ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
ALBERTO COSENTINO
Trial Judgment
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on November 3 and 4, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on November 25, 2025
H. Clow counsel for the Crown
M. Setia counsel for Mr. Cosentino
Introduction
1Alberto Cosentino is charged with three counts relating to events that occurred on October 3, 2024:
(i) Impaired operation of a conveyance while his ability to do so was impaired by a drug, contrary to Criminal Code section 320.14(1)(a);
(ii) Without reasonable excuse, refused to comply with a demand made by a peace officer to submit to an evaluation by an evaluation officer to determine impairment by a drug or a combination of alcohol and a drug, contrary to Criminal Code section 320.15(1); and
(iii) Fail to comply with a term of a probation order, namely "keep the peace and be of good behaviour", contrary to Criminal Code section 733.1(1).
2The Crown proceeded summarily. Mr. Cosentino is presumed innocent of all charges. The Crown must prove the essential elements of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
3On behalf of her client, Ms. Setia filed a Charter application alleging violations of Mr. Cosentino’s rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b). She requested, as a remedy, either a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) or the exclusion of all relevant evidence under section 24(2). If I found her client guilty, she also sought the court's permission to argue that her client was the victim of police entrapment, which could serve as a separate basis for issuing a stay of proceedings: see, for example, R. v. St. Georges, 2010 ONCJ 243.
4The burden typically rests on the Applicant to prove a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities. However, in this case, as with many impaired operation investigations, the arrest and the police officers' request for Mr. Cosentino to undergo a Drug Recognition Expert (“DRE”) examination were made without a warrant. Consequently, under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, the Crown must prove that his arrest and the subsequent demand were legally justified: see, for example, R. v. Gerson-Foster, 2019 ONCA 405, at para. 75.
Summary of the Crown’s Evidence
5The Crown called four police officers to testify. Since the majority of the officers’ relevant observations were recorded on their body-worn camera footage (“BWC”), which was entered as a series of exhibits, I will briefly summarize their testimony and what occurred before examining some of their evidence more closely later in this judgment.
6In the early morning hours of October 3rd, 2024, Mr. Cosentino called the police to report suspicious activity at a parking garage. He was concerned that unknown persons might be involved in criminal activity. At 5:04 a.m., police officers found him outside and well away from his vehicle. PC Longani, who testified, estimated Mr. Cosentino was at least 100, and possibly 200 metres, away from the vehicle when he first located him. Mr. Cosentino began explaining the suspicious activity he had observed and subsequently reported to 911.
7The officers investigated Mr. Cosentino’s claims. I do not need to go over the details of what he alleged had been occurring in this judgment. During their investigation, several officers listened attentively while near Mr. Cosentino to understand his concerns. They were able to observe him directly and evaluate his level of sobriety.
8As the officers continued their investigation into Mr. Cosentino’s allegations of suspicious activity, they soon began to question the accuracy of the information he provided. Their independent observations confirmed nothing he alleged; rather, their investigation led them to conclude he was misleading them. Several of them could be heard on the BWC footage, wondering aloud whether he was possibly experiencing a mental health crisis.
9Multiple officers eventually escorted Mr. Cosentino back to his vehicle. Up to this point in their investigation, the officers had not indicated that they were investigating him for being under the influence of drugs. Nor did they suggest that they had concerns about his having engaged in criminal activity more generally.
10PC Longani testified that before Mr. Cosentino was put in his motor vehicle, he was already concerned that Mr. Cosentino might have been under the influence of drugs. As I will explain, I do not find that credible, and it is not mentioned anywhere on the BWC footage prior to this moment, despite the officers having multiple conversations about Mr. Cosentino’s condition.
11Throughout the BWC footage, there are also many times when the officers can be heard questioning the status of Mr. Cosentino’s mental health once they determined his reports of suspicious activity in the area appeared to be false. They returned him to his car, as he had previously stated he was sleeping in it because he was unhoused. They did not want him wandering aimlessly around the area while he appeared agitated.
12At 5:05:51 - 5:05:18, an officer can be heard saying, “We’re gonna go back, we’re gonna open the door”, in reference to Mr. Cosentino’s car. Mr. Cosentino is heard saying, “I’m not a nutcase.” He, too, understood that officers wondered if he was mentally well.
