CONDOMINIUM AUTHORITY TRIBUNAL
Order under section 1.47 of the Condominium Act, 1998.
Member: Michael Clifton, Vice-Chair
The Applicant, Yujun Yang Represented by Rob Provenzano, Agent
The Respondent, Waterloo Standard Condominium Corporation No. 455 Represented by Michelle Kelly, Counsel
Hearing: Written Online Hearing – July 17, 2025 to February 26, 2026
REASONS FOR DECISION
A. INTRODUCTION
1This case deals with alleged contraventions of a Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties on June 24, 2025, during Stage 1 – Negotiation of a previous Tribunal case (Case No. 2025-00431N) (the “Settlement Agreement”). That case dealt with allegations relating to enforcement of visitor parking rules in the Respondent condominium corporation.
2The Applicant was represented in this hearing by Rob Provenzano, who is the tenant of the Applicant’s unit in the condominium and also desires to make use of the visitor parking for his second vehicle.
3The parties provided some information relating to the underlying dispute in their previous case, but this application does not involve adjudication of those issues. The only question before me is whether the Respondent has contravened the Settlement Agreement. I conclude that it has not, other than with respect to one minor and moot contravention. The case is dismissed without costs.
Preliminary Issue
4In addition to being the Applicant’s tenant who desires an exception to the condominium’s visitor parking rules, Mr. Provenzano is also the president of the Respondent condominium corporation.
5I requested that the parties provide submissions as to the appropriateness of Mr. Provenzano representing the Applicant in this case against the condominium. Upon reviewing the submissions of both parties, I concluded Mr. Provenzano could proceed in that role.
6Although Mr. Provenzano might have an interest that could conflict with the Applicant’s as it relates to compliance with the condominium’s rules, that was, or ought to have been, a subject matter of the original case, not this one.
7Further, while Mr. Provenzano’s participation here may be in tension with his fiduciary obligations as a member of the condominium’s board, that is an issue relating to the integrity of the condominium’s own governance and does not affect these proceedings.
8Counsel for the Respondent raised a concern regarding confidentiality of communications in these proceedings. However, unlike Stages 1 and 2 (Negotiation and Mediation, respectively) of the Tribunal process, everything communicated and submitted in Stage 3 – Tribunal Decision is part of the adjudicative record and is not subject to any automatic right or requirement of confidentiality.
9The confidentiality of communications between counsel and its client are a separate matter and presumably would be addressed in accordance with the usual rules relating to conflict of interest in the Condominium Act,1998, (the “Act”) or that might otherwise apply. In any event, that is not a matter of concern for these proceedings or relative to Mr. Provenzano’s activity here as representative of the Applicant.
10Lastly, counsel for the Respondent suggested that Mr. Provenzano himself had breached the Settlement Agreement. However, that is not the subject matter of this case and is not relevant to the allegations against the Respondent.
11In the course of making submissions, the Applicant also raised matters that are outside the scope of this case. These are similarly disregarded here. Likewise, though I have reviewed all materials submitted by the parties, I refer only to such submissions and documents as are necessary to explain the principal facts and my conclusions.
B. BACKGROUND
12I do not reproduce the entire text of the Settlement Agreement. A significant portion of its text consists of a summary of the issues and the Applicant’s claims in the applicable case, presented from the perspective of the Applicant (which were likely simply included as drafted by the Applicant) and set out under the heading, “Description of the Dispute.” Such portions of the text have the character of recitals and do not form the effective terms of the settlement and therefore are not relevant to this case.
13The effective terms of the Settlement Agreement come under the heading “Settlement” and provide the following proposed resolution to the parties’ dispute: (Paragraph numbering is added by me for convenience in writing this decision, since the original document lacked any, and the provisions are redacted to remove personal names where applicable.)
Immediate Cancellation of Tickets – The Corporation shall immediately cancel all outstanding parking tickets issued … to any vehicle that was displaying a valid yellow visitor parking tag belonging to a resident unit and was parked in a designated visitor parking space.
