ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO. D10912/13
B E T W E E N:
NATALIE REDDICK
ACTING IN PERSON
APPLICANT
- and –
SHELDON TURNER
ACTING IN PERSON
RESPONDENT
HEARD: NOVEMBER 24, 2025
JUSTICE S.B. SHERR
REASONS FOR DECISION
Part One – Introduction
1The parties have brought motions to change the final parenting and child support orders contained in the July 9, 2014 and September 19, 2016 orders of Justice Brian Scully regarding their now 12-year-old son (the child).
2The July 9, 2014 order (the original order) granted custody of the child to the applicant (the mother). It specified parenting time for the respondent (the father) to take place on alternate weekends from Friday at 6 p.m. until Monday at noon, and on alternate Thursdays. A final child support order was also made.
3The order dated September 19, 2016 (the second order) changed the hours of the father’s parenting time on the alternate Thursdays. It required him to pay the mother the Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines) table amount of $442 each month and $394 each month for daycare expenses. It also ordered the father to proportionately contribute to the child’s other special and extraordinary expenses (section 7 expenses) pursuant to section 7 of the guidelines. It capped this contribution at $1,000 annually. This order was based on the father’s annual income of $49,081 and the mother’s annual income of $84,702.
4The second order required the parties to exchange financial disclosure each year. The mother was also required to annually provide the father with any current information, in writing, about the status and amounts of section 7 expenses.
5The mother seeks orders changing the original and second orders as follows:
a) To change the parenting time schedule to eliminate Thursday visits, unless the father is prepared to take the child to his football practices; to end the father’s alternate weekend visits on Sunday evenings; and to specify the father’s summer parenting time with the child.
b) An accounting of section 7 expenses, other than childcare expenses, accrued from the second order. She claims the father owes her $3,943 for these expenses.
c) To terminate the annual cap of $1,000 for the father’s contribution to section 7 expenses.
d) To require the father to pay her guidelines table support based on an imputed annual income of $50,674, starting on January 1, 2024.
6The father agrees that the parenting orders should be changed to end his alternate weekend visits on Sundays. He submits he cannot reliably transport the child to football practices and that the Thursday visits should be terminated.
7The father also seeks the following changes to the original and second orders:
a) Joint decision-making responsibility for the child.
b) More holiday parenting time than proposed by the mother.
c) Reimbursement of childcare expenses. He claims he has overpaid the mother $34,154.
d) Child support to be based on his annual income of $32,000, starting on January 1, 2025.
e) His contribution to the child’s section 7 expenses to be reduced from 36% to 33%.1 Further, he seeks a term that the mother must obtain his consent prior to incurring section 7 expenses.
f) His ongoing child support obligations to be offset against his overpayment of childcare expenses.
8The parties both filed affidavits and document briefs for their direct evidence. They were permitted to give additional oral evidence and cross-examine each other at the trial. Both filed additional documents at trial. Neither party called any other witnesses.
9The issues for this court to determine are as follows:
a) Has there been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the child that warrants changing the original and second parenting orders?
b) If so, what parenting orders are in the child’s best interests?
c) Has there been a material change in circumstances that warrants retroactively changing the section 7 childcare expense payments, as requested by the father?
d) If so, what is the presumptive start date for those payments to change?
e) Should the court depart from the presumptive start date for the section 7 childcare payments to change, and if so, to when?
f) Should the father’s proportionate share of section 7 expenses be reduced to 33%, retroactive to the date of the second order, as requested by the father?
g) Has the father underpaid the child’s other section 7 expenses, and if so, by how much?
h) Should the father’s guidelines table support payments be changed, starting on January 1, 2024, as requested by the mother? Should they be changed on January 1, 2025, as requested by the father?
i) If so, what changes should be made to these payments? And, in making this assessment, what, if any, income should be imputed to the father?
j) How should any overpayment of support be reimbursed to the father?
Part Two – Brief background facts
10The mother is 41 years old. She resides in Toronto with the child. She is employed by the City of Toronto in Human Resources. According to her most recent pay stub filed at trial, she is on pace to earn slightly over $121,000 in 2025.
11The father is 46 years old. He lives in Oakville in a home owned by the mother of his 3-year-old child. He is separated from her within that home. He is presently unemployed. Previously, he worked for 18 years for a company delivering medical supplies to hospitals and nursing homes.
12The parties never cohabited. They had one child together. The child has always lived with the mother.
13The mother started an application in 2013 for parenting and child support orders. Justice Scully made the original order on July 9, 2014. He ordered the father to pay child support to the mother of $360 each month and to pay the child’s daycare expenses in proportion to the parties’ incomes.
14The parties brought motions to change that order and on September 19, 2016, Justice Scully made the second order.
15The mother issued her motion to change both orders on February 6, 2024.
16The father filed his response to motion to change on July 24, 2024, making his own claim to change the two orders.
17On July 24, 2024, Justice Sandra Meyrick ordered the father to pay $575 to the mother as his contribution to the child’s football expenses for the summer and fall months. She also made a temporary order specifying summer parenting time between the father and the child.
18On September 11, 2024, Justice Meyrick referred the parties to Mediate 311. Mediation did not result in any agreements.
19The matter was placed on the March 2025 trial sittings at the Toronto 311 Jarvis Street court site. It was not reached.
20The case was subsequently sent to the Toronto 47 Sheppard Avenue East court site for trial during its November sittings.
21The parties agree that the father made the guidelines table support payments, and the childcare payments, as required in the second order, to the end of June 2025. The mother received one further payment of $150 in July 2025. She has not received any support payments since then.
22The parties advised the court that the mother is not presently receiving child support because the Director of the Family Responsibility Office is taking the position that the father has a support credit of approximately $7,400 and is offsetting his monthly support obligations against that credit.
Part Three – Parenting issues
3.1 The parties’ positions
23The parties did not spend much time on the parenting issues at trial. For the most part, they have been able to make parenting arrangements between themselves.
3.1.1 The mother
24The mother is very angry at the father. She is frustrated because she believes that she is assuming most of the parenting responsibilities and the father is unwilling to assist her. She deposed that she would like the father to take the child more often, but he refuses to do so.
25The mother is particularly frustrated that the father refuses to take the child to his football practices on Thursdays. This means she must leave work early and rush to get the child from downtown Toronto to Scarborough on time. She said the father will often show up at the practices after she has done the hard work of getting the child there.
26The mother was also upset because when she asks the father to contribute more towards the child’s football costs he refuses to do so. She described how she took the child on a trip to Miami with his football team. The father refused to pay any of the child’s travel expenses, yet he showed up in Miami to join the team for the planned activities.
