ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
LUKE LACHANCE
Before Justice S. G. Pratt
Heard on 4 November, 17 December, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on 24 December 2025
Jonathan Lall......................................................................................... Counsel for the Crown
Brandon Diesbourg......................................................................... Counsel for the Offender
Pratt J.:
1On 4 November 2025 the Offender Luke Lachance appeared before me for sentencing. He had entered several guilty pleas before my brother Justice McGivern on 29 August. No facts were provided on that day as the pleas were entered so that a Pre-sentence Report (PSR) could be ordered. On the November date, sentencing submissions were made by counsel.
2The parties provided a joint submission on sentence. I advised them that I was considering departing from that sentence. I gave counsel an opportunity to provide caselaw that supported the joint submission and to make further argument. That caselaw and argument were put before the Court on 17 December.
3These are my reasons for sentence.
Facts
4The Offender pleaded guilty in relation to nine separate incidents, all from April and May 2025. Briefly, they are as follows:
(1) 15 April, robbery of Circle K at 7887 Tecumseh Road East at 120am. The Offender entered and took several packs of cigarettes. When confronted by the store clerk, he pointed a knife at him and threatened harm if he didn’t open the cash register and give him money. He took $150 and a quantity of beer.
(2) 17 April, robbery of Circle K at 2606 Jefferson Boulevard at 151am. He approached the clerk with a knife and a mask over his face and demanded money and cigarettes. He took $90.
(3) 25 April, robbery of Circle K at 1675 Tecumseh Road East at 1250am. He was armed with a knife. He told one of the two clerks not to move, and told the other to open the cash register. He took cash, then went to the back of the store and took a 12-pack of beer. The total value of the theft was approximately $250.
(4) 25 April, robbery of Circle K at 991 Ouellette Avenue at 458am. Wearing a mask, he entered the store and went behind the counter. He threatened to stab the clerk with a knife if he tried to intervene. He took $50-60.
(5) 27 April, robbery of Circle K at 1675 Tecumseh Road East at 1140am. While clerks were helping two customers, he went behind the counter and brandished a knife. He demanded money and took $150-200.
(6) 4 May, robbery of Circle K at 12270 Tecumseh Road East at 1138pm. Wearing a mask, he brandished a knife to the clerk and took $40 and five packs of cigarettes.
(7) 5 May, robbery of Petro-Canada at 3025 Manning Road at 2am. Wearing a mask, he entered the store with a knife and went behind the counter. He demanded money and cigarettes, and left with $200 and a four-pack of beer.
(8) 7 May, robbery of Circle K at 2695 Lauzon Road at 124am. With his face masked, he entered the store with a knife and went behind the counter. He demanded the clerk empty the cash register. He took a quantity of cigarettes and an unquantified amount of cash.
(9) 9 May, robbery of Circle K at 2695 Lauzon Road at 1250am. Armed with a knife, he entered the store and went behind the counter. He demanded the clerk open the store safe. When the clerk said he couldn’t, the Offender threw the safe timer on the floor. He took approximately $60 from the cash register and a six-pack of beer.
5All incidents were caught on surveillance video. To be clear, in all robberies the Offender was carrying a knife in his right hand and his face was covered. He was not wearing gloves. Police were able to recover a fingerprint from a pack of cigarettes at one of the crime scenes that led them to the Offender.
6While I have described all of the above incidents as robberies, it should be noted that on incidents 2, 4, 6, and 9, the plea entered was to the offence of having his face masked with an intent to commit an indictable offence. In my view, this does not change the underlying circumstances or the inherent seriousness of the encounters.
The Joint Submission
7Counsel jointly submitted that a sentence of two years jail, less one day, should be imposed. This would be followed by two years of probation and accompanied by several ancillary orders.
8I expressed concern on the November date that the proposed sentence was not appropriate given the number and seriousness of the offences. I adjourned the matter to give counsel the chance to provide additional support for the joint submission.
The Law
9Joint submissions are a common feature of criminal courts. They are negotiated agreements between Crown and defence as to sentence. This ability to arrive at such agreements, and the expectation that they will be acceded to by the courts, encourages resolution. Given the enormous volume of cases heard in criminal court, they are a most valuable tool. They allow counsel, who know the case better than the sentencing judge, to arrive at what they both believe is a just outcome. In turn, the judge is expected to go along with the agreement. This provides the predictability that allows the system to function efficiently.
