gravity and culpability: Zinck, supra, at para. 33.

66The Supreme Court has expressly urged sentencing judges to ensure that sentences—including parole eligibility—adequately reflect the full gravity of the offence and moral blameworthiness: Friesen, supra, at paras. 73‑97, 110, 140‑146.

Is the test met in this case?

67The facts in this case feature several aggravating factors which reflect the gravity of the offences and the high moral blameworthiness of the accused. They include:

• Premeditation and planning: Within days of the offence, Mr. Hailu conducted internet searches on rape, evasion of police detection, and purchased a knife on October 14, 2022.
• Stranger abduction and prolonged movement: He accosted Ms. L.O. on the street, restricted phone use, extracted personal identifiers, and moved her through multiple locations for nearly two hours.
• Sexual assaults at knifepoint: He compelled two acts of fellatio, threatened to slit her throat if she resisted, and kept the knife visible to reinforce compliance.
• Menacing communications post‑offence: He texted in anonymous accounts directing compliance, threatening to “send people” to verify her safety, and continued control efforts after police contact.
• Terrorization and cruelty: He acknowledged he “toyed” with her, intended to manipulate her emotional state from fear to confusion, and admitted he “thoroughly enjoyed” the sexual acts.
• Impact on the victim: The complainant was overwhelmed with fear, pleaded for her life (“Will you let me live?”), remained fearful even in police presence, and eventually left Canada for a time.

68There are few mitigating factors. The accused is a first offender, but there is no evidence of remorse or insight.

69The question is whether, on these facts, a custodial sentence alone—with ordinary parole eligibility at one‑third—would fail to achieve the paramount objectives of denunciation and deterrence, thereby justifying the exceptional measure of s. 743.6(1): Zinck, supra, at paras. 24, 29‑33.

70With respect to denunciation, these offences strike at the core of community safety: a woman abducted off the street, moved under threats and at knifepoint, sexually violated, and then subjected to further control through menacing texts after the accused obtained knowledge of her family information. The conduct was deliberately cruel, with the offender acknowledging that he played with the victim’s mind to induce fear and confusion—while enjoying the sexual violation. Denunciation must match the gravity and moral blameworthiness emphasized in Friesen and A.J.K.: Friesen, supra, at paras. 89, 95‑97, 110, 140‑146; A.J.K., supra, at para. 74.

71General deterrence is engaged in the strongest terms by public stranger abductions linked to sexual violence and weapon threats. The facts show planning (pre‑offence research and the purchase of a knife), execution (movement, control, assault), and post‑offence manipulation (anonymous threats and conditions). Sentences must communicate that such conduct attracts substantial custodial consequences and reduced early release prospects: Cook (N.), supra, at paras. 48‑49, 57; Levy, supra, at paras. 20‑24.

72In my view, allowing full parole at one‑third would signal a level of censure incommensurate with the gravity and cruelty of the offences and would fail to meet the denunciatory needs of this case.

73Rehabilitation remains a statutory objective, but it is subordinate in the s. 743.6(1) inquiry: Zinck, supra, at paras. 24, 29‑33. On the present record, there is no material rehabilitative engagement and, in the view of Dr. Gray which I accept, poor prospects absent strict external controls. A delayed parole order does not foreclose rehabilitative programming; rather, it structures parole eligibility to ensure denunciation and deterrence are satisfied before full release can be considered.

74I am mindful that delayed parole eligibility is not routine. However, having performed the two‑step analysis, I am persuaded that this is an appropriate case for the exceptional measure: the custodial sentence alone, with ordinary parole eligibility, would insufficiently vindicate society’s condemnation and deterrent needs in light of the planning, cruelty, prolonged captivity, weapon use, death threats, and continuing control post‑assault.

75For these reasons, the Crown’s application under s. 743.6(1) is granted. I order that Mr. Hailu shall serve one‑half of the custodial sentence before becoming eligible for full parole.

76Nothing in this order impacts statutory eligibility for day parole or other forms of conditional release under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, which remain within the jurisdiction of the Parole Board of Canada, subject to this full‑parole eligibility restriction. This order sits alongside the ancillary orders imposed (SOIRA, DNA, weapons prohibition, non‑communication), and the sentence otherwise fixed under s. 718.

LONG TERM OFFENDER APPLICATION

Introduction

77Section 753.1 of the Criminal Code authorizes a court, upon application and following an assessment under s. 752.1, to designate an offender as a Long-Term Offender (LTO) and impose a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) of up to 10 years.

