ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
CHRISTOPHER LARAMY
Before Justice Patrice F. Band
Reasons for Judgment
Released: November 13, 2025
Mr. M. Tooke counsel for the Public Prosecution Service of Canada
Ms. N. Simova counsel for Mr. Laramy
I. Introduction
1Mr. Laramy stood trial before me on indictable charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine, MDMA and crystal methamphetamine, and mischief under. The Toronto Police learned of the matter when Mr. Laramy’s landlord came to tell them that he thought Mr. Laramy was involved in the drug trade. Based on information and evidence that the landlord later provided, coupled with their own investigation, Toronto Police obtained a warrant to search Mr. Laramy’s unit. Inside, they found a variety of illegal drugs as well as related paraphernalia including digital scales, baggies and phenacetin, a known cocaine “cutting” agent. They also came to believe that he had damaged a security camera in the building, and he was arrested and charged accordingly.
2Mr. Laramy began renting a ground-floor unit in a building owned by Mr. David Rygier in late 2022. By early 2023, the two men were on very bad terms. Tenants had complained to Mr. Rygier that there was a lot of traffic in and out of Mr. Laramy’s unit, and that he was leaving the front door of the building unlocked to allow people to enter at all hours of the night. Mr. Laramy had installed his own locks on his door without first notifying Mr. Rygier. There were also issues with non-payment of rent. Mr. Rygier suspected that he was engaged in drug activity. He was also concerned about security. So, he bought three security cameras. They were equipped with motion sensors and would email him and other tenants when they were triggered. They also captured audio. He set up the first one on the ground floor near Mr. Laramy’s unit. It had a view of the front door of the building as well as the door to Mr. Laramy’s unit. Someone destroyed that camera, so Mr. Rygier set up another one, this time up the stairs above a landing. It captured a partial view of the door to Mr. Laramy’s unit. Mr. Laramy believed that the cameras were an illegal invasion of his privacy. So, he walked up the stairs, pulled down the second camera and took it into his unit. According to Mr. Rygier, the camera’s mounting that was affixed to the wall was damaged as a result. He never saw the camera again.
3A couple of weeks later, on May 31, Mr. Rygier went to 14 Division to report his concerns. He spoke to an officer at the desk, who told him that his complaint would be passed to the appropriate unit and that they would contact him if they wanted to. About a week later, Mr. Rygier decided that he would enter Mr. Laramy’s unit. He placed a Notice of Intent to Enter dated June 7 in Mr. Laramy’s mailbox (the Notice). It notified Mr. Laramy that he would be entering the unit on June 8 between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. for “inspection & renovation.”
4Mr. Rygier was unable to enter through the front door because he did not have the key or combination to the latest lock that Mr. Laramy had installed. He was also unable to enter through the fire exit door, as it had been bolted or screwed shut from the inside. So, he decided to enter through the kitchen window. Once inside, he saw what looked like illegal drugs as well as scales and other paraphernalia. He took pictures of what he saw. He also saw the Notice in the unit.
5Mr. Rygier returned to 14 Division to speak to police again on June 8. There, he met with an officer at the front desk, who told him that the information would be given to the appropriate unit. Later, a detective contacted Mr. Rygier and asked him to come in for an interview. Mr. Rygier gave a videotaped statement to two officers and provided them with the photographs he had taken in Mr. Laramy’s unit. In the following days, officers confirmed that Mr. Laramy was living at the building, and that he was associated with a car that was there. They learned that he had a record that included trafficking in scheduled substances. They also made some observations of Mr. Laramy meeting with individuals that appeared to them to be consistent with drug trafficking. With that, they sought and obtained a warrant to search Mr. Laramy’s unit.
6Inside, they found quantities of what they believed to be scheduled substances and related items in different parts of the unit. Some were in a satchel, some were in a backpack, some were in a dresser drawer, some were on the coffee table. They were packaged in baggies of different sizes, some bearing designs like red lips and black spades. They also found two digital scales and a small, old fashioned style balance.
7The exhibits were processed and tested in the ordinary course. The substances and quantities involved in this case are:
MDMA: 18.81 g.
