ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
PARVDEEP SAHOTA
Before Justice R. Tomovski
Ruling on s. 11(b) Charter Application
Heard on December 2, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on December 16, 2025
Anna Taghavian.................................................................................. counsel for the Crown
Andro Gerges.............................................. counsel for the accused Parvdeep Sahota
Tomovski J.:
I. INTRODUCTION
1The Applicant’s trial is scheduled for the third time on April 21-22, 2026, for what appears to be straightforward intimate partner violence allegations. This date is one month short of six years and, therefore, well beyond the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months.
2The Applicant brings an application pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time has been violated and seeks a stay of proceedings as a remedy. He and the Crown disagree on who is ultimately responsible for the delay in reaching the currently scheduled trial date. The Applicant argues that delayed disclosure by the Crown and the alleged victim’s non-attendance for the second trial caused significant delays that necessitate a stay. Conversely, the Crown argues that the non-attendance was an unforeseen circumstance and the root causes of delay in the case are the pandemic, an adjournment of the first trial at the Applicant’s request and a pervasive indifference to delay throughout the proceedings by the Applicant.
3For my reasons that follow, I dismiss the application. I find that once defence delay is deducted, the net delay is below the presumptive ceiling established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 and accept the Applicant’s concession that, in those circumstances, the Applicant’s case is not a clear case necessitating a subceiling stay. Although I agree with the Applicant that the non-attendance of the alleged victim for the second trial is crown delay, the Applicant is responsible for the bulk of the remaining delay as I will outline below.
II. BACKGROUND
4Mr. Sahota is charged with three assault-related offences against the alleged victim. The incident dates are April 15 and May 7, 2020. Mr. Sahota was arrested on May 12, 2020.
5The Information was sworn on May 8, 2020. The anticipated end of trial is April 22, 2026, the second day of a two-day trial. The overall delay is 2175 days or one month short of 6 years, which is well over the Jordan presumptive ceiling for unreasonable delay of 18 months for a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, when the Crown has elected to proceed summarily, which it has in this case.
6For the sake of analytical clarity, the history of the proceedings can be divided into four phases: the pandemic-related phase, the pre-trial phase, the adjournment of the first trial and the adjournment of the second trial.
a. The Pandemic-related Phase
7Starting with the pandemic-related phase, the applicable period is from the date the Information was sworn, May 8, 2020, to February 5, 2021, the re-opening of the courts following a second pandemic-related shutdown.
8After the alleged victim reported the allegations to police on May 7, 2020, a warrant was obtained, the following day, for Mr. Sahota’s arrest. The Information was sworn the same day. Mr. Sahota was arrested and charged on May 12. He was released on an undertaking with a first court appearance of July 23, 2020.
9On March 17, 2020, court operations were temporarily shut down for the first time because of the COVID-19 pandemic (“pandemic”). The pandemic continued to affect court operations for several years: see R. v. Kirkopoulos, 2024 ONCA 596; R. v. Coates, 2023 ONCA 856; R. v. Agpoon, 2023 ONCA 449; and R. v. L.L., 2023 ONCA 53.
10At the first court appearance of July 23, all cases, including the Applicant’s, were adjourned, with discretionary warrants, because of the ongoing impact of the pandemic. The case was adjourned to October 1.
11At the October 1 court appearance, Mr. Sahota appeared. The Crown advised that disclosure was being vetted. The Crown requested that the Applicant email the Crown’s office to request a copy of disclosure. The case was adjourned to November 12.
12Mr. Sahota emailed the Crown’s office on October 2. The disclosure was shared online via the “Disclosure Hub” on October 4.
13At the November 12 court appearance, Mr. Sahota advised he had not yet received the disclosure (even though there is written confirmation that disclosure had already been shared online on October 4). Mr. Sahota also advised that he had retained a lawyer. The case was adjourned to December 17.
14Like the first court appearance of July 23, the Applicant’s case was, once again, adjourned on December 17, with a discretionary warrant, because of the ongoing impact of the pandemic. The case was adjourned to February 5, 2021, at which time Mr. Sahota advised that he “recently” received disclosure. The case was adjourned to April 15 for Mr. Sahota to review disclosure with his lawyer.
b. The Pre-trial Phase
15Turning to the pre-trial phase, and starting with the April 15 court appearance, despite Mr. Sahota having received disclosure before February 5, his lawyer (hereinafter, “Applicant”) had not obtained a copy of it and, therefore, requested an adjournment to June 10 (four months after disclosure was first provided to Mr. Sahota). The request was to allow for receipt and review of disclosure and to conduct a crown pretrial. The Applicant, however, had not made a written request for disclosure until April 15.
