Madadi v. Jahfar, 2025 ONCJ 281

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: May 20, 2025
COURT FILE No.: Toronto DFO-23-00000905

BETWEEN:
Khatamah Madadi
Applicant

— and —

Aba Jahfar
Respondent

Before Justice Sheilagh O’Connell
Heard: January 20, 2025
Reasons for Judgment: May 20, 2025

Julia Amourgis.................................................................. counsel for the applicant mother
Aba Jahfar………………………………………………………………. acting in person

1. Introduction

[1] This focused hearing is about the father’s child support obligations for the parties’ child Emily, age 8 years old. Both parties testified. There were no other witnesses.
[2] The (applicant) mother seeks an order requiring the father to pay child support to her in the amount of $454.00 per month, based on an income of $49,236.00, retroactive to the date of separation, which she states is February of 2017.
[3] The mother also seeks an order that the father pay a fixed amount of $100.00 per month for Emily’s section 7 expenses, to be used for her activities or tutoring if needed.
[4] The (respondent) father seeks an order that he pay no child support and that all arrears under the Temporary Order be rescinded. The father states that he is no longer able to work for medical reasons. He states that he is now receiving Ontario Disability benefits as his sole source of income.
[5] On November 24, 2023, the parties consented to a temporary (without prejudice) child support order (the “Temporary Order”) in which the father’s stated income was $49,236.00. The father states that he can no longer pay this because he is medically disabled.
[6] The father also states that there should be no retroactive support and disagrees that the parties separated in February of 2017. He states that the parties separated in July of 2023, when he was criminally charged with uttering threats against the mother and the mother commenced this application in court.
[7] On July 26, 2024, and June 7, 2024, the parties settled the issues of decision-making responsibility, parenting time, incidents of parenting, communication, and travel in Final Minutes of Settlement, incorporated into Final Orders.
[8] The only outstanding issue is child support.
[9] However, during this hearing, the father attempted to re-open the issues of parenting time and decision-making in his opening and closing statements. He stated that his previous two lawyers were “working against [him].” The father now wants the child to reside with him 50 percent of the time in a shared parenting order.
[10] The father did not bring a motion to set aside the Final Orders that he consented to with previous counsel, nor did he bring a motion to change the Final Orders. He did not advance any material changes in circumstances since the final orders were made.
[11] Further, in his Answer/Claim, the father did not make claims for decision-making responsibility or shared parenting. He agreed that the mother retaining sole decision-making responsibility, with consultation, and that the child remain in the mother’s primary care.[1]
[12] The court cannot consider these claims in this ruling as it would be procedurally unfair to the mother. The mother did not have advance legal notice of these new claims by the father. The father will need to bring a motion to change, or other relief should he wish to advance these claims.
[13] The mother also seeks to amend or correct an omission in the Final Order, dated July 26, 2024, regarding travel. The Final Orders clearly contemplate that the father shall not remove the child from Canada. This issue was raised on several occasions by the mother during these proceedings.
[14] Since the Final Order(s), it is not disputed that the father has travelled to Iran twice for several weeks. Iran is not a signatory to the Hague Convention regarding international child abduction.
[15] This was clearly an oversight or omission in drafting the Final Order. The court will make that amendment to the Final Order accordingly, pursuant to Rules 2 and 25 (19) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99.

2. Issues

[16] The issues in this hearing are:
a. Has there been a change in circumstances since the Temporary Order for child support was granted on consent of the parties?
b. Is the father now unable to work due to medical reasons or is the father intentionally unemployed without a valid medical excuse?
c. If the father is intentionally unemployed, what annual income should be imputed to the father?
d. What final child support order should be made?
e. Should there be retroactive child support ordered, and if so, when should it commence?
f. What child support arrears, if any, should be fixed?

3. Background

[17] The mother is 31 years old. The father is 44 years old.
[18] The parties went through a form of marriage in 2013 in Iran, arranged through their families. The mother was an Afghan refugee at the time and 19 years of age.
[19] The father had been living in Canada since 2002 and travelled to Iran for the parties’ ceremony. He is also of Afghani descent and became a Canadian citizen in 2008.
[20] The father was previously married and divorced in Canada and had two teenage sons from his first marriage.
[21] The father sponsored the mother to immigrate to Canada. The mother arrived in January of 2016 and began residing with the father and his two teenage sons.
[22] Their only child, Emily, was born on […], 2016. The mother has no other children.
[23] The parties have very different narratives regarding their cohabitation and separation.
[24] According to the mother, the parties separated in February of 2017 following a violent incident by the father towards her. Emily was four months old at the time.
[25] The father denies any violence towards the mother and states that the mother was violent and abusive towards him and had “issues” with his teenage sons.
[26] What is not disputed is that the parties physically separated in February of 2017 after the police became involved following the violent incident.
[27] The mother states that the father assaulted her. The police took the mother and Emily to a shelter for women and children. There is no evidence that criminal charges were laid.
[28] The father agrees that the mother and Emily left the family home in February of 2017 with police assistance. However, he states that the police recommended to them that they have two separate places, given their conflict over the living arrangements, and not because he was violent towards the mother.
[29] Following this physical separation in 2017, the parties had no formal parenting or support arrangements until the mother commenced this application in July of 2023. The father states that he regularly saw Emily, that he would spend time with her often, and that he would regularly pick her up at her daycare after school and then return her to the mother’s home.
[30] The father also testified that although they were living in two separate homes, they were not separated and that he stayed mostly at the mother’s home. It is his evidence that he would provide groceries, clothes and shoes for Emily, provide financial assistance, and take them out for dinner.
[31] The mother testified that the father did not see her or the child at all while they were living in the shelter for several months. She further denies receiving any financial assistance from the father. The mother states that once she obtained her own housing and subsidized daycare for Emily the father started to visit Emily approximately once every three to four weeks.
[32] However, according to the mother’s evidence, the father then moved closer to the mother’s home when Emily started school. At that time, the father would pick up Emily from school or daycare and drop her off at the mother’s home more regularly while the mother attended ESL classes. He would then return her to the mother’s home. The mother maintains that at no time did the father live at her home.
[33] The mother later learned that the father was removing Emily from school early because it was convenient for him on his way home from work. The school permitted this because there was no court order in place.
[34] The mother alleged that the father started keeping Emily overnight, refusing to return her, or to tell the mother where Emily was staying. The mother states that the father started withholding the child. He was abusive and threatening when the mother asked him to return the child.