Crystal methamphetamine: 21.71 g.
Cocaine: 2.49 g.
8Police also found 6.31 g. of ketamine which, at the time, they believed to be crystal methamphetamine. Mr. Laramy was not charged in relation to that substance.
9A police officer was qualified as an expert with respect to the distribution, packaging, pricing, modus operandi and sale of the drugs in question at the street level. In his opinion, the variety and quantity of drugs, viewed in combination and along with other indicators including scales, baggies and a cutting agent, was consistent with possession for the purpose of trafficking.
10Mr. Laramy testified in his own defence. He explained that he possessed the drugs and associated paraphernalia only for his own personal use. He also said that he felt entitled to remove the second camera because it was violating his right to privacy. Moreover, he did not break its mounting. I will discuss his testimony in more detail below.
11On behalf of Mr. Laramy, Ms. Simova filed a Charter application asking me to quash the warrant and exclude the evidence found during the search. She argued that Mr. Rygier violated the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) and that he did so as an agent of the state. In the alternative, she argued that the police should have done more to satisfy themselves that what Mr. Rygier had done was legal. By failing to do so, they demonstrated negligence amounting to bad faith. What is more, their failure to do more encourages illegal behaviour among citizens by condoning what Mr. Rygier did. Even if the evidence were to remain in the Information to Obtain (ITO), the police conduct amounting to bad faith calls upon this court to exercise its residual discretion to quash the warrant, pursuant to R. v. Paryniuk 2017 ONCA 87.
12The trial and the Charter application proceeded in blended fashion. As for the merits, Ms. Simova argued that Mr. Laramy is not guilty of possessing the scheduled substances for the purposes of trafficking. Also, he is protected against conviction for damaging the camera mount by the “colour of right” defence, pursuant to s. 429(2) of the Criminal Code.
II. The Issues
13The parties agree that without the information and evidence that Mr. Rygier provided to police, the ITO in this case would not have met the reasonable grounds requirement. They also agree that Mr. Rygier violated the RTA, at least in relation to his Notice. The time range for entry was too broad and the reason he stated for entry was not his actual goal. Also, he entered the unit 23 hours after depositing the notice, not 24. Ms. Simova added that a landlord is not entitled to break into a unit because the tenant has changed the locks. The RTA prescribes other remedies in such instances.
14Based on the arguments as refined during oral submissions, the issues before me in relation to the Charter are:
A. whether Mr. Rygier’s illegally obtained evidence and information should be excised from the ITO because as an agent of the state, he violated Mr. Laramy’s s. 8 rights;
B. whether it was negligent for the police to rely on Mr. Rygier’s information and evidence without probing further into his compliance with the RTA and, if so, whether that negligence amounted to bad faith; and
C. in the alternative, whether I should exercise my residual discretion to quash the warrant.
15Because the search was judicially authorized, the burden on the Charter application rests on Mr. Laramy.
16If the warrant stands, I must decide if the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Laramy possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.
17Lastly, and independently of the search, I must decide whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Laramy committed mischief by damaging the camera’s mounting.
III. Law and Analysis
1. The Charter
A. Whether Mr. Rygier was acting as an agent of the state
18Ms. Simova’s argument on this point turns entirely on the fact that Mr. Rygier entered Mr. Laramy’s unit after attending 14 Division on May 31 and being told that officers might call him. Then, after entering the unit, he returned to 14 Division to pursue the matter further.
19As it turns out, he met with the same desk officer on both days: PC Marshall. Ms. Simova argued that I should be suspicious of PC Marshall’s testimony because it appeared rehearsed and the notes she referred to were typed in the style of will-says. PC Marshall maintained that she had made her notes in a timely fashion and that all she had done was relay information to the appropriate officers.
20In cross-examination, Mr. Rygier denied that the police had directed him to do anything on May 31. He wanted to investigate the matter. As for PC Marshall, Ms. Simova did not put to her the notion that she had directed Mr. Rygier, implicitly or explicitly, to go search for evidence.
