R. v. Williamson, 2025 ONCJ 412

DATE: July 28, 2025

Toronto Region

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— AND —

VANESSA WILLIAMSON

Before Justice Michael Waby

Reasons for Judgment released on July 28, 2025

Ms. Hunjan ………………………………………………………………………. for the Crown

Ms. Zhang ………………….…..…………………………….………………… for the Accused

Waby M.:

1Ms. Williamson is charged with a single count of assaulting a peace officer.

2Ms. Williamson trial commenced on July 21, 2025 and it concluded before me on July 22, 2025.

3Having indicated to the parties that I would provide a prompt decision in this case, the following is my judgement provided today on July 28, 2025.

Overview

4Briefly, it is alleged that following a Blue Jays game in Toronto, Ms. Williamson became engaged in a heated verbal exchange with Detective Constable (“D.C.”) Brown who was engaged in paid duty traffic management duties. The officer testified that after giving clear directions to pedestrians, Ms. Williamson was the lone pedestrian ignoring her direction to not cross the road while the officer allowed traffic to exit the area.

5The officer testified that Ms. Williamson was shouting and waving her arms at a vehicle the officer had directed to travel along the road and across a crosswalk. The officer testified that Ms. Williamson then directed her attention at the officer and began berating her for not seeing the light on the crosswalk and for the fact that she had a right to cross the street. The officer walked over to her and informed her that she had advised the driver of the vehicle to exit and for the pedestrians to not cross the street.

6Upon speaking with Ms. Williamson, the officer gave evidence that it was clear Ms. Williamson had been drinking and she could smell alcohol coming from her breath from a few feet away. The officer gave evidence that Ms. Williamson then called her a “pussy” and the officer responded “That’s very classy.” She directed Ms. Williamson to clear the roadway and determined that she was not going to become engaged in further argument with her.

7It is alleged that Ms. Williamson then spat on D.C. Brown striking her on the chin and her protective police-issue vest.

8Ms. Williamson testified in her defence and denied spitting on the officer. She testified that while she regretted some of her verbal interaction with the officer, she did not spit on the officer but spat on the ground a few feet away from her and she denied calling the officer a pussy.

9Ms. Hunjan, for the Crown, submits that the officer’s evidence was clear, compelling and consistent and that the evidence of Ms. Williamson was lacking in credibility. She submits that the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

10Ms. Zhang submits that the evidence of the officer was internally and externally inconsistent, lacked credibility and that the officer was an unreliable witness. Simply put, it is the case for the defence that the officer fabricated her evidence and overreacted to Ms. Williamson spitting on the ground and engaging her in an argument over how D.C. Brown was performing her duties that day. Ms. Zhang submits that the evidence of Ms. Williamson should be believed or at the very least, it should raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court.

Law and Analysis

11It is common ground between the parties that the Crown’s case stands or falls on my findings of credibility and reliability on the whole of the evidence tendered at this trial.

12The test that governs the analysis of credibility in this context is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It was explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.(D.) (1991), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 397 (S.C.C.) and other case law as follows:

If I believe Ms. Williamson’s evidence, I must acquit her.

Even if I do not believe her evidence but I am left in reasonable doubt by it, or any of the other evidence, I must acquit her.

Finally, even if I am not left in doubt by his evidence, I still must consider it and all of the evidence and ask myself, on the basis of the evidence that I do accept, whether the Crown has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

13Proof beyond a reasonable doubt goes hand-in-hand with the presumption of innocence which is a fundamental principal of our system of justice.

14The burden of proof in a criminal trial always rests with the Crown. The burden of proof is a heavy one. It is proof beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to each of the offence’s essential elements. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, far-fetched, or frivolous doubt. It is not a doubt based on sympathy for or prejudice against anyone involved in this trial. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense and is logically derived from the evidence or the absence of evidence. R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 39

15I may accept some, all, or none of a witness’ evidence.

16To be clear, it is not sufficient that on the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that Ms. Williamson is probably guilty and a criminal trial is not a credibility contest. Even if I believe the accused is probably guilty or likely guilty, that is not sufficient. In those circumstances, a judge must give the benefit of the doubt to the accused and acquit because the Crown has failed to satisfy the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

17In R. v. J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30, the Supreme Court qualified the W.(D.) instruction with an additional prong, partly in recognition that a trier of fact “may believe some, none, or all of the testimony of any witness, including that of an accused” (para. 10). This prong is that where the trier of fact is unable to decide whom to believe, the accused is entitled to an acquittal (paras. 11-12).

18Put another way, it reflects that the trier of fact must not treat “conflicting testimonial accounts” as a credibility contest, in the sense of deciding whether they accept one or the other. “The main point is that lack of credibility on the part of the accused does not equate to proof of his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”: J.H.S., ibid at para. 13.