78The provision aims to protect the public through extended supervision after a penitentiary term.

THE LTO STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

79Section 753.1 of the Criminal Code states:

80753.1(1) The court may, on application made under this Part following the filing of an assessment report under subsection 752.1(2) find an offender to be a long-term offender if it is satisfied that.

it would be appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment of two years or more for the offence for which the offender has been convicted;

there is a substantial risk that the offender will re-offend; and

there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

(2) The court shall be satisfied that there is a substantial risk that the offender will re-offend if

(a) the offender has been convicted of an offence under section... or has engaged in serious conduct of a sexual nature in the commission of another offence of which the offender has been convicted; and

(b) the offender

has shown a pattern of repetitive behaviour, of which the offence for which he has been convicted forms a part, which shows a likelihood of the offender's causing death or injury to the other persons or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, or

by conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of an offence for which the offender has been convicted, has shown a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons in the future through similar offences.

81The onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a substantial risk that the offender will reoffend. R. v. F.E.D., 2007 ONCA 246, [2007] O.J. No. 1278 (C.A.) at para 52.

82There are two ways the Crown can establish substantial risk. The first is by relying on the statutory presumption set out in s. 753.1(2) of the Code which states that the court shall be satisfied that there is a substantial risk of re- offence if the offender has been convicted of an enumerated offence under s. 753.1(2)(a) and has either:

shown a pattern of repetitive behaviour, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, which shows a likelihood of the offender's causing death or injury to other persons or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons; or

by conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which the offender has been convicted, has shown a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons in the future through similar offences.

83The court is not confined to the section 753.1(2) route to the finding of a substantial risk of reoffence. Where the presumption is not available, the Crown can establish substantial risk based on the available evidence. R. v. McLeod 1999 BCCA 347; R. v. McLean, 2009 NSCA 1.

84"Substantial risk" does not require a probability greater than 50%. Relative risk compared to other sexual offenders may suffice (R. v. Ouedraogo, 2023 ONCJ 136)

85The inquiry under the third prong of the test focuses on risk reduction, not elimination. The court must be satisfied that external controls and treatment can reasonably manage the offender's risk during the supervision period. Case law emphasizes that mere hope is insufficient; evidence of structured interventions and monitoring is required (R. v. Little, 2007 ONCA 548; R. v. C. (I.M.), 2014 ONCA 312)

86The Supreme Court in R. v. M. (L.), 2008 SCC 31, confirmed that the custodial sentence and LTSO serve distinct purposes: punishment versus public protection and rehabilitation. The length of an LTSO must be tailored to the offender's risk profile and supervision needs (R. v. Millie, 2022 SKQB 139). Courts have imposed maximum 10-year LTSOs where risk factors remain high and internal controls are absent, even for first-time offenders (e.g., Ouedraogo).

Evidentiary Record for the Crown’s application

87The evidentiary record for this LTSO application comprised: (a) Dr. Jonathan Gray’s s. 752 court-ordered assessment report and viva voce testimony; (b) institutional records and medical incident summaries from Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre; (c) police occurrence reports detailing prior contacts and (d) trial record extracts describing planning, execution, and post‑offence conduct in the index offences (kidnapping, sexual assault with a weapon, threats, criminal harassment).

(a) Dr. Gray’s Assessment and Testimony

88Dr. Gray conducted a court-ordered forensic psychiatric assessment under s.752 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Hailu declined to participate in interviews or questionnaires, limiting the scope of evaluation. Despite this, Dr. Gray relied on collateral records and actuarial tools to form his opinion. Two instruments, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) and Violence Risk Appraisal Guide-Revised (VRAG-R) could not be scored. However, STATIC-99R and STABLE-2007 were completed using available information, providing a baseline for risk analysis.

89On the STATIC-99R, Mr. Hailu scored 5, placing him in Level IVa, the second-highest risk category for sexual reoffending. This corresponds to an estimated 21.2% chance of sexual re-offence within five years and 32.1% within ten years—well above the 15% average for sexual offenders. His score situates him at the 88.7th percentile among Canadian sexual offenders, meaning only 8% scored higher.

90Dr. Gray testified, “If the test of substantial risk were 50% plus one… then no sexual offender would ever meet that standard… But if you define it as relative risk compared to other sexual offenders, then here, yes, it is high relative to other sexual offenders.”