27The mother deposed that the father has rarely exercised the Thursday parenting time set out in the second order and has never kept the child until Monday morning on his alternate weekends – he returns the child on Sunday.
28The mother would like the court to compel the father to take the child to his football practices each Thursday and change the regular parenting time schedule to reflect what is happening.
29The mother changed her holiday parenting time position during the trial. In her draft order for trial, she asked that the father have parenting time three weeks each summer. She changed that to two weeks in the summer at trial. She asked in her draft order that the two-week school winter break and March school break be divided. At trial, she asked that no orders be made concerning the school winter break and March school break.
3.1.2 The father
30The father deposed that he is unable to commit to taking the child to football practices on Thursdays. He lives in Oakville and would have to drive to Toronto to pick up the child, out to Scarborough for the practice, and then reverse that trip. He said he is in school and has childcare responsibilities for his other child. He said the child does not want to be late to practices. The father fears he would often be late if he was responsible for taking the child to his practices. The father said he drives directly from Oakville to Scarborough to support his son at his practices and games.
31The father agreed with the mother that the orders should be changed to reflect the present parenting schedule being exercised.
32The father would like the summer holidays to be divided equally between the parties – two weeks on and two weeks off. He also asked for the two-week winter school break to be equally divided.
33The father also requested “50/50” decision-making responsibility for the child.
3.2 Has there been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child?
3.2.1 Legal considerations
34Section 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act (the Act) provides the statutory authority for changing parenting orders. It states:
A court shall not make an order under this Part that varies an order in respect of custody or access made by a court in Ontario unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child
35In Licata v. Shure, 2022 ONCA 270, at paragraph 21, the court framed the test as follows:
21The Supreme Court of Canada set out the test for determining whether there has been a material change of circumstances in Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, at paras. 10-13. This court, in N.L. v. R.R.M., 2016 ONCA 915, 88 R.F.L. (7th) 19, at para. 29, summarized that test as having three components:
a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or or the ability of the parents to meet those needs;
the change must materially affect the child; and
the change was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order.
36The father must first meet the threshold of proving the required material change in circumstances before the court determines the child’s best interests.
37In L.M.L.P. v. L.S., [2011] SCC 64, the Supreme Court stated that the change must be substantial, continuing and that “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in a different order.” The Supreme Court stated that it must limit itself to whatever variation is justified by the material change of circumstances.
38The threshold material change in circumstances test is aimed in part at ensuring that the parties do not resort to litigation whenever any change occurs, however minimal. See: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207.
39A change in circumstances alone is not enough to justify a variation to a parenting order. The change must materially affect the child, the parents, or both. See: K.M. v. J.R., 2021 ONSC 111.
40A court can find that there has been a material change in circumstances regarding one aspect of a parenting order and no material changes in circumstances regarding other aspects of the parenting order. In M.D.L.C. v. D.S.C., 2024 ONCJ 550, the court found a material change in circumstances regarding decision-making responsibility, but no material change in circumstances regarding an equal-time parenting time order.
41On a motion to change, the court has the option of restricting changing the existing order to address a specific issue, while maintaining its integrity. See: Elaziz v. Wahba, [2017] ONCA 58.
3.2.2 Analysis
3.2.2.1 – Decision-making responsibility
42The court finds that the father did not establish there has been a material change in circumstances that warrants changing the original order granting the mother custody (now decision-making responsibility) for the child.
43The father presented no evidence of a material change in circumstances regarding this issue and did not address it at trial. He did not plead this relief in his response to motion to change. It was not listed as an issue for trial by the trial management judge. It appeared to be a throw-in claim in his draft order for trial.
44There was also no merit to this claim. The mother has done an excellent job assuming most of the childcare responsibilities for the child. She has made responsible decisions for him. She is the principal parent addressing his medical, academic and social needs. The child is thriving in her care.
45Conversely, the father did not know the name of the child’s teacher and struggled to name the child’s school.
46The mother also values the father’s relationship with the child, despite her anger with him. She has facilitated his parenting time. She said he is a good father and that he has a bond with the child. The mother deserves considerable credit for putting the child’s needs ahead of her anger.
47The communication between the parties is far too poor to find it is in the child’s best interests to make a joint decision-making responsibility order.
3.2.2.2 – Parenting time
48The court finds there has been a material change in circumstances regarding the issue of the child’s parenting time with the father. The father has not exercised his full weekend parenting time set out in the original order for many years. He has rarely exercised the Thursday parenting time set out in the second order,2 although he often attends the child’s football practices.
49Once a court determines that there has been a material change in circumstances, it must consider what parenting time orders are in a child’s best interests. In making this determination, the court has considered the relevant “best interests” factors set out in section 24 of the Act.
50Subsection 24 (2) of the Act provides that the court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being in determining best interests.
51Subsection 24 (3) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the court to consider in determining the child’s best interests.
52Subsection 24 (6) of the Act states that in allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
53The court will not order the father to take the child to football practices on Thursdays, as requested by the mother. Courts don’t impose parenting time on parents unable or unwilling to exercise it. Further, the reality is that the logistics of the father traveling from Oakville to Toronto to take the child to practices in Scarborough will create uncertainty for the child as to whether he will get to practice on times. The parties agreed that this certainty is important to the child.
54The court finds it is in the child’s best interests to terminate the Thursday parenting time. The father does not exercise it. The order should reflect this. The father will still be permitted to attend any of the child’s football practices or games, as the child enjoys the father being there.
55The court will also order that the father’s alternate weekend visits end on Sunday at 6 p.m., extending to Monday at 6 p.m., if the Monday is a statutory holiday. This reflects what the parties have been doing.
56Both parties sought a structured holiday parenting plan in their draft orders for trial, although the mother changed her position during the trial. The court finds that a structured and predictable schedule is in the child’s best interests.
57The court will order that the father has three non-consecutive weeks of parenting time each summer with the child. This is what the mother proposed in her draft order. She testified she offered the father four weeks in the summer of 2025, but he chose to only take the child for eight days. The mother will also be entitled to three exclusive weeks with the child in the summer. The mechanism to determine those weeks will be set out in the order. The regular parenting time schedule will be suspended during those weeks.
58The court will also order an equal division of the two-week winter school break. The mother requested this in her draft order but changed her mind at trial. Her uncertainty over this informs the court that the child will benefit from a predictable schedule. The specific schedule will be set out in the court’s order.
