Mississauga (City) v. Ananevych, 2025 ONCJ 640

minicounsel

Footnotes

R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.
ICON is the database used by the Ontario Court of Justice.
“Offence Number” refers to the complete identifier (e.g., “2360-997-23-10460484-00”), which includes a four-digit ICON/court location code (e.g., “2360” for the City of London), a three-digit classification code (e.g., “997” for a red light camera matter), a two-digit year code (e.g., “23” for 2023), an eight-digit code further specifying the matter (e.g., “10460484”), and a two-digit code specifying co-accused status (e.g., “00”).
R. v. Larizza, [2006] O.J. No. 5335 (C.J.), at para. 6; R. v. Preston Sand & Gravel Co., [2009] O.J. No. 6399 (C.J.), at para. 6.
R. v. Davis, 2017 ONCA 45, at para. 49.
London (City) v. Young, 2008 ONCA 429, at para. 85, per Doherty J.A. (dissenting).
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 3(2); Young, supra, at para. 9.
Stewart and Moffatt on Provincial Offences Procedure in Ontario, 4th Edition (Saltspring Island: Earlscourt, 2020) at p. 2.
Young, supra, at para. 9.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 19.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 21.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 20.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 18.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 25.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 24.
See, by analogy, R. v. Haevischer, 2023 SCC 11, at paras. 60, 66-73.
Young, supra, at para. 17-20. The dissenting judge explicitly agreed with the majority’s reasoning on this point.
As amended by 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s.1; 2020, c. 36, Sched. 39, s. 1.
Unless the defendant had reached an agreement with a prosecutor but did not appear at a sentencing hearing: POA, s. 9(1)(c). In those circumstances, the justice shall examine the Certificate of Offence to determine whether it is “defective, as determined by the regulations”, or “otherwise not complete and regular on its face”: POA, s. 9(5).
POA, s. 9(2).
e.g., the in-court default proceedings under s. 9.1 of the POA.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 200, as amended.
Young, supra, at para. 23.
Davis, supra. The Court of Appeal contemplated that the defendant would have an appellate remedy, through the combined operation of ss. 135 and 136 of the POA, if the resulting variance between the Offence Notice and the Certificate of Offence misled or prejudiced them (paras. 52-53).
POA, s. 9(4).
R. v. Khoshael, [2001] O.J. No. 2110 (C.J.), at para. 8.
Durham (Regional Municipality) v. Souvannarath, 2019 ONCJ 177, at paras. 12-14, explaining Young, supra, at para. 6 and Chow v. York (Regional Municipality), 2018 ONCJ 818.
Souvannarath, supra, at para. 18, cited with approval in R. v. Dimilta, 2025 ONCJ 57, at para. 15.
Young, supra, at para. 33.
Chow, supra, at paras. 8-10; see also R. v. Gainda, 2018 ONCJ 792, at paras. 11-20.
See, for example, the different approaches in Young, supra. Justice Feldman (Armstrong J.A. concurring) focused on whether the defendant had received effective notice of all the information needed to decide whether to default (para. 29, 33-34), whereas Doherty J.A. (dissenting) would have limited a remedy to defendants who had been materially misled by the incorrect information (paras. 82-85); see also Chow, supra, at paras. 7, 9 and 12; Souvannarath, supra, at para. 14; Dimilta, supra, at paras. 13-14, 25.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 22.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 23.
Souvannarath, supra, at para. 24, distinguishing Thunder Bay (City) v. Matzov, 2016 ONSC 4557.
See POA, sections 29(1) and (2), which do not apply to default proceedings: Souvannarath, supra, at para. 31.
Souvannarath, supra, at para. 11.
Young, supra, at para. 34.
See, for example, Souvannarath, supra, at para. 33.

CITATION: Mississauga (City) v. Ananevych, 2025 ONCJ 640

DATE: 2025 09 05

COURT FILE No.: 997-23-10380663-00

997-23-10460484-00

997-23-10450457-00

997-23-10120771-00

IN THE MATTER OF an appeal under s. 135(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended;

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING EX. REL. THE CITY OF MISSISSAUGA

Respondent

— AND —

YULIA ANANEVYCH, EDITH EBEYE, RICK LU AND JOHN PANESSO

Appellants

Before Justice M.C.T. Lai

Heard on April 17, 2025

Reasons for Judgment released on September 5, 2025

Dwayne Burgess for the prosecution

Danny Freitas for the appellants

On appeal from the convictions entered by court administration on January 30, 2024.

LAI J.:

A. OVERVIEW

1Yulia Ananevych, Edith Ebeye, Rick Lu and John Panesso appeal their convictions for Fail to Stop – Red Light, contrary to s. 144(18.1) of the Highway Traffic Act (“HTA”).¹ Each appellant was charged as the owner of the vehicle, and on the basis of evidence obtained through a red light camera system. Each appellant was charged under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act (“POA”) and properly served with an Offence Notice.