4. Court History

[35] On July 31, 2023, the mother commenced this family court application following an incident in which the mother states the father refused to return Emily to her home and threatened to kill her and other family members.
[36] The father was criminally charged with harassment and uttering threats to cause bodily harm against the mother.
[37] This case was identified for the Integrated Domestic Violence Court (IDVC) and both the family and criminal matters were traversed to that court.[2]
[38] The father denies threatening to kill the mother and states that the mother fabricated the allegations against him. He states that the mother was upset because he took Emily swimming. The mother told him to return Emily and threatened that she would never let him see Emily again. He stated that he “got upset, I said things and she said things.”
[39] The father is pleading not guilty to the criminal charges.[3]
[40] Following the commencement of the family court application, the parties, both represented by family counsel, consented to the following temporary without prejudice order on November 29, 2023:

1. The father shall have parenting time with the child every Saturday from 12 noon to 4 PM with supervised parenting exchanges at Access Centre for Parents and Children (APCO).
2. Commencing December 1, 2023, pending full financial disclosure, the father shall pay child support to the mother in the amount of $454.00 per month for the child based on his annual income of $49,236.00, in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines for Ontario.

[41] The father has only made one payment of child support under the Temporary Order. Arrears of $7,264.00 have accrued under this order and are owed to the mother.
[42] On November 23, 2023, the court ordered the father to provide financial disclosure pursuant to the Temporary Order.
[43] On February 16, 2024, the mother served the father with a Form 20 Request for Information regarding financial disclosure, including copies of income tax returns for 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023, T-4 slip for 2023, the title deed and mortgage for his condominium, and evidence of payment of support for the child, among other items.
[44] On March 8, 2024, the father advised the court that he was no longer able to work and that his income was reduced because of the impact of the family breakdown on his mental health. The court ordered the father to provide the financial and medical disclosure necessary to demonstrate his position that his income was reduced.
[45] Including the Automatic Financial Disclosure Order that is issued with this application, this was the third financial disclosure order made, and the first medical disclosure order made.
[46] As will be detailed later in these reasons, the father has not complied with the disclosure orders made.
[47] In March of 2024, the father filed a Notice of Change of Representation and retained new counsel.
[48] On June 7, 2024 and July 26, 2024, as noted earlier, the parties settled the issues of decision-making responsibility, primary residence, parenting time, incidents of parenting, communication, and travel. Both parties were represented by counsel at the time.
[49] The Final Orders on consent that were made are summarized as follows:

1. The mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for Emily (or “the child”) and Emily’s primary residence shall remain with the mother. Before making any non-emergency major decisions for the child, the mother shall consult with the father through the “Our Family Wizard” parenting application for separated families. The father shall have 72 hours to respond. If no agreement is reached the mother’s decision shall be final.
2. The mother shall be able to obtain and renew government issued identification documents for Emily, including passports and health cards. If the father does not sign the application(s) for same within five days of receiving, his consent shall be dispensed with.
3. The father shall not discuss the adult issues, or this court case, or make disparaging comments about the mother to the child or in the child’s presence and shall encourage his adult sons (from his previous relationship) to do the same.
4. The father shall have parenting time with Emily every Saturday for a period of four hours from 12 noon to 4 pm. The pick-up and drop-off of Emily shall be supervised by Access for Parents and Children in Ontario (APCO).
5. The father shall keep the mother apprised of his current address and all persons residing with him at that address at all times.
6. The mother (and father) shall abide with the relocation provisions under the Children’s Law Reform Act.
7. The mother shall be permitted to travel with the child to a Hague country for vacation purposes only for a period of up to 28 days without the consent of the father required. The mother shall provide the father with 30 days’ notice trip and a detailed itinerary, including address, contact information and flight details.

[50] The parties were not able to resolve the issue of child support on a final basis. A Trial Management Conference was scheduled for September 20, 2024.
[51] On September 16, 2024, the father filed a second Notice of Change of Representation, again changing his lawyer in the family matter. He sought an adjournment to seek new counsel, which was granted by the court.
[52] On September 16, 2024, the father had not provided the medical and financial disclosure that was ordered by the court on March 8, 2024.
[53] The father also travelled to Iran in the summer and fall of 2024 for several weeks. During that time, he missed several visits with the child.
[54] On November 29, 2024, at the return of the Trial Management Conference, the father had not retained new family counsel and advised that he was now representing himself. He was also still in Iran.
[55] The father participated in the Trial Management Conference by Zoom from Iran.
[56] The Trial Management Conference was conducted, with court filing timelines and directions given to the parties. The only issue was child support.
[57] Both parties consented to this court conducting the focused hearing on the issue of child support. The parties filed affidavits, with exhibits, and financial statements as their direct evidence, subject to cross-examination.
[58] The father returned to Canada at the end of December 2024 and that attended the focused hearing in person.

5. The Trial: Evidence Regarding the Father’s Income

[59] Both parties testified and were cross-examined at the hearing. There were no other witnesses.
[60] The father describes himself as a medical lab technician and musician. He is now 44 years old.
[61] The father came to Canada in 2005 in his early twenties as a permanent resident. He became a Canadian citizen in 2008. He testified that he did not receive an education in Iran given his status as an Afghan refugee.
[62] After arriving in Canada, he started working in construction, pizza delivery, and as a restaurant server, while studying during the day to learn English and to obtain his Canadian high school equivalency.
[63] The father attended an Adult Learning Centre part-time for several years while working full-time and obtained his high school diploma.
[64] In 2017, the father attended George Brown College and successfully graduated as Medical Lab Technician from the college’s diploma program.
[65] The father states that he started working for LifeLabs as a medical lab technician in approximately 2020 or 2021.
[66] The father testified that in 2020 to 2023, he also earned income from properties that he sub-let.
[67] The father explained that he rented a house at 66 Avondale in Toronto for $2,900.00 plus utilities which had nine rooms. He rented out most of the rooms in the house to international students at a rate of $650.00 to $700.00 per room plus utilities for upper levels and $550.00 plus utilities for basement units. He stated that he lost the Avondale income during Covid when all the tenants left.
[68] The father produced one sworn Financial Statement in these proceedings dated February 19, 2024, with his notices of assessment for 2022, 2021, and 2020 attached, as well as two paystubs from LifeLabs.
[69] The father states that he only earned approximately $31,000.00 annually at LifeLabs before he stopped working.
[70] According to his Financial Statement and his 2023 year to end pay stub, the father’s 2023 employment income from LifeLabs was $31,441.42.
[71] It is the father’s evidence that his hours were significantly reduced in July of 2023 when he was criminally charged and the mother commenced this family application, as he was no longer able to work physically or mentally due to the stress of both proceedings.
[72] The father’s CRA Notices of Assessment stated the following ‘Line 150’ income for previous years:

