R. v. Murray, 2025 ONCJ 604
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
GEORGE MURRAY
Before Justice Peter Scrutton
Heard on October 22, 23, 24 and November 10, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on November 19, 2025
A. Singh..................................................................................................................... for the Crown
O. Bedi.............................................................................................................. for George Murray
INTRODUCTION
1George Murray is charged with criminal harassment and uttering threats in relation to Laura Scott, a stranger he met in a Toronto parking lot early one morning. Both parties accept that Mr. Murray and Ms. Scott spoke for approximately five minutes. She alleges that he made threats and hateful comments at the end of their interaction which caused her to be fearful. Mr. Murray denies this. They were the only witnesses who testified at trial because the parties very responsibly collaborated on an extensive Agreed Statement of Facts that significantly streamlined the proceedings.
THE EVIDENCE
Laura Scott’s Account
2Laura Scott went to her local gym, in a plaza at Danforth and Victoria Park Avenues in Toronto, around 5:00 a.m. on December 1, 2023. She left the gym shortly after 6:00 a.m. As she walked out through the parking she heard a car horn. It was dark and cold outside. The parking lot was dimly lit. She did not notice anyone else in the vicinity.
3Ms. Scott turned around at the honk and saw a man sitting in a silver car. She thought he might need directions. He lowered the passenger window. She was about 10-15 feet away when she first saw him and walked toward the car. The driver asked if she was “White”. She answered that she was Irish American but had converted to Islam as an adult. He asked her how a White girl came to be a Muslim. She told him that she had studied, bought a Quran, and made a declaration of faith. He asked where she was from and when she told him she was from West Virginia, he told her about his recent trip to Mississippi.
4Ms. Scott began to feel uncomfortable. It was 6:00 a.m. and she did not know this person. She generally preferred not to speak to men outside of her work or her home. At the same time, she was used to people asking about her religious conversion and it was her habit to be polite. The man seemed genuinely interested so she obliged him.
5The man next asked her why she had to cover herself and dress the way she did (she was wearing a hijab). She explained why and he replied that he thought it was unfair that men did not have to cover themselves in the same way. She told him that some Muslim men did cover themselves and he responded that he had not seen that. They spent a few minutes discussing Islamic religious practices. Eventually, Ms. Scott became curt in an effort to end the conversation. She told the man that she did not feel like debating religion in a parking lot at six o’clock in the morning. He continued providing his opinion about her religion, including that she should not have to dress in the manner that she did. She began to feel anxious when she saw the direction that the conversation was taking. She tried to end the conversation politely, saying something to the effect of “good night” or “nice talking to you.”
6The man continued to speak and ask questions. When she conveyed that she did not want to keep talking, his tone changed and became more serious and less friendly. He began to make what she interpreted as Islamophobic comments. She tried to end the conversation again. Eventually, she told him that she did not want to speak to him and was uncomfortable speaking to a man. He replied, “Well, if I got out of this car and raped you, you would have no choice but to talk to me,” before embarking on what she described as a tirade. He referred to genocide and told her that she should join Hamas or a terrorist organization – associations that greatly offended her.
7By the end of her interaction with the man, Ms. Scott felt very unsafe and very fearful. She estimated that the conversation lasted about 5 minutes. His comment about raping her had not been precipitated by anything other than her saying that he did not want to talk anymore. She was concerned he was mentally ill. She walked away from the car and the man yelled after her. She waited around the corner for her husband to come. She called 911 once he arrived.
8Ms. Scott identified screen shots of a call log on her cell phone. She testified that when the conversation became less friendly and she began to feel afraid, she called her husband, who was asleep at home. He answered her third call at 6:13 a.m. She explained that she did not speak to him but held the phone down hoping that he could hear what was happening. She also sent two texts, “help me” and “HELP” during the call, both at 6:13 a.m.
Challenges to Ms. Scott’s Account
9Ms. Scott admitted that, given the passage of time, she did not have a clear memory of all the details of the conversation. When asked why it took her so long to walk away, she said that every time she was about to leave the man would say something else or ask another question, along the lines of “just one more thing.” She had politely responded each time. She did not step away from the vehicle when she became uncomfortable but began shifting her body. She did not walk away until the man threatened to rape her. He began to yell other comments as she walked away – he had not been yelling until that point. She agreed that their interaction was completely verbal and that the man never left his car. She testified that she thought that her husband had heard some of their conversation when she called him but agreed that she had told the police he had not overheard them after seeing part of her police statement. She called her husband rather than the police first because she was more comfortable with him.
