ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
NEWMARKET
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ZOLTAN MOOTOO
RULING ON APPLICATION FOR DISMISSAL
Submissions Heard: September 25, 2025.
Delivered: September 25, 2025
Mr. Avik Ghosh counsel for the Federal Crown
Mr. David Campos counsel for the defendant
KENKEL J.:
Introduction
1Mr. Mootoo was arrested in a residence, steps away from a large-scale drug laboratory. The commercial pill press was in operation producing pills when the police arrived. The officers confirmed that nobody else was in the residence.
2Mr. Mootoo is charged with:
1 – Possession of a pill press s 7.1 CDSA
2 – FTC with probation – keep the peace s 733.1(1)
3 – FTC probation – reside condition s 733.1(1)
4 – Careless storage of ammunition s 86(1)
5 – Produce Metonitazine s 7(1) CDSA
6 – Possess Metonitazine FTP of Trafficking s 5(2) CDSA
7 – Possess Bromazolam FTP s 5(2) CDSA
8 – Possess Methylenedioxymethamphetamine FTP s 5(2) CDSA
3The defendant applies at the close of the Crown’s case for a directed verdict of not guilty on all counts. The defence submits that there is no evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could convict on any charge.
4The Crown submits that it’s important to keep in mind the limit to the analysis at this stage. On the evidence heard, a trier of fact engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine reasonable inferences could reasonably infer guilt on each count.
5The test at this stage is whether the Crown has shown that there is sufficient evidence upon which a reasonably instructed trier of fact could find guilt on each count – R v Sheppard, 1976 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1976] SCJ No 106. Sufficient evidence in this context is evidence that could reasonably lead to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – R v Charemski, 1998 CanLII 819 (SCC), [1998] SCJ No 23. Where a case is based on circumstantial evidence, the court must engage in a limited weighing of the evidence to determine whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the inferences suggested by the Crown – R v Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54. This test is applied to the cumulative effect of the evidence as a whole.
The CDSA Charges
6The defence submits that the evidence at its highest establishes only that Mr. Mootoo was an occupant of the residence. Mr. Mootoo made no statement or admission that he knew of the drug lab. There was a tarp that covered the upper part of the doorway leading to that room. A trier of fact could not reasonably infer that Mr. Mootoo knew of the drug lab and was in control of that lab simply because he was the only person in the residence when it was in operation.
7The defence has referred to numerous cases, but they place particular emphasis on the decision in R v Turner, 2012 ONCA 570 as having a strong factual similarity to this case. In Turner, the accused was found at the doorway of a room. His driver’s license was on the floor of that room. There was no evidence that it was his bedroom or that he knew of the gun that was concealed in the closet under folded clothing. In that closet the police found passports belonging to two other people, both of whom denied knowledge of the gun. The defence submits that Turner and similar cases cited show that mere presence in a residence is insufficient to establish knowledge and control of hidden contents as a matter of law.
8I agree with the defendant/applicant that there is no “presumption of possession” that arises simply from occupation of a residence – R v Choudhury, 2021 ONCA 560 at para 19. However, all of these cases involve circumstantial evidence. In that context the particular circumstances are important:
This was not a simple residence as in the Turner case where an illegal item was found concealed in one room. This was a residence that contained a large-scale drug production lab. The total value of drugs seized was $2,577,000.
The lab was in operation and the machinery was producing pills when the officers arrived. The machinery made an audible noise. The accused was the only person in the residence at the time the machine was in operation.
Only the top portion of the production room was covered with a tarp taped to the doorway.
Beyond the drug lab room, there was black clothing dirty with powder along with a mask on the floor in the laundry room.
There were materials and equipment for drug production stored throughout the main floor, not just in the tarp room.
P.C. Barak testified that the accused walked out of the garage into the hallway when they arrived. The garage contained large commercial white buckets for liquid sugar, glycerin, black bottles used in the lab for illicit codeine and drug production equipment in boxes.
9There are other circumstances cited by the defence that might point to the involvement of others in the enterprise, but at this stage the court’s task is not to determine the best inference, or whether other inferences might be available, but rather to determine on a limited weighing whether there is sufficient evidence as discussed above upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably find guilt on each of the counts alleged.
10A commercial pill press does not fill itself with controlled substances and it cannot turn itself on. Considering all of the circumstances, I find a trier of fact could reasonably infer that entrance to a working commercial level drug lab with over $2.5 million dollars worth of drugs would likely be restricted to those involved in the operation or those permitted by the operators. The fact that the pill press had been filled and was in operation at the time when Mr. Mootoo was the only person in the residence is strong circumstantial evidence from which a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably infer that he was a direct participant in the drug production operation.
The FTC Charges
11It was agreed that Mr. Mootoo was subject to a probation that included the two conditions referred to in counts 2 and 3 at the time he was found in the residence.
12The finding with respect to the CDSA charges would provide a trier of fact with sufficient evidence to convict on count 2 alleging a breach of the term to “keep the peace”.
13This was not just a drug lab. The evidence shows the house was lived in. The master bedroom had bedding that had been used. The bathrooms contained personal items and towels. There was food about the house and food in the refrigerator.
14Mr. Mootoo was found in the house at 9:30 p.m., a time that people are typically at their residence if they are not at work or attending a social event. More importantly, there were many items found in the house bearing Mr. Mootoo’s name including – a Capital One Visa card, a puffer/inhaler, OCJ court documents, parts invoice from BMW, Toronto parking overdue notice, a fixed camera speed offence notice, a red light camera notice, an MOT letter regarding license suspension, and an Undertaking release from Halton.
15I find that the Crown has shown there is sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably infer that Mr. Mootoo was residing at the Markham location on the date he was arrested there, contrary to a term of his probation.
Conclusion
16The application is dismissed.
Delivered: September 25, 2025.
Justice Joseph F. Kenkel