1. 2020 Notice of Reassessment: $46,176
2. 2021 Notice of Assessment: $58,164
3. 2022 Notice of Assessment: $44,002

[73] The father testified that he was working at LifeLabs during the three years above, but the notices of assessment also included the rental income that he received. He gives this as the reason the NOAs reflected a much higher income than his 2023 employment income from LifeLabs.
[74] The father did not produce any supporting documentation regarding this testimony. He did not provide his LifeLab T-4 slips, individual income tax returns, statement of income and business expenses or any year to end statements of rental income for the three previous years of income reflected in the notices of assessment. There was no evidence at all supporting the father’s assertion.
[75] The father testified that he had an (unnamed) accountant who assisted him and “added the rental income” into his NOAs but he did not produce any documentation from an accountant, nor call him to testify.
[76] The father also testified that he purchased two condominiums in Toronto. He could not recall when he purchased the first condominium, which he purchased for paid $213,000.00. He testified that he used his savings, his line of credit and credit cards to accumulate $130,000.00 for the downpayment. The father did not provide any supporting documentation for this evidence.
[77] The father testified that he sold the first condominium in 2017 or 2018 and later purchased another condominium at 14 York Street Toronto for either $480,000 or $570,000.00. He could not recall when he purchased the York St. condominium. He did not provide any supporting documentation regarding this purchase.
[78] The father testified that he sold the second condominium for $580,000.00 on March 8, 2024. During cross-examination, the father acknowledged that he rented the York Street condominium as an Airbnb for an undefined period.
[79] On March 19, 2024, the father received $68,075.00 in net proceeds from the sale of the York Street condominium, according to the copy of the certified cheque and partial closing letter from real estate lawyer produced by the father.
[80] The father stated that he used this money to pay off several debts, including unpaid property taxes of approximately $25,000.00 for the York Street property. He did not itemize the debts that he claimed to have paid, or provide any supporting documentation, except for the property taxes.
[81] The father also testified that he has more debts owing of approximately $55,687.00, comprising of a car loan, student loans, credit cards and line of credit, and personal loans.
[82] The father acknowledged that he did not use the money from the sale of the condominium to pay child support. He admitted that he has only made one payment of child support under the November 2023 Temporary Order and stopped making any payments of child support under the court order after December of 2023. However, he stated that he would sometimes give cash and gifts for the child during his Saturday visits.
[83] The father did not declare any other sources of income in his February 19, 2024 Financial Statement. He deposed in his Financial Statement that the value of his condominium was approximately $490,000.00, even though he had sold the property for $580,000.00 approximately four weeks later, according to the Land Registry Office documents obtained by mother’s counsel.
[84] The father did not disclose the sale of his condominium in his sworn Financial Statement.
[85] When asked when he had signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and what the closing date was, the father stated that he could not remember, nor did he produce a copy of any closing documents.
[86] The father also performs as a musician in Iran when he is visiting there. He plays a variety of instruments. It is unclear what income he derives from this.
[87] When travelling back and forth to Iran during 2024, the father states that he paid $1,400.00 “and some” return for his airfare on both visits. His adult sons travel with him, but he denied paying for their tickets.
[88] The father deposed that he first went to Iran because his sister was very ill and had suffered a heart attack. He also went “to stay for a while to get emotional support as his health condition and depression worsened, and my only hope and happiness is my daughter Emily.”
[89] The father acknowledged that he also travelled to Iran for marriage, which he initially denied when raised by the mother. It is his evidence that that he is “communicating with a woman” in Iran and “if things go well, I’ll marry because I can’t live alone.”

The Father’s Medical Claims

[90] It is the father’s evidence that his circumstances changed significantly in July of 2023 following his criminal charges and these family court proceedings.
[91] He testified that the separation from his daughter disabled him and that he is now living in “agony, pain, anxiety, nightmares, excessive stress, it even affects [his] vision.” The separation from his daughter has put him into a “severe depression.”
[92] The father states that having parenting time with his daughter only four hours every Saturday has been devastating, affecting his whole being and that he lost everything: “my jobs, my income, my condo.”
[93] The father testified that he tried to work after July of 2023, but failed to perform his duties as a lab technician because he could not function or concentrate. He testified that he kept receiving complaints from his manager that his patients received the wrong test results for their blood work.
[94] It is the father’s evidence that he stopped working at LifeLabs on or around February of 2024.
[95] The father testified that he lost his job with LifeLabs and fell into great debt and could not pay his mortgage, forcing him to sell his condominium.
[96] According to the father, the traumatic separation from his daughter has completely disabled him and has caused him extreme physical and mental pain. This trauma has also worsened other health conditions that he has, arising from a 2008 car accident.
[97] The father did not provide any supporting documentation from LifeLabs confirming his termination. He produced one letter from LifeLabs dated March 15, 2024, which states that he has been employed with the company since March 22, 2021, and that he works on a “Regular Part-Time” basis and holds the position of a Mobile Lab Patient Technician.
[98] The letter did not state that the father had been terminated or laid off, nor did it state when he started working part-time with LifeLabs. The letter suggests that he continued to be employed by LifeLabs.
[99] At the focused hearing, for the first time, the father produced the following medical evidence, despite being ordered on March 8, 2024 to provide the medical documentation necessary to demonstrate his inability to work:

1. A handwritten note for a prescription dated April 23, 2024 from Dr. A. Buckridan, which states: “This patient has been under severe stress due to a domestic situation. This is expected to continue for some time. He is unable to see his 7 year old daughter.” The doctor prescribed 15mg of Remeron, an anti-depressant.
2. An Emergency Record dated June 13, 2024 by Dr. E. Bears of Mount Sinai Hospital after the father walked into report fatigue and “trauma, insomnia, brain fog, anxiety and no concentration” due to family break-up. The notes indicated that the father was “Feeling anxious and upset. Wants to see daughter.” The Main Diagnosis was “Situational Crisis.” The father was referred to the Ambulatory Outpatient Psychiatry Clinic.
3. A Triage Note dated June 17, 2024 by Allison Hughes, Social Worker and Mental Health Clinician from the Ambulatory Outpatient Psychiatry Clinic at Mount Sinai describing the father “as a 43 year old male on short term disability from his work as a phlebotomist with insomnia and anxiety in the context of a marital dissolution and associated legal charges/police involvement. He endorses difficulty concentrating and preoccupation with the goal if reuniting with his 7 year old daughter which he currently sees for supervised visits once a week.” No diagnosis or prognosis is provided but the “plan” proposed is to discuss psychoeducation and medication options with his family physician and the father was referred to “Centre for Men and Families” which offers advice and support for fathers who understand themselves to be falsely accused.
4. An “Abilities Form” from LifeLabs dated September 10, 2024. According to the form, the information provided in it is used “to determine if there are opportunities in LifeLabs for modified or alternative work as part of a temporary work arrangement while supporting medical documentation is being submitted or reviewed by [their] Insurer, Sun Life.” The father signed the form on September 10, 2024 authorizing the release of medical information to the Group Benefits Department of LifeLabs. The 3-page form was completed and signed by Dr. Kavita Randhawa.
5. An Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) cheque stub dated September 27, 2024 confirming that the father is receiving ODSP payments of $1,368.00 per month, but owed an overpayment of $36,882.45, collected at the rate of $68.40 per month.

100There was no other evidence regarding the father’s medical condition and ability to work.

6. The Law and Governing Principles

[101] The father states that he is no longer able to work and is seeking to change or terminate the Temporary Order for child support that he consented to, and to rescind all arrears, due to his claimed medical disability. He seeks these orders on a final basis.
[102] Subsection 37 (2.1) of the Family Law Act governs variations of child support and reads as follows:

Powers of court: child support
(2.1) In the case of an order for support of a child, if the court is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances within the meaning of the child support guidelines or that evidence not available on the previous hearing has become available, the court may,
(a) discharge, vary or suspend a term of the order, prospectively or retroactively;
(b) relieve the respondent from the payment of part or all of the arrears or any interest due on them; and
(c) make any other order for the support of a child that the court could make on an application under section 33. 1997, c. 20, s. 6.

[103] The powers of a court to vary child support are very broad. The court can change the terms of any order, either prospectively or retroactively, but can also suspend or discharge the order, either in whole or in part, and on either a prospective or retroactive basis. See: Bougataya v. Turkmen, 2023 ONCJ 341 at para 42; Meyer v. Content, 2014 ONSC 4001.
[104] The court’s authority with respect to arrears is similarly broad and includes the power to rescind arrears and interest, either entirely or in part, or to reduce the amount of arrears payable. See: Bougataya v. Turkmen, supra; Meyer v. Content, supra.
[105] The mother’s claim that the father is deliberately unemployed or under-employed, and that income should be imputed to him is governed by the Child Support Guidelines.
[106] Subsections 19(1) and (2) of the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, as amended, provide the legal authority for a court to impute income to a parent for child support purposes.
[107] Subsections 19(1)(a) and (f) of the Guidelines state the following:

19. Imputing income.—(1) The court may impute such amount of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,
(a) the parent or spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse;
(f) the parent or spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

[108] Imputing income is just one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. See: Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 ONCA 41868.
[109] In Duffy v. Duffy, 2009 NLCA 48, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal provided a very helpful summary of the important principles regarding child support under the Guidelines at paragraph 35 of its decision:

1. The fundamental obligation of a parent to support his or her children takes precedence over the parent’s own interests and choices.
2. A parent will not be permitted to knowingly avoid or diminish, and may not choose to ignore, his or her obligation to support his or her children.
3. A parent is required to act responsibly when making financial decisions that may affect the level of child support available from that parent.
4. Imputing income to a parent on the basis that the parent is “intentionally under-employed or unemployed” does not incorporate a requirement for proof of bad faith. “Intentionally” in this context clarifies that the provision does not apply to situations beyond the parent’s control.
5. The determination to impute income is discretionary, as the court considers appropriate in the circumstances.
6. Where a parent is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, the court may exercise its discretion not to impute income where that parent establishes the reasonableness of his or her decision.
7. A parent will not be excused from his or her child support obligations in furtherance of unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations or interests. Nor will it be acceptable for a parent to choose to work for future rewards to the detriment of the present needs of his or her children unless the parent establishes the reasonableness of his or her course of action.
8. A parent must provide proper and full disclosure of financial information. Failure to do so may result in the court drawing an adverse inference and imputing income.

The Legal Test in Drygala v. Pauli

110The legal test to apply when considering whether to impute income under section 19(1)(a) is set out in the 2002 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Drygala v. Pauli (“Drygala”). The Court set out the test as follows:

1. Step 1: Is the spouse intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
2. Step 2: If yes, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of one of the following exceptions under s. 19(1)(a):
   a. Required by the needs of the child of the union or marriage;
   b. Required by the needs of any child under the age of majority;
   c. Required by the reasonable educational needs of the parent;
   d. Required by the reasonable health needs of the parent.
3. Step 3: If the payor does not fall into any of the exceptions above under step two, what income is appropriately imputed in the circumstances?

[111] In Drygala, Justice Gillese, writing for the court, importantly clarified that the word “intentionally” used in subsection 19(1)(a) means “voluntarily”. The Court of Appeal adopted a “reasonableness” test in finding that ‘intentional’ did not require bad faith, but mere voluntariness. Choosing to earn less is enough. There does not have to be an intention to evade child support.
[112] In an application of first instance, such as this case, the onus is on the recipient to prove that the payor is intentionally under or unemployed, or voluntarily unemployed. See: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322.
[113] Once the recipient presents the evidentiary basis for a prima facie case in step one, then the onus shifts to the payor to establish a valid reason for his or her unemployment, as required in step two. See: Lo v. Lo, 2011 ONSC 7663; Charron v. Charron, 2016 ONSC 4719; Rilli v. Rilli, 2006 ONSC 34451.
[114] Finally, where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them. See: Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548.