Agreed Facts and Exhibits
10Ms. Scott called 911 and provided a description of the car as a silver/grey older model sedan. She described the person she spoke to as a Black man, in his late 30s or early 40s, approximately 5’8 with a small build but with a belly. Police investigators conducted a video canvass of nearby businesses. This surveillance footage eventually enabled them to identify the car that Ms. Scott had described, which was registered to the defendant. The defence admits that Mr. Murray was the man Ms. Scott spoke to that morning.
11Exhibit 1A, video footage from a business across the street from the plaza, shows parts of the interaction between Ms. Scott and Mr. Murray. At 6:10 a.m., Mr. Murray’s sedan drives into the plaza and stops. Just as he is pulling into a parking space, before he has completely stopped, Ms. Scott is visible walking from the gym toward the street on the sidewalk perpendicular to the front of his car. She walks some distance past the car at a relatively brisk pace and then turns around and walks more slowly over to the passenger side of the car. She remains by the passenger side of the car from 6:10 a.m. to 6:15 a.m., about 4½ minutes, before walking out of the plaza. Because of the distance between the surveillance camera and the car, the footage does not capture Ms. Scott’s relative distance to the car or whether that changed during the interaction. The silver car begins to back out within a few seconds of Ms. Scott walking away and drives out of the plaza.
George Murray’s Account
12Mr. Murray left his home in Oshawa that morning for work in downtown Toronto near the intersection of Dundas Ave. and River Street. He ran a cleaning company and was to begin work at 8:00 a.m. Highway 401 west was congested and the traffic made him tired. He called his wife, who suggested he leave the highway, get a coffee, and rest. He departed from his usual route down the Don Valley Parkway and exited the highway east of it at Victoria Park Avenue. He drove south until Danforth Ave, saw a plaza, and thought it would be a good place to stop and canvass for new business.
13Mr. Murray pulled into the plaza and saw a White lady wearing a hijab walk past his car. Both his windows were already down for fresh air. He asked if he could ask her a question. She said “yes,” and he asked if she was a Muslim. She said “yes” again. He asked her how things were in the current climate (referring to the aftermath of the October 7, 2023 attacks), noticed her gym bag, and asked if there was a gym in the plaza. She said “yes”, an all-female gym. He asked if she was permitted to exercise with men and she said yes but that she chose not to.
14Mr. Murray inquired if he could ask another question and then asked about the different dressing and grooming practices between Muslim men and women. She said she did not know the answer and explained that she was a convert. He asked about prayers and whether men and women prayed separately. He told her about his business and a property that he owned in Mississippi. Eventually, she mentioned that she had to go, her husband was coming to pick her up, and walked away.
15When asked what prompted him to start this conversation with a stranger, Mr. Murray said that he was curious, as he had never seen a White Muslim person, and often spoke to strangers. Essentially, he described a normal, innocuous chat.
Challenges to Mr. Murray’s Account
16Mr. Murray could not recall why he left home so early that morning, given that he was not scheduled to begin work until 8:00 a.m. He did not recall what he planned to do until worked started. He did not stop anywhere on Victoria Park Ave after exiting the highway and could not explain why he chose this specific plaza on the Danforth. He did not do any canvassing there. He maintained that Ms. Scott was 3-4 feet away from his car when he called out to her and disagreed that the surveillance footage established she was considerably farther away. He was shown surveillance footage and disagreed that glare visible on his passenger window from an overhead light subsequently disappeared because he had rolled his window down. He also disagreed that he had honked rather than called out to Ms. Scott but allowed that his windows might not have been down when he drove into the plaza. When asked about whether it would be unusual to engage in a conversation with a stranger at this time of day, he said that “he wasn’t aware of the time, if it was early or late.”
The Parties’ Positions
17Defence counsel emphasizes the burden of proof and argues that the surveillance footage supports Mr. Murray’s version of events as much if not more than it supports Ms. Scott’s. She willingly approached the car, willingly remained for five minutes, and did not seek the assistance of any passersby (which I take to mean motorists). He said he was interested and curious and that is what Ms. Scott perceived him to be. No forensic evidence establishes that she called her husband. Defence counsel relies on Ms. Scott’s limited memory of the conversation and uncertainty as to exactly when she told Mr. Murray that her practice was not to speak to men she did not know to submit that her evidence cannot be relied upon.