16At the June 10 court appearance, the Applicant requested an adjournment to await receipt of the booking video before conducting a crown pretrial. The Applicant’s written request on April 15, however, was a generic request for disclosure, without any reference to specific items including the booking video (see the June 10, 2021, transcript, pp. 1-3). The Crown maintained that a crown pretrial should be conducted. The presiding judge adjourned the case to August 12 and directed that the Applicant send a written request outlining any specific items of disclosure being sought and conduct an initial crown pretrial even if the booking video is not received by then. The Applicant returned on August 12 without having had a crown pretrial. The case was adjourned, once again, to September 30 for the Applicant to conduct a crown pretrial.
17Like the court appearances of July 23 and December 17, 2020, the Applicant’s case was, once again, adjourned on September 30, 2021, with a discretionary warrant, to October 28 because of the ongoing impact of the pandemic. On that date, agent for the Applicant advised, likely in error, that they were awaiting all disclosure and that they would make a written request to the Crown for a second copy, even though a first copy was provided to Mr. Sahota on October 4, 2020. The case was adjourned, yet again, for the Applicant to conduct a crown pretrial.
18At the next court appearance of December 23, the Applicant advised that a crown pretrial was scheduled for February 7, 2022. The case was adjourned to February 17 to allow for the conduct of the pretrial.
19At the February 17 court appearance, the Applicant advised that the crown pretrial was conducted and he and the Crown agreed that a judicial pretrial was not required (see, however, the December 1, 2022, transcript, in which the Crown says a pretrial was not held on February as there was no answer when the Crown called the Applicant’s phone). The case was adjourned to April 21 for a trial date to be obtained in the interim. The Applicant advised on April 21 that he was still waiting to hear back from the trial coordinator’s office. The case was adjourned to June 18. There is no indication from the Applicant or Crown when the former contacted the trial coordinator’s office to schedule a meeting.
20The Applicant returned on June 16 without having obtained a trial date. Instead, the Applicant advised that he was now pursuing a resolution. The case was adjourned to August 11 with a formal Defence waiver. On August 11, the Applicant advised he scheduled a crown pretrial to obtain a trial estimate instead of pursuing a resolution. The case was adjourned to October 20. On that date, and on December 1, the Applicant had not obtained a trial estimate because a resolution was, once again, being pursued. It was not until December 16, that the Applicant advised he scheduled a crown pretrial to obtain a trial estimate. The Applicant confirmed the Defence’s ongoing waiver. The case was adjourned to January 11, 2023. A trial estimate was obtained in the interim. On January 11, the case was adjourned to March 15 to confirm the trial date. The trial date was obtained in the interim from the trial coordinator.
21At the January 25, 2023, trial scheduling meeting, a two-day trial was obtained for April 10-11, 2024. The trial scheduling form shows the court offered 12 earlier dates for a two-day trial commencing February 8-9, 2023 – all of which the Applicant was unavailable. Of those dates, the Crown was available for 9 of them, starting with March 21-22 and 23-24, 2023.
22As part of the court’s effort to reduce the backlog of cases in the region at that time, the Applicant’s case was one of many cases brought forward from their respective trial dates to offer earlier trial dates. This court appearance occurred on October 5, 2023. The court offered earlier dates for a two-day trial commencing in November 2023 and every month thereafter including April 2024 – all of which, once again, the Applicant was unavailable. Of those dates, the Crown was available for all dates except November 2023. The existing trial date of April 10-11, 2024 was maintained.
c. The Adjournment of the First Trial
23Turning now to the adjournment of the first trial.
24On April 5, 2024, the Applicant brought the case forward to seek an adjournment of the April 10-11 trial date. No reasons were noted on the record. The Applicant made a formal waiver. The adjournment was granted. The case was adjourned to April 19 to confirm the new trial date.
25A trial scheduling meeting was held on April 11 to obtain a new trial date. A trial date of June 18-19, 2025, was obtained. No interim dates were noted on the trial scheduling form, likely, because the Applicant had provided a formal waiver to secure an adjournment of the first trial. At the April 19 court appearance, the Applicant confirmed the ongoing waiver to the second trial.
d. The Adjournment of the Second Trial
26Turning now to the adjournment of the second trial.