91On the STABLE-2007, Mr. Hailu scored 12 out of 24, placing him in the highest category for dynamic risk factors and treatment needs. These include hostility toward women, lack of relationship stability, and poor cooperation with supervision. Even if some items were rescored downward, his overall risk category would remain unchanged when combined with STATIC-99R.

92Dr. Gray linked ‘poor cooperation’ to the offender’s refusal to charge his GPS monitoring device and non‑participation in the assessment, noting that these behaviours foreshadow difficulties with transparent supervision. He testified: “If there’s no communication… it impairs the probation officer’s ability to monitor factors associated with the re‑offence… to find out whether they’re entering into their offence cycle… so that steps can be taken to prevent it.” Dr. Gray further explained that even with cautious downward rescoring on certain Stable items, the “combined” placement remains in an elevated band when integrated with Static‑99R.

93Using recognized integration guidance for Static‑99R and Stable‑2007, Dr. Gray estimated a “31.8%” probability of “violent sexual reoffence within five years”. He characterized this as “quite high” relative to other sexual offenders, given the gravity of anticipated harm.

94Dr. Gray also provided his diagnostic impressions of the accused. Dr. Gray observed features consistent with Sexual Sadism Disorder, where sexual arousal is linked to the victim’s fear and humiliation rather than the sexual act itself. However, a formal diagnosis could not be made due to insufficient longitudinal evidence and Mr. Hailu’s refusal to participate. This potential paraphilic interest is clinically significant because it heightens risk and complicates treatment.

95Dr. Gray opined that any future offence would likely “mirror the index pattern”—that is, “planned, coercive, weapon‑facilitated sexual violence”—rather than an impulsive, minor sexual infraction. He testified, “Absent some kind of treatment that would change his idea that this is a good thing to do, I’d worry about this becoming an issue again in the future… because it’s not impulsive. It took place over time and many different steps.”

96On denial and treatability, Dr. Gray cautioned that entrenched denial and failure to engage pose “challenges for successful treatment to lower an offender’s pre‑existing risk.” In his report, he wrote, “If Mr. Hailu maintains a stance of firm denial throughout his future treatment programs, or refuses to participate in assessments and treatments altogether, his elevated risk would not be mitigated with these interventions.”

97Dr. Gray acknowledged that denial is “not, by itself, an independent risk factor” for sexual reoffending. Nevertheless, persistent “non‑engagement” means the Court must rely on “external controls” for future risk management.

98Dr. Gray emphasized that Mr. Hailu’s offences were highly planned and deliberate, involving premeditation and steps to avoid detection. This intentionality suggests that any future reoffence would likely mirror the severity and planning of the index offence rather than being impulsive or minor. Combined actuarial scores indicate a 31.8% chance of violent sexual reoffence within five years. The absence of remorse and entrenched denial further elevate risk.

99Dr. Gray stated, “Without treatment and external controls, the public would not be adequately protected.”

100With respect to treatment prospects and challenges, Dr. Gray observed that Mr. Hailu has no history of engaging in treatment and currently shows entrenched denial and unwillingness to cooperate. These factors pose significant barriers to reducing risk through internal controls. While treatment could theoretically reduce dynamic risk factors, there is no evidence of motivation or prior success. Dr. Gray cautioned that denial and failure to accept responsibility make treatment less effective and prolong risk.

101Dr. Gray concluded that without treatment and external controls, the public would not be adequately protected. While there is a theoretical possibility of eventual risk reduction through treatment, current evidence supports reliance on external measures for community safety.

102Dr. Gray viewed prospects for internal change as poor given persistent denial, lack of insight, and refusal to engage with assessment/treatment. Dr. Gray offered recommendations for external controls. Given the high risk and uncertain treatability, Dr. Gray recommends intensive interventions during custody and strict external controls upon release. Key recommendations include:

• Participation in a high-intensity sexual offender treatment program during federal incarceration
• Residency in a Community Correctional Centre with curfew and monitoring upon release. Weekly meetings with a parole officer and ongoing outpatient treatment at a forensic clinic
• Prohibition on weapon possession and strict compliance with supervision conditions
• Imposition of a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) for the maximum duration of 10 years

(b) Institutional and Police Records

103In his assessment, Dr. Gray considered institutional and police records submitted into evidence by the Crown including:

• Institutional Discipline (March 1, 2025): OCDC records document a day‑room altercation with a fellow inmate, resulting in a misconduct finding and ten days’ canteen loss.
• Medical Emergency (June 22, 2025): OCDC medical notes describe Mr. Hailu in an unresponsive state in his cell and that he was treated with multiple naloxone administrations, AED shock, and CPR—with partial recovery and hospital transfer. Diagnostic imaging (CT/MRI) was declined by Mr. Hailu against medical advice.
• Police Occurrences (2017–2021): (a) 2017 shoplifting diversion, with a comment from Mr. Hailu that he was “too smart for this, that’s why I got a scholarship”; (b) 2021 complaint following a transactional encounter with a sex worker, including a troubling statement that equated rape with being “ripped off” by the sex worker; and (c) 2021 bar incident involving persistent filming of patrons, with females reporting discomfort and a request for police.
• GPS Tamper Alerts & Surety Revocation (Sept–Oct 2024): Police were called to Mr. Hailu’s residence. Mr. Hailu had been refusing to charge his GPS ankle bracelet. His family had reported that he was being confrontational and showing disrespect to his family. As a result of Mr. Hailu not charging his GPS monitor, his father revoked his suretyship.

104Dr. Gray gave limited weight to the institutional and police records in his assessment. He acknowledged that these records provided some useful background information but were constrained by the defendant’s refusal to participate in the assessment, the hearsay nature of some police reports, and the absence of direct clinical data. Consequently, Dr. Gray treated these records as supplementary context rather than primary evidence, relying more heavily on actuarial risk assessment tools like the Static-99R and Stable-2007 to form his overall opinion. He also emphasized that exercising legal rights, such as refusing to participate in the assessment, should be considered a neutral factor and not held against the defendant as a negative inference.

(c) Trial Record and Index Offences

105The Crown also relied on evidence proven at trial of planning and deliberation including pre‑offence internet searches over several weeks ("how do rapists get caught""is it rape forum", and related queries) and purchase of a knife on the offence date. All of this, the Crown says, indicates forethought and preparation.

106The Crown relied on evidence proven at trial of the control exerted by the accused over the victim including stranger abduction in a public setting; movement through multiple locations for approximately two hours; restriction of phone use; extraction of personal identifying information; two forced acts of fellatio at knifepoint coupled with explicit threats to slit the complainant’s throat.

107The Crown also relied on post-offence conduct including menacing messages designed to sustain control and deter reporting ("Did you forget what we talked about last night"; "I might need to send some people"), contemporaneous searches of the complainant’s address and family names; acknowledgment in chats of having instilled fear and "toying" with her emotions.

108For his part, Dr. Gray described the risk-relevant features in the trial record and index offences as clinically significant and relevant to his assessment. He highlighted the deliberate, planned nature of the offences and the defendant’s intentional steps to avoid detection, which indicated a higher risk of similar future offending. He also noted that the trial evidence, including text messages and internet searches, revealed problematic attitudes such as hostility toward women, which informed his evaluation of dynamic risk factors like hostility and cooperation with supervision.

109However, Dr. Gray also emphasized the limitations imposed by the defendant’s refusal to participate in the assessment and the absence of direct clinical interviews. While the trial record and index offences were important in shaping his clinical opinion, he integrated them carefully within a broader assessment framework that relied primarily on actuarial risk tools (Static-99R and Stable-2007) supplemented by collateral information.

Positions of the Parties

Position of Crown

110The Crown submitted that all of the statutory criteria to have Mr. Hailu designated as a Long-Term Offender (LTO) under s. 753.1 of the Criminal Code are satisfied.

111First, the Crown submits that a penitentiary sentence well in excess of two years is appropriate given the seriousness of the convictions, including sexual assault with a weapon and kidnapping.