Reimbursement for Previously Paid Tickets – The Corporation will reimburse any unit owner who submits valid proof of payment for parking tickets that were issued to vehicles displaying a valid yellow visitor parking tag while parked in a designated visitor parking space. This reimbursement applies only to this specific category of infraction and does not extend to other types of parking violations. All reimbursements will be issued by the Corporation no later than July 5, 2025.
Cessation of Improper Ticketing – Effective immediately, the Corporation shall cease issuing parking tickets to any vehicle parked in a designated visitor parking space while clearly displaying a valid yellow visitor parking tag.
Notice to Unit Owners – The Corporation will issue written notice to all unit owners confirming the following:
i. Vehicles may park in designated visitor parking areas provided a valid yellow visitor parking tag is clearly displayed in the vehicle.
ii. The vehicle and its license plate must be registered with the Corporation in accordance with its current registration procedures.
14Mr. Provenzano acknowledges that the Respondent did cancel and cease issuing tickets to yellow-tagged vehicles and does not contest these points. However, he asserts that the Respondent contravened the terms of the Settlement Agreement by:
Failing to provide the required written notice to the owners confirming the new parking policies; and
In July 2025, issuing a proposed new rule of the condominium that:
i. would allow towing of yellow-tagged vehicles in visitor parking spaces, and
ii. would convert a number of visitor parking spaces into rentable secondary parking spaces for residents.
15Later in the proceedings, Mr. Provenzano introduced a third allegation that the condominium also contravened the Settlement Agreement by not paying some of the promised reimbursements to owners until August 2025, though the Settlement Agreement specified this should be completed by no later than July 5 (i.e., just 11 days after the agreement was made). It is my understanding that this information was not available at the time the application was first filed and that this is the reason it was introduced only later in the case.
16The Respondent denies that there was any contravention of the Settlement Agreement by them. As noted, the corporation’s counsel suggested the Applicant had contravened the agreement, but this does not form an issue in this case.
C. ISSUES & ANALYSIS
17The issues addressed in this decision are:
Did the Respondent contravene the Settlement Agreement by failing to provide the written notice to owners required by the agreement?
Did the Respondent contravene the Settlement Agreement by issuing its new rule relating to visitor parking?
Did the Respondent contravene the Settlement Agreement by reimbursing owners later than July 5, 2025?
18Fourthly, I address whether costs should be awarded to either party.
Issue No. 1: Did the Respondent contravene the Settlement Agreement by failing to provide the written notice to owners required by the agreement?
19As noted above, the two items of information that the Settlement Agreement required to be included in a notice to owners from the corporation were (1) that vehicles may park in designated visitor parking areas provided a valid yellow visitor parking tag is clearly displayed in the vehicle, and (2) that the vehicle and its license plate must be registered with the corporation in accordance with its current registration procedures.
20On or about July 4, 2025, shortly after entering the Settlement Agreement, the Respondent issued a notice to owners of a new visitor parking rule. The provisions of the new rule, which was part of the notice as the Act requires, included the following requirements:
Residents must provide their overnight visitor’s vehicle with a numbered yellow visitor parking tag.
This tag should be clearly displayed on the visitor’s dashboard or windshield to avoid ticketing and towing on account of parking violations.
The parking tag must match the registered licence plate on file with the property management company.
Residents must report any changes to vehicle make, model, or license plate to the condominium manager within seven calendar days to keep records current.
21This information clearly matches what the agreement required the corporation’s notice to owners to say. However, Mr. Provenzano submitted three reasons, on behalf of the Applicant, that he believes this notice did not satisfy the Respondent’s obligations under the Settlement Agreement.
22Initially, he stated that the Respondent, “[f]ailed to issue the required written notice to all unit owners affirming those terms.” I will address this allegation third, as it requires more explanation than the other two reasons. Secondly, he stated that because the notice of new rule did not accurately satisfy the requirements of s. 58 of the Act pertaining to such a notice, it “cannot be relied upon to satisfy any obligation,” and his third argument was that the Settlement Agreement required a “stand-alone notice”.