19The burden never shifts to the accused to establish their own innocence, and the onus always lies with the Crown to prove every essential element (R. v. J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30, 2008 S.C.C. 30, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 152, at para. 13).

Issues

20The central issues in this case before me are those of reliability and credibility.

Analysis

21As Ms. Zhang rightly submits, professional witnesses, including police officers of 32 years service, are not presumed to be credible or owed any deference by the Court. Their evidence is to be subject to the same level of scrutiny and weighing as any other witness, including that of the accused.

22I found that D.C. Brown presented as a compelling and credible witness throughout her testimony. Contrary to the eloquent submissions of Ms. Zhang, I did not find the officer to be combative in cross-examination. I accept the officer provided answers that sometimes sought to anticipate addressing the issues defence counsel was seeking to explore, however, this was simply a product of an experienced witness seeking to address the issues it was clear defence counsel was raising. It did not undermine the officer’s credibility but represented an attempt to be fulsome in her answers.

23I do find D.C. Brown was consistent and credible in her evidence and was unshaken in all material regards. She did not embellish her evidence and it is clear that this experienced officer was almost resigned, with a somewhat world weary air, to deal with Ms. Williamson’s behaviour and abuse as a regrettable part of her duties. The video footage at the scene shows she was calm and professional in her dealings with Ms. Williamson after the arrest and once Ms. Williamson had begun to calm down. Nothing in the officer’s observable dealing with Ms. Williamson is indicative of any malice or hostility towards her and she showed the required professionalism and courtesy towards Ms. Williamson despite the conduct that was alleged.

24D.C. Brown was not assigned a body-worn camera but some footage from the cameras of other officer who attended in the immediate aftermath of the incident formed part of the evidence at this trial. D.C. Brown was clear in her evidence as to the directions she had given to pedestrian and vehicular traffic as part of her traffic management duties. She had used her whistle and clear hand signals to pedestrians to stop them crossing the road while she directed a white Tesla to exit.

25The officer did not claim to see from where Ms. Williamson first emerged but testified that she became aware of her when Ms. Williamson began berating the driver of the Tesla. She testified that she had a clear recollection of the day’s events and that Ms. Williamson was the only pedestrian among approximately 60 others who failed to comply with her clear directions not to cross the road.

26Contrary to the submissions of Ms. Zhang, I find that the officer engaged promptly and professionally with Ms. Williamson to address her behavior and to direct her to clear the roadway. From first seeing Ms. Williamson to speaking with her was a matter of seconds. The officer described Ms. Williamson as being rude, “dropping f-bombs” and waving her arms and being erratic and a large number of the public exiting the stadium had congregated and were filming and watching Ms. Williamson’s antics.

27The officer testified that she approached Ms. Williamson to explain to her what the officer was doing and that she shouted “don’t you see this car” and became abusive.

28I accept that specific reference to the phrase “f-bombs” is not in the officer’s notes, although reference to Ms. Williamson being abusive is. I also accept that the officer did not provide as detailed a description of Ms. Williamson’s physical actions in spitting on her in her notes as she did in her testimony which she physically demonstrated in the witness box.

29In her notes, the officer describes Ms. Williamson leaning towards her and spitting on her. In her evidence, she demonstrated Ms. Williamson tilting her head back, taking a step towards her and spitting. Ms. Zhang submits that this significantly impacts the officer’s credibility. While I accept that sufficiently detailed and appropriate notes are necessarily expected from officers in cases of which they are a part, any consideration of an officer’s notes and any omissions necessarily require a case specific analysis. Officer’s notes are in large part an aide memoir to assist them in the giving of their evidence as well as recording key elements of their actions and involvement. They are not a transcript of events not intended to be so.

30It is clear from the officer’s notes that she referenced Ms. Williamson lunging towards her when she spat on her. The fact that the officer did not provide exactly the same wording or level of description that she gave in her evidence does not, in this case, undermine her credibility. In all material regards, her evidence in court aligned with the note that she had made of the mechanics of the Accused’s actions and I find it unremarkable that in her notebook she did not seek to add further description. It is also important to note that the evidence before the court is the evidence that the officer gave under oath, not the contents of her memo book, although I accept the relevance and potential importance of discrepancies in any officer’s notes.

31I also accept that the officer failed to recognize one of the Crown attorneys in Court as one of the Crowns, or the Crown with whom she conducted a witness preparation meeting some 2-3 weeks before this trial. I accept that D.C. Brown was confidently wrong when she testified that that Mr. Surmanski was not the Crown she met with. However, I do not accept Ms. Zhang’s submissions that this impacts the officer’s reliability as to the alleged events.