13When Mr. Cosentino entered his vehicle, he did not start the engine or try to do so. At that moment, he was surrounded by at least five to six officers, and his parked vehicle was blocked by a large police SUV parked directly behind it.
14While he sat in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, officers asked him multiple questions. I have included the following excerpts from the BWC footage to provide a sampling of what the police officers said to Mr. Cosentino at the time.
“Do you have any mental health issues?”
“Look around you there are ten officers here because you called us… then you called us a second time saying you saw people in a minivan”
“We don’t want to get called back in another 5- 10 minutes”
“My concern is that you might be seeing things today… so I have a concern for your mental health”
“Do you wanna hurt yourself or anyone else?”
15The questions focused on Mr. Cosentino’s mental health. They also aimed to determine whether he deliberately misled the officers when they arrived on the scene while exploring the veracity of his report to the 911 call taker.
16Having reviewed the footage presented at the trial, I find as a fact the following about Mr. Cosentino’s condition on October 3, 2024:
At all times on the BWC footage, Mr. Cosentino is alert and attentive;
He can respond to the officer’s questions and take directions from them;
He is not defiant or belligerent;
He articulates himself and can be properly understood;
He does speak quickly at times, and presents as being somewhat animated;
He walks around normally, and is not unsteady on his feet, or unable to keep his balance;
He does not have noticeable or unusually “bloodshot eyes”, although he does appear somewhat sleep-deprived.
17The officers did not find any drugs, drug residue, or drug paraphernalia, either outside the vehicle, on his person, or inside the vehicle. There was a bottle of prescription medication, which appeared in one BWC, but it was never specifically identified.
18PC Longani stated in cross-examination that he knew Mr. Cosentino was a crack user. While I permitted this question because the officer’s prior dealings with Mr. Cosentino were relevant during the Charter voir dire, I note that I cannot assign much, if any, weight to uncorroborated hearsay evidence, even when evaluating whether there were lawful grounds for Mr. Cosentino’s arrest. How PC Longani “knew” Mr. Cosentino used crack cocaine in the past was never adequately explained to me.
19Following this line of questioning, at approximately 5:08 am, the officers asked Mr. Cosentino to step out of his vehicle. After further questioning, at 5:11 a.m., PC Longani informed him that he was being arrested for impaired driving. Shortly afterwards, PC Longani made a DRE demand.
20After being transported to the police division, Mr. Cosentino refused to cooperate with the DRE officer’s instructions. The evaluation could not be completed.
Testimony of Mr. Cosentino
21Mr. Cosentino testified during the Charter voir dire. He denied using drugs on October 3, 2024, or having any mental health issues. He explained that he genuinely believed he observed suspicious activity, which is why he called the police. He has poor eyesight and admitted he might have been mistaken. However, his intentions were genuine when he called 911.
22He explained that if he appeared nervous on the BWC footage, it is because he is often nervous around the police due to his past experiences with them. Most of those have been negative, especially with officers from 31 Division.
23He had not slept well when the officers arrived, and his behaviour might have been affected by sleep deprivation.
24He did not remember everything the officers claimed he said or did, and accepted that his memory of the events was not flawless. He insisted that his arrest was unfair, as he was not impaired by a drug when the officers arrested him.
Positions of the Parties
25On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Clow submits that while there is no direct evidence Mr. Cosentino consumed drugs (or alcohol), there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was impaired at the time he was in the driver’s seat of his car. In support of her argument, she asks me to accept the evidence of PCs Longani and Singh. They testified that Mr. Cosentino was exhibiting hyperactive behaviour, seemed restless, and spoke quickly. He may have experienced hallucinations, as what he reported to the police did not appear to have happened. The officers also noticed bloodshot eyes.
26Ms. Clow relied upon the case of R. v. Kroll, 2025 ONCJ 296. In Kroll, the offender was found in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parking diagonally in a parking spot. The investigating officers noted that he was hyperactive, restless, and frantic, and that he spoke very quickly. Methamphetamines were in his pocket. He was convicted of impaired operation due to the consumption of a drug. I will comment on this case later in my reasons.