18The Crown argues that Ms. Scott authenticated her own phone calls and texts. The prosecution does not seek to rely on her messages as res gestae but argues that they are probative of Ms. Scott’s state of mind at the time of the alleged conduct. Her account was clear and consistent throughout her testimony. Mr. Murray’s evidence was void of details, at odds with the surveillance footage, and internally inconsistent. The Crown emphasizes that the threats must be considered in all the circumstances, which involve an unknown man engaging with a Muslim woman in a dark and empty parking lot and directing threatening and Islamophobic comments toward her.
Relevant Legal Principles
19George Murray is presumed innocent of these charges. The burden of proof is on the Crown, who must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of criminal harassment or uttering threats. There is no onus on him to prove anything. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an exacting one. It is more than probable or likely guilt and much closer to absolute certainty than proof on a balance of probabilities. Ultimately, I may only find Mr. Murray guilty if I am sure that he committed the offence alleged.
20Mr. Murray is entitled to the full weight of the direction in R. v. W. (D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. If I believe his evidence that he did not threaten Ms. Scott, then I must find him not guilty. If I do not believe his testimony but am nonetheless left in reasonable doubt by it, he must similarly be found not guilty. Even if I am not left in doubt by his evidence, I must ask myself whether, based on the evidence that I do accept, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
21The purpose of this framework is to emphasize the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence by ensuring that criminal cases are not reduced to credibility contests. The issue is not whose evidence I prefer but whether the Crown has proved the case against Mr. Murray beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no rigid order in which evidence must be analyzed – reasonable doubt principles are a matter of substance rather than form.
22This case hinges on the credibility of each witness. No magic formula applies to assessing credibility. A witness’ evidence is to be considered using a common-sense approach that is not tainted by myth, stereotype or assumption. Many factors may be relevant. Some key ones include whether the witness’ evidence is internally consistent, whether it coheres with evidence from other witnesses or exhibits, whether the witness has a motive to fabricate, whether inconsistencies in the evidence are about important or minor matters, what explanations are given for any inconsistencies, and whether the inconsistencies suggest that the witness is lying. I must also be mindful of the distinction between credibility and reliability. The former relates to the sincerity of the testimony; the latter relates to its accuracy.
CREDIBILITY FINDINGS
a) Mr. Murray
23I reject Mr. Murray’s evidence, almost in its entirety. Very little of it makes any sense or withstands even mild scrutiny.
24Mr. Murray could not explain why he set out for work some three hours in advance of his scheduled start time that morning. He did not explain how he spent, or had planned to spend, the time between leaving the plaza at 6:15 a.m. and beginning work at 8:00 a.m. I do not accept his testimony that he planned to canvass businesses in that plaza. According to him, the only reason he was in that area at that time was because he was tired and wanted to rest. 6:00 a.m., hours before most businesses are open, does not seem like a particularly good time to knock on doors to solicit prospective business. Further, Mr. Murray testified that he thought of canvassing when he noticed an empty storefront at the end of the plaza. He did not explain why a vacant business or building might want to hire a cleaner. In any event, Mr. Murray spent the entirety of his time in the plaza speaking to Ms. Scott and admitted that he did no canvassing, which is also evident from the surveillance footage.
25I reject Mr. Murray’s evidence that he left the highway because he was tired and that his “plan” was to pull over to rest and have a coffee. He did neither of those things in the plaza.1 All he did there was interact with Ms. Scott before he drove away. He would have passed other places to stop and rest or have a coffee on his drive south on Victoria Park Ave from Highway 401, which took him past major intersections such as Ellesmere, Lawrence, and St. Clair avenues. Yet, despite his professed tiredness, he did not stop until he reached Danforth Ave., at a plaza he had never been to, one for which he said he made a conscious, specific choice to stop but for reasons that he could not explain. When he did stop, he did not rest but initiated a conversation with a stranger. He did not stay to rest once that conversation ended but immediately drove away. I am even sceptical about his claim that traffic was congested on the highway that morning, given that he would have been driving before 6:00 a.m. but appreciate that this is a minor point and that heavy traffic may have been attributable to a collision or construction that Mr. Murray did not describe.