Medical or Health Related Reasons Claimed for Unemployment

[115] When considering whether a parent’s unemployment is required by the reasonable medical or health needs of the parent, it is well established in law that cogent medical evidence in the form of a detailed medical opinion and supporting documentation should be provided by the payor to satisfy the court that the payor’s reasonable health needs justify the decision not to work. See: Stoangi v. Petersen, 2006 ONSC 24124 at para 25; Cook v. Burton, 2005 ONSC 1063.
[116] The court should scrutinize any medical evidence presented. A considerable body of case law has developed regarding the medical evidence required for a party who claims they cannot work for medical reasons, summarized below.
[117] A party who wishes to have a medical condition considered as a basis that he or she cannot work bears the onus to establish material disability. This goes beyond testifying that they suffer from depression and anxiety: they must establish that the extent of the condition disables them from work. This onus cannot ordinarily be discharged solely based on the party’s testimony. The party would need to produce medical records and expert evidence about their condition, prospects, and treatment. See: Geishardt v. Ahmed, 2017 ONSC 5513 at paras 26, 33; Wilkins v. Wilkins, 2018 ONSC 3036.
[118] In Davidson v. Patten, 2021 ONCJ 437 at para 15, Justice Carole Curtis set out that a party resisting a claim for imputation of their income based on medical reasons should provide a medical report setting out at least the following information:
i. Diagnosis;
ii. Prognosis;
iii. Treatment plan (is there a treatment plan? And what is it?);
iv. Compliance with the treatment plan; and,
v. Specific and detailed information connecting the medical condition to the ability to work (e.g., this person cannot work at the pre-injury job; this person cannot work for three months; this person cannot work at physical labour; this person cannot return to work ever).
[119] Support payors must use reasonable efforts to address whatever medical limitations they may have to earn income. This means following up on medical recommendations to address these limitations. See: Cole v. Freiwald, 2011 ONSC 3654 at paras 140-141.
[120] Even if the court accepts that the party has health-related challenges that may impact their income earning capacity, it must consider the nature and extent of the impact and whether the party could work on a part-time basis or in a less demanding position. See: Bentley v. Bentley, 2009 ONSC 562; Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785.
[121] The receipt of ODSP or Workplace Safety and Insurance Board benefits is not sufficient proof of one’s inability to work for support purposes. See: Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 2017 ONSC 6499. The court cannot take judicial notice of any eligibility requirements for ODSP. Nor can it delegate the important and complex determinations of employability and income earning capacity to unknown bureaucrats applying unknown evidence to unknown criteria. See: Abumatar v. Hamda, 2021 ONSC 2165; Bougataya v. Turkmen, 2023 ONCJ 341.

7. Analysis

Credibility and Reliability Findings

[122] The court found that the mother was generally a credible and reliable witness. She answered questions in a straightforward and consistent manner. She was not shaken in cross-examination.
[123] However, there were significant gaps in her evidence, particularly regarding the father’s involvement and financial assistance for Emily between the years of 2018 and July of 2023, and her claim for retroactive child support going back to February of 2017.
[124] The mother deposed that the father “never picked up Emily from the daycare on a daily basis with my consent. If he did so, it was hidden from me, and he would return Emily to me whenever it pleased him, rather than on my schedule.”
[125] This evidence was confusing, and it did not make sense, as it could not have been “hidden” from her if she was picking up Emily directly from daycare herself. It also contradicted her evidence at trial that the father was picking up Emily on a regular basis from daycare once he moved closer to her home, prior to the July 2023 criminal charges and court application.
[126] The mother’s evidence that she received no financial assistance from the father whatsoever was contradicted by some of the father’s evidence showing photographs of cash and gifts that he provided to Emily at visits for the mother. However, this evidence also contradicted the father’s evidence that he had no money to pay child support.
[127] The court found that the father’s evidence was far more unreliable and not credible for the following reasons:

1. His answers were inconsistent, often illogical and his evidence changed frequently. He often engaged in hyperbole and very exaggerated statements.
2. His financial evidence was woefully inadequate, despite three court orders for financial disclosure.
3. The father failed to provide the court ordered financial disclosure to support any of his explanations for why his income was significantly higher in the three years prior to the mother’s application for child support, according to his 2020, 2021, and 2022 Notices of Assessment (NOAs).
4. He claimed that the NOAs included his rental income, but he did not provide his LifeLab T-4 slips, individual income tax returns, statement of income and business expenses or any year to end statements of rental income for the three previous years of income reflected in the notices of assessment. There was no evidence at all supporting the father’s assertion that his annual income from LifeLabs was only $31,000 before he reduced his hours and stopped working after the mother commenced these proceedings.
5. The father failed to disclose that he had sold his condominium in his sworn financial statement even though the closing on the sale was less than four weeks away. It is highly unlikely that the father would have signed and closed on an Agreement of Purchase of Sale of his condo in less than four weeks after he had he signed his statement. When asked the date he signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, the father stated that he ‘could not recall’. He did not produce any documentation supporting the sale.
6. The father deposed in his financial statement that his condominium was only worth $480,000.00, even though he had sold it less than four weeks later for 580,000.00 (not disclosed until trial).
7. The father failed to disclose that he received $68,000.00 in net sale proceeds from the sale of his condominium until this trial. He did not pay any child support or arrears owing from the net sale proceeds.
8. The father testified that he had an (unnamed) accountant who assisted him and “added the rental income” into his previous NOAs but he did not produce any documentation from an accountant, nor call him to testify.
9. When asked, the father could not recall when he purchased his first condominium, which he purchased for paid $213,000.00. He testified that he used his savings, his line of credit and credit cards to accumulate $130,000.00 for the downpayment but did not provide any supporting documentation for this evidence, or any closing documents regarding this purchase.
10. According to the father’s testimony, the traumatic separation from his daughter has “completely disabled him” and has caused him “extreme physical and mental pain” and that he stopped working at LifeLabs in February of 2024.
11. The father did not provide any supporting documentation from LifeLabs confirming his termination. He produced one letter from LifeLabs dated March 15, 2024, which states that he works on a “Regular Part-Time” basis and holds the position of a Mobile Lab Patient Technician.
12. This employment contradicts the father’s that he had been terminated or laid off. The letter suggests that he continued to be employed by LifeLabs. The letter also does not indicate when the father started working part-time at LifeLabs.
13. Further, the “Abilities Form” from LifeLabs dated September 10, 2024, produced by the father also contradicted his testimony. The form indicated that the father was still employed there but that he was applying for a temporary workplace accommodation and insurance benefits. According to the form, the information provided in it is used “to determine if there are opportunities in LifeLabs for modified or alternative work as part of a temporary work arrangement”.
14. Both hospital reports dated June 14th and 17th, 2024 tendered by the father as evidence indicates that the father stated that he was on a “leave of absence/short term disability” from his employment, again contradicting the father’s testimony that he had stopped working or had been terminated in February of 2024.
15. The father did not produce a Record of Employment from LifeLabs, despite being asked to do so in the Request for Information served and filed on February 16, 2024.
16. The father also did not produce any evidence of short-term disability through his employer.
17. Further, according to the LifeLabs “Abilities Form” for temporary work accommodation dated September 10, 2024, the father had no physical restrictions in sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, reaching, climbing, pinching, gripping, fine finger movement, vision, hearing or driving.
18. This report, signed by both the father and a medical doctor, contradicts the father’s testimony that he is living in “agony” and “extreme physical pain” that has “completely disabled him” even “affecting his vision” making it impossible for him to work.
19. The father testified that his sole source of income is ODSP and produced a paystub confirming that he receives $1,299.60 per month yet admitted in his testimony that he travelled to Iran for several weeks in the summer and the fall of 2024 and paid “$1,400.00 and some” per round trip. He did not provide any evidence regarding how he paid for these flights if his sole source of income was ODSP, nor did he provide any supporting documentation confirming the actual cost.
20. The father’ evidence regarding the parties’ separation was confusing and changed often. He acknowledged that the parties had stopped living together in 2017 when the police brought the mother and child to a shelter, and that the mother had her own apartment with the child. He also acknowledged that he and his sons lived elsewhere in their own apartment and then in his condo. His evidence that he was staying at the mother’s home most of the time is contradicted by the hospital report that he produced at trial, in which he told the social worker that the police had arrested him in July of 2023 at his condo, and that Emily and the mother lived elsewhere, after he failed to return Emily to her home with “his ex”, as he described the mother.