27In addition, Ms. Clow submits that the officers had a lawful basis to make a DRE demand. Mr. Cosentino refused to comply with that demand. She asks me to employ section 320.31(10) of the Criminal Code, which permits a trial judge to draw an adverse inference against the accused when he has failed to comply with a lawful demand. Mr. Cosentino’s refusal, she submits, is evidence of consciousness of guilt.
28Ms. Setia submits that the investigating officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest her client or to issue a DRE demand. Their entire investigation was flawed and appeared to be based on manufactured grounds after the officers became frustrated with Mr. Cosentino. I should find that Mr. Cosentino’s Charter rights under sections 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter were infringed.
29Ms. Setia noted that her client was outside his vehicle when the police first arrived, and he called them himself due to concerns about possible illegal activity in the area. The officers can be heard on the BWC footage asking him various questions about his mental health. They cannot be heard accusing him of drug use. Moreover, PCs Singh and Longani’s testimony was neither credible nor reliable in general. They provided evasive, vague answers.
30Regarding PC Longani, Ms. Setia submits that while he stated more than once that he had reasons to suspect her client of being impaired by drug consumption, he was unable to convincingly articulate how it was he formed reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest. Indeed, she invites me to draw an adverse inference against the officer’s credibility because, under his version of events, he escorted Mr. Cosentino back into his car and allowed him to sit in the driver’s seat. It was only after this occurred that the officer suddenly decided he had grounds to make an arrest. He could not point to any specific event that shifted his subjective view which should cause me to approach his claim with caution: see R. v. Winter, 2010 ONCJ 147, at para. 41. This is illogical, and even if true, it would certainly constitute an abuse of process, as the officers placed Mr. Cosentino in the driver’s seat before arresting him. Her client effectively had no choice in the matter, even if he were impaired.
31PC Longani further testified that he “knew Mr. Cosentino to be a crack user”, and she submits that this demonstrates the officer allowed his prior prejudice to affect his decision-making on this date.
32She contends that I should have a reasonable doubt that her client was impaired by a drug, and therefore, he should be acquitted of the count of impaired care or control of a conveyance. She also argues that the officer’s DRE demand was unlawful, and that refusing to comply with it does not constitute an offence. Lastly, her client should be acquitted of failing to comply with a probation order, as he did not participate in any illegal activity.
Findings of Fact, Law and Analysis
(i) Charter Sections 8 and 9 - Initial Police Investigation, Arrest and DRE Demand
33An officer must have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest a person without a warrant for a criminal offence: Criminal Code section 495(1)(a). The officer must subjectively believe the person committed the offence, and objectively, there must be reasonable grounds for this belief: R. v. Rhyason, 2007 SCC 39, at para. 12. When a person is arrested for impaired driving and a breath demand is made, this is not only a statutory requirement but also a constitutional one, as it serves as a precondition for a lawful search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter: see R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35, at paras. 13-17. This principle also applies to a DRE demand made under Criminal Code section 320.28(2)(a).
34An officer must consider all available information at the time and can only dismiss information if they have good reason to believe it is unreliable: R. v. Golub, 1997 CanLII 6316 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 21. At the same time, the presence of other possible explanations for signs of impairment besides alcohol or drugs does not necessarily undermine the existence of reasonable and probable grounds: Shepherd, supra at para. 23; R. v. Bush, 2010 ONCA 554, at para. 57.
35This case involves an allegation that Mr. Cosentino was impaired by a drug, not by alcohol. Criminal Code section 320.28(2)(a) states (paraphrased) that if a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person had operated a conveyance while their ability to do so was impaired to any degree by a drug, the peace officer may, by demand, made as soon as practicable, require the person to submit to an evaluation conducted by an evaluating officer. The evaluating officer may conduct an evaluation to determine whether the person’s ability to operate a conveyance has been impaired by drug consumption.
36In the context of a standard impaired driving investigation, this is not generally regarded as an onerous test: see Bush at para. 46; R. v. Wang, 2010 ONCA 435, at para. 17. But the requirement of reasonable and probable grounds to make a lawful arrest must always be taken seriously, and rigorously analyzed when challenged by the defence.