32While the issue was not explored in any detail during the trial aside, there was an Agreed Statement of Facts tendered that accepted Mr. Surmanski was at this witness preparation meeting. It became apparent during the course of submissions that the witness preparation meeting was conducted via zoom and not in person. I have no other additional information before me as to whether any other Crown or other individuals were present for this particular meeting, nor any other information about it.

33Nevertheless, despite this acknowledged mistake on the part of the officer, I see no linkage between mis-remembering the face of a Crown Attorney and the suggestion that the officer was unreliable in recalling the evidence of the events alleged. This is not a case about identification nor one in which identification is in issue. The officer is not alleged by defence counsel to have mis-remembered what happened but is alleged to have fabricated the core allegations before the court. It is with this in mind but the analysis of credibility and reliability needs to focus.

34Lastly, I accept Ms. Zhang’s submissions that one might have expected the officer to have availed herself of wipes or sanitizer at the scene to wipe her chin after being spat on. This would not have been remarkable for the officer to so had she chosen to do so. However, D.C. Brown was clear that she was satisfied that she had wiped the spit off her chin at the time it occurred and it is clear that her focus in the immediate aftermath was on that of arresting appropriately restraining and processing Ms. Williamson with the assistance of her colleagues. I do not accept that the absence of any additional measures taken at the scene of the incident necessarily reduces the officer’s credibility with respect to this incident, particularly given the combative conduct of Ms. Williamson.

35\The sustained struggle on the ground by the officer with the physically larger Ms. Williamson when trying to apply handcuffs is, in my view, a perfectly logical and reasonable explanation as to why the close-up photo stills presented by defence counsel of the officer’s police vest do not appear to show obvious sign of saliva present. It was highly likely any such residue would be dislodged during these post-arrest struggles.

36Similarly, the officer was very clear as to why there was no notation in her memo book of the wrist injury she reported. This was not noticed by her until she was en route to the division with Ms. Williamson and she knew that she would have to file a separate injury report through her Staff Sergeant. This she did. She followed the required process and did as expected. Doing so and not also noting it in her memo book is unremarkable.

37Turning to the evidence of Ms. Williamson, I accept Ms. Zhang’s submissions that she was unshaken in her core assertion that she did not spit on the officer. I also accept defence counsel’s submission that there were admissions made by Ms. Williamson in her evidence that reflected poorly on her. These included swearing at the officer, generally acting disrespectfully towards the officer and failing to comply with her directions. Ms. Williamson also accepts that she had consumed alcohol on the day of the incident and that, to use her words, she was “tipsy, drunk or intoxicated.”

38A considerable portion of time in the trial was devoted to testimony by Ms. Williamson relating to her self-reported tendency to accumulate larger than typical quantities of saliva in her mouth when she became stressed or exerted herself and which required her to rid herself of it through various means, including spitting. Whether Ms. Williamson is afflicted by such a condition, I cannot say and no medical evidence was put before me in this regard. I accept that post-arrest video footage shows her spitting several times on the ground. Nevertheless, the central issue in this case is whether an angry Ms. Williamson spat on D.C. Brown not whether she suffers from any such affliction that requires her to spit in the street.

39I do, however, accept the potential relevance of the issue as it relates to the defence theory of this case. That being Ms. Williamson upset the officer by arguing with her and then spat on the ground which sufficiently enraged D.C. Brown and prompted to her to arrest Ms. Williamson for assaulting her.

40While I find the repeated assertions that Ms. Williamson spontaneously and involuntarily accumulates saliva questionable, it is whether the Crown has proven that she spat on the officer as alleged that is the central issue in this case.

41Ms. Williamson is an educated and articulate individual with a professional career. Nevertheless, I found her to be unpersuasive about several important aspects of her evidence. I am satisfied that she was considerably more combative with D.C. Brown from the outset of the incident than she acknowledged. This included her continuing to refuse to follow clear directions from the officer about not crossing the road while simultaneously shouting at and arguing with the officer while these appropriate directions were being given.

42Although Ms. Williamson would have been well able to see the officer from where she testified she was first situated, I accept she may not have seen the officer prior to her engaging with the motor vehicle she encountered when crossing the road. On her own acknowledged evidence, she was “peeved and irritated” at the driver. I am satisfied that this considerably underplays her level of frustration at encountering the car while she believed she had the right of way. Ms. Williamson continued to be dogmatic about the amount of time she believed to have to cross the road and her right to do so.

43I am also satisfied that this frustration manifested itself, as the officer testified, by her shouting and gesturing at the driver. I am also satisfied that alcohol played a substantial part in the actions of Ms. Williamson on the date of this incident and that it impacted her decision making substantially more than she allowed. The consumption of at least a bottle of wine by her rendered her intoxicated and combative and this manifested itself in her engagement with the officer and driver of the Tesla. It is clear that Ms. Williamson felt she was in the right and the officer was in the wrong and she resented being spoken to by the officer about her conduct.