2The appeals were jointly argued because they raise the same issues about the power of court administration to amend the location code on each of the appellants’ Certificate of Offence during the in-office default procedure, and the impact of the incorrect location code on the completeness and regularity of those Certificates.

3In short, each of the appellants’ Offence Notice and Certificate of Offence identified a red light in the City of Mississauga, but bore an ICON² location code of 2360, which represents that the City of London was the issuing organization. Without notifying the appellants, court administration changed the location code to 3161, which represents that the City of Mississauga was the issuing organization, in order to match the jurisdiction of the alleged offence. The online payment system used by both the City of London and the City of Mississauga requires a defendant to enter the location code in order to locate and pay their ticket. If searching by Offence Number,³ ICON requires a user to enter the location code in order to view details about a matter.

4The appellants did not respond to the Offence Notices. In each matter, the clerk of the court initiated in-office default proceedings, entered a conviction, and imposed the set fine and associated surcharges.

5For the following reasons, I allow the appellants’ appeal against conviction. To be clear, not every typographical error in an Offence Number will warrant quashing a Certificate of Offence. That approach would be contrary to the “overall philosophy of the Provincial Offences Act”, which is “to ensure that technical objections do not impede the arrival of a verdict on the merits”.⁴ Proceedings should not be invalidated because of technical objections or irregularities that could not prejudice a defendant.⁵ The administration of justice should be more concerned with the merits of the allegations and the fairness of the process than an officer’s ability to correctly fill in boxes on a form.⁶

6However, in all the accepted factual circumstances about the role of the location code in the online ticket payment system and in the use of ICON, the incorrect location code rendered each Certificate of Offence not “complete and regular on its face”. The appropriate remedy is to quash each of the Certificates of Offence.

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(i) The legislative scheme

7The appellants were charged pursuant to sections 144(18)-(18.1) and 207(1) of the HTA, excerpted below:

Red light

(18) Every driver approaching a traffic control signal showing a circular red indication and facing the indication shall stop his or her vehicle and shall not proceed until a green indication is shown.

Certificate of offence — owner — red light camera evidence

(18.1) A person who issues a certificate of offence and offence notice under subsection 3 (2) of the Provincial Offences Act for a contravention of subsection (18) shall, despite that Act and the regulations under that Act, specify this subsection, instead of subsection (18), as the provision that was contravened, if,

(a) the person who issues the certificate of offence and offence notice believes that the offence was committed on the basis of evidence obtained through the use of a red light camera system; and

(b) the defendant is being charged as the owner of the vehicle.

Vehicle owner may be convicted

(1) Subject to subsection (2), the owner of a vehicle may be charged with and convicted of an offence under this Act or the regulations or any municipal by-law regulating traffic for which the driver of the vehicle is subject to be charged unless, at the time of the offence, the vehicle was in the possession of some person other than the owner without the owner’s consent and on conviction the owner is liable to the penalty prescribed for the offence.

8Part I of the POA contains a stream-lined procedure for less serious offences. It provides for the issuance of a Certificate of Offence, and either an Offence Notice or a Summons.⁷ The charging procedure is a two-step process. First, the defendant is served. Second, the proceedings must commence.⁸

9Only a provincial offences officer or police officer (“an officer”) may commence Part I proceedings. Section 3(1) of the POA provides that an officer may commence proceedings by filing a Certificate of Offence in the office of the court. Section 4 of the POA requires a Certificate of Offence to be filed in the office of the court “as soon as practicable, but no later than seven days after service of the offence notice”. Section 76.1 of the POA permits electronic filing under certain conditions:

Electronic court documents

76.1 (1) A document that is required or authorized to be filed, given or delivered to a court office or the clerk of the court under this Act or the rules of court may, in accordance with the regulations, be filed, given or delivered electronically.

Electronic signature

(2) An electronic document that is filed, given or delivered to a court office or the clerk of the court may be signed electronically in accordance with the regulations.

Electronic copy of paper original

(3) When a document is filed, given or delivered to a court office or the clerk of the court in paper form, the court may create and retain an electronic copy instead of the paper original.

Duty to ensure integrity

(4) A person who creates, retains or reproduces an electronic copy of a paper original for the purposes of subsection (3) shall ensure the integrity of the information contained in the electronic copy.

Power to deal with electronic documents

(5) Anything that the court is required or authorized to do with respect to a document may be done with respect to an electronic document.

10 Section 3(1) of O. Reg. 67/12 (“Electronic Documents and Remote Meetings”) supplements those conditions. The salient portions are reproduced below:

Electronic filing

(1) For the purposes of subsection 76.1 (1) of the Act, a document may be filed with a court office by direct electronic transmission if,

(iv) for a document relating to a proceeding commenced under Part I or II of the Act,

(A) if a court file number has not been assigned, the offence number and court location code, or

(B) if a court file number has been assigned, either the court file number or the offence number and court location code,

11Where the officer issues an Offence Notice, the defendant has several out-of-court options. One such option is to default.⁹

12 Section 8 of the POA provides that a defendant who does not wish to dispute the charge may, “in the manner indicated on the offence notice”, pay the set fine and applicable costs and surcharges. Doing so constitutes a plea of guilt, a conviction, and the imposition of the set fine.

