CITATION: Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2025 ONCJ 691
COURT FILE NO. D46137/25
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
STEVEN PATRICK LLOYD
PAULINE KLEMENCIC, for the APPLICANT
APPLICANT
- and –
HALEY LLOYD
ENI HANXHARI, for the RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT
HEARD: In Chambers
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
COSTS ENDORSEMENT
Part One – Introduction
1On November 24, 2025, the court delivered written reasons for decision on cross-motions brought by the parties regarding temporary decision-making responsibility for their 4-year-old son (the child). See: Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2025 ONCJ 612. The main issue on the motions was who would have decision-making responsibility regarding vaccinations for the child.
2The court made temporary orders including:
a) The applicant (the father) shall have sole decision-making responsibility regarding vaccinations for child. He shall determine what vaccinations the child receives, and when.
b) The respondent’s (the mother’s) consent for the child to be vaccinated is dispensed with.
c) The father shall advise the mother, in a timely manner, what vaccinations the child receives.
d) Otherwise, the parties shall have joint decision-making responsibility regarding major health decisions for the child.
e) All other claims, except for costs, contained in the parties’ notices of motion are dismissed.
3The parties were given the opportunity to make written costs submissions. The father seeks costs of $6,219 plus HST. The mother asks that no costs be ordered.
Part Two – General costs principles
4The Ontario Court of Appeal in Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 set out that modern costs rules are designed to foster four fundamental purposes:
(1) to partially indemnify successful litigants;
(2) to encourage settlement;
(3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants and;
(4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly under subrule 2 (2) (all references to rules in this decision are to the Family Law Rules).
5Costs awards are discretionary. Two important principles in exercising discretion are reasonableness and proportionality. See: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.
6An award of costs is subject to the factors listed in subrule 24 (14), subrule 24 (7) pertaining to unreasonable conduct of a successful party, subrule 24 (10) pertaining to bad faith, subrule 24 (12) pertaining to offers to settle, and the reasonableness of the costs sought by the successful party. See: Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, at paragraph 94.
Part Three – Did the mother’s offer to settle attract the costs consequences set out in subrule 24 (12)?
7Subrule 18 (4) sets out that an offer shall be signed personally by the party making it and also by the party’s lawyer, if any.
8The father made an offer to settle dated October 21, 2025. The mother did not make a formal offer to settle.
9The costs consequences of a party’s failure to accept an offer to settle that is as good as or better than the trial result of the person making the offer, is now set out in subrule 24 (12). It reads as follows:
COSTS CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO ACCEPT OFFER
24 (12) A party who makes an offer is, unless the court orders otherwise, entitled to costs to the date the offer was served and full recovery of costs from that date, if the following conditions are met:
If the offer relates to a motion, it is made at least one day before the motion date.
If the offer relates to a trial or the hearing of a step other than a motion, it is made at least seven days before the trial or hearing date.
The offer does not expire and is not withdrawn before the hearing starts.
The offer is not accepted.
The party who made the offer obtains an order that is as good as or better than the offer.
10Subrule 24 (13) sets out that the onus of proving that the order is as good as or better than the offer to settle is on the party who claims the benefit of subrule 24 (12).
11The court is not required to examine each term of the offer as compared to the terms of the order and weigh with microscopic precision the equivalence of the terms. What is required is a general assessment of the overall comparability of the offer as contrasted with the order. See: Wilson v Kovalev, 2016 ONSC 163.
12Close is not good enough to attract the costs consequences of 24 (12). The offer must be as good as or better than the trial result. See: Gurley v. Gurley, 2013 ONCJ 482; Axford v. Axford, 2024 ONSC 2864.
13The father’s offer to settle was not as good as the order made. He sought temporary sole decision-making responsibility regarding all health issues for the child. The court only ordered temporary sole-decision making responsibility regarding vaccinations.
14The father’s offer was considered under sub-clause (iii) of subrule 24 (14) (a).