10That efficiency, however, does not come at all costs. There will be times when a joint submission is, in the Court’s view, so unduly harsh or lenient that it should not be followed. While this should be the exception and not the rule, judges retain the discretion to impose the sentence they believe to be fit, regardless of counsels’ recommendation.
11This discretion is codified in s. 606(1.1)(b)(iii). That subparagraph is part of the broader plea inquiry that should be carried out before any guilty pleas are entered. The section states as follows:
(1.1) A court may accept a plea of guilty only if it is satisfied that
(a) the accused is making the plea voluntarily;
(b) the accused understands
(i) that the plea is an admission of the essential elements of the offence,
(ii) the nature and consequences of the plea, and
(iii) that the court is not bound by any agreement made between the accused and the prosecutor; and
(c) the facts support the charge. (Emphasis added)
12In the present case, before Justice McGivern, counsel for the Offender was asked if the plea inquiry was carried out. His Honour was told it had been. That satisfied Justice McGivern, and it satisfies me as well. Courts are entitled to rely on the submissions of counsel in this regard.
13A court cannot set aside a joint submission simply because it would prefer a different sentence. Deference is owed to counsel, who have often engaged in significant discussion on details of the case that are unknown to the sentencing judge. Even in cases where the proposed sentence seems out of step with what would ordinarily be imposed, courts are expected to agree.
14That expectation was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of R. v. Anthony-Cook 2016 SCC 43, [2016] S.C.J. No. 43. Justice Moldaver began that decision with a more succinct summary of the principles I’ve noted above:
1 Resolution discussions between Crown and defence counsel are not only commonplace in the criminal justice system, they are essential. Properly conducted, they permit the system to function smoothly and efficiently.
2 Joint submissions on sentence -- that is, when Crown and defence counsel agree to recommend a particular sentence to the judge, in exchange for the accused entering a plea of guilty -- are a subset of resolution discussions.1 They are both an accepted and acceptable means of plea resolution. They occur every day in courtrooms across this country and they are vital to the efficient operation of the criminal justice system. As this Court said in R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, not only do joint submissions "help to resolve the vast majority of criminal cases in Canada", but "in doing so, [they] contribute to a fair and efficient criminal justice system" (para. 47).
15As His Honour then noted, however, joint submissions are not sacrosanct. There may be times when judges depart from them. The Anthony-Cook decision considered this situation. In that case, a trial judge found a joint submission to be unfit and declined to follow it. In allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that fitness was not the correct test to apply when departing from a joint submission. A more demanding test is required, given the value of joint submissions to the parties and to the justice system. At paragraphs 32 - 34, Justice Moldaver stated:
32 Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. But, what does this threshold mean? Two decisions from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal are helpful in this regard.
33 In Druken, at para. 29, the court held that a joint submission will bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the public interest if, despite the public interest considerations that support imposing it, it is so "markedly out of line with the expectations of reasonable persons aware of the circumstances of the case that they would view it as a break down in the proper functioning of the criminal justice system". And, as stated by the same court in R. v. B.O.2, 2010 NLCA 19, at para. 56, when assessing a joint submission, trial judges should "avoid rendering a decision that causes an informed and reasonable public to lose confidence in the institution of the courts".
34 In my view, these powerful statements capture the essence of the public interest test developed by the Martin Committee. They emphasize that a joint submission should not be rejected lightly, a conclusion with which I agree. Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. This is an undeniably high threshold -- and for good reason, as I shall explain.
16This test continues to be applied when joint submissions are evaluated by sentencing judges (see: R. v. Holtorf 2025 ONSC 6068; R. v. Velauther 2025 ONSC 6877).
17I would also note that the stringency of this test was questioned by Justice Bychok of the Nunavut Court of Justice in the case of R. v. Aklok 2020 NUCJ 37. His Honour found the “so unhinged” test to be too demanding, and that it denied judges the discretion conferred on them by Parliament. Referring to the idea that a joint submission should only be rejected if it would lead to the conclusion that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down, His Honour noted:
A judge's inability to impose a just and principled sentence constitutes a breakdown in the justice system.