112Second, the Crown asserts there is a substantial risk of reoffending, supported by Dr. Gray’s assessment: a Static-99R score of 5, placing the accused in the second-highest risk category and a Stable-2007 score of 12, indicating high criminogenic needs. Dr. Gray opined that the index offences involved planning and sadistic elements, suggesting future offences may be similar in nature. The Crown stresses that the accused’s failure to participate in the assessment does not preclude an LTO finding and cited case law where first-time offenders received LTSOs. R. v. Ouedraogo, 2023 ONCJ 136; upheld 2025 ONCA 566 R. v. McColeman, 2018 ONSC 4388 (reasons at 2017 ONSC 4019) R. v. A.T., 2016 ONCJ 221 R. v. Janssen, 2015 ABCA 92

113Third, the Crown argues there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community, but only through external controls such as intensive treatment and supervision. Dr. Gray recommends a lengthy treatment program during custody, followed by strict community conditions, including residency at a Community Correctional Centre, weekly parole meetings, and prohibition on weapons. The Crown requests the maximum 10-year supervision order, citing Hailu’s youth, elevated risk, and lack of evidence of internal change. Case law such as R. v. Ouedraogo and R. v. Sohal is referenced to support imposing a 10-year LTSO even for first-time offenders who refused assessment participation.

114The Crown relies on section 753.1(2) of the Criminal Code, which creates a statutory presumption of substantial risk where two conditions are met: (1) conviction for an enumerated offence, and (2) either a pattern of repetitive behaviour or conduct in any sexual matter showing a likelihood of causing injury or harm through similar offences. Mr. Hailu was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon under s. 272, an enumerated offence, satisfying the first prong. For the second, the Crown argues that the index offences involved planning, deliberation, and sadistic elements, demonstrating a likelihood of future harm.

115Even if the statutory presumption does not apply, the Crown asserts substantial risk is established on a residual basis. This argument is supported by Dr. Gray’s assessment: a Static-99R score of 5 (placing Hailu in Level IVa, second-highest risk category) and a Stable-2007 score of 12 (high criminogenic needs). Dr. Gray opined that the offences were not impulsive but carefully planned and combined with lack of remorse and refusal to participate in treatment, these factors heighten risk.

116The Crown cites case law confirming that LTO designation is not limited to offenders strictly within s. 753.1(2) presumptions. Courts have imposed LTSOs based on overall risk evidence, even for first-time offenders and those who refused assessments, including R. v. Ouedraogo and R. v. Sohal. These authorities reinforce that residual risk analysis permits designation where actuarial and clinical evidence demonstrates elevated risk requiring external controls.

Position of the defence

117The defence argues that the Crown has not met its burden to justify a Long-Term Offender (LTO) designation. While acknowledging that the defendant faces a sentence of more than two years, the defence submits that the remaining criteria—substantial risk of reoffending and reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community—have not been proven. The defence emphasizes that the defendant is a youthful first offender with no prior criminal record and that the current correctional system, including parole supervision and institutional programming, is sufficient to manage any risk. Even if the court finds the criteria met, the defence contends that a three-year supervision period, equivalent to the maximum probation term, would be adequate rather than the ten years sought by the Crown.

118The defence also challenges the reliability and objectivity of Dr. Gray’s risk assessment, arguing that his opinion is biased and overly reliant on standardized tools (Static-99R and Stable-2007). The defence asserts that Dr. Gray improperly drew negative inferences from the defendant exercising his legal rights, such as the right to trial and the right to remain silent, treating these as signs of denial and lack of responsibility. This approach, according to the defence, reflects a misunderstanding of Charter-protected rights and introduced bias into the evaluation. Further, the defence highlights that Dr. Gray’s scoring on the Stable-2007 involved subjective judgments, awarding the highest possible scores in several categories without clear justification, and selectively interpreting evidence to paint a negative picture. As a result, the defence submits that Dr. Gray’s evidence should be given limited weight and does not establish a substantial risk of future similar offences.

Analysis

119In order to make a LTSO, the s. 753.1(1) three-part test must be met. The Court must be satisfied that (a) a prison term of two years or more is appropriate; (b) the offender presents a substantial risk of reoffending; and (c) there is a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community. Parliament created a statutory route to “substantial risk” where the offender is convicted of an enumerated sexual offence and, by pattern or by sexual conduct, has shown a likelihood of future harm through similar offences (s. 753.1(2)). Where the presumption is not available, the Crown can establish substantial risk based on the available evidence.

120Substantial risk does not require a probability above 50%: The case law confirms that “substantial risk” can be proven even when numerical percentages fall below 50%, provided the risk is meaningfully elevated and the feared harm is serious: R. v Ouedraogo, 2023 ONCJ 136, para. 77; upheld 2025 ONCA 566. The Crown must prove the substantial risk element beyond a reasonable doubt: R. v. F.E.D., 2007 ONCA 246), while eventual control is a practical, evidence‑based inquiry that does not carry the criminal standard of proof: R. v. Little, 2007 ONCA 548; R. v. C.(I.M.), 2014 ONCA 312; R. v. J.J.P., 2020 YKCA 13; R. v. K.P., 2020 ONCA 534).