37After investigating Mr. Cosentino’s allegations, the officers could conclude that he was acting somewhat erratically. He reported events that simply did not occur. He appeared nervous. It was entirely appropriate for them to question him about why he called the police and to inquire about his mental health. That was responsible police work and entirely reasonable.
38Eventually, they searched his car and found no evidence of drug use whatsoever. There were no drugs. No drug residue. No bags or containers linked to drug use. No devices capable of being used for drug consumption. In fact, there was simply nothing that could be associated with drug use. PCs Singh and Longani agreed with this conclusion during cross-examination.
39Mr. Cosentino was not even physically near his car when the officers arrived, much less operating it or sitting in the driver’s seat. He was between 100 and 200 metres away. The officers had plenty of time to assess him before leading him back to his car. When testifying, PC Longani denied having formed his grounds to make an arrest prior to Mr. Cosentino being placed in the driver’s seat of his car by another officer. Instead, PC Longani testified that he had changed his subjective determination and formed reasonable and probable grounds for an arrest because more time had passed and he had made additional observations of Mr. Cosentino. The passage of time he referenced amounted to mere minutes when nothing eventful occurred.
40When asked to explain his grounds for an arrest, PC Longani testified that Mr. Cosentino was displaying “hyperactive behaviour” and was “jittery” or “restless.” He made inaccurate claims and claims that “did not make sense." I agree with Ms. Clow that these are factors the officer was entitled to consider. However, PC Longani emphasized several times during his testimony that his observations led him to suspect that Mr. Cosentino might be under the influence of drugs.
41When he was pressed during cross-examination on what changed for him that elevated these suspicions into reasonable and probable grounds, he explained that after placing Mr. Cosentino in his vehicle, he had spent more time with him and answered more questions. But none of the answers resulted in any incriminating statements.
42I did not find PC Longani’s answers to many of Ms. Setia’s questions to be honest or sincere. At one point, she played the BWC footage of another officer, PC Graham, where PC Longani can be clearly heard stating, “We will open the door” and “check”. This was obviously a reference to Mr. Cosentino’s vehicle, and it is not disputed that Mr. Cosentino ended up back in the driver’s seat of his car and that officers searched that car for drugs later. PC Longani testified he did not “recall” what his comments were about. This response was totally unworthy of belief. The point Ms. Setia was making, that the officer felt the need to “check” for evidence of drug consumption to confirm his suspicions that evening, was obvious and logical. For some reason, PC Longani felt the need to attempt to deceive me with this portion of his testimony.
43Furthermore, PC Longani stated during cross-examination that he asked Mr. Cosentino whether he used crack when he first arrived at the scene because he was concerned about illegal drug use. However, no record of this was found in his memo book. PC Longani could not explain why he did not note this question. That omission would be significant in an investigation that ultimately led to an arrest for impaired driving due to drug use. I do not accept his answer given during cross-examination. Additionally, he testified that he also “forgot” to activate his BWCs until later that evening, meaning there was no audio or video record of the interaction. PC Longani agreed this was a breach of TPS policy regarding BWC use. I do not accept this portion of his testimony either.
44Ms. Setia also played a section of PC Singh’s BWC footage for PC Longani, showing where Mr. Cosentino’s vehicle was parked. A police vehicle was positioned directly behind it, effectively preventing movement. The video was intended to visually demonstrate that Mr. Cosentino’s vehicle could not be moved out of the area, even if he tried. PC Longani gave evasive answers to Ms. Setia’s questions, which were merely intended to have him confirm this glaring and obvious fact, which was indisputable based on the video evidence. For example, he stated at one point that it was “hard to tell if the [vehicle] could go anywhere.” It is also notable that over 10 officers were present at the time, surrounding Mr. Cosentino, who was in the driver’s seat with the driver’s-side door still open and the keys out of the ignition. PC Longani’s responses to this line of questioning did not inspire confidence.