13Under s. 9(1)(a) of the POA, a defendant is deemed to not wish to dispute the charge if:

at least 15 days have elapsed after the defendant was served with the offence notice and the defendant did not give notice of intention to appear under section 5, did not request a meeting with the prosecutor in accordance with section 5.1 and did not plead guilty under section 7 or 8.

14 Section 9(2) of the POA requires the clerk of the court to examine the Certificate of Offence whenever a defendant is deemed to not wish to dispute the charge:

(2) If a defendant is deemed to not wish to dispute the charge in accordance with clause (1) (a) or (b), the clerk of the court shall examine the certificate of offence and,

(a) if it is not defective, as determined by the regulations, enter a conviction in the defendant’s absence and without a hearing and impose the set fine for the offence; or

(b) if it is defective, as determined by the regulations, quash the proceeding.

15 Section 1 of O. Reg. 472/21 (“Defective Certificate of Offence”) sets out the circumstances under which a Certificate of Offence is defective for the purposes of s. 9(2) of the POA. The salient portions read as follows:

For the purposes of subsections 9 (2) and (5) of the Act, a certificate of offence is defective if,

(b) the certificate of offence was not filed in accordance with section 4 of the Act; or

(iv) the location, including the municipality, where the offence is alleged to have occurred,…

16 Section 9(3) of the POA provides that a defendant convicted by the clerk of the court under s. 9(2) of the POA can, within 15 days after becoming aware of the conviction, apply to a justice to strike out the conviction. Section 9(4) of the POA sets out the test that the justice hearing the application has to apply: “the justice shall strike out the conviction if satisfied that the certificate of offence is defective, as determined by the regulations, or is otherwise not complete and regular on its face”.

(ii) Yulia Ananevych

17Ms. Ananevych was convicted pursuant to s. 9(1) of the POA on January 30, 2024. Ms. Ananevych swore an affidavit dated February 28, 2025, attesting as follows:¹⁰

I received a red light camera ticket in the mail under my name.

The ticket number was 2360-997-23-10380663-00.

The ticket did not exist in the court system or any court data base and I could not elect an option.

Months later I received a conviction notice in the mail with a different ticket number 3161-997-23-10380663-00

It was discovered that court administration changed the ticket number with no notification to me.

I was precluded from the proceedings.

18The Certificate of Offence bears Offence Number 2360-997-23-10380663-00 and ICON Location Code 2360. It reveals the following information:

A provincial offences officer, Juan Carlos De Los Rios (Officer No. 44), completed and signed a Certificate of Offence, in the prescribed form, certifying that:

o an offence under ss. 144(18.1) and 207 of the HTA had been committed;

o the date of the alleged offence was August 19, 2023;

o the red light camera system was a ROBOT TraffiStar SR 520-ONT;

o a vehicle with Ontario number plate CZAN461 approached the red light at 60 km/h and failed to stop;

o the red light was at Derry Rd. W. and Shelter Bay Rd. / Copenhagen Rd. in the City of Mississauga;

o he sent Offence Notice 2360-997-23-10380663-00 to Ms. Ananevych on August 29, 2023; and

o the set fine was $260 and the total payable was $325.

The Certificate of Offence was filed on September 12, 2023.

19An ICON print-out reveals the following additional information:

The Certificate of Offence was entered into ICON as 3161-997-23-10380663-00. It is not clear if it was initially entered into ICON with the amended location number or if the amendment was made at a later time.
The matter was put on a docket on October 19, 2023 as Ms. Ananevych did not respond.

20Ms. Ananevych filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2024.

(iii) Edith Ebeye

21Ms. Ebeye was convicted pursuant to s. 9(1) of the POA on January 30, 2024. Ms. Ebeye swore an affidavit dated November 15, 2024, attesting as follows:¹¹

I received a red light camera ticket in the mail under my name.

The ticket number was 2360-997-23-10460484-00

The ticket did not exist in the court system or any court data base and I could not elect an option.

Months later I received a conviction notice in the mail with a different ticket number 3161-997-23-10460484-00

It was discovered that court administration changed the ticket number with no notification to me.

I was precluded from the proceedings.

22The Certificate of Offence bears Offence Number 2360-997-23-10460484-00 and ICON Location Code 2360. It reveals the following information:

A provincial offences officer, Juan Carlos De Los Rios (Officer No. 44), completed and signed a Certificate of Offence, in the prescribed form, certifying that:

o an offence under ss. 144(18.1) and 207 of the HTA had been committed;

o the date of the alleged offence was August 17, 2023;

o the red light camera system was a ROBOT TraffiStar SR 520-ONT;

o a vehicle with Ontario number plate BRYE041 approached the red light at 70 km/h and failed to stop;

o the red light was at Queensway E and Camilla Rd. in the City of Mississauga;

o he sent Offence Notice 2360-997-23-10460484-00 to Ms. Ebeye on August 29, 2023; and

o the set fine was $260 and the total payable was $325.