26I do not believe Mr. Murray when he says that his front passenger window was down when he entered the plaza. This was an early December morning on a day that Ms. Scott described as cold. He was clear about his windows being down in his examination-in-chief but allowed in cross-examination that the passenger window may have been up. I accept that Exhibit 4, surveillance footage from Sally’s Beauty, establishes that Mr. Murray’s passenger window was up when he parked the car and that he lowered it once already stopped.2 In infer this not only from the fact that the glare from the overhead light on the window glass disappears after he stops but because the window’s movement is faintly visible upon close review of the footage. This aspect of Mr. Murray’s testimony directly relates to his account of how he got Ms. Scott’s attention.
27I reject Mr. Murray’s description of Ms. Scott being 3-4 feet away from his car when he first called out to her. She testified that she was 10-15 feet away when she heard a car horn. Exhibit 1 shows that she walked back to the car from a number of paces away. Given the perspective of the camera, it is impossible to determine with any precision how far Ms. Scott was from Mr. Murray’s car when he first caught her attention but I am sure she was much farther away than 3-4 feet. Because his passenger window was up, and Ms. Scott was some distance from his car, I reject Mr. Murray’s testimony that he did not honk at her but got her attention simply by asking if he could ask her a question in a normal voice. I accept her evidence that he honked at her.
28Based on common sense and human experience, I am dubious about Mr. Murray’s claim that he did not think there was anything strange or unusual about initiating a conversation with a stranger about race and religion in a dark parking lot at six o’clock in the morning. I do not, though, reject his testimony in this respect for normative reasons. I do so because of his explanation that he “wasn’t aware of the time, if it was early or late, I thought I would give her the opportunity to respond yes or no to whether I could ask her a question.” It was dark, the plaza was virtually deserted, and it was just after 6:00 a.m. It could not have been lost on Mr. Murray that this was “early,” and that Ms. Scott was walking away from the plaza with purpose. Nothing in her body language conveyed receptivity to a chat.
29For these reasons and others that I will expand on below, I reject Mr. Murray’s version of events. I do not believe him when he says that he did not threaten Ms. Scott and that they engaged in a friendly conversation. Nor does his account raise a reasonable doubt.
b) Ms. Scott
30Ms. Scott was a thoughtful and articulate witness. She repeatedly acknowledged in her examination-in-chief and in cross-examination that she could not recall all of their conversation. At no point was there any suggestion that she was filling in gaps or speculating. On both witnesses’ accounts, she was polite and patient with Mr. Murray, a stranger to her. In my view, Ms. Scott did not exaggerate any of her evidence. In fact, she did not seem to have any particular interest in the outcome of this prosecution. She appeared simply to be resigned to the fact that Islamophobia is a feature of society that she has experienced and will likely continue to experience.
31Defence counsel did not allege any motive to fabricate, which is a neutral factor insofar as Ms. Scott’s credibility is concerned but certainly does not detract from it. I am satisfied that her inability to remember with precision the exact sequence and content of the 5-minute conversation does not detract from the credibility and reliability of the material parts of her account.
32Many parts of Ms. Scott’s testimony are confirmed by independent evidence. With the exception of its make, she accurately described the car that she had seen and, with the exception of Mr. Murray’s age, she accurately described its driver. The surveillance footage confirms that she accurately described the length of this interaction, where it occurred, and the character of the location (dimly lit and devoid of people).
33I accept Ms. Scott’s evidence that the name visible on the screenshot of her call log is her husband’s and that she both called and messaged him during this interaction. While potentially admissible as res gestae, I am not relying on the text messages she sent during this interaction, “help me” and “HELP”, for the truth of their contents, i.e., as evidence that Ms. Scott needed assistance that night. Nor am I relying on them as a prior consistent statement that enhances Ms. Scott’s credibility in virtue of the fact that her in court testimony is consistent with the texts she sent during the interaction and with calling the police immediately after: R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114 at para. 25. I do, though, find that the spontaneous nature of these texts, and their timing, which exactly coincides with Ms. Scott’s interaction with the defendant, are probative of her emotional state at the time she made the texts, which is something that is relevant to my assessment of her credibility. See R. v. Khan, 2017 ONCA 114 at paras. 41-44.