59The court received no independent evidence regarding the child’s views and wishes. Neither party referenced them in their trial affidavits. The parents gave conflicting evidence about these views and wishes at trial. The court placed little weight on this evidence. It was hearsay, the parties are heavily invested in the outcome, and they interpret the child’s views through their different perspectives. The evidence was unreliable.
60The mother testified that she is agreeable to the father having additional holiday time if the child wants it. It is important for the child to have a voice regarding parenting time, so the order will be that the father can have additional parenting time, as agreed to by the parties, in consultation with the child.
Part Four – Child support since January 1, 2024
4.1 The parties’ positions
61The parties agree that there have been changes in circumstances that warrant changing the child support order from January 1, 2024 – the month before the mother issued her motion to change. However, they agree for different reasons.
62The mother submits the father’s income has increased since the second order and guidelines table support should be based on his 2024 income of $50,674. She also submits that the child’s section 7 expenses, specifically football expenses, have increased and that the father should make increased contributions to them. She submits that a $1,000 annual cap on section 7 expenses is no longer fair, nor is the restriction in the second order that the father only contributes to one of the child’s activities.
63The father agreed to his guidelines table support increasing starting on January 1, 2024, based on his annual income in that year. However, he says his 2025 income will only be $32,000 because he was laid off and he is in receipt of Employment Insurance (EI). He wants his guidelines table support obligation reduced, starting on January 1, 2025, to be based on his reduced income.
64The father asked to reduce his share of the child’s section 7 expenses to 33% from the present contribution of 36%. He also asked that the mother obtain his consent before he is required to contribute to a section 7 expense.
65The father claims that he should not be required to contribute to the child’s daycare expenses after 2023. He claims these expenses were no longer reasonable or necessary. He also disputes the amounts claimed by the mother for these expenses.
66The mother agreed that the childcare expenses should be terminated effective June 30, 2025. She asks that the father’s claim to reduce his contribution to these expenses prior to that date be dismissed.
67The mother asks the court to impute an annual income of $50,674 to the father starting on January 1, 2025. She submits that he has either earned or has been capable of earning this level of income since then. The imputation request is based on the father’s 2024 income.
4.2 Legal considerations
4.2.1 Authority to change a child support order
68Subsection 37 (2.1) of the Family Law Act sets out the powers of the court to change child support. It reads as follows:
Powers of court: child support
(2.1) In the case of an order for support of a child, if the court is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances within the meaning of the child support guidelines or that evidence not available on the previous hearing has become available, the court may,
(a) discharge, vary or suspend a term of the order, prospectively or retroactively;
(b) relieve the respondent from the payment of part or all of the arrears or any interest due on them; and
(c) make any other order for the support of a child that the court could make on an application under section 33.
69Paragraph 1 of section 14 of the guidelines reads as follows:
Circumstances for variation
For the purposes of subsection 37 (2.2) of the Act and subsection 17 (4) of the Divorce Act (Canada), any one of the following constitutes a change of circumstances that gives rise to the making of a variation order:
In the case where the amount of child support includes a determination made in accordance with the table, any change in circumstances that would result in a different order for the support of a child or any provision thereof.
4.2.2 Imputing income
70The jurisprudence for imputation of income sets out the following:
a) Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this obligation, the parties must earn what they are capable of earning. If they fail to do so, they will be found to be intentionally under-employed. See: Drygala v. Pauli 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 3731(Ont. C.A.).
b) The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, affirmed that the following three questions should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income:
Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?
If not, what income is appropriately imputed?
c) The onus is on the party seeking to impute income to the other party to establish that the other party is intentionally unemployed or under-employed. The person requesting an imputation of income must establish an evidentiary basis upon which this finding can be made. See: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, [2009] O.J. No. 1552. (Ont. C.A.). However, in Graham v. Bruto, 2008 ONCA 260, the court inferred that the failure of the payor to properly disclose would mitigate the obligation of the recipient to provide an evidentiary basis to impute income.
d) Once a party seeking the imputation of income presents the evidentiary basis suggesting a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the individual seeking to defend the income position they are taking. See: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719.
e) As a general rule, separated parents have an obligation to financially support their children and they cannot avoid that obligation by a self-induced reduction of income. See: Thompson v. Gilchrist, 2012 ONSC 4137; DePace v. Michienzi, 2000 CanLII 22560 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 453, (Ont. Fam. Ct.).
f) The court must have regard to the payor’s capacity to earn income in light of such factors as employment history, age, education, skills, health, available employment opportunities and the standard of living enjoyed during the parties’ relationship. The court looks at the amount of income the party could earn if he or she worked to capacity. See: Lawson v. Lawson, 2006 CanLII 26573 (ONCA).
g) A common situation arises where one of the parents involuntarily loses his or her job though a layoff followed by a lengthy period of unemployment. Where the recipient alleges the payor should have been able to find substitute employment if they had looked hard enough, a contextual analysis is required. The payor’s situation, options, and opportunities must be considered in the context of other individuals – or in the case of mass plant closures, groups of individuals – facing similar circumstances. The Court must be mindful of employment rates and trends, and economic conditions as a whole. The analysis cannot be done in the abstract: Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719; Gee v. McGraw, 2014 ONCJ 87; Miller v. Volk (2009), 2009 CanLII 41356 (ON SC), 74 R.F.L. (6th) 61 (Ont. S.C.).
h) It is not reasonable for a payor to return to school and not pay support, unless it is justified by a sufficient increase in earning ability that will benefit the children. See: Carter v. Spracklin, 2012 ONCJ 193, [2012] O.J. No. 1533 (OCJ); Ffrench v. Williams, 2016 ONCJ 105.
4.2.3 Section 7 expenses
71Unlike section 3 of the guidelines, which presumptively provides for the table amount of child support, an order for section 7 expenses involves the exercise of judicial discretion. See: Park v. Thompson, 2005 CanLII 14132 (ON CA), 77 O.R. (3d) 601, (Ont. C.A.).
72In Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, the court set out the following framework for determining a party’s contribution to a child’s section 7 expenses:
a) Calculate each parties’ income for child support purposes.
b) Determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of section 7 of the guidelines.
c) Determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary “in relation to the child’s best interests” and are reasonable “in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation.”
d) If the expenses fall under paragraphs 7 (1) (d) or (f) of the guidelines, determine whether the expenses are “extraordinary” as defined by subsection 7 (1.1) of the guidelines.
e) The court considers what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then applies any tax deductions or credits.3
f) The court determines the proportions that each party should contribute to the expenses, with the guiding principle being that the expenses will be shared in proportion to their incomes.
73The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of the categories under section 7 and that the expenses are necessary and reasonable, having regard to the parental financial circumstances. See: Park v. Thompson, supra.