Part Four – Success
15Subrule 24 (3) creates a presumption of costs in favour of the successful party. Consideration of success is the starting point in determining costs. See: Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe 2000 CanLII 22584 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 330 (SCJ- Family Court).
16To determine whether a party has been successful, the court should examine who was the successful party, based on the positions taken in the litigation. See: Lazare v. Heitner, 2018 ONSC 4861. This assessment includes the positions taken in the pleadings, and the specific relief sought at the hearing, if different. See: Kyriacou v. Zikos, 2022 ONSC 401.
17Subrule 24 (4) sets out that if success in a step in a case is divided, the court may apportion costs as appropriate.
18Divided success does not equate with equal success. It requires a comparative analysis. Most family cases have multiple issues. They are not equally important, time-consuming or expensive to determine. See: Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 1556, paragraph 66.
19Where there are multiple issues before the court, the court should have regard to the dominant issue at trial in determining success. See: Firth v. Allerton, [2013] O.J. No. 3992 (SCJ); Mondino v. Mondino, 2014 ONSC 1102.
20The dominant issue on these motions was which parent would decide if the child should be vaccinated. The father was the successful party on this issue.
21Both parties sought sole decision-making responsibility regarding the child’s health. Except for the issue of vaccination, the court ordered joint decision-making responsibility regarding the child’s health. There was divided success on this issue.
22The father sought an order prohibiting the mother from discussing vaccination with the child. This was not ordered. Little time was spent on this issue. The mother was the successful party on this point.
23Overall, the father was the successful party on the motions. The mother did not rebut the presumption that the father is entitled to his costs.
Part Five – Amount of costs and order
23Subrule 24 (14) reads as follows:
24 (14) In setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider,
a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:
(i) each party’s behaviour,
(ii) the time spent by each party,
(iii) any written offers to settle including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18,
iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates,
v) any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates,
vi) any other expenses properly paid or payable; and
(b) any other relevant matter.
24These motions were important to the parties. They were not difficult or complex.
25The court finds that both parties acted reasonably on these motions. The mother sincerely holds the belief that her position regarding vaccination is in the child’s best interests. Being unsuccessful does not necessarily equate to being unreasonable. See: Wauthier v. McAuliff, 2019 ONSC 5302; W.H.C. v. W.C.M.C., 2021 ONCJ 363; Okafor v. Okafor, 2022 ONCJ 290.
26Two appearances were required for this motion because the mother did not attach some exhibits referred to in her affidavit. The court wanted to give her the opportunity to do so. She did not resolve that issue by the second attendance and the court proceeded with the motions. This added time and expense to this step in the case.
27The rates of $325 per hour claimed by the father’s counsel are reasonable for a 2015 call to the bar.
28The time claimed by the father’s counsel are reasonable and proportionate. The court recognized that additional work had to be done to obtain public records regarding vaccinating children and to research case law on this subject.
29The mother submitted that her claimed costs of $6,219 represent 70% of her actual costs.
30The court considered the mother’s ability to pay costs. See: MacDonald v. Magel (2003) 2003 CanLII 18880 (ON CA), 67 O.R. (3d) 181 (Ont. C.A.). However, difficult financial circumstances are a factor but not are always a reason to deprive a successful party of costs or to reduce the amount of costs. See: Beaulieu v. Diotte, 2020 ONSC 6787.
31In determining the appropriate quantum, the court should consider the amount that the unsuccessful party could reasonably have expected to pay in the event of lack of success in the litigation. See: Arthur v. Arthur, 2019 ONSC 938. The court finds that the mother, if she was unsuccessful, should have reasonably expected to pay the amount of costs that will be ordered.
32The court finds that the mother can afford to pay the costs that will be ordered, if a reasonable payment plan is ordered.
33The court orders as follows:
a) The mother shall pay the father’s costs of the motions fixed in the amount of $6,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST.
b) The mother may pay the costs at $300 each month, starting on February 1, 2026. However, if she is more than 30 days late in making any payment, the entire amount of costs then owing shall immediately become due and payable.
Released: December 29, 2025
Justice Stanley B. Sherr