18The Anthony-Cook test has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in the cases of R. v. Fuller 2020 ONCA 115 where the Court found joint submissions should only be departed from in “rare cases” and “exceptional circumstances”, and R. v. Harasiuk 2023 ONCA 594, which cited both Anthony-Cook and Fuller as proper statements of law.
19It is a curious corollary of Anthony-Cook and subsequent cases that sentencing courts are required to impose demonstrably unfit sentences if they are packaged as joint submissions. I find myself agreeing with Justice Bychok in Aklok that this mandatory acquiescence forces sentencing judges into untenable positions and potentially conflicts with their oath to administer justice fairly and impartially.
20All of that being said, any changes to the proper legal test must come either from appellate courts or from Parliament. In the meantime, I am required to apply the test set out in Anthony-Cook. That is the test I must, and will, implement.
The Pre-sentence Report
21The PSR in this case provided useful background on the Offender. It shows aspects of his life that are encouraging, and others that are less so.
22The Offender has a good relationship with his mother Tracy Meloche. She supports him and is willing to have him under her roof so long as he remains committed to sobriety and to addressing his mental health. She said the Offender was an intelligent person whose employment prospects suffered because of his addiction and mental illness. Ms. Meloche did express some concern with the Offender’s current intimate relationship, describing it as “unhealthy”.
23That relationship is with Amanda Skrobacz. She and the Offender have been together for fifteen years and share an eight-year-old daughter. While Ms. Skrobacz told the PSR author she is not fearful of the Offender, there has been conflict in their relationship, and he was once charged with threatening her.
24The Offender began experimenting with illicit drugs at 12 years old. He first used marijuana, and then at the age of 15 began using magic mushrooms, ecstasy, cocaine, and ketamine. By age 17, he was a regular cocaine user and was selling the drug to support himself. He was off drugs from ages 22 to 25, but was then introduced to crystal methamphetamine by a friend. When he learned Ms. Skrobacz was pregnant with their daughter, he was sober for about two years. He subsequently relapsed with cocaine and alcohol, and then with methamphetamine as well. Eventually, his use of cocaine diminished while his use of methamphetamine increased. This is from page 6 of the PSR:
He stated he initially would sell the substance to support his own use; however, when he stopped selling and ran out of money, he resorted to robberies to acquire money to support his habit.
25While he has attended inpatient rehabilitation “three or four times” in the past, he has been unable to maintain his sobriety. The PSR states that his most recent time in custody has “opened his eyes” and caused him to re-commit to staying off drugs. He is on psychiatric medication and feels he is in a better position to live a positive life.
26Regarding that psychiatric medication, the Offender was diagnosed with schizophrenia at the age of 33. While he has been prescribed medication to treat this condition, his compliance has been intermittent. He told the PSR author he was not taking his medication at the time of the offences. Rather, according to his counsel, he was self-medicating with street drugs.
27Overall, I find the PSR to be mixed in its impact. The Offender has the support of his mother and his partner. He is committed to maintaining his sobriety and appears compliant with his medication. These factors augur well for his future.
28I cannot ignore, however, the less encouraging aspects of the report. His addictions are of long standing. They have not been defeated by efforts at rehabilitation, but by the fact that the Offender has been in custody since the robberies. Likewise, outside the structure of a detention centre, he has been inconsistent in taking his medication. When his addiction and lack of medical compliance coincided, multiple violent offences resulted.
29It was also suggested that the Offender’s mental illness was a driving factor in these offences. I will address this issue shortly. For now, I am left with the PSR passage quoted above. The Offender admitted to the author that he committed robberies not because his illness compelled him, but to finance his own drug addiction.
30While the PSR offers some hope for the future, the Offender’s own words and past conduct temper that hope.
Victim Impact
31I received one Victim Impact Statement in this case. The victim Robin Singh described ongoing fear and an impact on his employment as a result of the robbery.
Principles of Sentencing
32Parliament has directed sentencing judges on how to fashion appropriate sentences. This direction is found in the Criminal Code from section 718 onward.
33That section states that “[t]he fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions”. It then sets out objectives that should figure into each sentence. These objectives include denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders.
34In addition to these general principles, Parliament has also enacted more specific provisions applicable to certain cases, depending on their underlying facts.
