Rose J.:

1Mr. Smissaert pleaded not guilty on September 17, 2025 to several charges. The date of each offence is the same, April 4, 2025:

Make surreptitious recording per s. 162(1);
Careless store firearm;
Store Firearm without a secure locking device;
Possess firearm carelessly;
Use firearm carelessly;
Store firearm without locking device;
Possess prohibited firearm without a licence;
Possess firearm without licence;
Possess firearm without licence;
Possess magazine with no licence;
Possess prohibited device;
Possess prohibited device;
Possess prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition without licence.

2On October 28, 2025 Mr. Smissaert changed his plea on count #1 to guilty and maintained his not guilty pleas for the balance of the charges. The trial commenced with a Charter Application alleging that his rights were violated under s. 8 as a result of the seizure of various firearms and related items on April 4, 2025 by DC Dikih. Those seizures were taken, all agree, without prior judicial authorization.

3The Application commenced with the Crown calling evidence on the basis that a seizure without prior judicial authorization is presumptively unreasonable, see Hunter v. Southam 1984 CanLII 33 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at p. 9 , R. v. Collins 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. The Crown therefore called evidence to rebut that presumption.

Overview

4Mr. Smissaert is now 64 years old, and was arrested on April 4, 2025 because of a voyeurism allegation by his tenant. An Agreed Statement of Fact (ASF), accompanying videos, and download analysis from his two devices were put into evidence on the guilty plea. Mr. Smissaert lives on Bridge Street in Carleton Place which is where the voyeurism occurred. That address is a single family dwelling on a corner, across from a church.

5Upon arrest Mr. Smissaert gave a statement to Det Dikih at the OPP detachment in Carlton Place. The video of the statement shows Mr. Smissaert to talk openly about the voyeurism allegation. Det. Dikih told Mr. Smissaert that the police would request a 3 day investigative hold for him when he appeared before a Justice the next day. The reason for that request was to get a search warrant to search Mr. Smissaert’s house for electronic devices connected with the voyeurism count.

6At about 1 hour into the interview he was asked if there is anything else he would like to disclose to the officer. At that point he talked about various firearms he had in his house which were not stored properly. Det Dikih then went, almost immediately, to Mr. Smissaert’s house with Det Cst. Pineau and seized the firearms, various parts and pieces of ammunition. There was no prior judicial authorization for that entry, although there was a search warrant obtained and executed at the house some days later.

The interview

7Mr. Smissaert told Det. Dikih that “I have rifles that are unregistered they’re hunting rifles…I got three…they’re somewhat hidden in the house but you know you’re going to find them”. He denies that he is under any firearms prohibition, and said that he didn’t have a hunting licence. He had the 12 gauge shotgun since he was probably twenty years old, and he got the other hunting rifle from his uncle maybe 15 or 20 years ago. He didn’t register them because he disagreed with the government’s firearms registrations scheme. He bought one of them in 1979 or 1980 when he was in the military.

8Mr. Smissaert continued that “…one’s a bolt action one’s just gas operated you know semi-automatic”. One of the rifles was his father’s M1 carbine, which was passed along to him via his uncle. The rifles are hidden in a closet and “…you won’t have any problem finding…they’re not in a locked locker or nothing like that”.

9He admitted to not having a licence for the weapons.

10In the interview Det. Dikih was asked why this was relevant, and replied “…why it’s a very simple explanation because people’s homes get broken into all the time…right now you’re in police custody right which means your house is going to be vacant because you’re not at home tonight or tomorrow night and if somebody breaks in you just enabled them because good people don’t break into people’s houses…”.

11As the interview progressed Mr. Smissaert confirmed that nobody knows about the guns, not even the complainant who was living in the house with him before his arrest. His house has never been broken into.

12Det. Dikih was candid with Mr. Smissaert, saying that “…I can guarantee we’re going to take them we’re going to seize them because you’re not lawfully allowed to have it plus you’re not storing it properly which we can’t ignore because then I’ll be breaking the law”.

13Mr. Smissaert disclosed more about his background, he is a Canadian Forces veteran, was stationed in Gagetown and discharged in 1984 because of an injury. Det. Dikih asked him, “I would it expect you to store it properly though just saying as a solder I would expect you to store that properly”. Mr. Smissaert replied “well they were stored properly but again not locked up or nothing”. The bolt of one is out and the rifles are not fireable. Ammunition was in the house – “a good pile”.