(a) A prison term of two years or more is appropriate

121The predicate offences—kidnapping and sexual assault with a weapon, among others—are serious personal injury offences. I have already imposed a penitentiary sentence well in excess of two years. This threshold is easily satisfied and not in dispute.

(b) There is a substantial risk that Mr. Hailu will reoffend

122The evidence of Dr. Gray provides the foundation for the Crown’s application. A brief summary of his findings can be set out as follows:

123Dr. Gray completed a court-ordered forensic psychiatric assessment under section 752 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Hailu refused to participate in interviews or questionnaires, which limited the scope of the evaluation. Despite this, Dr. Gray relied on collateral records and recognized risk assessment tools to form his opinion.

124Dr. Gray used two validated instruments: Static-99R and Stable-2007. On the Static-99R, Mr. Hailu scored 5, which places him in Level IVa, the second-highest risk category for sexual reoffending. This score means that, based on large studies of similar offenders, Mr. Hailu has about a 21% chance of committing another sexual offence within five years and about 32% within ten years. These figures are well above the average for sexual offenders. His score also places him in the top 12% of risk among Canadian sexual offenders.

125On the Stable-2007, which looks at changeable risk factors, Mr. Hailu scored 12 out of 24, indicating high needs. These include hostility toward women, lack of stable relationships, and poor cooperation with supervision. Even if some items were scored lower, his overall risk category would not change when combined with the Static-99R result.

126Dr. Gray also considered clinical factors. He noted signs that Mr. Hailu may have a paraphilic interest—sexual arousal linked to fear and humiliation—though he could not make a formal diagnosis because Mr. Hailu refused to participate. Dr. Gray emphasized that the index offences were highly planned and deliberate, involving steps to avoid detection. This planning suggests that any future offence would likely be serious and organized, not impulsive.

127Dr. Gray concluded that Mr. Hailu’s risk of violent sexual reoffending is very high, estimating about a 31.8% chance within five years. He also found that prospects for internal change are poor because Mr. Hailu shows no remorse, denies responsibility, and refuses treatment. These factors make rehabilitation difficult and increase the need for external controls.

128With respect to Mr. Hailu’s potential for a future reoffence, Dr. Gray reaffirmed in testimony the following passage from his report at pp.. 21-23:

[..] due to the number of statistically significant factors Mr. Hailu shares with offenders released into the community who committed another sexual offence, his overall risk of sexual reoffence is in the higher end of "above average". Given the degree to which Mr. Hailu seemed to be planning out the sexual assault of a woman with a weapon, and the apparent thinking he had put into evading apprehension post-offence, one may reasonably fear that a future reoffence may take a similar form. His offence was not a sudden, impulsive, one-time event. He took many steps in planning it out and had obviously thought or fantasized about committing such an offence well before the act itself.

From a psychiatric perspective, this intentionality, planning, and the lack of evidence of any remorse post-offence suggests that his above average risk of sexual reoffence will coalesce into a similar offence in the future, rather than a more minor, impulsive sexual offence such as an indecent act.

Even without an opportunity to interview Mr. Hailu on issues relevant to the referral issues, and with limited background collateral information, it is still clear from a psychiatric perspective that Mr. Hailu is at an elevated risk of sexual reoffence. The Static-99R actuarial risk instrument is highly validated through subsequent studies and does not require an interview or substantial file information beyond an official criminal record.

The Crown has proven that Mr. Hailu is a substantial risk.

129The defence submits that Dr. Gray’s evidence should be given limited weight for several reasons. First, his reliance on actuarial tools such as the Static-99R and Stable-2007 is criticized as overly mechanistic and not individualized. These instruments, while historically validated, cannot predict how this specific offender will behave upon release. The Static-99R measures only static factors and does not account for the nature of the index offence, while the Stable-2007 introduces subjectivity, particularly when scored without an interview. Defence argues that Dr. Gray’s interpretation of file information was coloured by bias, penalizing the accused for exercising Charter-protected rights to trial and silence. High scores on categories such as hostility toward women and lack of concern for others were allegedly based on misinterpretations of chats and bail breaches. Further, Dr. Gray’s inability to make a formal diagnosis of sexual sadism disorder and his selective reliance on quotes for PCL-R factors are said to undermine the reliability of his clinical conclusions.