44Although I accept there may have been an initial moment of surprise, I do not accept Ms. Williamson’s evidence that she did not know what was happening when she was being arrested or that she was dealing with police officers. D.C. Brown, in the partial video footage available, is clearly seen standing at the head of Ms. Williamson and issuing repeated instructions to her which Ms. Williamson spends some time resisting. The officer was in full uniform and her presence would not have been unknown to Ms. Williamson. Not least of all because of their interaction moments before.

45The extent of Ms. Williamson’s combative nature is reinforced by the fact that an off-duty officer identified himself to D.C. Brown and rendered assistance as Ms. Williamson failed to comply with repeated directions given to her once D.C. Brown was trying to handcuff her.

46While I accept that for anyone a dynamic arrest process can be shocking, I do not accept Ms. Williamson’s evidence that either during or after the arrest she suffered a panic attack, was confused or did not appreciate what was happening. Understandably given her recent surgery, the repeatedly issue directions to officers when she was on the ground to be careful of her leg which had been subject to relatively recent surgery. While understandable, at no point does the footage show her asking “who are you”, “what is happening” or “why is this happening”. I do not attribute this to shock but a legitimate concern by Ms. Williamson to prioritize the care of her knee while comprehending who she is dealing with. I find Ms. Williamson’s assertions to the contrary do not assist her credibility.

47More significantly, in none of the video footage shown, does Ms. Williamson appear to be confused as to what is happening and why. On the two occasion she is shown being told why she is under arrest, she registers no surprise and asks no questions about the reason for her arrest or its circumstances. She is sufficiently self-composed to ask questions of the officers about the whereabouts of her phone and other property. I find Ms. Williamson’s assertions to the contrary do not assist her credibility.

48At various points in post-arrest, she tells officers what she is going to be doing and seeks to direct events. This includes seating herself in the rear of the open door scout car, talking relatively calmly on the phone to her partner about what is happening and advising officers that she won’t be able to attend court on the date on the Form 9 because she is out of the country and engaging in discussions about an alternate date (which the officers accommodate) and then speaking to an officer about her upcoming European river cruise.

49I accept that Ms. Williamson is seen to spit on the ground several times after her arrest and advises officers she is going to do so. I do not accept that this is corroborative of her evidence that she did not spit on the officer but only spat on the ground proximate to her. I also do not accept that in the presence of hundreds of members of the public who were proximate, some of whom were filming this heated encounter, that D.C. Brown decided to arrest the physically larger and stronger Ms. Williamson simply because Ms. Williamson spat on the ground and upset her and then decided to fabricate the allegation against Ms. Williamson to justify her actions.

50To the extent that the officer’s evidence is corroborated by the available video evidence, Ms. Williamson appeared combative and highly resistant to following direction that she was given. This occurred upon and following arrest and I am satisfied it was the case beforehand too. I am satisfied that this occurred from the moment she encountered the Tesla and berated the driver and then the officer. I am also satisfied that, while Ms. Williamson acknowledges some poor and disrespectful behaviour on her part, she deliberately understated the true nature and extent of it as well as the impact of the alcohol she had consumed and its impact upon her behaviour.

51I am satisfied that she was highly agitated and hostile towards the officer and, as agreed, swore at the officer and then when challenged by the officer, I find this course of alcohol fuelled behaviour led to Ms. Williamson calling the officer a pussy and spitting on D.C. Brown as alleged. I am satisfied that this was a deliberate act on the part of Ms. Williamson.

52Ms. Zhang helpfully provided the Court with various case law in her submissions, this included R. v. Pittiman, 2006 SCC 9, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 381, which cautions triers of fact against seeking to reconstruct events where they are not readily apparent and appropriately reminds the court that the central task is to determine whether the Crown has proven each and every essential element of the alleged offence. I am amply satisfied that there is no mystery as to what transpired on the date of the alleged incident.

53I reject Ms. Williamson’s evidence that she only spat on the ground and not on the officer and I reject her evidence that she did not call the officer a “pussy” before doing so. I am satisfied that her walking away afterwards, rather than running as Ms. Zhang suggests would be more realistic, was primarily a sign of her contempt of the officer and was a product of her alcohol-fuelled disdain. It may well also be consistent with the recent knee surgery she reported. I am also satisfied for the reasons I have given I do not believe the evidence of Ms. Williamson where it materially departs from that of the officer and nor does it raise a reasonable doubt in my mind as to her guilt. I find her actions belie Ms. Williamson’s assertion in her evidence that “I may have been at a ball game but I’m still a professional woman”. On this occasion, this is clearly not how she conducted herself.

54On the totality of the evidence and absence of evidence I do accept, I am satisfied that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Williamson is guilty of the offence with which she is charged. Accordingly, I find her guilty of the offence of assaulting a peace officer.