21At the time, Mr. Rygier was very frustrated with Mr. Laramy as a tenant. Aside from the issues with rent, the locks and security concerns, he thought Mr. Laramy was a drug dealer. I believed him that the police did not direct him to do anything. Rather, he decided to take things into his own hands by entering Mr. Laramy’s unit. I make this finding despite my concerns about his credibility and reliability, because it is plainly apparent that he was motivated to do so because he wanted Mr. Laramy out. I discuss those concerns below.
22PC Marshall’s evidence-in-chief proceeded without the usual qualification of her notes. She seemed to have memorized them, which struck me as unusual. But in the circumstances of this case, it would be a huge and unjustified leap to conclude that she had implicitly or explicitly directed Mr. Rygier to conduct an investigation, and that she had written up her notes after the fact to cover it up.
23I find that Mr. Rygier acted for his own reasons and not at the instance of police, either implicitly or explicitly. As such, he was not a police agent and his actions cannot be attributed to them or constitute a breach of s. 8 of the Charter: see R. v. Wilkinson 2001 BCCA 589. Therefore, the argument that his information and photos ought to be excised from the ITO fails.
B. Whether the police negligently relied on Mr. Rygier’s evidence and information
24During his interview, Mr. Rygier told police that he had provided notice to Mr. Laramy and that he had climbed into the unit through the window. They expressed surprise that he had entered through the window. PC Harding explained that this was because of Mr. Rygier’s age. PC Brown did not see red flags because the locks had been changed and the fire exit door had been screwed shut. Moreover, he knew that 24 hours’ notice was required, and understood that Mr. Laramy had received the Notice. As PC Brown explained, he believed Mr. Rygier, who had sworn to tell the truth.
25In this case, I do not find that the police had an obligation to probe further into Mr. Rygier’s compliance with the RTA. They were satisfied that he had given Mr. Laramy notice and that he did not have any other way to enter the unit. While little turns on it, I am not persuaded by Ms. Simova’s argument that Mr. Rygier removed the window. He testified that he removed the screen and then slid the window open. In his statement to police, what he said about the window was not clear. What I heard on the video was that he “made entry through kitchen window … removed the ah …” which is ambiguous at best. After a certain amount of repetition, PC Brown capitulated and agreed with Ms. Simova that Mr. Rygier said he had removed “it.” I note that PC Brown’s recollection of details was poor, due to the passage of time. I do not accept his evidence on that point.
26I do not find that the police were negligent. Mr. Rygier provided them with photographs of what clearly looked like illegal drugs and related paraphernalia. These amply corroborated his stated observations. They conducted their own independent investigation in which they confirmed things about Mr. Laramy and his connection to the unit. They also did some surveillance and saw him engaging in what looked to them like hand-to-hand drug transactions.
27I find that the police did not breach Mr. Laramy’s s. 8 rights by relying on Mr. Rygier’s information and evidence.
28I would add that these conclusions find support in the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Wilkinson, supra.
C. Whether I should exercise my residual discretion to quash the warrant
29Courts have a residual discretion to set aside an otherwise valid warrant “where police conduct has subverted the pre-authorization process through deliberate non-disclosure, bad faith, deliberate deception, fraudulent misrepresentation or the like”: Paryniuk, supra at paras. 69 & 72. The standard to be met is high; it may even be the “clearest of cases” standard where, as here, what is claimed would gut the Crown’s case to such an extent as to amount to a stay of proceedings: ibid, at paras. 80-81.
30If I am wrong about my conclusions, and the police did missed the mark, it was not by much. Their conduct could not reasonably be described as deliberate non-disclosure, bad faith, deliberate deception, fraudulent misrepresentation or the like. Assuming that a police officer who acts upon evidence that was illegally obtained by a citizen could breach an accused person’s s. 8 rights because doing so condones or encourages such conduct, I see no realistic concern that the police in this case condoned Mr. Rygier’s actions or that they have indirectly encouraged other citizens to break the law. Put differently, I do not see this as a case that calls upon the Court to distance itself from the actions of the police. Their conduct in this case was not subversive of the warrant process.