The Certificate of Offence was filed on September 12, 2023.

23An ICON print-out reveals the following additional information:

The Certificate of Offence was entered into ICON as 3161-997-23-10460484-00. It is not clear if it was initially entered into ICON with the amended location number or if the amendment was made at a later time.
The matter was put on a docket on October 19, 2023 as Ms. Ebeye did not respond.

24Ms. Ebeye filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2024.

(iv) Rick Lu

25Mr. Lu was convicted pursuant to s. 9(1) of the POA on January 30, 2024. Mr. Lu swore an affidavit dated November 15, 2024, attesting as follows:¹²

I received a red light camera ticket in the mail under my name.

The ticket number was 2360-997-23-10450457-00

The ticket did not exist in the court system or any court data base and I could not elect an option.

Months later I received a conviction notice in the mail with a different ticket number 3161-997-23-10450457-00

It was discovered that court administration changed the ticket number with no notification to me.

I was precluded from the proceedings.

26The Certificate of Offence bears Offence Number 2360-997-23-10450457-00 and ICON Location Code 2360. It reveals the following information:

A provincial offences officer, Juan Carlos De Los Rios (Officer No. 44), completed and signed a Certificate of Offence, in the prescribed form, certifying that:

o an offence under ss. 144(18.1) and 207 of the HTA had been committed;

o the date of the alleged offence was August 20, 2023;

o the red light camera system was a ROBOT TraffiStar SR 520-ONT;

o a vehicle with Ontario number plate BWWE637 approached the red light at 81 km/h and failed to stop;

o the red light was at Derry Rd. W and Syntex Dr. / Syntex Ct. in the City of Mississauga;

o he sent Offence Notice 2360-997-23-10450457-00 to Mr. Lu on August 29, 2023; and

o the set fine was $260 and the total payable was $325.

The Certificate of Offence was filed on September 12, 2023.

27It is not disputed that the Certificate of Offence was entered into ICON as 3161-997-23-10450457-00. It is not clear if it was initially entered into ICON with the amended location number or if the amendment was made at a later time. At some point, the matter was put on a docket, as Mr. Lu did not respond.

28Mr. Lu filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2024.

(v) John Panesso

29Mr. Panesso was convicted pursuant to s. 9(1) of the POA on January 30, 2024. Mr. Panesso swore an affidavit dated February 28, 2025, attesting as follows:¹³

I received a red light camera ticket in the mail under my name.

The ticket number was 2360-997-23-10120771-00

The ticket did not exist in the court system or any court data base and I could not elect an option.

Months later I received a conviction notice in the mail with a different ticket number 3161-997-23-10120771-00

It was discovered that court administration changed the ticket number with no notification to me.

I was precluded from the proceedings.

30The Certificate of Offence bears Offence Number 2360-997-23-10120771-00 and ICON Location Code 2360. It reveals the following information:

A provincial offences officer, Juan Carlos De Los Rios (Officer No. 44), completed and signed a Certificate of Offence, in the prescribed form, certifying that:

o an offence under ss. 144(18.1) and 207 of the HTA had been committed;

o the date of the alleged offence was August 19, 2023;

o the red light camera system was a ROBOT TraffiStar SR 520-ONT;

o a vehicle with Ontario number plate CWJA656 approached the red light at 55 km/h and failed to stop;

o the red light was at Derry Rd. and Rexwood Rd. in the City of Mississauga;

o he sent Offence Notice 2360-997-23-10120771-00 to Mr. Panesso on August 29, 2023; and

o the set fine was $260 and the total payable was $325.

The Certificate of Offence was filed on September 12, 2023.

31It is not disputed that the Certificate of Offence was entered into ICON as 3161-997-23-10120771-00. It is not clear if it was initially entered into ICON with the amended location number or if the amendment was made at a later time. At some point, the matter was put on a docket, as Mr. Panesso did not respond.

32Mr. Panesso filed a notice of appeal on February 29, 2024.

C. ISSUES ON THE CONVICTION APPEAL

(i) The procedural history of the appeal

33A brief review of the procedural history is necessary to understand the evolution of the evidentiary record and the delay in hearing the appeal.

34This matter first came before me on June 21, 2024. The appellants’ representative was anxious to have the matter argued. I listed the matter to be argued before me on August 20, 2024. I directed the appellants’ material to be filed by July 9, 2024, and the respondent’s material to be filed by August 6, 2024.

35On August 20, 2024, early in the appellants’ oral submissions, it became clear that the appellants’ argument relied on factual assertions not in the evidentiary record. After a colloquy with the parties, the appellants sought an adjournment to adduce evidence on those points. The respondent was opposed.