27On the first day of trial, on June 18, 2025, the Crown sought a material witness warrant and an adjournment of the trial because of the non-attendance of the alleged victim. The request for an adjournment was opposed by the Applicant. The presiding judge granted both Crown applications. Neither the Applicant nor the Crown provided a copy of the transcript of these applications. The case was adjourned to June 19 then July 21 to obtain a new trial date in the interim.
28This second trial was unable to proceed before the presiding judge, who was seized with a two-day in-custody trial, which had priority over the Applicant’s (see the June 18, 2025, transcript, pp. 2). There was no indication that another judge was available to hear the Applicant’s trial.
29At the July 8 trial scheduling meeting, a two-day trial was secured for April 21-22, 2026. The trial scheduling form shows the court offered 5 earlier dates for a two-day trial commencing July 2025 – all of which the Applicant was unavailable. Of those dates, the Crown was available starting January 27-28, 2026.
30At that same meeting, a date was obtained for this application for December 2, 2025. The application proceeded before me as scheduled. I reserved my reasons to December 16, 2025.
III. ANALYSIS
a. The Jordan Framework
31The Supreme Court in Jordan outlined the framework by which delay is to be assessed under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The framework as it applies to the Ontario Court of Justice is summarized as follows.
32There is a presumptive ceiling of 18 months: Jordan at paras. 5, 46, 49, and 105. Delay above that mark is presumptively unreasonable, whereas delay below it is presumptively reasonable: Jordan at paras. 47-48, 68, 82 and 105.
33Delay is considered and calculated in different ways at various stages of the framework. At the outset, the total delay must be calculated. This period is calculated from the date of the charge to the end of the trial: Jordan at para. 60. The former equates with the date the Information is sworn: see R. v. Allison, 2022 ONCA 329 at paras. 35-43; R. v. Kalanj, 1989 CanLII 63 (SCC).
34Defence delay is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at paras. 49, 60, and 66.
35Defence delay can result from an explicit or implicit waiver or delay caused solely or directly by the defence’s conduct: Jordan at paras. 61, 63 and 66. An example of the latter is when the Crown and court are ready to proceed but the defence is not: Jordan at para. 64. However, legitimate defence conduct is not defence delay: Jordan at para. 65.
36When the delay is above the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to establish the presence of exceptional circumstances that justify the delay: Jordan at paras. 47, 68, 81 and 105. Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the ensuing delay emanating from those circumstances cannot reasonably be remedied by the Crown: Jordan at para. 69. The Crown must show that it took reasonable steps to avoid the delay before the presumptive ceiling was surpassed: Jordan at para. 70. Those steps need not be successful in preventing the delay: Jordan at para. 70.
37Generally, exceptional circumstances fall into two groups: discrete events or particularly complex cases: Jordan at para. 71. The former includes medical emergencies or unexpected illnesses, whereas the latter includes cases with novel or complicated legal issues, voluminous disclosure or many witnesses requiring a lengthy trial: Jordan at paras. 77-78.
38Like defence delay, delay caused by exceptional circumstances is subtracted from the total delay: Jordan at para. 75.
39When the delay is below the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Applicant to show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable by establishing that it “took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings” and the case took “markedly longer than it reasonably should have”: Jordan at paras. 48, 82 and 105.
40Meaningful and sustained steps include seeking and setting the earliest available trial dates and giving notice when delay is becoming a problem: Jordan at para. 85.
41Whether a case took markedly longer considers multiple factors including the case’s complexity, local considerations, and whether the Crown took reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings: Jordan at para. 87.
42Stays beneath the presumptive ceiling will be granted only in clear cases: Jordan at para. 83.
b. Jordan Applied
i. Defence Delay
43The total delay in the Applicant’s case is from May 8, 2020 (the date the Information was sworn) to April 22, 2026 (the anticipated end of trial). The total delay is 2175 days.
44There are several periods of defence delay that are to be deducted from the total delay. I will begin with formal waivers, of which there are two.
45The first waiver is from June 16, 2022, to January 25, 2023, a period of 223 days. This period starts with when the Applicant sought an adjournment of the case in order to obtain a trial estimate and (first) trial date but returned on multiple court appearances having failed to do so and ends with when the trial scheduling meeting was held.
46The second waiver is from April 10, 2024, to June 18, 2025, a period of 434 days. This period starts with the first day of the first trial, which was adjourned at the Applicant’s request, and ends with the start of the second trial.