31As such, the claim that I should use my residual discretion to set aside the warrant in this case is dismissed.
2. The Case on the Merits
A. The burden of proof
32The Crown bears the entire burden of proving Mr. Laramy’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden never shifts to Mr. Laramy. In R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 320 at para. 36, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that reasonable doubt is not based on sympathy or prejudice; rather, it is based on reason and common sense; it is logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence; it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt; and more is required than proof that the accused is probably guilty.
33In most cases where an accused person testifies or presents evidence, it is important to follow the analytical framework that the Supreme Court of Canada provided in R. v. W.D. (1991), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), 63 CCC (3d) 397 (S.C.C.) to ensure that the burden of proof does not shift. It is broken down into three prongs:
(i) If I believe Mr. Laramy’s evidence and it is exculpatory, I must acquit him.
(ii) If I do not believe Mr. Laramy’s testimony but am left in reasonable doubt by it, I must acquit him.
(iii) Even if I am not left in doubt by Mr. Laramy’s evidence, I must ask whether, on the basis of the evidence that I do accept, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of his guilt.
34I also remind myself that a criminal trial is not a credibility contest as between the accused person and the complainant. What is more, credibility and reliability are not all or nothing propositions; a judge can accept some, all or none of what a witness says.
35In R. v. G.(M.) (1994), 1994 CanLII 8733 (ON CA), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 347, at para. 23, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 390, the Ontario Court of Appeal wrote that “[p]robably the most valuable means of assessing the credibility of a crucial witness is to examine the consistency between what the witness said in the witness box and what the witness has said on other occasions, whether on oath or not.” The Court went on to explain that
[i]nconsistencies vary in their nature and importance. Some are minor, others are not. Some concern material issues, others peripheral subjects. Where an inconsistency involves something material about which an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken, the inconsistency may demonstrate a carelessness with the truth about which the trier of fact should be concerned.
36In R. v. R.E.M. 2008 SCC 51, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed trial judges’ reasons regarding credibility findings. At para. 49, the Court explained:
While it is useful for a judge to attempt to articulate the reasons for believing a witness and disbelieving another in general or on a particular point, the fact remains that the exercise may not be purely intellectual and may involve factors that are difficult to verbalize. Furthermore, embellishing why a particular witness’s evidence is rejected may involve the judge saying unflattering things about the witness; judges may wish to spare the accused who takes the stand to deny the crime, for example, the indignity of not only rejecting his evidence and convicting him, but adding negative comments about his demeanor. In short, assessing credibility is a difficult and delicate matter that does not always lend itself to precise and complete verbalization. (My emphasis.)
B. The CDSA and [Criminal Code](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html) charges
37The police found the three scheduled substances at issue in different parts of Mr. Laramy’s apartment, where he lives alone. A fourth substance tested as ketamine. The drugs were packaged in different sized baggies, some bearing designs. They also found three scales; two of them digital. In addition, they found about 8 g. of phenacetin in a baggie. On top of the fridge, they found a crystalline substance in a plastic food container.
38The expert witness, DC Dickenson, was of the view that the combination of drugs and the additional paraphernalia were consistent with possession for the purpose of trafficking. He explained that street level dealers like to have a variety of substances to serve their customers. He also explained that phenacetin is commonly used to cut cocaine to increase the amount for sale and, therefore, profit. He gave his testimony fairly and made reasonable concessions. For instance, he readily acknowledged that the relatively small quantity of cocaine, seen on its own, was consistent with personal use. He also limited himself to what he knew about phenacetin. I accept his testimony. It was honest, credible, and it accorded with common sense in view of the circumstances.
39As for the mischief charge, the hallway camera captured Mr. Laramy removing it and taking it away.