74Subsection 7 (1.1) of the guidelines sets out that for the purposes of clauses 7 (1) (d) and (f) of the guidelines, the term “extraordinary expenses” means:
(a) expenses that exceed those that the spouse requesting an amount for the extraordinary expenses can reasonably cover, taking into account that spouse’s income and the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate; or
(b) where paragraph (a) is not applicable, expenses that the court considers are extraordinary taking into account
(i) the amount of the expense in relation to the income of the spouse requesting the amount, including the amount that the spouse would receive under the applicable table or, where the court has determined that the table amount is inappropriate, the amount that the court has otherwise determined is appropriate,
(ii) the nature and number of the educational programs and extracurricular activities,
(iii) any special needs and talents of the child or children,
(iv) the overall cost of the programs and activities, and
(v) any other similar factor that the court considers relevant.
75Subsection 7 (2) of the guidelines provides that in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection (1), the expense is shared by the parents or spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. The court has discretion to deviate from this. See: Zhao v. Xiao, 2023 ONCA 453.
76The court has the discretion to apportion the section 7 expense in a different manner than pro-rata to the parties’ incomes, depending on the circumstances of the case. See: Hamilton v. Salmon, 2023 ONCJ 343, per Justice Danielle Szandtner; Salvadori v. Salvadori, 2010 ONCJ 462, [2010] O.J. No. 4425 (OCJ); Buckley v. Blackwood, 2019 ONSC 6918.
77The court may consider the parties’ capital assets, income distribution, debts, third party resources, access costs, support obligations, receipt of support and any other relevant factor in determining each parties’ contribution to section 7 expenses. See: Delichte v. Rogers, 2013 MBCA 106; T.R. v. S.G., 2025 ONCJ 224
78Section 7 of the guidelines itself does not require prior consultation for allowable expenses, but a failure or refusal by a claiming parent to discuss an expense with the other parent in advance bears on the court’s exercise of its discretion in determining whether it is reasonable. However, where consultation would be meaningless due to chronic default of payor, or attitude of payor, prior consultation should not be required. See: Yeo v. Hutcheson, 2020 ONSC 1256.
4.3 The father’s income and guidelines table payments
79The father earned $50,674 in 2024. The father’s increase in income, from the date of the second order, was a change in circumstances. The support terms in the second order will be changed in accordance with this increase. The guidelines table amount for one child at this income is $467 each month. The father will pay this amount starting on January 1, 2024.
80The father deposed he was laid off by his employer in March 2025. He did not serve and file a record of employment from his employer. He deposed that he received $60,000 for his pension from his employer. However, that amount is locked in. He cannot access those funds. He also said he received $22,000 for severance pay from his employer. He provided no evidence of this.4 He was unsure if this amount was net of tax or the gross amount he received. The court draws an adverse inference against him, due to his failure to disclose this important information. The severance pay must be included in his 2025 income for the purpose of calculating his child support obligations.
81The father said he has been in receipt of EI since May 2025. He deposed that he is receiving EI of $2,328 each month.
82The father’s incomplete disclosure means the court must estimate his 2025 income. The court finds that his 2025 income will be close to his 2024 income, based on the combination of his employment income, EI income and severance pay. The court will assess his 2025 income at $50,674 – the same as his 2024 income. His guidelines table payments will remain unchanged until October 1, 2025, when they will change to $458 each month.5
83This leads to what annual income should be imputed, if any, to the father starting on January 1, 2026.
84The father testified that he is not working. Instead, he is taking a course in logistics five days each week, from 4:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m., at the Toronto School for Business. He is also taking courses to obtain his BZ driver’s licence. He said he is taking these courses three days each week through a private company and this will qualify him to obtain jobs as a driver, including driving buses and dump trucks. He hopes to obtain this licence within two months. He said he will complete the logistics course by June 2026 and that this will enhance his marketability.
85The father said that he hopes the driving jobs will pay him over $100,000 annually. He believed he will initially obtain a job paying him between $60,000 to $70,000.
86The father said that once he obtains his BZ licence he plans to work part-time as a driver until he completes the logistics course. He expects to earn income working part-time, based on an annual income “in the thirties”, by early in 2026.
87The mother agreed this is a reasonable career path for the father.
88The father was employed for 18 years. He has always been a hard worker and has always paid his child support. He only has a high school education. The court agrees with him that his plan to make himself more marketable is reasonable.
89The court will continue to impute the father’s annual income at $50,674, starting on January 1, 2026. This recognizes that he will earn less income during the first half of 2026. However, he should earn much more income in the second half of 2026. His guidelines table payments shall continue to be $458 each month.
4.4 Special expenses
4.4.1 Football
90The child plays Triple A football in Toronto. This is an elite program for skilled players. The court finds this is an extraordinary extracurricular activity, as defined by subsection 7 (1.1) of the guidelines. The activity is more than the mother can reasonably afford on her own after receiving the guidelines table amount from the father These expenses are reasonable and necessary, as playing football is critical to the child’s social and physical development and his sense of self-worth. Simply put, football is very important for the child.
91The mother deposed that she spent $1,700 for the child’s football expenses in 2024.
92The mother said she spent $1,750 for the child’s football expenses in 2025. This includes registration and $150 for a strength and training program. She also plans to enroll the child in private lessons for training as a wide receiver. She says this will cost about $560. She will likely start incurring this expense in 2026.
93Both parties have bought some ancillary football equipment for the child. They have each paid their share of these expenses and the court will not include these expenses in its calculation.
94The court finds the football expenses claimed by the mother are reasonable and necessary.
95The father proposes paying 33% of the football expenses. The court will exercise its discretion and maintain the father’s share of these expenses at 36%, as set out in the second order. The court recognizes this is more than the father’s proportionate share of these expenses based on the parties’ respective incomes. However, the court accepts the mother’s argument that she is the person making all the arrangements to get the child to his practices and games, because the father is not exchanging the child for his Thursday parenting time. She is doing the hard work, while the father reaps the benefits of attending and cheering his son on.
96The father will be required to pay the mother $612 towards his share of the 2024 football expenses and $630 for his share of the 2025 football expenses.
97Starting on January 1, 2026, the father’s share of football expenses shall increase to $832 for the year, as he is also required to pay 36% of the child’s training expenses as a wide receiver of $560. His monthly payments for these expenses will be $69.
98The mother also asked that the father pay her $232 for his share of the child’s expenses for a January 2024 football team trip to Miami, where they visited the University of Miami campus. This was an opportunity for team bonding. It was important for the child’s sense of belonging to the team and his social development to go. The court finds this qualifies as a section 7 football expense. The expense was reasonable and necessary. It was disappointing to hear that the father decided to join the trip and refused to pay any of the child’s expenses.