34I would have no trouble concluding that Ms. Scott was credible absent these messages, given the clarity and fairness of her testimony and how much of her account coheres with the surveillance footage. I accept her evidence that Mr. Murray got her attention by honking his horn, that she engaged in what progressed from an inconvenient to irksome to anxiety-producing conversation only out of a sense of politeness, and that she walked away from this interaction once Mr. Murray became threatening and hateful. I accept her evidence that he threatened to rape her and that she felt unsafe and fearful, which is a completely understandable response to being accosted by a strange man in a dark and empty parking lot. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that she gave a truthful, reliable account of her interaction with Mr. Murray that night. I reject any part of his evidence that is inconsistent with hers as failing to raise a reasonable doubt.
Analysis of the Counts
35Mr. Murray is charged with criminally harassing Ms. Scott contrary to s. 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code. The Crown must prove that he engaged in threatening conduct, without lawful authority, that harassed Ms. Scott, that he knew or was reckless to the fact that his conduct harassed her, that this caused her to fear for her safety, and that her fear was reasonable in the circumstances: R. v. Kosikar, 1999 CanLII 3775 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3569 at paras. 15-26.
36I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved each element of this offence. Mr. Murray threatened to rape a stranger wearing a hijab immediately before unleashing a tirade of Islamophobic remarks toward her. He did so in a dark, empty parking lot. When all of the circumstances are considered, I am sure that any person in Ms. Scott’s circumstances would consider this conduct to be threatening. It certainly harassed Ms. Scott, who felt distressed, fearful, and unsafe. I am satisfied that Mr. Murray knew or was at least reckless to the fact that Ms. Scott was harassed, a consequence that was virtually inevitable in the circumstances. I am sure that he was not ever genuinely interested in Ms. Scott’s answers to the questions that he asked about being a Muslim woman, even while acknowledging that Ms. Scott initially believed that he was. When asked why he was so curious about Ms. Scott, Mr. Murray answered that he works with a lot of Muslims, whom he regularly speaks with. It does not make sense for him ask a stranger these questions, at this time, given his familiarity with these religious customs. His own views about this religion became clear early in the conversation.
37I am satisfied that Ms. Scott feared for her safety and that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would feel that way if threatened by an unknown man in a dark and empty parking lot. Mr. Murray certainly had no authority to engage in this conduct. I find him guilty of criminal harassment.
38Mr. Murray’s uttering threats count alleges that he “did by word of mouth knowingly cause Laura Scott to receive a death threat contrary to section 264.1(a) of the Criminal Code.” I have already explained that I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Murray threatened to rape Ms. Scott and that he did so knowingly. There is no doubt that this threat satisfies the bodily harm element of this offence, as sexual assault is capable of causing serious hurt, injury, or psychological harm: R. v. McCraw, 1991 CanLII 29 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72.
39The only legal question that must be answered in respect of this count is whether, because of the specific wording of the count as charged, the Crown must prove that Mr. Murray threatened to kill Ms. Scott, an issue I invited the parties to make submissions on after this matter was originally adjourned for judgment. The prosecution submits that the particularization of “threat to cause death” necessarily includes a threat to cause bodily harm, such that there is no legal impediment to a finding of guilt on the count as charged. In the alternative, the Crown seeks to amend the count to conform with the evidence at trial by substituting the word “death” with “bodily harm” or by deleting “to cause death.” Defence counsel opposes an amendment, largely on the basis that the separate charge of criminal harassment obviates concerns about technicalities or the multiplicity of proceedings that animate the jurisprudence on the powers of amendment under s. 601(2) of the Criminal Code.
40The count in issue specifies that Mr. Murray was charged under s. 264.1(a) of the Criminal Code, which makes it an offence to knowingly utter a threat to cause death or bodily harm. As charged, the count particularizes the more serious of two modes of committing that offence. In my view, Mr. Murray’s defence has not been misled and would not be prejudiced by the Crown’s proposed amendment. I am also satisfied that the amendment will not impact the fairness of the trial: R. v. Bidwani, 2018 ONCA 698 at paras. 33 and 50; R. v. Morozuk, 1986 CanLII 72 (SCC), 1986 1 S.C.R. 31; and R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 626. Mr. Murray knew the case he had to meet. His defence was a complete denial of the allegations. Having regard to the merits of the case, it is in the interests of justice to amend the count to conform to the evidence that Mr. Murray threatened to rape rather than kill Ms. Scott. I amend count one to substitute the word “death” with “bodily harm” and find him guilty of that count.
Dated: November 19, 2025 _________________________
Justice Peter Scrutton