40As a result, a lot turns on Mr. Laramy’s credibility. While he is in a committed relationship now, Mr. Laramy lived alone in the unit which, as he explained, he liked to keep neat. He is a truck driver and a part-time DJ and event planner. When he DJs, it is late at night. He testified that he has been addicted to crystal methamphetamine for 20 years. It helps him to think. He has recently learned that he might have ADHD. He also uses MDMA and cocaine from time to time when he DJs. As a habitual drug user, he likes to buy in larger quantities. It is less expensive and more convenient. He likes to weigh out his doses, and package them accordingly. This explains why he possessed the drugs in the amounts that he did. It also explains the scales and the quantity of different sized baggies. As for the phenacetin, Mr. Laramy said that he got ripped off. He thought he had bought 14 g. of cocaine on the street, but it turned out to be 8 g. of phenacetin. Nonetheless, he kept it in a drawer. He does not know what the crystalline substance in the container on top of his fridge is, but thinks it is Epsom salts.
41As for the camera, Mr. Laramy explained that he removed it carefully and did not damage the mounting.
42I did not believe Mr. Laramy’s testimony. It was internally inconsistent and did not accord with common sense. For instance, he testified that he intended to give Mr. Rygier a key to the second lock and texted him about it. Then, in cross-examination, he agreed that there had been no such communication. He testified that he intended to return the camera to Mr. Rygier but never got the chance before the police searched his unit. That was over two weeks later. I do not believe that Mr. Laramy, a long-time drug user who likes to weigh and package his own doses, would walk away from a half-ounce cocaine purchase with only 8 g. What is more, I do not believe that Mr. Laramy, who likes to keep his apartment neat, would keep those 8 g. of phenacetin lying around for no reason. Similarly, it does not make sense that he would not know the nature of the crystalline substance that was found on top of his fridge. Nor does it make sense that with his two decades of experience in the illegal drug trade, he would choose to carry around his own doses in small tell-tale baggies in a backpack or satchel together with a digital scale if it was exclusively for his own personal use. Of course, his 2021 convictions for use of a forged or falsified credit card (s. 342(1)(c)(i)) and procuring an identity document that relates to another person (s. 56.1(1)) added to my concerns.
43I reject Mr. Laramy’s evidence. Viewed in the context of all the evidence, it does not raise a reasonable doubt in my mind concerning the CDSA counts. On the basis of the evidence that I do accept, which includes the combination of drugs, the baggies, the scales and the expert testimony, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Laramy possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking. This includes the cocaine, despite the relatively small amount. I make this finding based on the expert evidence, the variety of drugs and, importantly, the presence of phenacetin.
44With respect to the camera, Mr. Laramy explained that he felt entitled to remove it because it was violating his right to privacy. Typically, the colour of right defence relates to a property interest: R. v. DeMarco, [1973] O.J. No. 533 at para 8 (C.A.). In this case, Mr. Laramy had none. For the defence to have an air of reality, Mr. Laramy would have to have had an honest belief that he had a legal right to damage the camera, even if that belief was mistaken. A moral belief is not enough: see R. v. Hemmerly, [1976] O.J. No. 143 (C.A.). Even if Mr. Laramy correctly believed that his privacy rights were being violated, the defence has no air of reality. First, I did not believe Mr. Laramy’s testimony. Second, a belief that he could remove, damage and keep the camera is so unreasonable that I do not accept that Mr. Laramy honestly held it. If he held any belief that he could damage and remove the camera, it was no more than a belief in a moral entitlement. That is not enough.
45But that does not settle the question. Mr. Rygier’s testimony was also problematic. He was forgetful and inconsistent. His evidence about where he installed the first camera was confused. His recall of the chronology of events – such as when Mr. Laramy moved in, and when he attended the police station for his interview – was also muddled. He told the police that Mr. Laramy broke the first camera. At trial, he said he did not know who had done it. He also gave different answers about where in the apartment he saw the Notice. Also, the reason for entry that he wrote on the Notice was not truthful.
46Ms. Simova submits that battery-powered cameras like the ones Mr. Rygier installed are designed to be easily removed from their mounts. The mount was not presented as evidence. There is only Mr. Rygier’s word. I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was damaged.
IV. Conclusion
47For these reasons, I find Mr. Laramy guilty of the CDSA counts, as amended, but not guilty of the mischief count, which is particularized to allege damage.
Released: November 13, 2025
Justice Patrice F. Band