ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
GURMAN CHEEMA
Before Justice G.P. Renwick
Heard on 12 December 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on 21 December 2025
R. Mullins counsel for the prosecution
S. DiClemente counsel for the Offender Gurman Cheema
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
INTRODUCTION
1Following a six-day trial, I found the Offender guilty of driving dangerously causing the death of Rosa Narvaez, contrary to s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code.
2The Offender’s driving caused a tragedy that never needed to happen. Ms. Narvaez was driving the speed limit on a Sunday morning when the Offender’s excessive speed and balding tires caused him to lose control on a damp city street, resulting in his Lexus crossing a raised median and violently slamming into Ms. Narvaez’ oncoming vehicle. As was evident on some of the dash-cam videos presented at trial, the violent collision narrowly missed impacting other vehicles before the Lexus also struck Vanessa Allen-Green’s car.
3It is trite to note that any sentence the court imposes will not adequately represent the undeserved loss of a wonderful Mother, wife, and Grand-Mother and the incalculable suffering caused to many. For the other drivers, witnesses, family members, and first responders of this collision, the sentence will do little to ease their pain, loss, or trauma. At best, the sentence represents an attempt, in a considered and rational way, to respond to a senseless crime and to hold the Offender accountable.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
4Section 320.12 of the Criminal Code recognizes and declares the following:
(a) Operating a conveyance is a privilege that is subject to certain limits in the interests of public safety that include licensing, the observance of rules and sobriety;
(b) The protection of society is well served by deterring persons from operating conveyances dangerously…, because that conduct poses a threat to the life, health and safety of Canadians…
5Through many of its decisions, the Supreme Court has explained the principles that apply to the sentencing of offenders. In R. v. Lacasse, the Court held that:
The determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation. It involves a variety of factors that are difficult to define with precision.1
6The purposes of sentencing as expressed in section 718 of the Criminal Code are to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing appropriate sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: denunciation; deterring the offender and other persons from committing offences; separating offenders from society, where necessary; assisting in rehabilitating offenders; providing reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders while acknowledging the harm they have caused. There is no single fit sentence for any particular offence. The relevance and relative importance of each of the sentencing objectives will vary according to the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender.2
7In Hamilton and Mason, Doherty J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that:
The "gravity of the offence" refers to the seriousness of the offence in a generic sense as reflected by the potential penalty imposed by Parliament and any specific features of the commission of the crime which may tend to increase or decrease the harm or risk of harm to the community occasioned by the offence…
The "degree of responsibility of the offender" refers to the offender's culpability as reflected in the essential substantive elements of the offence - especially the fault component - and any specific aspects of the offender's conduct or background that tend to increase or decrease the offender's personal responsibility for the crime3.
8Section 718.1 of the Code ensures that proportionality is the fundamental principle of sentencing. The punishment should fit the crime. However, proportionality is not the sole principle to be considered. A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.4
SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS
9The maximum sentence for this offence is life imprisonment. The minimum sentence for a first offence (applicable here) is a fine of $1000.5
Victim Impact
10By his deliberately risky driving, the Offender caused the death of Rosa Narvaez and bodily harm to Zelma Allen-Green. These people and their families did nothing to deserve the loss, pain, and on-going suffering caused by this Offender.
11In her victim impact statement, Ms. Allen-Green wrote that “The accident and all that came with it has definitely aroused all sorts of emotions that cannot be explained…”
12Ms. Narvaez’ loving husband, Pedro Narvaez, wrote that he “lost the best thing in my life, a person who was always there for me and who was my best friend…”
13The victim impact statement of Ms. Narvaez’ daughter, Christina, noted that she is so wracked with grief that she feels continually anxious. A poem she wrote to celebrate her Mother ends:
The special years will not return,
When we were all together,
But with the love within our hearts,
You will walk with us forever.
14Her son Roberto wrote:
I do not believe that a sentence would change another person’s views or mentality, but I pray that people think and realise you can change a whole family’s life with your decisions or actions…I just hope we can put an end to these senseless tragedies, so other families do not have to go through the pain and suffering our family is forced to live with.
15Pedro Narvaez junior also wrote about his mother:
…You loved being a mother and provider for your children. But what made me most happy was how you help raise my kids (your grandkids)…My mother was superwoman, she was the best mother, grandmother and wife.