36I granted the appellants’ adjournment request. I directed the appellants to serve and file their proposed fresh evidence (in affidavit form) and any amended factum by September 6, 2024. I adjourned the matter to be spoken to on September 20, 2024, for the respondent to confirm whether they would seek to cross-examine on the proposed fresh evidence, file responding evidence, or file an amended factum. If so, the presiding jurist could set whatever timelines they felt appropriate or, in the alternative, have the matter return to be spoken to before me.

37On September 20, 2024, my colleague adjourned the matter to October 18, 2024, because the appellants’ representative had not filed their materials. On October 18, 2024, my colleague adjourned the matter to November 15, 2024, with the expectation that the parties would fix a date for argument before me. On November 15, 2024, the matter was adjourned to January 30, 2025, to be argued.

38On January 30, 2025, the appellants’ representative sought an adjournment. He had been unable to comply with the above timelines based on personal circumstances outside of his control. The respondent asked that the appeal be dismissed as abandoned. I dismissed the respondent’s request but imposed the following deadlines:

The appellants must serve and file their proposed fresh evidence (in affidavit form) by Friday, February 28, 2025, at 5 p.m.
The appellants must serve and file their amended factum(s) by Friday, March 14, 2025, at 5 p.m.
The appeal will be spoken to before me on April 4, 2025 in Courtroom 409 at 10 a.m. to confirm readiness.
The appeal will be argued on Thursday, April 17, 2025, in Courtroom 105, at 9 a.m. This date is peremptory on the appellants.

39I also directed that there would be no modifications to these deadlines or further adjournments of the appeal hearing without my approval.

40As directed, on February 28, 2025, the appellants’ representative served and filed affidavits from the appellants; and on March 14, 2025, the appellants’ representative served and filed amended factums.

41On April 17, 2025, the parties told me that, when they appeared before my colleague on April 4, 2025 to confirm appeal readiness, the appellants’ representative advised that they intended to file additional evidence. His Honour directed that this evidence be filed by April 11, 2025, and that the appellants attend court for possible cross-examination.

42In fact, on April 11, 2025, the appellants’ representative obtained summonses to two witnesses, Carmela Radice, manager of the court administration office, and Carla Mariuz, manager of the prosecutions office, to give evidence on April 17, 2025.¹⁴ The appellants’ representative also served and filed his supporting affidavit¹⁵ in which he deposed to his own personal belief that Ms. Radice had taken certain actions in respect of the Certificates of Offence, and to his receipt of information from an unnamed City of Mississauga employee regarding certain communications between Ms. Radice and Ms. Mariuz.

43 Section 136(3)(b) of the POA gives me discretion to receive the evidence of any witness. I released Ms. Radice and Ms. Mariuz from their obligation to attend pursuant to the summonses and dismissed the appellants’ request to cross-examine them, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

First, I imposed timelines with respect to the filing of proposed fresh evidence. Those timelines were not to be modified except with my approval. The April 17, 2025, hearing date was peremptory on the appellants. These expectations were set out in a written endorsement released to the parties on February 4, 2025.
Second, the appellants advance their argument on the basis of an affidavit in which the appellants’ representative is himself the deponent, and in which he relies on unsourced information about alleged communications between the two proposed witnesses. An individual should not act as both witness and legal representative in the same matter.
Third, the summonses were in aid of an argument that would unduly expand the scope of the appeal. In oral submissions, the appellants’ representative elaborated that he sought to establish that the two proposed witnesses engaged in deliberate misconduct, that their misconduct was motivated by financial gain for the municipality, that their misconduct had compromised the independence and impartiality of the process, and that their misconduct had impacted hundreds of defendants. Respectfully, the factual assertions in his affidavit, even if I assumed that they were true, do not reveal any anticipated evidence that could establish the facts necessary to advance his sweeping claim of deliberate and systemic misconduct.¹⁶ Nor is there any reason to convert these appeal proceedings into a broader inquiry about the internal workings of Part I prosecutions in Mississauga. There are only four appellants before the court. The appeal is properly focused on the disposition of their matters. There is no compelling reason to change that focus.
Fourth, the factual assertions most central to the appellants’ position – that the location code was changed by court administration in ICON, without notice to the appellants, to reflect the jurisdiction alleged in the Certificates of Offence; that the online payment system is as depicted in the Appellants’ Materials; and the role of the location code in the use of ICON – are not in dispute.

44I also dismissed the respondent’s request to cross-examine the appellants on their affidavits, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

First, the affidavits were filed on February 28, 2025. There was no indication that the respondent wished to cross-examine until April 2025.
Second, the respondent’s request was, in part, responsive to the summonses issued to Ms. Radice and Ms. Mariuz and the appellants’ request to cross-examine them. I did not permit the appellants to pursue that avenue.
Third, the affidavits add nothing to the evidentiary record apart from what is not in dispute between the parties (see para. 43, fourth bullet-point). The appellants did not avail themselves of the opportunity to provide any individualized detail about any actual prejudice they may have experienced. The text of each affidavit is exactly the same except for the ticket number. This appeal will turn on the potential to mislead or cause prejudice and not any actual prejudice. Cross-examination would not have assisted me in reaching a fair and appropriate disposition of the appeal.