14Mr. Smissaert told Det. Dikih that he “…had the rifles legally and you could buy (ammunition) at Canadian Tire”. He said “…no I had an FAC before”. He didn’t renew his FAC, because “…the whole process uh the FAC uh was changed to the PAL uh uh like I don’t know all this but there is no FAC anymore you get a PAL” He simply did not get his PAL because his son lost interest (in hunting).

15I take this to mean that FAC is the older firearms permit and short form for Firearms Acquisition Certificate, and PAL to be the current Possession Acquisition Licence under the Firearms Act S.C. 1995 c. 39 as amended. Although not argued in this Application, an FAC is deemed to expire after 5 years, see Firearms Act s. 120. Mr. Smissaert therefore told Det. Dikih that his firearms permits had expired, and on his statement, that would have been many years ago.

16Det Dikih was asked by Mr. Smissaert if he had to stay “here” overnight. Det Dikih said, “…that’s a pretty simple question…because we’re going to we’re going to request a three day investigative hold which means it gives us a chance to write a warrant…and then execute it and search the house.”

17Det Dikih then went to Mr. Smissaert’s residence with DC Pineau and, using the information Mr. Smissaert gave them during the statement, seized the weapons. He said in evidence that it was a matter of exigent circumstances. He had no warrant to enter Mr. Smissaert’s residence or to seize anything at the time.

18The Body Worn Camera (BWC) from DC Pineau shows the two officers arrive at the back door to the house, enter and go directly to the front entrance and search the closet in the front entrance. Almost immediately they find long arms. First a B B gun and next two hunting rifles. They are extracted from the closet and put on the living room floor. The two officers then proceed to the rear room which is quite cluttered. They find a large box covered by some things, open the box, and find ammunition, rifle bolts and a magazine for a military FN rifle.

19Dets. Dikih and Pineau entered Mr. Smissaert’s home at 6:35 pm and left with the firearms and seized ammunition and parts at 6:55. By 7 pm the two officers were at the Carleton Place O.P.P. detachment processing the guns. On the evidence played in Court the 20 minute search inside Mr. Smissaert’s home was focused entirely on seizure of the guns and related parts and ammunition. Once the two officers found those items they left right away.

20Det. Dikih testified at the Application. He was asked about why he decided to go into Mr. Smissaert’s home to seize the weapons before getting a search warrant. He gave several grounds for that decision:

i) Exigent Circumstances: namely the presence of four firearms stored without trigger locks, with readily accessible ammunition, and not secured in a safe manner;

ii) Unlocked Residence: Mr. Smissaert disclosed that the rear door of the residence was unlocked, which increasing the risk of unauthorized access.

iii) Risk of Theft and Harm: Concern that someone could enter the home, steal the firearms, and use them to harm others. Det. Dikih was concerned about break- ins and shootings in the community.

iv) Delay in Obtaining a Warrant: Preparing and obtaining a telewarrant could take several hours to days. Det. Dikih decided not to wait.

v) Public Visibility of Arrest: The accused was arrested in public view, which could alert others to the unsecured residence.

21Det. Dikih also spoke of alternate strategies to secure the scene. He could have called for other officers to secure the scene. Depending on what else was happening in the detachment area it may have been granted or not. He did not make inquiries about the availability of other police assets to secure the scene. In his evidence before me, Det. Dikih emphasized that his decision was based solely on public safety, not the nature of the charges. He was clear: 'Looking back I would make this decision every time.'

Legal Framework

22On this Charter Application the operative provision of the Criminal Code is s. 117.04(2). It permits a warrantless seizure of firearms.

117.04(2) Search and seizure without warrant

(2) Where, with respect to any person, a peace officer is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable, in the interests of the safety of the person or any other person, for the person to possess any weapon, prohibited device, firearm part, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, the peace officer may, where the grounds for obtaining a warrant under subsection (1) exist but, by reason of a possible danger to the safety of that person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.

23This version of s. 117.04(2) is fairly new. It received royal assent in late 2023, and came into force on January 14, 2024 some 16 months before the events in this case. Notably the current version of s. 117.04 permits warrantless seizure of a firearm part, which the older version did not. It appears that the language of the current s. 117.04 mirrors the older version of s. 117.04 other than that.