47Subtracting 223 and 434 days from the total delay of 2175 days leaves a net delay of 1518 days.
48I turn now to non-waived periods of defence delay.
49The first period of delay is from November 12 to December 17, 2020, a period of 35 days. The case was adjourned from October 2 to November 12 for the Applicant to receive and review disclosure. The Crown shared disclosure with the Applicant online on October 4, 2020, but the Applicant returned on November 12 having failed to download and review the disclosure.
50The case was adjourned in the Applicant’s absence on December 17, because of the pandemic-caused court closure to February 5, 2021. I use December 17 as the end point of this first period of defence delay, as I will address the period from December 17, 2020, to February 5, 2021, when specifically addressing the pandemic’s impact on the assessment of delay.
51The second period of delay is from February 5 to September 30, 2021, a period of 237 days. This period starts with when court operations resumed and ends with when they were, once again, temporarily, suspended. Between these two dates, the Applicant attended court on February 5, April 13, June 10 and August 12, each time seeking a further adjournment because of a failure to conduct a crown pretrial and set a trial date. I find the Applicant’s insistence on receiving the booking video before conducting a crown pretrial in the circumstances of this case was unreasonable and contributed to the ongoing delay. Core disclosure in this case, the alleged victim’s statement, had already been disclosed and was sufficient to allow for a meaningful crown pretrial. The booking video was not part of core disclosure.
52The case was adjourned, once again, in the Applicant’s absence on September 30 because of the pandemic-caused court closure to October 28, 2021. I use September 30 as the end point of this second period of defence delay, as I will also address the period from September 30 to October 28, 2021, when specifically addressing the pandemic’s impact on the assessment of delay.
53The third period of delay is from October 28, 2021, to January 25, 2023, a period of 455 days. However, this period includes the first waiver, referenced above, from June 16, 2022, to January 25, 2023, a period of 223 days (to avoid double-counting, I subtract 223 from 455 for a remainder of 232 days). This period starts with when court operations resumed and ends with when the Applicant obtained a first trial date from the trial coordinator. Between these two dates, the Applicant attended court on October 28, December 23, 2021, February 17, April 11, June 16, August 11, October 20, December 1, 12, 16, 2022, and January 11, 2023, once again, each time seeking a further adjournment because of a failure to conduct a crown pretrial and set a trial date. Further, I find the Applicant wavering between setting a trial date and seeking a resolution also contributed to the ongoing delay.
54The fourth period of delay is from March 22, 2023, to April 10, 2024, a period of 385 days. This period is in reference to the meeting held with the trial coordinator on January 23, 2023, to schedule the first trial. Of the dates offered, March 21-22, 2023, was the first date that the court and Crown were ready to proceed but the Applicant was not. The latter was not available until April 10-11, 2024, the dates chosen for trial. The Applicant, in his factum at p. 5, concedes this period as defence delay. Further, the Applicant was still unavailable for all earlier trial dates offered during the backlog initiative court appearance on October 5, 2023.
55The fifth period of delay is from January 28 to April 22, 2026, a period of 83 days. This period is in reference to the meeting held with the trial coordinator on July 8, 2024, to schedule the current trial. Of the dates offered, January 27-28, 2026, was the first date that the court and Crown were ready to proceed but the Applicant was not. The latter was not available until April 21-22, 2026, the dates chosen for trial.
56Subtracting 35, 237, 232, 385 and 83 days from the net delay of 1518 days leaves a net delay of 546 days or 17.9 months: see R. v. Shaikh, 2019 ONCA 895 at footnote 2 for the conversion of actual days to months.
57The Applicant indicated in oral submissions that, if the net delay is below the presumptive ceiling, he conceded that a subceiling stay is not justified in the circumstances of the Applicant’s case. I accept that concession. However, even without the concession, I would have concluded that the Applicant’s case is not a clear case warranting a subceiling stay based on the history of the proceedings, as outlined above, including that the Applicant failed to take meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings and did not accept earlier trial dates on three separate occasions.
ii. Pandemic-related Delay
58Despite the Applicant not seeking to justify a subceiling stay, I will briefly address the delay caused by the pandemic.
59I find a deduction attributable to the impact of the pandemic would have been warranted in the Applicant’s case as a discrete exceptional circumstance. The Applicant was charged less than two months after the court first suspended its operations because of the pandemic. At least two temporary shutdowns occurred during the proceedings: December 17, 2020, to February 5, 2021, and September 30 to October 28, 2021. Approximately one-third of the proceedings occurred during the pandemic.