(ii) Issues on the conviction appeal

45The appellants frame the issues on appeal as follows:

Did the clerk err in law by not accurately inputting the data of the original Certificate into the ICON database?
Did the clerk err in law by not quashing the Certificate?
Were the appellants prejudiced by the wrong ICON location code and the unilateral amendment?

46In my view, the issues on appeal can be addressed by answering two questions. First, whether court administration had the power to amend the location code; and second, whether the Certificates should be quashed. The potential for prejudice to the appellants is subsumed within and properly addressed under the latter question.

D. NO POWER TO AMEND THE LOCATION CODE

47For the following reasons, I conclude that court administration did not have the power to amend the location code on the Certificate of Offence, either on the Certificate itself or on ICON.

48In my view, the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Young is dispositive. Young holds that a justice, examining a Certificate of Offence as part of an in-office default proceeding (as opposed to an in-court proceeding), does not have the power to amend a defective Certificate.¹⁷

49Young was decided in the context of the former in-office default procedure,¹⁸ which provided that a defendant deemed to not wish to dispute the charge would have their Certificate of Offence examined by a justice to determine whether it is “complete and regular on its face”. The current in-office default procedure provides that a defendant deemed to not wish to dispute the charge will have their Certificate of Offence examined by the clerk of the court to determine whether it is “defective, as determined by the regulations”.¹⁹

50However, the reasoning in Young applies equally to a clerk of the court exercising the special powers and procedures conferred under the current in-office default procedure.²⁰ Part IV of the POA still reserves separate powers of amendment to proceedings on a Certificate of Offence that has moved forward to the hearing stage.²¹ Section 15(1) of the Rules of the Ontario Court (Provincial Division) in Provincial Offences Proceedings²² still reserves “amending an information, a certificate of offence or a certificate of parking infraction” as a matter that “shall be dealt with only in court”.

51Young is also a complete answer to the respondent’s reliance on s. 90(1) of the POA, which is found in Part V of the Act and has not been amended since Young was decided. The Court’s reasoning about the set fine in Young is applicable to the location code in this case:²³

Subsection (2) makes it clear that s. 90 applies in the context of a hearing before the court, and therefore not where the justice is proceeding on default under s. 9(1) where no hearing is held. Furthermore, s. 90(1)(b) contemplates a comparison between the certificate and the offence notice, but the offence notice is not before the justice in a s. 9(1) proceeding. In any event, a defect in the set fine on the certificate would be identical to that on the notice.

52 Section 76.1(5) of the POA similarly does not assist the respondent. The respondent is correct that anything that the court is required or authorized to do with respect to a document may be done with respect to an electronic document. But court administration would not have the power to amend the location code on either a paper copy or an electronic copy of the Certificates during the in-office default procedure.

53I make no comment on whether the officer could have amended the location code prior to filing the Certificates, notwithstanding that the Offence Notices had already been served on the appellants.²⁴ But court administration had no power to amend the location code. The sufficiency of the Certificates of Offence must be assessed with the incorrect location code.

E. THE CERTIFICATES OF OFFENCE SHOULD BE QUASHED

54The incorrect location code rendered each of the appellants’ Certificate of Offence not “complete and regular on its face”. The convictions should be struck and each of the Certificates should be quashed.

55The respondent submits that the clerk of the court did not err by failing to quash the Certificates. I agree. The standard that the clerk of the court has to apply is whether the Certificates were defective “as determined by the regulations”. The Certificates comply with the requirements of O. Reg. 472/21.

56But that is not the end of the analysis. In my view, the standard that applies on appeal is whether each of the Certificates was “complete and regular on its face”.

57Under s. 9(3) of the POA, the appellants would have been entitled, within 15 days after becoming aware of their conviction, to apply to a justice to strike out their conviction. There is no evidence about when the appellants became aware of their conviction, or whether they considered or attempted to bring such an application. However, the language of s. 9(3) is permissive, and there is no suggestion, either in the legislation or by the parties, that the absence of an application is an impediment to an appeal.

[58] If the appellants had pursued a s. 9(3) POA application, the examining justice would have applied the standard of whether “the certificate of offence is defective, as determined by the regulations, or is otherwise not complete and regular on its face” (emphasis added).²⁵ That is a more robust standard than the one applied by the clerk of the court pursuant to s. 9(2) of the POA, and consistent with the standard applied by the examining justice during an in-court default procedure under ss. 9.1(2) and $3$ of the POA. After all, the purpose of judicial examination is to act as a safeguard and to ensure that default convictions are lawful.²⁶ Further, section 136(2) of the POA provides that an appeal should be conducted by means of a review, which itself connotes a less deferential approach. These circumstances support that the “complete and regular on its face” standard should apply on appeal.