4.4.2 Childcare expenses
99The mother deposed that she required childcare expenses until June 30, 2025, to permit her to work. She said she hired friends and family to provide this service for her. She said she paid them cash and that she declared these expenses on her income tax returns.6
100In Lobban v. Lobban, 2022 ONCJ 163, this court permitted childcare expenses until a child was 12 years old. Here, the court finds that the amounts it will permit for childcare expenses for the 12-year-old child are reasonable and necessary.
101The mother’s evidence regarding the childcare expenses was problematic. She attached what she claimed were childcare receipts. She wrote them all. Many were not dated. None were signed by the caregivers.7 Some were difficult to read. Two of the caregivers were family members.8 She only attached receipts until June 2024.
102The mother provided a letter from one caregiver dated September 27, 2024. It was particularly problematic. The caregiver wrote that she received $3,600 from the mother over six months. She said she was paid $300 each weekend. This letter was unsworn. The friend did not testify. The friend did not identify when those services were incurred, or even in what year they were paid. The mother said the caregiver was a friend who she let stay with her at her home. No evidence was provided to the court about rent her friend paid to her, if any, or if she provided childcare services in lieu of rent. The court found this evidence unreliable.
103The mother gave inconsistent and unreliable evidence about her childcare expenses. In her spreadsheet prepared for trial she said she said she spent $4,200 for childcare expenses in 2024. She also said the father spent $4,200 for childcare expenses in 2024. When asked, she clarified her evidence and said she spent $8,400 for childcare expenses in 2024 and received $4,200 from the father towards those expenses. However, later in her evidence, she said the total childcare expenses were $300 each month, maybe $350 each month.
104The total receipts for 2024 produced by the mother for the first half of the year added up to $1,900. Extrapolated over the balance of 2024, they total $3,800. This is close to the $300 - $350 each month she claimed she was paying in cash to the caregivers. It is also close to the total figure of $4,200 she said she paid in 2024, before she revised the number to $8,400.
105The court finds that the mother incurred childcare expenses at the annual rate of $3,800 from January 1, 2024, until June 30, 2025. The court further finds that any childcare expenses that exceed this amount are not reasonable or necessary, given the child’s age.
106The court also accepts the mother’s evidence that she declared the tax benefits for her childcare expenses to the Canada Revenue Agency.
107Subsection 7 (3) of the guidelines states that in determining the amount of an expense referred to in subsection 7 (1), the court must take into account any subsidies, benefits or income tax deductions or credits relating to the expense, and any eligibility to claim a subsidy, benefit or income tax deduction or credit relating to the expense. This should be done even if the recipient indicates that he or she will not be claiming any tax credit or deduction related to this expense (for example, he or she obtains a discount from the childcare provider by not reporting the child-care expense to Revenue Canada). Whether the recipient claims the credit or expense is her choice. The payor is only required to pay the after-tax amount of the expense. See: Ramm v. Rice, [2012] N.W.T.J. No. 82 (NTSC); D.L. v. F.K. [1998] N.W.T.J. No. 42 (NTSC), K.H. v. T.K.R., 2013 ONCJ 418.
108This means that even if the mother is wrong, and she did not deduct the childcare expenses on her income tax returns, the court would still have treated the father’s share of these expenses as if she had done so.
109Neither party provided the court with software calculations showing what the annual net amount of the childcare expenses were. The court did these calculations.9 The difference between the gross and net amounts of the annual childcare expenses, at the mother’s level of income, is substantial.
110The software analysis shows the net childcare expenses in 2024 were $1,516, based on a gross amount of $3,800, and the mother’s 2024 income of $108,675. The court will exercise its discretion and maintain the father’s contribution of 36% of these expenses. The court finds this is fair because the father did not exercise all the parenting time allotted to him in the second order. This meant the mother was spending more on the child – not just on section 7 expenses. The father’s share of childcare expenses in 2024 was $546.
111The software analysis shows the net childcare expenses for the first six months of 2025 were $702, based on $1,900 of childcare expenses for six months and the mother’s 2025 income of $121,000. The father will pay 36% of these expenses. This comes to $253 for 2025.
4.4.3 Other section 7 issues
112The mother said the child has had no other section 7 expenses since January 1, 2024.
113The court agrees with the mother that some of the section 7 expense terms in the second order should be changed. The child is older, and the mother should not be restricted to enrolling him in one activity, as set out in the second order, to receive a contribution to the expense from the father. Further, the child may go to university in five years, and section 7 expenses will likely significantly exceed the $1,000 annual contribution cap. The court will remove that cap.
114The court will also order that the mother shall first consult with the father before incurring further section 7 expenses for the child. She will not have to consult with him regarding football expenses.
Part Five – The father’s claim to retroactively change the childcare payments set out in the second order from September 1, 2017
5.1 The parties’ positions
115The father seeks to retroactively change his contributions to the child’s section 7 childcare expenses of $394 each month, as set out in the second order. He asserts that the childcare expenses significantly decreased once the child started school. He asks to adjust the payments in accordance with the childcare expenses actually incurred back to September 1, 2017.
116The father did not ask to retroactively change his guidelines table payments prior to January 1, 2024. His annual income from 2017 until 2023, was fairly close to the income the second order was based upon.
117The mother denies that the father has overpaid childcare expenses and seeks to dismiss this claim.
5.2 Legal considerations
118The Supreme Court of Canada set out the framework for deciding applications to decrease support retroactively at paragraph 113 in Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 as follows:
(1) The payor must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. The onus is on the payor to show a material decrease in income that has some degree of continuity, and that is real and not one of choice.
(2) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively decreasing child support to the date the payor gave the recipient effective notice, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the decrease context, effective notice requires clear communication of the change in circumstances accompanied by the disclosure of any available documentation necessary to substantiate the change and allow the recipient parent to meaningfully assess the situation.
(3) Where no effective notice is given by the payor parent, child support should generally be varied back to the date of formal notice, or a later date where the payor has delayed making complete disclosure in the course of the proceedings.
(4) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors10 (adapted to the decrease context) guide this exercise of discretion. Those factors are: (i) whether the payor had an understandable reason for the delay in seeking a decrease; (ii) the payor’s conduct; (iii) the child’s circumstances; and (iv) hardship to the payor if support is not decreased (viewed in context of hardship to the child and recipient if support is decreased). The payor’s efforts to pay what they can and to communicate and disclose income information on an ongoing basis will often be a key consideration under the factor of payor conduct.