24There are three essential elements to s. 117.04(2): The peace officer must 1) have reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable for a person to have a firearm or device; 2) that the peace officer has reasonable grounds to seize said items under the authority of a warrant; and 3) that by reason of the possible danger to the safety of the person or others make it not practicable to obtain a warrant to seize the items.

25When it says “…by reason of…” the text of the statute connects the impracticality of obtaining a warrant to the possible danger to the safety of the person or others.

26Ms. Bedar takes no issue with the first two parts of the test. She agrees that the police had reasonable grounds to believe that it was not desirable for Mr. Smissaert to have the rifles. She also agrees that the police had reasonable grounds to believe that the police had reasonable grounds to seize the guns and ammunition under the authority of a warrant. These are fair admissions. The last requirement is really in issue here, namely “by reason of a possible danger to the safety of that person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person”.

Emphasis added

27There is a dearth of authoritative rulings on the interpretation of s. 117.04(2). R. v Peacock-McDonald 2007 ONCA 128 is the lone appellate decision which considers the predecessor section – though the change in language from the 2023 amendment is immaterial for present purposes. In Peacock-McDonald the Appellant had been apprehended under the Mental Health Act (MHA) and taken to a local hospital for a psychiatric assessment. The police believed her to be suicidal. The Appellant was not charged with an offence but the police found out at the hospital that the Appellant had a firearms licence and had on her keys to her firearms cabinet in her house. There was no sense that the Appellant had committed any crime whatsoever but she was suicidal and had access to guns in her home. With that the police entered her home under the authority of s. 117.04(2) and seized the guns. The appellant claimed, on her forfeiture application under s. 117.05, that the police violated her s. 8 rights by seizing the guns without a warrant. At first instance Chester J. found no Charter violation. This was upheld on Appeal.

28What is apparent in the ruling is that the police had no realistic ability to obtain a warrant and seize the guns before the appellant would be released from the hospital. Key in the ruling (at par. 32) is that a MHA apprehension could end any time if a physician cleared the patient to leave. The police had no control over the Appellant’s liberty to return home and access her guns. She was held on the strength of a medical apprehension, not a police detention or arrest. As the Court said,

Moreover, nothing on this record suggests that there was any realistic opportunity for the police to obtain a warrant in the time that elapsed between the appellant's arrival at the hospital and the completion of the search carried out by Officer Allore. The Officer testified that the time required to obtain a search warrant for a residence could vary from "as little as four or five hours to two days or more sometimes of trying to confirm your grounds...and articulate it". He also said that he did not know for sure whether the appellant was going to be assessed until he got back to the hospital after seizing her firearms and that, if she were released, it would be too late to seize them.

29In my view, when public safety issues are implicated, as in this case, the police should not be required to speculate upon the timing of the release from hospital of a person in the appellant's position in the hope that they might secure a warrant for the seizure of firearms in the possession of the detainee before that release. Matters of public safety, when firearms are involved, should not depend on guesswork; nor are they a 'race to the swiftest'.

Emphasis added

29Peacock-McDonald is therefore a case about appellate deference to lower courts, see par. 36. I do not take the Court of Appeal to have handed down an interpretative ruling. Peacock-McDonald is one of many cases dealing with the seizure of firearms from persons with mental health challenges facing no criminal charges, and therefore not under detention or arrest, see for eg Wojcik v. R. 2025 NBCA 46, R. v. Dupree 2025 ONCJ 18, R. v. Schill 2024 ONCJ 249, R. v. Tereck 2008 MBCA 90 (at par. 31) though not a s. 117.04(2) decision.

30It is not surprising that s. 117.04(2) decisions should so often be applied in the mental health crisis situation. What is common in this line of authority is the police inability to control the movement of a firearm owner who lawfully possesses guns, and who is in a suicidal state. S. 117.04(2) seems designed for that very purpose. With that said, application of s. 117.04(2) is not confined to that fact pattern.