59In Souvannarath, Javed J. succinctly summarized the jurisprudence on the “complete and regular on its face” standard, and explained that the proper focus is on whether the defendant received effective notice of all the information needed to decide whether to default:²⁷

The term “complete and regular on its face” is not defined by statute. The consideration of this issue involves a legal assessment based on all the accepted factual circumstances: R. v. Badhan, 2018 ONCJ 747 at para. 7. I agree with the analysis of Kenkel J. in Chow v. York (Regional Municipality), supra, at para. 7 who observed that an interpretation of this phrase is linked to the concept of effective notice to make a decision about whether or not to default. …

A review of the cases also reveals that where there is incorrect information that has the potential to mislead or prejudice the defendant and her choice regarding to default, the certificate would not be regular and complete. Where the incorrect information is merely “surplusage”, or extra information, it may not mislead or prejudice the defendant in making this choice. [Emphasis added.]

60The concept of effective notice means “more than just knowing the case to meet and also implies an acknowledgement that the state would be able to secure a lawful conviction.”²⁸ Indeed, the incorrect information does not need to relate to an element of the offence in order to affect the validity of the Certificate. For example, in Young, the set fine was part of the information that the defendant required in order to decide whether to default, even though it was not an element of the offence and only related to sentencing.²⁹

61Souvannarath adopts the reasoning in Chow, which contains a detailed analysis of the types of information that have the potential to mislead or cause prejudice to the defendant or their decision whether to default.³⁰ Suffice it to say that an error in or the omission of information that constitutes surplusage – information that does not provide notice of the alleged offence and could not mislead the defendant or prejudice their decision whether to default – will not render a Certificate incomplete or irregular. The analysis focusses on the potential impact on the defendant’s decision-making process, viewed in the entire factual context. A defendant need not show actual prejudice.³¹

62In this case, the location code on the Certificate of Offence was 2360, when the location code for the jurisdiction of the alleged offence was 3161. The factual context is important. Without that context, the location code would seem to be a clerical artefact of no importance to anyone or anything other than the internal workings of court administration; a sequence of numbers that would have no meaning to a defendant and therefore could not impact any decision they made. But the factual context – in particular, the practical reality of how the location code is used in the tracking and resolution of Part I matters – elevates the incorrect location code from surplusage to a defect.

63Both the City of London and the City of Mississauga chose to use an online payment system that requires a defendant to enter the location code in order to find their ticket and to pay that ticket. If the appellants used the 2360 location code on the online payment system – for example, to confirm that court administration had actually received and logged their ticket – they would have been taken to the “London 2360” “Ticket Selection” and “Ticket Details” pages, and entering the Offence Number would not have generated a result.³² If the appellants used the dropdown menu to navigate to the “Mississauga 3161” “Ticket Selection” page, they would not have been given the option to pay a red light camera ticket.³³ Further, an ICON search by Offence Number requires the location code in order to view details about a matter. If the appellants had asked court staff to search for the Offence Number after court administration had changed the location code to 3161, the search would not have generated a result. In this manner, the incorrect location code deprived the appellants of the ability to exercise their options. That deprivation necessarily had the potential to mislead or prejudice the appellants and their decision whether to default.

64There is another way in which the incorrect location code had the potential to mislead or prejudice the appellants and their decision whether to default. The incorrect location code held out that the issuing organization was the City of London, and that any examination upon default would occur in the City of London – i.e., outside the jurisdiction where the offence allegedly took place.³⁴ That information was relevant to the state’s ability “to secure a lawful conviction”.³⁵

65The respondent submits that the appellants forfeited their ability to challenge the Certificates of Offence by failing to respond to the Offence Notices. That approach would be inconsistent with the jurisprudential recognition that “there is nothing improper about choosing to default for ‘tactical’ reasons if the certificate of offence is defective”.³⁶ A defendant is entitled to rely on the safeguards built into the default proceedings, which are meant to ensure that only lawful convictions are entered, and that defective or otherwise incomplete or irregular Certificates are quashed.

66That leaves the question of remedy.

67The respondent submits that the appropriate remedy is to direct a new trial for the appellants. The respondent contests both the propriety and the court’s jurisdiction under s. 138(1) of the POA to quash the Certificates.

68The respondent is correct that a remedy should be responsive to the wrong. If the wrong was simply that the appellants were deprived of their ability to exercise their options, a new trial would restore that ability to the appellants. However, the related and further wrong is that each Certificate of Offence was not “complete and regular on its face” because the incorrect location code potentially misled or prejudiced the appellants and their decision whether to default. The jurisprudence supports that the appropriate remedy in these circumstances is to quash the Certificates.³⁷ In my view, the authority to “reverse or vary the decision appealed from” is sufficiently broad to cover this remedy.³⁸

F. CONCLUSION

69I allow the appellants’ appeal against conviction. I quash the Certificates of Offence. The appellants have paid their fines and are entitled to a refund.

70This was an atypical proceeding for a number of reasons. I thank both parties for their professionalism and assistance.