16Ms. Narvaez’ daughter-in-law also noted her fears about being in a car or losing her husband in the same way. Two of Ms. Narvaez’ grandchildren drew pictures of their “Nana,” which are both beautiful and incredibly sad. These are snapshots of a loving wife, Mother, and Grand-Mother who was taken from her family too soon.
17No sentence can ever replace Ms. Narvaez, or heal the deep loss of her grieving family. Likewise for Ms. Allen-Green’s pain. Nor should the sentence focus on these aims.
Positions of the Parties
18The prosecution seeks a penitentiary sentence of four to five years, a driving prohibition of 10 years, and an Order requiring submission for deoxyribonucleic acid sampling for the national offender databank (“DNA Order”).
19The Offender seeks the maximum reformatory prison sentence, two years less one day, served conditionally, in the community, and a driving prohibition of four to seven years. The Offender opposes a DNA Order.
20The parties produced trial jurisprudence to support a range of sentences from conditional sentences of imprisonment to penitentiary sentences of five years. I have read and considered all of the cases presented. None was binding upon me. Several spoke of deliberate risk-taking that is similar to this Offender’s conduct.
21The decisions produced demonstrate the wide range of sentences for this offence, depending on the moral blameworthiness of the offender in all the circumstances. The cases make it clear that the circumstances of each case and each offender are unique. Accordingly, I must reflect on the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances of this case to determine a just sentence.
Aggravating Circumstances
22Section 320.22(a) dictates that it is aggravating that the Offender’s driving resulted in the death and bodily harm of more than one person. In addition to the tragic loss of life of Ms. Narvaez, the Offender’s driving was agreed by the parties as the cause of bodily harm (on-going neck and shoulder pain) suffered by Ms. Allen-Green.
23The Offender’s dangerous driving occurred on a city street with many vehicles present. The collision hit two vehicles and narrowly missed several others.6 The Offender’s car was partially airborne when it collided with oncoming traffic. The driving at issue put several other motorists in the area at risk.
24The Offender’s driving included speeding well in excess of the posted speed limit on a damp street with balding tires, over several seconds, as he changed lanes and increased his speed to pass other motorists. This conduct was deliberately risky.
25There was evidence to support an unsafe mindset on the Offender’s part, just prior to the collision at a nearby red traffic light, where it appeared that he was showing off (revving his engine) or even attempting to engage another motorist in a race.
Mitigating Circumstances
26The Offender is a young adult. He was 19 years and 10 months old at the time of the offence and he recently turned 22 years old. He had no prior driving or criminal record.
27The Offender is productive. He has graduated from high school and he has registered for marketing and related business courses at Humber Polytechnic.
28Additionally, the offender has completed an indeterminate amount of mental health counselling and he has taken two on-line defensive driving courses.
29The Offender is supported by a loving family. He exhibits pro-social behaviours: he volunteers at his place of worship and he has worked part-time as a courier driver.
30The Offender is remorseful. In his letter to the court he noted that he carries the guilt of having taken a life and impacted many others.
31The pre-sentence report, which is positive, supports these findings and noted:
During the narration of the incident, the subject explained that he lost control of the vehicle as he would never intentionally cause harm to anyone. It is noteworthy that this is the subject’s first involvement with the criminal justice system. His self-awareness, humility and willingness to be held accountable denotes an earnest frame of mind as it relates to the seriousness of this offence.
32I conclude that the Offender is an excellent candidate for rehabilitation and he presents a very low risk to re-offend.
DISCUSSION
33I note that as a sentencing sanction, imprisonment is always to be used as a last resort. It should be used sparingly, when it is required, and the sentence must aim to denounce an offender’s conduct and deter them or other like-minded offenders from similar offences, without crushing an offender’s potential for rehabilitation.
34In this case, it is recognized that the youth of the Offender, his prior exemplary character, and his past and prospects for pro-social behaviour mitigate toward a sentence that ranks rehabilitation as the primary goal above denunciation and deterrence.
35This is consonant with recent guidance from our Court of Appeal:
Sentencing judges must also respect several other settled principles when sentencing youthful offenders for their first criminal offence. First, they must practice restraint. This requires them to avoid imprisoning young adults when possible. When imprisonment is necessary, it also requires them to make the sentence as short as possible to achieve the principles and objectives of sentencing. See Priest, at pp. 544-546. Second, they must prioritize rehabilitation as the paramount sentencing objective. Where necessary, they must also prioritize specific deterrence. See Brown, at paras. 5 and 10. Third, they cannot focus exclusively on denunciation and general deterrence or elevate those objectives above rehabilitation and specific deterrence. See Borde, at para. 36; Brown, at para. 7. Fourth, they must consider young adults' reduced moral culpability and the harsher impact that incarceration causes them due to their stage of life. See R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2 at paras. 161 and 165; R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, at paras. 132 and 152.