(5) Finally, once the court has determined that support should be retroactively decreased to a particular date, the decrease must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.
119The same retroactive support analysis applies to table support and to section 7 expenses. See: Smith v. Selig (2008) 2008 NSCA 54, 56 R.F.L. (6th) 8 NSCA; Cumor v. Mohammed, 2024 ONCJ 162.
120The powers of the court on a motion to vary a child support order are very broad. The court can not only change the terms of the order, either prospectively or retroactively, but can also suspend or discharge the order, either in whole or in part, and on either a prospective or retroactive basis. The court's authority with respect to arrears is similarly broad and includes the power to rescind the arrears and interest, either entirely or in part, or to reduce the amount of arrears payable. See: Meyer v. Content, 2014 ONSC 6001.
121The court in Colucci made the following comments about motions to retroactively decrease support:
a) The presumption that support will be reduced back to the date of effective notice strikes a fair balance between the certainty interests of the child and recipient and the payor’s interest in flexibility (par. 80)
b) Where the payor has such an understandable reason in delaying the application, fairness may militate in favour of extending the date of retroactivity to a time before the date of effective notice or not applying the three-year limit (par.97).
c) Understandable reasons for delay in bringing a claim may include health problems or other difficulties that prevent the payor from confronting the situation, or an unwillingness to disrupt a fragile parent-child relationship. The payor may also lack the financial or emotional wherewithal to proceed with the matter (par. 98).
d) In some cases, the recipient’s conduct may be at play, such as where the recipient threatens to withhold access or uses other tactics to discourage the payor from applying to reduce support (par. 99).
e) The recipient’s delay in enforcing arrears is irrelevant to the analysis. Courts must bear in mind that child support arrears are a debt. Under general principles of debtor-creditor law, the debtor is required to seek out and pay the creditor, and debts are not forgiven by the mere passage of time in the absence of a statutory limitation period (par. 100).
f) If more than three years have passed between the date of effective notice and the date of formal notice, the court might consider declining to apply the three-year rule if the payor has made ongoing efforts to disclose, communicate and engage in dialogue with the recipient (par. 102).
g) The court may also consider whether the payor made voluntary payments against the arrears, continued to pay in accordance with their ability to pay, cooperated with enforcement agencies, and showed a willingness to support the child rather than evading child support obligations. Genuine efforts to continue paying as much as the payor can show good faith and a willingness to support the child (par. 103).
h) Full and frank disclosure is also a precondition to good faith negotiation. Without it, the parties cannot stand on the equal footing required to make informed decisions and resolve child support disputes outside of court (par. 51).
i) The exercise of judicial discretion must encourage financial disclosure and in no way reward those who improperly withhold, hide or misrepresent information they ought to have shared (par. 54).
j) If the child has experienced hardship or is currently in need, this factor militates in favour of a shorter period of retroactivity (par. 104).
5.3 Material change in circumstances
122The first step in the Colucci framework is to determine if there has been a material change in circumstances.
123The mother acknowledged that the child’s childcare expenses went down from about $1,300 each month to about $750 each month when he started school in September 2017. This was a material change in circumstances.
5.4 What is the presumptive start date for the childcare expenses to change?
124The father first asked the mother about the child’s childcare expenses in September 2017, when the child started school, but did not follow up on the issue. He said he raised the topic again with her in late April or early May 2020, because the mother and child were at home during the pandemic and the child was no longer attending his before and after school program. He said the mother kept telling him “if you want your money you have to take me to court”. The court found his evidence credible.11
125The court finds that the father gave effective notice to the mother of his desire to reduce his childcare payments on May 1, 2020.
126Colucci sets out that the presumptive start date to change support cannot be more than three years before the date of formal notice. The father did not bring his motion to change the childcare expenses until July 24, 2024. This means the presumptive start date for the childcare payments to change is July 24, 2021.
5.5 Should the court depart from the presumptive start date to change childcare payments?
127It has been challenging for support payors to successfully reduce their support payments since Colucci was decided. This is because under the Colucci framework, the payor must not only provide effective notice, but they must also provide meaningful financial disclosure for the support recipient to assess the request to reduce support. Colucci refers to this as the “informational disadvantage” – the payor is the person in possession of the information required to reassess support. It is their obligation to provide this information to the recipient in a timely manner.
128This scenario is very different. The father is not seeking a downward change in support because of a reduction in his income. He is seeking it because the mother was not incurring the childcare expenses the second order was based upon. The mother was the one in possession of the relevant facts to reassess support – the father is the person who has had the informational disadvantage.
129The court will next assess the four D.B.S. factors for determining whether it is fair to depart from the presumptive start date to change the father’s childcare payments. They are delay, conduct, the circumstances of the child and hardship.
130The father provided partially understandable reasons for his delay in coming to court being:
a) The mother did not disclose the changes in the childcare expenses so he could assess whether he should bring the matter back to court. He was at an informational disadvantage.
b) He didn’t want to engage in court with the mother. He filed texts from her confirming his oral evidence that she was emotionally abusive and demeaning to him when she was angry with him.12
131However, the father was aware by May 17, 2022, that the mother would not agree to change the childcare expenses, and he would need to go to court to change it. He chose not to take this step until after she started the case.
132The mother engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to advise the father of the reductions in the child’s childcare expenses as they happened. The second order required her to keep him advised of these expenses and any changes to them.
133The mother expressed at trial that she felt entitled to these additional childcare amounts because she has assumed a disproportionate share of parenting responsibilities. The court understands why the mother feels this way. However, this is not an acceptable excuse for failing to adjust the father’s contribution to childcare expenses when they significantly declined.
134Both parties engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to exchange annual income information, as required in the second order.
135There was no evidence that the child’s circumstances have been disadvantaged. His needs have always been met.
136A retroactive adjustment to the childcare expenses will cause some hardship for the mother. She has minimal savings. However, her hardship can be addressed through a reasonable payment order.
137The father is now unemployed. He has far more debt than the mother. He will suffer some hardship if the court does not make a retroactive adjustment to his childcare payments. However, as the mother pointed out at trial, the father is still spending over $1,000 each month on his BMW vehicle.
138The court finds it is fair to change the father’s contribution to childcare expenses as of the presumptive date of July 24, 2021. It will not depart from that date. To simplify the calculation, it will apply August 1, 2021, as the start date.
5.6 Recalculation of the father’s contribution to childcare expenses from August 1, 2021 until the end of 2023
139The final step in the Colucci framework is to recalculate the childcare expenses starting on August 1, 2021.