Released: September 5, 2025

Signed: Justice Mabel Cheuk Ting Lai

Footnotes

R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.
ICON is the database used by the Ontario Court of Justice.
“Offence Number” refers to the complete identifier (e.g., “2360-997-23-10460484-00”), which includes a four-digit ICON/court location code (e.g., “2360” for the City of London), a three-digit classification code (e.g., “997” for a red light camera matter), a two-digit year code (e.g., “23” for 2023), an eight-digit code further specifying the matter (e.g., “10460484”), and a two-digit code specifying co-accused status (e.g., “00”).
R. v. Larizza, [2006] O.J. No. 5335 (C.J.), at para. 6; R. v. Preston Sand & Gravel Co., [2009] O.J. No. 6399 (C.J.), at para. 6.
R. v. Davis, 2017 ONCA 45, at para. 49.
London (City) v. Young, 2008 ONCA 429, at para. 85, per Doherty J.A. (dissenting).
R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 3(2); Young, supra, at para. 9.
Stewart and Moffatt on Provincial Offences Procedure in Ontario, 4th Edition (Saltspring Island: Earlscourt, 2020) at p. 2.
Young, supra, at para. 9.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 19.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 21.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 20.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 18.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 25.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 24.
See, by analogy, R. v. Haevischer, 2023 SCC 11, at paras. 60, 66-73.
Young, supra, at para. 17-20. The dissenting judge explicitly agreed with the majority’s reasoning on this point.
As amended by 2009, c. 33, Sched. 4, s.1; 2020, c. 36, Sched. 39, s. 1.
Unless the defendant had reached an agreement with a prosecutor but did not appear at a sentencing hearing: POA, s. 9(1)(c). In those circumstances, the justice shall examine the Certificate of Offence to determine whether it is “defective, as determined by the regulations”, or “otherwise not complete and regular on its face”: POA, s. 9(5).
POA, s. 9(2).
e.g., the in-court default proceedings under s. 9.1 of the POA.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 200, as amended.
Young, supra, at para. 23.
Davis, supra. The Court of Appeal contemplated that the defendant would have an appellate remedy, through the combined operation of ss. 135 and 136 of the POA, if the resulting variance between the Offence Notice and the Certificate of Offence misled or prejudiced them (paras. 52-53).
POA, s. 9(4).
R. v. Khoshael, [2001] O.J. No. 2110 (C.J.), at para. 8.
Durham (Regional Municipality) v. Souvannarath, 2019 ONCJ 177, at paras. 12-14, explaining Young, supra, at para. 6 and Chow v. York (Regional Municipality), 2018 ONCJ 818.
Souvannarath, supra, at para. 18, cited with approval in R. v. Dimilta, 2025 ONCJ 57, at para. 15.
Young, supra, at para. 33.
Chow, supra, at paras. 8-10; see also R. v. Gainda, 2018 ONCJ 792, at paras. 11-20.
See, for example, the different approaches in Young, supra. Justice Feldman (Armstrong J.A. concurring) focused on whether the defendant had received effective notice of all the information needed to decide whether to default (para. 29, 33-34), whereas Doherty J.A. (dissenting) would have limited a remedy to defendants who had been materially misled by the incorrect information (paras. 82-85); see also Chow, supra, at paras. 7, 9 and 12; Souvannarath, supra, at para. 14; Dimilta, supra, at paras. 13-14, 25.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 22.
Appellants’ Materials, Tab 23.
Souvannarath, supra, at para. 24, distinguishing Thunder Bay (City) v. Matzov, 2016 ONSC 4557.
See POA, sections 29(1) and (2), which do not apply to default proceedings: Souvannarath, supra, at para. 31.
Souvannarath, supra, at para. 11.
Young, supra, at para. 34.
See, for example, Souvannarath, supra, at para. 33.

Mississauga (City) v. Ananevych, 2025 ONCJ 640

Case Summary

A. OVERVIEW

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(i) The legislative scheme

(ii) Yulia Ananevych

(iii) Edith Ebeye

(iv) Rick Lu

(v) John Panesso

C. ISSUES ON THE CONVICTION APPEAL

(i) The procedural history of the appeal

(ii) Issues on the conviction appeal

D. NO POWER TO AMEND THE LOCATION CODE

E. THE CERTIFICATES OF OFFENCE SHOULD BE QUASHED

F. CONCLUSION

Footnotes

Mississauga (City) v. Ananevych, 2025 ONCJ 640

Case Summary

A. OVERVIEW

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(i) The legislative scheme

(ii) Yulia Ananevych

(iii) Edith Ebeye

(iv) Rick Lu

(v) John Panesso

C. ISSUES ON THE CONVICTION APPEAL

(i) The procedural history of the appeal

(ii) Issues on the conviction appeal

D. NO POWER TO AMEND THE LOCATION CODE

E. THE CERTIFICATES OF OFFENCE SHOULD BE QUASHED

F. CONCLUSION

Footnotes