Sentencing judges must always give serious and sufficient consideration to all these principles. Merely referring to them as relevant is not always sufficient to show their proper application. Failing to apply or unreasonably underemphasizing them is an error in principle.7
36In my view, if this offence had been committed by an older offender, it would warrant a four-year penitentiary sentence. This is commensurate with the dangerousness of the driving, the seriousness of the offence, and the harm caused.
37Counsel for the Offender submits that several comparable cases have resulted in conditional sentences of imprisonment. He argues that placing excessive weight on the tragic outcome of the Offender’s conduct, a death and bodily harm caused to two motorists, risks producing a disproportionate sentence for a brief period of poor judgment.
38With respect, I disagree that this was a singular bad decision of short duration. This Offender was deliberate in his speed, his lane changes, and his rapid acceleration over a sustained distance. He ignored the warning signs of traction-loss and continued to push the vehicle until he lost complete control. He chose to put several other motorist’s safety at risk by his deliberate conduct. The seriousness of this offence (evidenced by the consequences of the poor driving) raises the moral blameworthiness of the Offender.
39In my view, a reformatory prison sentence would be insufficient to respond to the dangerousness of the Offender’s conduct. It is not the consequences of the bad driving that should be punished, but the driving itself. Here, the driving was inexplicable and totally unnecessary. The Garmin video shows that the Offender had already passed all other westbound traffic, yet he persisted to accelerate to the point of catastrophic slippage. While youth, no prior record, remorse, and rehabilitation prospects meaningfully reduce the term from what would be imposed for an older offender, they do not justify a sentence below two years. As a result, a conditional sentence is unavailable.
40I agree that specific deterrence plays a reduced role in sentencing this Offender. He is not likely to drive so deliberately aggressively ever again. I have also taken into account that any prison sentence will be a hardship for this Offender and his family and given his prior unblemished character, the sentence must demonstrate penal restraint.
41A life has been lost and another motorist’s life has been significantly impacted. These consequences were not the result of a mere accident, civil negligence, or quasi-criminal (provincial offences) behaviour. Rather, the Offender’s moral responsibility is heightened because he drove in an obviously dangerous way and deliberately undertook a course of action (speeding, lane changes, and rapid acceleration) over a protracted period, in moderate traffic, on wet roads, with balding tires. The Offender knowingly undertook maneuvers that placed the lives and safety of others at significant risk and continued his conduct, regardless of wheel slippage, until the risks materialized.
THE SENTENCE
42Accounting for the Offender’s youth, I will impose a sentence of three years of imprisonment. This prioritizes the Offender’s rehabilitation while tracking his actual culpability for this offence.
Ancillary Orders
43The Offender is prohibited from driving a motor vehicle for five years in addition to the period of his confinement. This period is appropriate for the actual dangerousness exhibited by the Offender’s driving.
44Given the potential maximum sentence, this is a secondary designated DNA offence. Having considered the minimal impact upon his privacy interests, it is appropriate to make a DNA sampling Order in respect of the Offender.
45The Offender’s DNA will be taken in hygienic conditions that respect the bodily integrity, health, safety, and privacy of the Offender, while in custody. If the Offender refuses to cooperate with the DNA sampling procedure, reasonable force may be used to take his DNA sample.
CONCLUSION
46This case is an example of the intersection of deliberately risky behaviour, tragedy, and consequence. A meaningful sentence in this case must account for the rehabilitative potential of the youthful Offender, the serious nature of the offence, and the harm and suffering caused to two motorists and their families.
47It is for these reasons that Gurman Cheema is sentenced to three years in a penitentiary for the offence of driving dangerously causing death. A driving prohibition of five years and a DNA Order are also made.
48For his sake, and the sake of our community, I wish that Gurman Cheema fully rehabilitates and lives up to his full potential.
Released: 21 December 2025
Justice G. Paul Renwick
Footnotes
- 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at para. 58.
- See R. v. Hamilton and Mason, 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 3252 (C.A.) at para. 102
- Hamilton, supra, at paras. 90-91.
- See s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code.
- See s. 320.21(a) of the Criminal Code.
- This is especially apparent in the Garmin video, trial exhibit #1C.
- R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830 at paras. 31 and 32.