8. Findings of Fact: The Father’s Income

128The court makes the following findings of fact to assist in determining what if any income should be imputed to the father:

1. The father is a trained medical lab technician.
2. He was steadily employed by LifeLabs at the time of the separation and the commencement of the mother’s application and had been working there since 2021.
3. The father has a history of being productive and being steadily employed, in the restaurant industry, as a landlord/superintendent, managing an Airbnb, an Uber driver in addition to his history as a medical lab technician.
4. He is 44 years old.
5. He also earned rental income for an undetermined number of years and was able to save sufficient funds to purchase a condominium.
6. In 2024, he received $68,000.00 from the net sales proceeds from his condominium and did not use any of these funds to pay child support;
7. The father’s three years of income before the mother brought her claim for child support were as follows:
   a. 2020 Notice of Reassessment: $46,176
   b. 2021 Notice of Assessment: $58,164
   c. 2022 Notice of Assessment: $44,002
8. The father consented to a temporary without prejudice order on November 23, 2023 stating that his income for child support purposes was $49,236.00.
9. The father is now in receipt of ODSP. It is unclear when this started.
10. The father has traveled to Iran at least twice in the past year and paid for the round trips during the period that he states he was unable to work.
11. There is evidence that the father is no longer receiving the rental and Airbnb income since he sold his condominium.
12. There is also some evidence of a high debt load that the father has accumulated relating to a line of credit, credit cards and a car loan.

[129] The father filed little to no medical evidence that he is now completely unable to work due to medical reasons since the mother commenced this family court application in July of 2023.
[130] The brief handwritten note dated April 23, 2024 from a doctor simply states that the father has been “under severe stress due to a domestic situation” which is expected “to continue for some time”. It does not say that he is unable to work, or how this affects his ability to work, nor does it provide any prognosis, treatment plan or referral. The doctor does prescribe a mild anti-depressant. The letter was written more than one year ago.
[131] The June 2024 hospital reports from the ER doctor and social work clinician both state that the father is going through a family break up, and experiencing stress, anxiety, and insomnia. The diagnosis is “situational crisis”, written almost one year ago. The father was prescribed Ativan by the ER physician and referred to the hospital’s Crisis Clinic.
[132] The social worker at the Crisis Clinic referred the father to a support group, the Canadian Centre for Men and Families. No other referrals, including psychiatric assessment or treatment, were made.
[133] The LifeLabs Abilities form designed to determine temporary workplace accommodation or modifications for its employees provided some evidence that the father had difficulty concentrating, multi-tasking, and working under pressure, according to the check boxes ticked. No further explanation is provided, nor to what extent this affected the father’s ability to work on either a full-time or part-time basis. There was no evidence from the father whether accommodation was offered to him, and for how long.
[134] None of these reports provided adequate evidence of a total inability to work, nor do they provide any evidence of prognosis, diagnosis, any further treatment plan, or recommendations for treatment, and whether the father is compliant with prescriptions and recommendations.
[135] In fact, the hospital ER report prepared by the emergency physician indicates that the father stopped taking the anti-depressant prescribed by his doctor in April of 2024.
[136] There is no evidence provided regarding how the father was assessed and deemed eligible for ODSP. There is no evidence of any medical report(s), diagnosis, prognosis, or the criteria and evidence that ODSP relied upon in determining the father’s eligibility for ODSP.
[137] The fact that the father is now receiving ODSP is not sufficient evidence of proof of one’s inability to work for child support purposes. See: Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 2017 ONSC 6499.
[138] The father provided no evidence regarding what steps he was taking to treat or address what he described as his medical disability.
[139] When asked what medical steps he was taking to get better, the father replied “Nothing… I need equal rights.”
[140] In his closing submissions, the father repeated that his medical conditions would be cured if the court granted him shared parenting. He would then be able to work again and pay child support.