140The court, for the reasons set out above, will maintain the father’s share of the child’s section 7 expenses at 36%, as set out in the second order, for the purpose of this calculation.
141The mother testified she was paying between $300 and $350 each month for childcare expenses during this period.13 The receipts she produced showed close to $3,600 of annual childcare payments from 2021 to 2023, although her summary claimed she paid much more.
142The court’s previous comments about the unreliability of the mother’s evidence about the childcare expenses in 2024 and 2025 also apply to her evidence about these expenses from 2021 to 2023.
143The court finds that the mother’s annual gross childcare expenses were approximately $3,800 during this period.
144The software analysis shows the following are the annual net amounts of the childcare expenses:
a) 2023 – $1,441 – This is based on the mother’s 2023 income of $104,106. The father’s 36% share of the expenses is $519.
b) 2022 – $1,290. This is based on the mother’s 2022 income of $97,269. The father’s 36% share of the expenses is $464.
c) 2021 – $988 – This is based on the mother’s 2021 income of $99,815. The father’s share of the expenses is $356. However, this is only calculated for five months, since August 1, 2021 is the date the support changes. Accordingly, the father’s pro-rated 36% share of the expenses is $148.
145The father’s share of the childcare expenses from August 1, 2021 until the end of 2023 totals $1,131 ($519+ $464 + $148).
Part Six – Mother’s claim for an accounting of section 7 expenses from the date of the second order until December 30, 2023
146The mother seeks an accounting of section 7 expenses, other than the childcare expenses, from the date of the second order until the end of 2023.14 She claims that the father has failed to pay his share of these expenses.
147The mother’s claim for football expenses will be allowed. The court has already found these qualify as section 7 expenses. The total football expenses for 2022 and 2023 will be fixed at $2,833.15 The father’s share of these expenses will be 36%, being $1,020.
148The mother incurred dental fees of $656 for the child in 2021 and 2022. These qualify as section 7 expenses under the guidelines. They were necessary and reasonable. The father’s share of these expenses will be 36%, being $236.
149The mother claimed $3,600 for karate classes for the child from 2016 to 2018. She had no receipts. However, the father acknowledged the child was attending the program, he was unhappy with the cost, and he attended many of these classes. The court accepts the mother’s evidence about these expenses. It finds they fall within the criteria for section 7 expenses defined in the second order. The father’s 36% share of these expenses will be fixed at $1,296.
150The mother incurred expenses of $2,373 for camp, swimming and martial arts programs through the City of Toronto programs for the child between 2017 and 2024. She filed receipts. These expenses fit within the criteria for section 7 expenses defined in the second order. The father’s 36% share of these expenses is $854.
151The mother claimed the child’s airfare for a flight to Jamaica in 2022. This does not fall within one of the enumerated categories to qualify as a section 7 expense.
152The court finds that the father’s share of qualified section 7 expenses, not including childcare expenses, up until the end of 2023 is $3,406 (Football – $1,020, Dental – $236, Karate – $1,296, City of Toronto – $854).
Part Seven – Support calculations
7.1 Calculations until the end of 2023
153The parties agree that the father paid the guidelines table child support and childcare payments set out in the second order until June 30, 2025.
154The father’s share of childcare expenses from August 1, 2021, until December 31, 2023 is $1,131, as calculated in paragraph 144 above.
155The father paid childcare expenses of $11,426 during this period ($394 x 29 months).
156The father overpaid childcare expenses in the amount of $10,295 during this period ($11,426 - $1,131).
157The father owes the mother $3,406 for his share of section 7 expenses up until the end of 2023, as set out in paragraph 152 above.
158The father overpaid support of $6,889 until the end of 2023 ($10,295 - $3,406).
7.2 Calculations from January 1, 2024
159The father’s share of childcare expenses from January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025, total $799 ($546 in 2024 + $253 in 2025). He paid $7,092 ($394 x 18 months) for those expenses. He overpaid childcare expenses in the amount of $6,293 ($7,092 - $799).
160The father’s guidelines table payments have accrued in the amount of $2,775 since July 1, 2025, calculated as follows:
$467 x 3 months = $1,401
$458 x 3 months = $1,37416
Total: $2,775
161The father has only paid $150 for child support since July 1, 2025, leaving a balance owing since then of $2,625 ($2,775 - $150).
162The father’s share of football expenses since January 1, 2024, is $1,474 ($612 in 2024 + $232 in 2024 for the football trip + $630 in 2025). The mother deposed that the father has paid her $900 for football expenses. The father has underpaid football expenses by $574 ($1,474 - $900).
163The father has overpaid support in the amount of $3,094 since January 1, 2024 ($6,293 overpayment for childcare expenses - $2,625 underpayment of guidelines table support - $574 underpayment of section 7 football expenses).
Part Eight – Overpayment of support
8.1 Legal considerations
164The court retains discretion whether or not to order the mother to reimburse the father for all or part of the overpayment. See: M.P.A.N. v. J.N., 2018 ONCJ 769.
165In M.P.A.N., Justice Alex Finlayson reviewed an array of factors that could determine how the court might exercise its discretion regarding overpayments, including:
a) The amount of the overpayment.
b) The D.B.S. factors – delay, conduct, circumstances of the child and hardship.
c) The overall financial positions of the parties, including their incomes and net worth.
d) Whether the recipient had a reasonable explanation for continuing to collect the overpayment.
e) Efforts made to resolve the issue of overpayment.
166M.P.A.N. was a case where the support recipient collected support after the child was no longer entitled to it. However, the principles set out should also apply to a situation such as this, where section 7 expenses materially declined, and the support recipient failed to notify the support payor and adjust the payments.
167In Paynter v. Sackville, [2004] S.J. No. 422 (Q.B.), the court ordered reimbursement of section 7 childcare expenses that had been overpaid. As of 2001, the petitioner was no longer incurring section 7 expenses. Despite that, she continued to enforce payment of those expenses. The court found that to allow the petitioner to keep that money for expenses that were not incurred would amount to a windfall.
168In Harder v. Harder, [2003] S.J. No. 429 (Q.B.), the court found that parents who receive payments for section 7 expenses have an obligation to terminate those payments when the expense is no longer incurred. The failure to do so warrants a reimbursement order.
8.2 Discussion
169The court finds that support recipients have an obligation to notify the support payer in a timely manner when a section 7 expense materially declines, and to adjust the support payments accordingly. Here, that obligation was specifically set out in the second order.