45Perhaps of greatest importance, I found that his testimony never convincingly addressed the most relevant question about how he and the other police officers handled a key aspect of this investigation. Why would they let Mr. Cosentino back into his car at all if any of them, including PC Longani, suspected that his ability to operate the vehicle was impaired due to drug use? Indeed, having decided to direct him back into his car, it is hard to believe that the officers genuinely worried that drugs impaired his judgment. If that were true, it would mean they knowingly allowed him to operate a vehicle even though they knew there was a risk he could not do so safely. That, in turn, would have jeopardized their safety and that of the community. Such a degree of negligence would be astonishing for a police officer.
46In conclusion, I did not find PC Longani to be a credible or reliable witness.
47Regarding the other officers who testified, PC Singh was not a reliable witness. He answered many questions with “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall.” He relied on the BWC footage to explain what happened and clarified that PC Longani made the decision to arrest Mr. Cosentino. PC Brown testified that he did not make any significant observations of Mr. Cosentino until after he was arrested. The police cannot rely on observations made after an arrest to justify the grounds for that arrest: see R. v. Beaver, 2022 SCC 54, at para. 72.
48I recognize that any degree of impairment, from slight to great, is sufficient to make out the offence of impaired driving: R. v. Stellato, 1993 CanLII 3375(Ontario C.A.). In this case, there is no direct evidence of drug consumption. The Crown asks me, nevertheless, to conclude on the basis of alleged circumstantial evidence that the officers could draw a reasonable inference that Mr. Cosentino had consumed drugs and thus the arrest and DRE demand were lawful.
49I do not agree that such an inference was available to PC Longani. In reported cases where courts have found there were reasonable grounds to arrest a motorist for impaired operation by drugs, much more evidence has been presented. For example, in R. v. Dhaliwal, 2014 ABQB 717, the arresting officer stopped a driver for speeding. The officer described the suspect’s red, bloodshot and half-closed eyes, and that he was unsteady on his feet. There was also a glass bong in plain view.
50If the officers, including PC Longani, had a suspicion that Mr. Cosentino’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired due to drug consumption, they could have resorted to Criminal Code section 320.27(1). That section states the following (my emphasis added):
If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol or a drug in their body and that the person has, within the preceding three hours, operated a conveyance, the peace officer may, by demand, require the person to comply with the requirements of either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b) in the case of alcohol or with the requirements of either or both of paragraphs (a) and (c) in the case of a drug:
(a) to immediately perform the physical coordination tests prescribed by regulation and to accompany the peace officer for that purpose…
51The physical coordination tests are outlined in the Evaluation of Impaired Operations (Drugs and Alcohol) Regulations – SOR/208-196, s. 2. These are performed by a Standard Field Sobriety Test (“SFST”) officer. The three tests described in the regulation can be done quickly to minimize interference with the suspect’s Charter rights during the screening process: see R. v. Parada, 2016 SKCA 102, at para. 34. The SFST request is the functional equivalent of the approved screening device demand for a driver suspected of being impaired by alcohol. It is a tool officers can use to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the suspect has committed a drug-operating offence: see Jokinen, K, and Keen, P., Impaired Driving and Other Offences, 2nd Edition. Toronto: Emond Publishing (2023), at p. 367.
52The officers did not testify that they considered this investigative step, and I must evaluate their conduct based on what they did and the stated basis for their actions, not what they could have done: see the dissenting reasons of Tholla J.A. in R. v. Sabiston, 2023 SKCA 105, at para. 93; adopted by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sabiston, 2024 SCC 33, at para. 1. Nevertheless, my point is that they had other investigative means available to them and did not consider them. “Reasonable and probable grounds” is a higher standard than “reasonable suspicion”: see Beaver, supra. Before jumping to an arrest on such a questionable basis, they could have considered a lawful means to further investigate Mr. Cosentino and potentially buttress their belief in Mr. Cosentino’s impairment, if that belief was genuine.
53For example, in R. v. Wilson, 2020 ONSC 1956, Justice Heeney ruled that detaining a motorist at a roadside for an evaluation by an SFST officer was Charter-compliant. The accused, while driving, hit a building. An officer later found his white minivan damaged nearby. The officer approached the accused and observed bloodshot eyes, constricted pupils, and a lethargic speech pattern. He could not answer simple questions clearly. The driver denied having consumed alcohol or drugs. The officer issued a demand under the former section 254(2), citing reasonable grounds to suspect the motorist’s ability to operate was impaired by drugs: see paras. 11-27. Justice Heeney then found that the subsequent arrest and DRE demand were lawful, as the officers relied partly on SFST results: see para. 36.