31In R. v. K.H. 2016 ONSC 5275 the Court scrutinized the officers’ basis to avail themselves of the s. 117.04(2) authority. In that case the police were investigating a stolen police handgun. That investigation lead them to believe that the gun was at a house, unsecured and that there were five people in the house. If K.H. is not on all fours with the case at bar it is very close to it. Roger J. rejected the police reasons as meeting the standard under s. 117.04(2), saying,

The gun had presumptively been with the Applicant for close to one month without incident. The Applicant was polite, friendly and cooperative. The officers indicated that they had no reasons not to trust him when he told them that the gun was hidden and only he knew where it was. The Applicant was with the officers and the officers testified that, at this point, they would not allow him to call home or return home. The person with psychiatric issues was not in the home and only family members were in the home. The Applicant and the Applicant's son were not known criminals and no known criminal or any otherwise presumptively dangerous person was known to be in the home. The concerns raised by the officers are not supported by the circumstances that existed at the time. To conclude otherwise would allow warrantless searches based upon exigent circumstances where the risk is premised on mere speculation and extremely remote possibilities. As an aside, the casual manner in which the officers entered the residence does not assist their argument of exigent circumstances.

68 There was essentially no change in earlier circumstances and the OPP, in the absence of exigent circumstances, should have proceeded to obtain a warrant on an expedited basis, taking whatever steps they deemed appropriate to contain the scene. Consequently, in my view this was an unreasonable search and seizure.

Emphasis added

32I also find that, while the s. 117.04 (2) provision does not itself contain the words “exigent circumstances” it is clearly about that. Other parts of criminal law legislation contain similar provisions, see for eg. Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) S.C. 1996 c. 19 as amended, s.11(7) which does contain the words “exigent circumstances”. The warrantless power to enter a dwelling under “exigent circumstances” under s. 529.3 of the Code is another.

33What differentiates s. 117.04(2) from s. 529.3 and s. 11(7) of the CDSA is that in s. 117.04(2) Parliament has seen fit to particularize the test, namely, by reason of a possible danger to the safety of that person or any other person, it would not be practicable to obtain a warrant, search for and seize any such thing, and any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any such thing, that is held by or in the possession of the person.

34In s. 529.3 and s. 11(7) of the CDSA Parliament simply said exigent circumstances were sufficient to conduct a warrantless search in those two situations. Not every legislative instance of exigent circumstances is the same. None have the same standard, see R. v. Paterson 2017 SCC 15 at pars. 29 – 34.

35Despite the differing language in the enabling legislation I find it helpful to use jurisprudence considering the language of “exigent circumstances” to interpret s. 117.04. In R. v. Campbell 2024 SCC 42 the Court considered exigent circumstances in s. 11(7) of the CDSA. There the police had seized electronic devices from the accused which told them that a drug deal involving fentanyl was about to be completed. The exigency lay in the immediacy of a deal involving “deadly drugs” which “would have been trafficked to vulnerable drug users in the community imminently” see Campbell at par. 137 - 138.

36In R. v. Paterson (supra) Brown J., referring to the CDSA, said that,

In sum, I conclude that, in order for a warrantless entry to satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown must show that the entry was compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety. Further, this urgency must be shown to have been such that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives.

37Other senior appellate courts have interpreted exigent circumstances to be “extraordinary” and should be invoked “only where necessary”, see R. v. Kelsy 2011 ONCA 605 at par. 35.

38I therefore find that, in law, the test for invoking s. 117.04(2) must include similar urgency, as identified by the Courts in Campbell, Paterson, and Kelsy. That finding includes the similar public safety concerns animating both s. 117.04(2) and the CDSA s. 11(7). Release of toxic drugs like fentanyl (per Campbell) is every bit as concerning as access to firearms by someone who poses a danger with a gun in hand. All that is different is the mechanism by which public safety is endangered. That symmetry of concern informs the constitutional test by which warrantless seizure can occur in either situation. It has urgency at its center.

39The possible danger test in s. 117.04 (2) is therefore informed by that urgency. In order to satisfy s. 117.04(2) the Crown must show a possible danger which was real. A theoretical danger is insufficient. A speculative danger is insufficient. I would borrow from the Court of Appeal’s dicta in R. v. Golub 1997 CanLII 6316 (ON CA), 102 O.A.C 176 and consider: the nature of the potential danger; the potential consequences of not seizing the firearms; the availability of alternative measures; and the likelihood of the contemplated danger actually existing, see Golub at par. 48. In Golub the Court was considering the basis on which a police officer can enter a dwelling to search incident to arrest without a warrant, but the test fits well in this context.