60Appellate courts have recognized the pandemic as a discrete exceptional circumstance: see, for example, R. v. K.D., 2025 ONCA 639 at para. 50; and Agpoon, supra at paras. 4, 33. Further, the pandemic caused systemic disruptions to the court’s operations including a backlog of cases already in the criminal justice system.
61In attributing pandemic-related delay, appellate courts have endorsed both a general deduction and one tethered to a specific time period: K.D., supra at paras. 62-63. General deductions for pandemic-related delay have been given in the following cases: R. v. Soni, 2024 ONCJ 389 at para. 13; R. v. Gutnik, 2023 ONCJ 274 at para. 17; and R. v. A.N., 2025 ONCA 300 at paras. 5, 9. General deductions may be informed by a judge’s knowledge of their local conditions: see R. v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151 at para. 66; R. v. Jones, 2025 ONCA 103 at para. 56; Coates, supra at para. 6; and Agpoon, supra at para. 26.
62Local conditions have been considered in attributing pandemic-related delay in the following Peel region cases: see, for example, R. v. Al-Ramahi & Paul, 2023 ONSC 7281 at para. 97; R. v. M.W., 2023 ONCJ 581 at para. 17; R. v. Toor, 2022 ONCJ 8 at paras. 25-26; and R. v. Lokubalasuriya, 2024 ONCJ 46 at para. 10.
63Although I would have made a general deduction based on pandemic-related delay (relying on cases like Soni, supra), I decline to identify a specific quantum and deduct it from the net delay in the circumstances as it is unnecessary for the disposition of this application.
iii. Crown Delay
64There is one final period of delay raised by the parties that I will address. It relates to the delay caused by the non-attendance of the alleged victim for the second trial. I do not accept the Crown submission that the non-attendance was “unforeseen” or if it was that it should be treated as a discrete exceptional circumstance.
65The cases provided by the Crown to support its submission are distinguishable from the facts of the Applicant’s case. In Justice Monahan’s decision of R. v. Tomlinson, an unreported decision of the Ontario Court of Justice dated May 9, 2025, the delay caused by the alleged victim’s non-attendance at trial was found to be a discrete exceptional circumstance. However, the finding was based on evidence tendered by the Crown through viva voce and affidavit evidence on both the application to adjourn the trial and the s. 11(b) Charter application that the alleged victim was ill and hospitalized on the trial date: see paras. 20-29. Similarly, in Justice Agarwal’s decision of R. v. Fredrique, an unreported decision of the Superior Court of Justice dated October 21, 2025, the delay caused by the alleged victim’s non-attendance at trial was also found to be a discrete exceptional circumstance. Like Tomlinson, the Crown presented evidence on the adjournment application that the alleged victim was admitted into a detox facility and unable to attend court, including the trial, for approximately 30 days: paras. 30-34.
66Unlike Tomlinson and Fredrique, the application record placed before me by the Applicant and the Crown is silent on the reason for the alleged victim’s non-attendance. Speculation is impermissible. The Crown, like the Applicant, could have but chose not to obtain a copy of the transcript of the appearance before the judge who granted the trial adjournment and issued the material witness warrant. I cannot speculate why those orders were granted. Further, the Crown could have but chose not to provide on this application, for example, an affidavit explaining the alleged victim’s non-attendance.
67I do not accept that the unexplained non-attendance of a witness for trial, without more to explain the non-attendance, automatically qualifies as an exceptional circumstance. Such a categorical approach is inconsistent with an assessment of exceptional circumstances, which depends on a trial judge’s good sense and experience: Jordan at para. 71. Each circumstance of non-attendance, in my view, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
68Alternatively, even if I am in error in finding that the non-attendance of a witness, without more, is not a discrete exceptional circumstance, I would have found that the delay resulting from the adjournment of the second trial was non-defence delay and should not be deducted from the net delay. The reason is that the Applicant’s trial could not have proceeded because another trial was given priority over the Applicant’s and there is no evidence that there was an offer of assistance from another judge to hear the Applicant’s trial regardless of whether the alleged victim was present.
IV. CONCLUSION
69Even without attributing any pandemic-related delay, the net delay of 17.9 months is below the Jordan presumptive ceiling. The Applicant did not seek a subceiling stay. Accordingly, the Applicant has failed to rebut the presumption and show that the delay is otherwise unreasonable.
70The application is dismissed.
Released: December 16, 2025
Signed: Justice Tomovski