9. Application of the Drygala Legal Test

Steps 1 and 2

[141] The court finds that the mother has met her onus (the first step in Drygala) in providing an evidentiary basis that the father is voluntarily unemployed. At the time that the mother commenced these proceedings, that father was working full-time as a medical lab technician and he consented to a Temporary Order (with counsel) providing that his income was $49,236.00.
[142] The court finds that the father has not provided a valid reason for his unemployment (the second step in Drygala) based on my analysis of the medical evidence above.
[143] The court finds that the father is capable of working full-time and can return to his employment as a medical lab technician.
[144] The court draws an adverse inference against the father for his failure to comply with the orders for medical and financial disclosure.

Step 3: What Income should be imputed to the Father

[145] The father’s hourly rate as a lab technician at LifeLabs, is close to $20.00 per hour, according to the 2023 paystubs that were filed as exhibits on consent. Based on the father’s hourly rate and working full-time at LifeLabs (40 hours weekly), the father’s annual income from LifeLabs would be $41,600.00.
[146] The annual income stated in the father’s previous Notices of Assessments is clearly significantly higher than what the father earned if he was only working full-time hours at LifeLabs. The November 2023 temporary without prejudice order that the parties consented to is based on an annual income of $49,000.
[147] It is unclear how the income in the temporary without prejudice order was calculated. This could have included the rental income, averaged from the previous three years. It is not disputed that the father no longer receives rental income.
[148] It could also be overtime. Given that the father failed to produce his income tax returns and T-4 slips, as he was ordered to do so, it is difficult for the court to ascertain whether the father received overtime pay.
[149] The court will impute income of $44,000.00 to the father for child support purposes, which was the income stated in the father’s last Notice of Assessment (2022) filed before the litigation started.
[150] Although this amount is lower than the income agreed to by the parties in November of 2023, (consented to on a without prejudice basis), it is the court’s view, based on all the evidence, that this is a more accurate reflection of the father’s income to determine child support.
[151] The ongoing table amount of child support, based on the father’s imputed income, is $406.00 under the Child Support Guidelines.

10. The Mother’s Retroactive Claim

[152] The mother seeks retroactive child support to February 1, 2017, which she states is the date the parties separated.
[153] The court’s authority to make retroactive support orders is set out in section 34(1)(f) of the Family Law Act. This section states that in application for support, the court may make an interim or final order requiring the support to be paid in respect of any period before the date of the order.
[154] Any child support claimed after an application is issued is prospective support, not retroactive support and is presumptively payable. See: Mackinnon v. Mackinnon, 2005 13 R.F.L. (6th) 331; Ebba v. Sheriff Jalloh, 2025 ONCJ 127 at para 30, per Justice Stanley Sherr.
[155] In Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the framework that should be applied for retroactive applications to increase child support in a court order or agreement at paragraph 114 of that decision.
[156] In an original application for child support, such as the case before me, there is no need to establish a material change in circumstances, as required by Colucci, however, the remaining principles set out in the Colucci framework apply. In Ebba v. Sheriff Jalloh, supra, Justice Stanley Sherr sets out the framework as follows at paragraph 330 of that decision:

“… The first step will be to determine the presumptive date of retroactivity as described in Colucci. The second step will be to determine if the court should depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors will guide the exercise of that discretion, as described in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24. The third step will be to quantify the proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity, calculated in accordance with the guidelines.” [par. 33]

157The relevant factors for original applications for support in the Colucci framework are therefore as follows:

c) Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice.
d) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income.
e) Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines. [par. 114]

158The D.B.S. factors referred to in Colucci above are:

a. Whether the recipient spouse has provided a reasonable excuse for his or her delay in applying for support;
b. The conduct of the payor parent;
c. The circumstances of the child;
d. The hardship that a retroactive award may entail.[5]

[159] Retroactive child support awards are not exceptional. They can always be avoided by proper payment. See D.B.S., supra, at paragraph 97.
[160] Retroactive child support simply holds payors to their existing (and unfulfilled) support obligations. See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 at para 25.

Presumptive Start Date and Reasons for Delay

[161] Very unfortunately, in this trial, I heard little evidence on any of the above factors from the mother.
[162] The court was unable to determine a presumptive start date prior to the court’s application as the mother did not provide any evidence of effective notice given to the father or that she broached the issue of paying child support with the father until she issued her application on July 21, 2023.
[163] The mother also did not provide any direct evidence regarding the reason for delay in bringing her application, more than five years after the date of separation.
[164] However, a delay, in itself, is not inherently unreasonable and the mere fact of delay does not prejudice an application, as not all factors need to be present for a retroactive award to be granted. See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 at para 113.
[165] A delay will only be prejudicial if it is deemed unreasonable, taking into account a generous application of the social context in which the claimant’s decision to seek child support was made. See: Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, at para 86; Ebba v. Sheriff Jalloh, supra, at para 50.
[166] In this case, it is reasonable for the court to assume that the issues of domestic violence, the mother’s young age, her recent arrival in Canada, and her lack of English language skills at the time of the separation were factors contributing to the delay in bringing an application.

Blameworthy Conduct

[167] The date of effective notice is not relevant when a payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct (irrespective of the degree of blameworthiness). See Michel v. Graydon, supra, at para 36.
[168] The mother states that the father provided very little or no financial assistance during five year period before she commenced her application. The father states that he provided substantial assistance, including groceries, cash, clothing, and ballet lessons. He did not provide any supporting documentation regarding these payments.
[169] Although the court had serious concerns about the father’s evidence regarding the date of separation, the court also found that there were significant gaps in the mother’s evidence regarding the extent of the father’s involvement and financial assistance for Emily, as well as Emily’s circumstances between the years of 2018 and July 21, 2023.
[170] There is no doubt that the father engaged in blameworthy conduct after the mother commenced this application for support:

1. The father made only one payment of child support under the Temporary Order for child support after the application was issued. He has refused to make any payments of child support under the Temporary Order that he consented to since January 1, 2024.
2. In March of 2024, the father received $68,000.00 from the net sale proceeds for his condominium. He used that money to pay his own personal debts and to travel to Iran on two separate occasions. He did not pay ongoing child support or any of the arrears of child support that had accumulated, which are now significant.
3. The father has failed to comply with three orders for financial and medical disclosure.