170The total amount of the father’s overpayment of support is $9,983 ($6,889 until the end of 2023 + $3,094, since January 1, 2024). The overpayment is due to the mother’s failure to notify the father about the reduction in childcare expenses and her unreasonable refusal to adjust these payments. She received a windfall.
171In its Colucci analysis above, the court took the D.B.S. factors, being delay, conduct, circumstances of the child and hardship to both parties, into consideration when it determined the start date for the childcare expenses to change. The court only adjusted the childcare expenses starting on August 1, 2021. The court exercised its discretion under the Colucci framework, and did not further adjust the childcare payments despite overpayment by the father before then.
172The mother is presently in a better financial position than the father. She earns more than twice his income. She does not have his debt load.
173The court finds that the mother should reimburse the father for the entire amount of the overpayment calculated in this decision. She told him to “take me to court to get your money”, when he raised the issue in May 2020, and said the same thing whenever he subsequently raised the issue. She also did not advise the Director of the Family Responsibility Office that she was no longer incurring any childcare expenses after June 30, 2025.
174The court recognizes that the mother has limited savings and cannot pay this money immediately. It also does not want to create a payment scheme that may create confusion for the Director of the Family Responsibility Office or be difficult for the father to enforce.
175The court will further exercise its discretion regarding the father’s overpayment of support by requesting the Director of the Family Responsibility Office to amend its records to show a support credit of $9,983 for him. It further requests it to apply the father’s child support obligations of $527 each month (table support of $458 + $69 for section 7 football expenses), starting on January 1, 2026, against the credit balance until the credit is eliminated.
Part Nine – Conclusion
176The court orders that the parenting time terms contained in the second order are changed as follows:
a) The father’s Thursday evening parenting time with the child is terminated.
b) The father may still attend the child’s football practices and games.
c) The father’s alternate weekend visits with the child will end on Sunday at 6 p.m., extending to Monday at 6 p.m. if the Monday is a statutory holiday.
d) Each party shall have three exclusive weeks with the child during the summer vacation. The father’s weeks will be non-consecutive. In odd-numbered years, the father will choose his weeks by May 1st and the mother will choose her weeks by May 15th. In even-numbered years, the mother will choose her weeks by May 1st, and the father will choose his weeks by May 15th.
e) The parties shall equally divide the two-week winter school break. In odd-numbered years, the child will be with the mother during the first week and with the father during the second week. In even-numbered years, the child shall be with the father during the first week and with the mother during the second week.
f) The parties may agree on additional holiday parenting time between the father and the child, taking into consideration the views and wishes of the child.
g) The holiday parenting time schedule takes priority over the regular parenting time schedule.
h) The balance of parenting terms presently in force under the original and second orders remain in force.
177The court orders that the support terms in the second order are changed as follows:
a) The father shall pay the mother child support of $527 each month, starting on January 1, 2026. This is comprised of the guidelines table amount of $458 each month, based on the father’s imputed annual income of $50,674 and the father’s monthly share of the child’s section 7 football expenses of $69 each month.
b) The father shall pay 36% of the child’s future section 7 expenses. The mother shall first consult with the father before incurring these expenses. She does not have to consult with him regarding the football expenses.
c) The $1,000 cap for the father’s annual contribution to the child’s section 7 expenses, contained in the second order, is terminated.
d) The term in the second order that limits the mother to claiming contribution from the father to one activity for the child is terminated.
e) The father has overpaid child support to the mother in the amount of $9,983, as calculated in this decision.
f) The Director of the Family Responsibility Office is requested to adjust its records in accordance with this order.
g) The Director of the Family Responsibility Office is also requested to record the overpayment of $9,983 as a support credit for the father in its records. It further requests it to apply the father’s monthly child support obligations, starting on January 1, 2026, against the credit balance until the credit is eliminated.
h) A support deduction order shall issue.
i) The parties shall exchange their complete income tax returns and notices of assessment by June 30th each year.
j) The mother shall provide the father with all receipts for any section 7 expenses claimed, including football expenses, by June 30th each year.
k) The father shall immediately notify the mother once he obtains employment. He shall provide her with the name and address of his employer, his job description, his work hours, a copy of any employment contract, and copies of his first three pay stubs.
178All other claims made by the parties, except for costs, not addressed above, are dismissed.
179If either party believes there has been a mathematical error in this decision, or an inputting error in the software calculations, they have until December 16, 2025 to make submissions (about these mathematical or inputting errors only) by Form 14B motion. The other party will then have until December 23, 2025 to respond.
180If either party seeks their costs, they are to serve and file written costs submissions by January 6, 2026. The other party will then have until January 20, 2026 to serve and file their response to the other’s submissions (not to make their own submissions). The written submissions shall not exceed more than 3 pages, not including any offer to settle, bill of costs, or invoices from lawyers they retained. The submissions should be double-spaced in 12-point font.
Released: December 2, 2025 __________________________
Justice Stanley B. Sherr
Footnotes
- In his draft order for trial, the father asked for these expenses to be shared in proportion to the parties’ respective incomes. He modified that request at trial and said he agreed to pay one-third of these expenses.
- This second order assumes the father will pick up and drop off the child on Thursdays. He doesn’t do this.
- This step is not relevant in this case.
- He revealed this evidence for the first time at trial.
- The guidelines table amounts changed on September 10, 2025.
- The mother did not serve or file any income tax returns, despite many requests from the father to produce them. And, for 2024, she only filed a T4 statement on the day of trial.
- The mother had the caregivers sign a letter, dated September 11, 2024, saying they had provided childcare services to her since 2020 and that the mother pays them $25 to $40 cash for each session. Dates, times and specific amounts for those services were not set out in the letter. None of the caregivers provided sworn evidence. The court found this evidence was unreliable.
- Several courts have disallowed section 7 claims for childcare provided by family members. See: Sage v. Sage, 2014 ONSC 1330, for a discussion of this issue.
- The software calculations referred to in these reasons for decision will be attached.
- See: D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37.
- The father produced a text he sent to the mother on May 17, 2022, asking to change the childcare expenses. The mother responded to his text by telling him to take her to court. The father also presented the mother with a letter to adjust the childcare expenses in 2023. The mother refused to sign it.
- The mother testified she regrets sending the texts.
- The mother testified that she had additional childcare expenses in 2020 because she had to work extra weekends and the father was not taking the child. She said she might have been spending closer to $500 each month. This does not come into the analysis since the court is not reducing the father’s childcare payments prior to August 1, 2021.
- The court has already done the prospective analysis on this issue starting from January 1, 2024.
- This includes a $200 expense for a mouth guard.
- The child support payment for December 1, 2025 has been taken into account in this calculation.