35Section 718.04 states that where the victim of an offence is “vulnerable because of personal circumstances”, a court should give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. I will have more to say about the vulnerability of the victims in this case later in these reasons.
36Finally, section 718.1 reminds courts that any sentence imposed should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
Caselaw
37As part of their additional submissions, both counsel submitted caselaw in support of the proposed sentence.
38The Crown filed three cases.
39The case of R. v. Maroti 2010 MBCA 54 dealt with the sentencing of an offender who pleaded guilty to seven gas station robberies. All took place over a ten-day period, and all involved the brandishing of a knife. One location was robbed twice in a short period of time. In one robbery the offender threatened to stab the clerk if they did not open the cash register. The offender committed the robberies to support his drug addiction.
40The sentencing judge imposed a three-year sentence. The sentence was appealed on the basis of the judge’s reasons being insufficient. In his decision, the judge simply relied on the concept of stare decisis and imposed sentence. No resort was had to the principles of sentencing and no explanation was given for why that sentence fit those particular circumstances.
41The bulk of the decision related to concurrent vs consecutive sentences when multiple offences are committed in a “spree” fashion. Without diving deeply into this area of the law, I find a concurrent sentence on each count before me would be appropriate. The offences are sufficiently close in time that while I do not make a finding that they were effectively one transaction, I do conclude that the interest of justice can be served with concurrent sentences. Further, were I to impose consecutive sentences, the principle of totality would require a series of artificially and unreasonably short component sentences. In the result, the sentence I impose today will be concurrent across all counts and informations.
42Before leaving Maroti, I note that while the sentence was upheld as fit despite the insufficient reasons, Justice Steel found that had she been the trial judge, she would have imposed a four-year sentence. Given the similarities between Maroti and the Offender, this is a useful observation.
43In R. v. Huang 2020 ONCA 341, a 12-month sentence was upheld on appeal (with an adjustment to reflect pre-sentence custody). Huang had robbed two gas stations a total of three times, all with a knife and while wearing a mask. He had what the Crown on appeal termed “serious mental health issues” that warranted “a more merciful sentence” than might otherwise be appropriate.
44The Crown also relied on R. v. Ellis 2013 ONCA 739, a case that considered mental illness in the context of criminal sentencing.
45The Offender provided the case of R. v. Lea 2010 MBCA 37. In that case, the Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld a conditional sentence of two years less a day (minus a small adjustment) for two gas station robberies. The difficulty with this case is that the only description of the offences is as follows, from paragraph 3 of the decision:
On July 25 and 26, 2007, in the City of Winnipeg, the respondent robbed two convenience stores while on a cocaine binge.
46There is nothing in the decision about the use of a weapon or mask, or about how Lea interacted with the victims. The sentence is therefore of limited use in the present case. What is clear is that the imposition of a conditional sentence for multiple retail robberies is highly unusual and at odds with much of the caselaw in this area. I take counsel’s reliance on this case to show a wide range of sentences are possible even on offences like these.
47The case of R. v. Knoblauch 2000 SCC 58 also dealt with the imposition of a conditional sentence on a mentally ill offender, but on facts and offences vastly different from the case before me.
48Finally, in the case of R. v. Cadienhead 2014 ONSC 618, Justice Spies imposed a 12-month conditional sentence for one count of robbery committed in the context of a bogus meeting to sell electronics equipment. Cadienhead had no prior record.
49Counsel for the Offender also provided a chapter from the book Mental Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law. The passage cited in argument included the suggestion at page 6-37 that an offender’s mental illness can function as a mitigating factor “where it played a role in the commission of the offence but the accused has subsequently sought and received psychiatric assistance.”
50I’m not convinced the cases provided support the joint submission. Maroti received a three-year sentence for fewer robberies than the Offender committed. Huang received a 12-month sentence for just two robberies. The Lea decision would appear, respectfully, to be an outlier in the realm of retail robbery sentences.
51The materials are more helpful on the question of how the Offender’s mental illness should be considered.