130I respectfully disagree.

131I am satisfied on all the evidence that Dr. Gray’s evidence is methodologically sound and highly probative. The Static-99R and Stable-2007 are internationally recognized, peer-reviewed instruments widely used in Canadian courts. Dr. Gray scored conservatively, treating results as a “floor” due to non-participation; even with downward adjustments, Mr. Hailu remains in the same elevated risk category. A Static-99R score of 5 places Mr. Hailu in the second-highest risk band (Level IVa), with a 21.2% chance of sexual reoffence within five years and 32.1% within ten years—well above the average for sexual offenders. Combined with a Stable-2007 score of 12, the integrated assessment indicates a 31.8% probability of violent sexual reoffence within five years. These figures, coupled with proven trial facts of planning, weapon use, and deliberate cruelty, support Dr. Gray’s opinion that any future offence would likely mirror the index pattern rather than be impulsive.

132I do not accept that Dr. Gray’s findings are biased. Dr. Gray clarified that non-participation was one factor among many and that scoring adhered to training protocols. Even if certain scores were reduced, the overall risk category would remain unchanged.

133I am of the view that Dr. Gray’s assessment is reliable. His use of validated tools, conservative scoring approach, and clinical synthesis of trial-proven facts provide a cogent basis for concluding that Mr. Hailu presents a substantial risk of violent sexual reoffending. The actuarial results, combined with offence characteristics and absence of internal controls, justify reliance on his opinion that the court should impose a ten-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The presumption in s. 753.1(2) does not apply.

134Section 753.1(2) of the Criminal Code creates a presumption of substantial risk where two conditions are met: conviction for an enumerated sexual offence and either a pattern of repetitive behaviour or sexual conduct showing a likelihood of future harm. Mr. Hailu was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, which satisfies the first condition. However, there is no prior pattern of similar offences, and the expert evidence did not use the statutory language of ‘likelihood’. I have concluded that the presumption’s high threshold has not been met.

The residual route to the LTSO applies

135As a result, this analysis must next consider the residual route under s. 753.1(1)(b), consistent with the approach endorsed in R. v. Ouedraogo 2023 ONCJ 136, para. 77; aff’d 2025 ONCA 566).

136Having considered the totality of the evidence, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hailu presents a substantial risk of violent sexual reoffending. This finding rests on the actuarial and clinical assessment provided by Dr. Gray, corroborated by the proven facts of the index offences.

137In summary, Dr. Gray employed two validated instruments: the Static-99R and the Stable-2007. On the Static-99R, Mr. Hailu scored 5, placing him in Level IVa, the second-highest risk category. This corresponds to an estimated 21.2% probability of sexual reoffence within five years and 32.1% within ten years—figures that significantly exceed the average for sexual offenders. On the Stable-2007, he scored 12 out of 24, indicating high dynamic risk factors, including hostility toward women, lack of stable relationships, and poor cooperation with supervision. Integrated scoring yields a combined estimate of 31.8% for violent sexual reoffence within five years.

138Dr. Gray’s clinical opinion reinforces these actuarial findings. He described the index offences as planned, coercive, and weapon-facilitated, with features suggestive of sexual sadism, though a formal diagnosis could not be made due to non-participation. He opined that any future offence would likely mirror the index pattern rather than be impulsive or minor. Entrenched denial, absence of remorse, and refusal to engage in treatment severely limit prospects for internal change, necessitating reliance on external controls.

139The trial record corroborates this assessment. The offences involved stranger abduction, prolonged confinement, and two sexual assaults at knifepoint. The complainant was threatened explicitly—told her throat would be slit if she resisted—and compelled to plead for her life. After release, Mr. Hailu sent anonymous messages designed to intimidate and maintain control, including threats to ‘send people’ to verify her safety. He admitted in communications that he ‘toyed’ with the victim’s emotions and enjoyed instilling fear. These facts underscore deliberate cruelty and sustained domination.

140The legal threshold for substantial risk does not require a probability exceeding 50%. It requires a meaningful elevation above base rates, measured against the gravity of anticipated harm. On the evidence before me—validated risk instruments, clinical synthesis, and trial-proven facts—the Crown has met this burden beyond a reasonable doubt.