[171] The court should apply an expansive definition of blameworthy conduct. Blameworthy conduct is anything that privileges the payor’s own interests over his or her child’s right to an appropriate amount of support. See D.B.S., supra, para 106.
[172] The failure to disclose actual income, a fact within the knowledge of the payor, is a failure of a significant obligation and is considered blameworthy conduct. Michel v. Graydon, supra at para 116.
[173] Given the court’s findings regarding the father’s credibility in this proceeding, the court finds that although the father may have provided some financial assistance to the mother during the years prior to her court application, it was not as much as he claimed, and certainly not the table amount of support that he should have paid in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, based on the notices if assessment that were filed.

The Circumstances of the Child

[174] There was very little to no evidence regarding the child’s circumstances, and whether she experienced hardship. The mother obtained subsidized housing and subsidized daycare approximately five months after she and the child had moved to a shelter. The mother’s home is close to the child’s school. The father gave evidence that he paid for the child’s ballet lessons, which was not disputed by the mother.
[175] Any kind of hardship is not a necessary antecedent to making a retroactive support award. A payor’s support obligation does not disappear when the child no longer requires support. If this factor were to tip the balance against making a retroactive award, then, in essence, the payor will have profited from “holding off” on paying increased child support See: Michel v. Graydon, at para 122.
[176] There are plenty of circumstances where a parent will absorb the hardship that accompanies a dearth of child support to prioritize their child’s well-being. There is absolutely no principled reason why this parent should receive any less support as a result of choices that protect the child See: Michel v. Graydon, at para 123.

Hardship on the Payor

[177] The father has accumulated substantial debt since the parties’ separation and in the past year, totaling approximately $26,000.00 according to the documents that he filed regarding his credit cards, line of credit and car loans. His incomes will also likely be modest once he returns to work.
[178] If there is the potential for hardship to the payor, but there is also blameworthy conduct which precipitated or exacerbated the delay, it may be open to the courts to disregard the presence of hardship: Michel v. Graydon, at para 124.
[179] In all cases, hardship may be addressed by the form of payment. See Michel v. Graydon, supra, at para 124.
[180] Considering all the above circumstances, the court finds that a fair and reasonable presumptive start date is July 31, 2020, three years prior to the commencement of the mother’s application (July 31, 2023) and the father’s formal legal notice of the child support claim.
[181] Accordingly, the arrears are calculated as follows, based on the father’s notices of assessments for the previous three years, and ongoing income imputed since July 31, 2023:

1. 2020 - $46,176: Arrears: $2,145.00 (Table amount $429 X 5)
2. 2021 - $58,164: Arrears: $6,456.00 (Table amount $538 X 12)
3. 2022 - $44,002: Arrears: $4,872.00 (Table Amount $406 X 12)
4. Income imputed from July 31, 2023 to May 20, 2025- $44,000: $8,526.00 (Table Amount $406 X 21)

Total Arrears: $21,999.00

182The court finds that the father has made one payment of child support under the Temporary Order and made some financial contributions to the mother over the three years before she commenced her application for support. The father will need to return to work and his income is modest. The court will give the father a support credit of $7,000.00 and fix the arrears at $15,000.00.

11. The Mother’s Claim for Section 7 expenses

[183] The mother also seeks an order that the father pay a fixed amount of $100.00 per month for Emily’s section 7 expenses, to be used for her activities or tutoring if needed.
[184] When asked, the mother stated that Emily has no section 7 expenses at this time. Her daycare expense is fully subsidized.
[185] The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of the categories under section 7 and that the expenses are necessary and reasonable, having regard to the parental financial circumstances. See: Park v. Thompson, 2005 ONCA 14132.
[186] In Titova v. Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, the court set out the following framework for determining a party’s contribution to a child’s section 7 expenses:

a) Calculate each parties’ income for child support purposes.
b) Determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of section 7 of the Guidelines.
c) Determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary “in relation to the child’s best interests” and are reasonable “in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation.”
d) If the expenses fall under paragraphs 7 (1) (d) or (f) of the Guidelines, determine whether the expenses are “extraordinary” as defined by subsection 7 (1.1) of the Guidelines.
e) The court considers what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then applies any tax deductions or credits.
f) The court determines the proportions that each party should contribute to the expenses, with the guiding principle being that the expenses will be shared in proportion to their incomes.

[187] The court cannot make an order that the father contribute to section 7 expenses when there are no expenses claimed.
[188] Further, the mother filed no proof of her income. She failed to serve and file a financial statement. This is required when a party is claiming section 7 expenses. The court requires evidence of the mother’s income to calculate the parties’ respective section 7 expense obligations. See: Ebba v. Sheriff Jalloh, supra, at para 83.
[189] The mother’s claim for section 7 expenses is dismissed without prejudice to the mother making this claim in the future should there be section 7 expenses.

12. Final Order and Conclusion

190The court makes the following final orders:

1. Commencing June 1, 2025, the father shall pay child support to the mother in the amount of $406.00 each month. This is the Table amount under the Child Support Guidelines for one child, based on the father’s imputed annual income of $44,000.00.
2. The father’s support arrears are fixed at $15,000.00.
3. Commencing July 1, 2025, the father shall pay the child support arrears at the rate of $150.00 each month until arrears are paid in full.
4. The father shall provide the mother with complete copies of his income tax returns, including all schedules, attachments, T-4 slips, statement of income and expenses, and any notices of assessment, by July 1st each year, the first year being July 1, 2026.
5. A Support Deduction Order shall issue. The Family Responsibility Office shall adjust its record accordingly. The arrears calculated in this decision replace the previous amount owing.
6. The Final Order dated June 7, 2024 shall be corrected to include the following provision regarding travel: The father shall not be permitted to remove the child from Canada without a further court order.
7. The father’s approval of this order as to form and content is dispensed with.

191If either party seeks their costs, they are to serve and file written submissions by June 30, 2025. The other party will then have until July 30, 2025 to provide a written response. The submissions should not exceed three pages, not including any bills of costs or offers to settle.

Released: May 20, 2025
Signed: Justice Sheilagh O’Connell

Footnotes

[1] See pages 2, 5, 6, and 8 of his signed Answer, dated February 9, 2024.
[2] The IDVC hears criminal and family cases in which there are active criminal charges relating to intimate partner violence and an active family case involving the same parties in both cases.
[3] On January 10, 2025, the criminal matter was scheduled for a criminal trial before another judge. At the time of writing this decision, the court does not know the outcome of the father’s criminal trial.
[4] Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 ONCA 41868.
[5] See: D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; Laura Jean W. v. Tracy Alfred R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37.