52In his submissions, Crown counsel suggested it “used to be” that a causal connection between an offender’s mental illness and offending had to be shown, but that the language had been softened in the Ellis decision. Respectfully, I don’t see any softening of that requirement. This is paragraph 116 of Ellis:
The authorities, some of which were referred to by the trial judge, indicate that it is not enough to determine that the offender had a mental illness at the time of the offence. The trial judge must also determine the extent to which that illness contributed to the conduct in question and the impact of that finding on the appropriate sentence. The trial judge will consider whether there a causal connection between the offender's mental illness and the commission of the offence and, if so, whether it diminished the offender's culpability. (Emphasis added)
53In R. v. Batisse 2009 ONCA 114, cited in Ellis, Justice Gillese said this at paragraph 38:
Furthermore, unlike Hill, where mental illness was not a factor, here the appellant's mental health problems played a central role in the commission of the offence. In such circumstances, deterrence and punishment assume less importance. As this court emphasized in R. v. Robinson, 1974 CanLII 1491 (ON CA), [1974] O.J. No. 545, 19 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (C.A.), at p. 197 C.C.C., where offenders commit offences while they are out of touch with reality due to mental illness, specific deterrence is meaningless to them. Further, general deterrence is unlikely to be achieved either since people with mental illnesses that contribute to the commission of a crime will not usually be deterred by the punishment of others. As well, severe punishment is less appropriate in cases of persons with mental illnesses since it would be disproportionate to the degree of responsibility of the offender. In such circumstances, the primary concern in sentencing shifts from deterrence to treatment as that is the best means of ensuring the protection of the public and that the offending conduct is not repeated. This is especially so where a lengthy prison term may be regarded as counterproductive: see, also, R. v. Hiltermann, 1993 CanLII 16387 (AB CA), [1993] A.J. No. 609, 141 A.R. 223 (C.A.), and R. v. Peters, 2000 NFCA 55, [2000] N.J. No. 287, 194 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 184 (C.A.), at paras. 18-19. (Emphasis added)
54The need for a causal connection was recently affirmed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in the case of R. v. Lojovic 2025 ONCA 319, where the Court cited both Ellis and Batisse as correct statements of law.
55What evidence is there, then, of a causal connection between the Offender’s mental illness and his offences?
56In my respectful view, the answer is very little.
57Based on the facts as read in and accepted, these robberies were not carried out by someone in the throes of mental illness who had lost touch with reality. This is not a case of a person randomly attacking others because of hallucinations or delusions only they can perceive. On nine separate occasions, the Offender armed himself with a knife, put on a mask, and entered a convenience store. He threatened harm, sometimes verbally and sometimes through brandishing the knife, to the clerks if they did not comply with his demand for money and cigarettes. I heard no evidence that the Offender was at all incoherent or seemingly divorced from reality during these times. On multiple occasions he also helped himself to beer before leaving. In the PSR he admitted he committed robberies to finance his drug habit. In short, I see almost no connection between the Offender’s mental health diagnosis and his offending. It could be argued that his illness led him to self-medicate, which led to a need to buy street drugs, which led to him committing the robberies. But that chain ignores the conscious, intentional decisions made along the way: he’d been medicated for his illness but chose not to take what was prescribed. Instead, he chose illicit drugs. He committed offences to pay for the path he chose to take.
58I have every sympathy for people suffering from mental illness, including the Offender. I sincerely hope he is successful in addressing his illness and his addiction. But saying his sentence should be reduced because of his mental health is, respectfully, to ignore the facts of this case.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
59An aggravating factor in this case is the number of robberies committed. Multiple Circle K stores were targeted along with one Petro-Canada station. On each occasion, the Offender confronted no more than two clerks. Convenience store clerks are vulnerable victims who deserve protection (see: R. v. Macri 2012 SKPC 94, R. v. Gokool-Clark 2024 ONSC 5927).
60In the case of R. v. Foster 2023 ONSC 5066, Justice Goldstein sentenced an offender for three convenience store robberies. His Honour imposed an eight-year sentence, though in that case the robberies were violent and led to injury to all clerk victims. Regarding the vulnerability of store clerks, His Honour said this at paragraph 22:
Convenience store clerks often work alone late at night. They are vulnerable and isolated. Robberies of convenience stores shake the safety and security of the community. Everyone must occasionally resort to these stores. In addition to the danger to the store clerks, average citizens are also exposed to danger when these stores are robbed.
61In the present case, eight of the nine robberies were committed late at night. The one that wasn’t was committed when other customers were in the store, further endangering innocent citizens.