40I find that the “possible danger” test in s. 117.04 is met when the police have no to little control over access to the firearms. This is particularly so when the police have a constellation of discernable facts that an identifiable person has access to the guns – someone who poses a public danger in that situation, and there is insufficient time to obtain a warrant. In such situations s. 117.04(2) furnishes the police with lawful grounds to seize guns without a warrant. Ayotte J. found that this provision is preventative in nature, concerned with the situation where the potential for violence is real, even though it has not occurred, see R.v Robinz 2022 ABPC 159. I agree.

41Mcdonald-Peacock is therefore a case where that real danger is met by the certainty that a suicidal person will have access to guns and the police are otherwise powerless to prevent it. The combination of those two discernible facts was sufficient to meet the possible danger threshold for warrantless entry in s. 117.04(2). In R. v. Lafond 2012 ONCJ 661 (at par. 264), the co-existence of children in the house with unlocked firearms, and allegations of domestic violence were sufficient to lawfully engage s. 117.04(2). There was no s. 8 Charter violation in the warrantless seizure of guns.

42Against this legal background I am prepared to make the following findings.

In his evidence Sgt. Dikih cast the possible danger from the unsecured firearms as coming from someone who might break into Mr. Smissaert’s house, find the guns and steal them. He testified that someone might have seen Mr. Smissaert getting arrested and might have used his arrest to break into his home.

I find that this is quite speculative. There is no evidence that anyone knew that Mr. Smissaert had the guns. The tenant who was the complainant did not know of them according to the evidence before me. The only person who saw Mr. Smissaert interact with the police was his neighbour, and Det. Pineau only asked the neighbour if he had seen Mr. Smissaert. Det. Pineau did not tell him Mr. Smissaert was to be arrested. Oddly, when Mr. Smissaert was arrested he was not handcuffed. If anyone had seen Mr. Smissaert’s arrest they would not have seen one of the universal indicia of a police arrest, namely the handcuffing of the arrestee. In other words the arrest of Mr. Smissaert outside his home would not have clearly presented to an observer as an arrest.

I therefore find that Det. Dikih’s concern about someone seeing Mr. Smissaert’s arrest was speculative. It is equally speculative to say that seeing his arrest would have lead to a break in. Simply put there is no evidence that anyone was planning to break into Mr. Smissaert’s residence. No one knew the guns were there. The house was empty and no one else was expected to enter.

To sum up, the danger posed by the guns in the house was theoretical, or speculative and not real.

Mr. Smissaert on the evidence before me, possessed guns with no current licence. It appears that he was licenced in the past but did not keep his licencing current. His licences appear to have lapsed many years ago. From his statement to Det. Dikih Mr. Smissaert said that the guns had been in their current location for years. No one knew about them. He appears to have been a retired member of theCanadian Forces. There is no evidence of gang or criminal element associations to Mr. Smissaert.
It is a significant obstacle in the Crown’s attempt to justify the reasonableness of the seizure that Det. Dikih did nothing to secure the scene once he learned that the house had rifles in it. He did not alert anyone at the OPP other than Det. Pineau that there was a possible danger in the unsecured firearms at the house – and Det Pineau was there to provide assistance in the firearms seizure. Det. Dikih made no request for an officer to secure the scene, pending a warrant application.

With Mr. Smissaert in custody and the complainant apparently uninterested in returning to the home where she was filmed in private there was no one else who would enter the home. The guns were in an empty house while Mr. Smissaert was in custody pending his first appearance. Det. Dikih was candid with Mr. Smissaert that he would be asking the Crown to request a 3 day hold for a search warrant. In any event, the police had until approximately noon the next day before Mr. Smissaert was required to appear before a justice. That left some 18 hours to apply for a warrant to seize the guns while Mr. Smissaert was in police custody. Given the nature of the voyeurism allegations it was reasonable to infer that a longer hold would have been granted while the police obtained a warrant for electronic devices still in the house.

I struggle with Det. Dikih’s evidence that if he had asked for assistance to secure the scene it might not have been granted. That amounts to saying that a police detective’s concern about a danger to public safety would not be so concerning to others in his unit to the point where other police assets would be deployed to secure the scene.