141In light of these findings, I conclude that external controls are essential to protect the public. Dr. Gray recommends high-intensity sexual offender programming during custody and strict supervision upon release, including residency at a Community Correctional Centre, curfews, monitoring, and specialized treatment. I accept these recommendations. A Long-Term Supervision Order of ten years is necessary and proportionate to manage risk and ensure community safety.

(c) Eventual Control in community

142Section 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code requires the Court to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility of managing the offender’s risk in the community through structured supervision and treatment.

143The inquiry is practical and focused on risk reduction, not cure. Long‑Term Supervision Orders (LTSOs) protect the public after release and do not reduce the custodial sentence, which serves denunciation and deterrence (see Criminal Code, Part XXIV; R. v. L.M., 2008 SCC 31).

144Community risk management is achieved through layered, modifiable conditions administered by Correctional Service Canada (CSC) and the Parole Board of Canada (PBC)—including residency at a Community Correctional Centre (CCC) for up to 365 days at a time (renewable), curfews, reporting requirements, electronic monitoring, and specialized treatment—tailored to risk and reviewed as circumstances change. In this regard, I have reviewed and considered the Parole Board of Canada Decision‑Making Policy Manual, Chapter 6; Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, s. 161; CSC Commissioner’s Directive 719).

145It is important to note that the Court does not set supervision conditions. The imposition, modification, and management of conditions fall within the jurisdiction of the PBC and CSC under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and their policy frameworks (PBC Manual, ch. 6; CSC CD 719). The Court’s role is to determine whether an LTSO is warranted and its duration; supervision conditions are subsequently set and adjusted by the PBC/CSC.

146Eventual control must be realistic given available resources. Appellate guidance emphasizes that courts should assess the real‑world capacity of CSC/PBC to deliver the recommended supervision and treatment when determining feasibility (R. v. Little, 2007 ONCA 548).

147I have considered the evidence of Dr. Gray as well as policy materials submitted from Corrections Canada and the Parole Board of Canada concerning supervision and treatment of offenders designated as Long-Term Offenders

148Correctional Services Canada (CSC) manages offenders under a Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO) through structured planning and monitoring. While in custody, CSC conducts intake assessments and uses tools like Static-99R and Stable-2007 to determine risk and program needs. High-risk offenders are referred to intensive programs addressing sexual violence, mental health, and other criminogenic factors. Before release, CSC prepares a Community Strategy to support gradual reintegration through conditional release options such as day parole or statutory release.

149Once in the community, supervision is carried out by parole officers who monitor compliance with conditions, update correctional plans, and implement interventions to manage risk. The Parole Board of Canada sets standard and special conditions, which may include residency at a community facility for up to 365 days, subject to review. Conditions can be modified based on risk changes, and supervision focuses on balancing public safety with reintegration. The LTSO framework combines treatment, structured oversight, and tailored conditions to reduce reoffending risk while supporting eventual control in the community.

150I am satisfied on the evidence that there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Hailu’s risk in the community through well-structured supervision and treatment.

151I attach significant weight to the testimony of Dr Gray and his report concerning Mr. Hailu’s risk to re-offend and whether such risk can be eventually controlled in the community. First, there are the concerning results of Dr. Gray’s testing using actuarial instruments are described in detail earlier in these reasons. Clinically, Dr. Gray described the index offences as planned, coercive, and weapon‑facilitated, with features consistent with sexual sadism (no formal diagnosis). He opined that, absent internal change, any future offence would likely mirror the severity and planning of the index offence rather than be impulsive or minor. Dr. Gray testified that given Mr. Hailu’s refusal to engage in treatment and lack of remorse, internal controls are limited and insufficient to manage risk.

152Dr. Gray opined that without such external controls, the public would not be adequately protected. Dr. Gray recommended: (a) high-intensity sexual-offender programming in federal custody under CSC’s Integrated Correctional Program Model (ICPM); (b) upon release, residency at a Community Correctional Centre (CCC) during the highest-risk early period; (c) weekly meetings with a parole officer with active monitoring (including ACUTE checks); (d) a weapons prohibition; and (e) specialized outpatient treatment (e.g., a Sexual Behaviours Clinic). He recommended a 10-year LTSO given the offender’s youth and anticipated monitoring needs once residency lapses.

LTO designation and LTSO

153A Long‑Term Offender designation is entered, and a Long‑Term Supervision Order of ten (10) years is imposed. Conditions are to be set and managed by the Parole Board of Canada and Correctional Service Canada in accordance with their statutory mandates and policies.