62The Offender also has a criminal record that includes four offences of violence: assault, two convictions for assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats. I agree with counsel that there are gaps in his record that show he is capable of being a law-abiding member of society. I must remember, however, that the present offences are not the first time he has been convicted of violence.
63Further, while I do not consider his mental illness to be an aggravating factor, I do consider his decision not to medicate that illness appropriately. That decision led to criminality in the form of several violent offences. Parliament has directed sentencing judges to impose sentences that protect society. That requires an assessment of the level of risk offenders pose. In the present case, the Offender has shown that he presents a significant risk to public safety when he makes the choice to self-medicate.
64In mitigation I have the important factor of the Offender’s guilty pleas. He has taken responsibility for his actions. I accept his remorse as sincere. In submissions in support of the jointly recommended sentence, Crown counsel stated that by resolving these cases, the Offender saved the court system a trial of at least a week’s duration. By doing so he allowed other cases to be tried instead. I agree that by resolving these matters the Offender has freed up resources in the justice system. Since the pandemic, prosecutors have been actively engaged in triaging criminal cases to ensure the most serious matters can be heard on their merits. As a consequence, many cases have been resolved for sentences that might otherwise not have been considered. This is a necessary step as the system deals with its ongoing backlog.
65Surely, though, this is one of the cases that deserves whatever resources it needs. Minor (and sometimes not so minor) thefts and assaults are resolved to free up time to hear serious cases like this one. While the Offender has saved trial time by entering guilty pleas, we must be careful not to overstate the importance of those savings in serious cases. The Crown runs the risk of appearing to resolve cases for expediency if we do.
66The Offender’s family support is also mitigating in the sense that it reduces his likelihood of reoffending. His mother and partner are willing to help him if he is willing to take that help. He has two places he can stay on release from custody. Coupled with his new willingness to take his medication and deal with his addiction, he is well-positioned for success.
Analysis
67I have reviewed the caselaw provided, together with other authorities that came from my own research. I have assessed the aggravating and mitigating factors and considered the individual circumstances of this offender and these offences.
68The joint submission is for a jail sentence of two years less a day minus credit for pre-sentence custody. I may only depart from that joint submission if I find it is contrary to the public interest and would lead a reasonable, well-informed person to conclude the functioning of the justice system had broken down.
69After much consideration, I find the joint submission is unacceptable. It is contrary to the public interest. A reformatory sentence would be wholly inadequate for this offender and these offences. It would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I do not ignore the rehabilitative efforts and intentions of the Offender, but I must emphasize public safety, denunciation, and deterrence. The Offender victimized innocent citizens repeatedly, with a weapon and with his face covered. On nine separate occasions, he made the decision to enter these stores and take what he wanted under threat of violence. He exploited the vulnerability of the clerks and posed a significant risk to the public. His crimes only stopped when police caught up to him, thanks to a fingerprint he’d left behind at one of the stores.
70I have considered whether to give the Offender the chance to withdraw his guilty plea. I will not. Prior to his plea being entered, his counsel was asked if the plea inquiry had been completed. Counsel said it had. There is no evidence to suggest the Offender was under any misapprehension as to the Court’s discretion to depart from whatever sentence recommendations counsel may make. There are no grounds to permit the Offender to withdraw his plea.
71The sentence I impose today must reflect the seriousness of the offences, but it must also balance that concern with the need for rehabilitation. The gaps in the Offender’s record show, as I said, his ability to be a law-abiding citizen. He has the tools he needs to succeed in the future.
72The Offender will be sentenced as follows:
(1) He will be imprisoned for a period of four years minus credit for pre-sentence custody. That credit will reflect 227 actual days enhanced to 341 days. This leaves a further 1,119 days to be served, concurrent on each count.
(2) He will provide a sample of his DNA to the Windsor Police Service for inclusion in the national DNA databank, on or before 31 January 2026. This order will apply only to each count of robbery.
(3) There will be a weapons prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code on each robbery count, for life.
73Victim surcharges on each count will be waived.
74I genuinely hope the Offender is sincere in his desire to overcome his addiction and his mental illness. Let this be the end of a dark chapter, and the start of a new, bright chapter.
Released: 24 December 2025
Signed: Justice S. G. Pratt