There is in my finding no real reason why another officer in a police car could not have been sent to Mr. Smissaert’s house to ensure that no one entered while a warrant was applied for. The video of the house does not support a finding that it was a difficult location to secure. I find the opposite, that it would have been very easy for another officer to monitor the house to ensure that no stranger went in while a warrant was being applied for. I would infer that anyone thinking about breaking into a house would be deterred by the presence of a police car at the curb.

While I have found that there was no real danger posed by the guns in the house when Mr. Smissaert was in police custody, if I had, the ability to secure the scene pending a warrant application made such a warrant application straightforward. This Court operates a telewarrant center 24 hours a day for such situations. A Justice of the Peace is always available to consider conventional warrants outside of normal court hours. Det. Dikih referred to this in his evidence. I do not find that the situation made it impracticable to apply for a warrant. To the contrary I find that that could have been completed very easily.

Det. Dikih was candid in his testimony about the reasons he seized the firearms that evening. He made no attempt to distance himself from that part of the investigation. As he said in his evidence “ …I would do that same thing again…”.

43For these reasons I find that Mr. Smissaert’s Charter rights were violated. The police did not satisfy the warrantless seizure test in s. 117.04(2). The warrantless seizure in the circumstances violated Mr. Smissaert’s s. 8 rights.

Section 24(2)

44Taking the three part test under R. v. Grant 2009 SCC 32 I find that Sgt. Dikih had the grounds to obtain a warrant. I find that the s. 8 violation lay in his decision to enter Mr. Smissaert’s home without a warrant instead of making a conventional warrant application. On the first prong of Grant it is aggravating that Det. Dikih did not explore other alternatives to a warrantless entry into a private dwelling. It is mitigating that there is a dearth of appellate authority on which the police can be expected to know the test to apply when considering s. 117.04(2). I take as neutral that Det. Dikih testified that he would do the same thing again. On one hand his candour meets the standard expected of police detectives, but with that said, it is somewhat concerning that his testimony does not permit the idea that he may have proceeded in violation of a constitutional standard.

45I would therefore find that the first prong of Grant modestly favour exclusion of the evidence.

46The impact on Mr. Smissaert’s Charter protected interests was limited on the evidence before me. He was held in custody pending bail while a search warrant was duly applied for and executed. The warrantless entry therefore merely advanced seizure of guns which would have been found when the warrant was executed later. I assume that if Det. Dikih had not gone in with Det. Pineau on the Friday night that seizure of the guns would have been included in the search warrant which was applied for later. Given that no one was home during that time the location remained static. I take into consideration that the Friday evening search by Dets Dikih and Pineau was focussed entirely on the guns. They searched for nothing else and left once they had seized the guns, ammunition and items. The second prong of Grant favours admission of the evidence.

47Society always has an interest in the adjudication of a trial on the merits. The question is by how much. I find that this case involved a former hunter who held his guns unsafely and had let his firearms permits expire. Let there be no mistake that those are serious criminal offences. But this case falls closer to the regulatory side as gun cases go, and is some distance from a true crime situation. Apart from the lack of permit, and unsafe storage there is nothing on these facts to suggest that Mr. Smissaert’s rifles, ammunition or rifle parts would be used in a violent crime. I also find that the context of this Charter Application is the seizure of hunting rifles in a geographic area where lawful hunting is common. The third prong of Grant favours exclusion of evidence.

48The balancing required of the Court in the s. 24(2) analysis is discretionary. No two judges will necessarily come to the same conclusion, See. R. v. Hobeika 2020 ONCA 750, R. v. Griffith 2021 ONCA 302 at par. 78. Putting the three factors of Grant together I have no difficulty in excluding the evidence.

49This Charter Application was well prepared and well argued.

Released: November 19, 2025

Signed: Justice D. Rose

His Majesty the King v. Matthew Smissaert, 2025 ONCJ 603

Case Summary

Rose J.:

Overview

The interview

Legal Framework

117.04(2) Search and seizure without warrant

Section 24(2)

Released: November 19, 2025

His Majesty the King v. Matthew Smissaert, 2025 ONCJ 603

Case Summary

Rose J.:

Overview

The interview

Legal Framework

117.04(2) Search and seizure without warrant

Section 24(2)

Released: November 19, 2025