54In this case, my final determination is that PC Longani did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Cosentino for impaired operation of a conveyance. Nor did he have reasonable grounds to issue a DRE demand. Furthermore, I find PC Longani’s testimony that he had a subjective belief in the necessary grounds to be untrue. At most, he thought he had a reasonable suspicion. He did not genuinely believe he had reasonable and probable grounds. He falsely constructed and presented that belief later to justify the arrest he had already decided to make.
55Mr. Cosentino’s rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.
(ii) Mr. Cosentino’s Degree of Impairment
56Having reviewed the BWC footage, I find that Mr. Cosentino was alert, articulate and in control of his faculties. He was able to answer the officer’s questions. He walked normally and was not unsteady on his feet. I do not see particularly “bloodshot eyes.”
57The only notable feature about how he presents himself is that he could be described as a “fast-talker.”
58I am not prepared to draw the conclusion, based on the circumstantial evidence presented in this case, that Mr. Cosentino consumed drugs. There are other, plausible alternatives, including that Mr. Cosentino was tired, or is naturally a nervous person, especially when interacting with police officers: see R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, at para. 30.
Verdicts
59Ms. Setia made several other meritorious Charter arguments that I do not need to address in light of the conclusions I have already made.
60Considering all of the evidence presented by the Crown that I accept, I am left with reasonable doubt that a drug impaired Mr. Cosentino’s ability to operate his motor vehicle. Furthermore, I found Mr. Cosentino to be a truthful witness. I accept his testimony that he did not consume drugs that night. While I recognize his testimony was confined to the voir dire, it is important that he knows I believe him.
61I do not find the case of Kroll, relied upon by the Crown, to be of assistance. In Kroll, officers located the offender in his car. Mr. Cosentino was originally outside his vehicle. Drugs were found on the offender’s person in Kroll, and a crack pipe was located in this car; no drugs or drug paraphernalia were found on Mr. Cosentino. The offender was acting “frantically” and at one point placed his feet up in the air in the back of the officer’s squad car. I find Mr. Cosentino’s behaviour was nothing akin to that. Finally, there were toxicology results presented to the court in Kroll that the offender had consumed methamphetamines and GHB: see paras. 8-10, and 26-31.
62He is found not guilty of count 1.
63As I have explained, there was no lawful basis to make a DRE demand. Therefore, he must be acquitted of count 2 as well. The demand was unlawful, and it is not an offence to refuse an unlawful demand: R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, at paras. 48-9; R. v. Montana, 2025 ONCJ 484, at para. 85.
64I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally violated his probation order by not “keeping the peace,” either, and he is found not guilty of count 3. On the basis of the facts that I have found, Mr. Cosentino did nothing that could constitute “not keep the peace and being of good behaviour” in any event.
Final Remarks
65This trial neither started nor finished on its originally scheduled dates. Mr. Cosentino, who was detained on these charges, was not brought to court until 2 pm. on the first day of trial. I never received any explanation from the Toronto South Detention Centre regarding this delay, despite repeated requests. This was completely unacceptable and, unfortunately, not an uncommon occurrence in Toronto. We often face unexplained delays at this courthouse in bringing inmates to trial, leading to hours of lost court time.
66On the second day of the trial, while the witnesses completed their testimony, there was insufficient time to hear counsel's submissions. A new date for continuing the trial was not available until February 26, 2026.
67Ms. Clow and Ms. Setia agreed to submit written arguments instead and to return the case for a judgment on November 25, 2025. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to them for suggesting this approach and following through as promised. Their written submissions were excellent: clear, concise, and directly on point. They allowed me to make a decision for an accused person in custody within a reasonable time frame, rather than delaying the trial by at least another three months. Their willingness to contribute such helpful written material on a short timeline demonstrated noteworthy professionalism.
Released: November 25, 2025
Signed: Justice Brock Jones