23Regarding the third allegation – that the Settlement Agreement required a stand-alone notice – this is simply not so. The Settlement Agreement does not state anywhere that the notice required by it must be “stand-alone” or that it could not be combined with a notice covering any other topics or purposes. Whether or not that was something the Applicant or Mr. Provenzano believed was intended in the Settlement Agreement, he is reading into the agreement a requirement that is not there.
24Regarding whether the notice of the new rule accurately satisfies the requirements of s. 58 of the Act pertaining to such notices, this is not relevant and would not constitute a contravention of the agreement. A notice is not automatically invalid for all purposes simply because it fails to fulfill the criteria relating to one of its purposes. Even if the criteria for a notice under s. 58 of the Act are not fully met by the Respondent’s July 4, 2025, notice, I find that it satisfies the requirements for the notice to be delivered under the Settlement Agreement.
25Mr. Provenzano’s remaining argument requires somewhat more explanation. As noted, he submitted that the Respondent “[f]ailed to issue the required written notice to all unit owners affirming those terms.” It is important to understand what is being referred to by the phrase, “those terms.” The reference is made evident by the sentence immediately before that statement: There, Mr. Provenzano wrote, that the Respondent had “[c]ontravened the settlement by proposing rule changes that contradict its terms.”
26Mr. Provenzano’s complaint therefore relies on an assertion that the written notice was intended to affirm the terms of the Settlement Agreement overall – the terms that Mr. Provenzano says the rule contradicts. However, this is, again, not an accurate assertion. The Settlement Agreement required the notice to affirm only two specific points that are set out in what I have labelled as section 4 of the agreement (in paragraph 13 of this decision), which (as I note in paragraph 21 above) the Respondent’s July 4, 2025, notice clearly addresses.
27I therefore find no contravention of the Settlement Agreement in relation to the fulfillment of the notice requirement.
28For clarity, I note that, in reaching this conclusion, I have not disregarded the fact that the required statements were set out in the text of the proposed rule rather than any other part of the notice. Arguably, that was not the most direct and clear manner in which to satisfy the terms of the Settlement Agreement pertaining to the notice, and I expect it genuinely was not the kind of notice Mr. Provenzano had in mind when the Settlement Agreement was made. Nevertheless, it was a notice to owners that was delivered in writing to owners, within the requisite time, and included the information that the Settlement Agreement specifically required.
Issue No. 2: Did the Respondent contravene the Settlement Agreement by issuing its new rule relating to visitor parking?
29Mr. Provenzano asserts that the act of proposing the new rule itself “violates the letter and spirit of the settlement.” He also argues that this act constitutes an attempt to amend the Settlement Agreement, which he defined as a contravention because an amendment to the agreement cannot be made unilaterally by either party.
30I note that a claim cannot be brought to the Tribunal for contravention of the “spirit” of an agreement, but only for actual or effective contravention of its terms: i.e., what Mr. Provenzano calls its “letter.”
31The ways in which Mr. Provenzano argues the proposed new rule contravenes the “letter” of the Settlement Agreement are: (1) That the rule would allow towing of yellow-tagged vehicles parked in visitor spaces; and (2) that the rule would convert the use of fifteen of the visitor parking spaces into spaces that could be, in effect, rented for use by unit owners for second vehicles.
32Regarding the first concern, the relevant provision of the Settlement Agreement states:
Effective immediately, the Corporation shall cease issuing parking tickets to any vehicle parked in a designated visitor parking space while clearly displaying a valid yellow visitor parking tag.
33Although the Settlement Agreement refers to ticketing and not towing, that is somewhat moot since, according to the rule, the risk of being towed results from there first being at least three tickets issued to a vehicle for the same offence.
34Mr. Provenzano is correct that the rule could, therefore, allow for the towing of yellow-tagged vehicles parked in visitor parking spaces. However, Mr. Provenzano is not correct that this is contrary to the Settlement Agreement. The agreement expressly provides that tickets will not be issued to any vehicle that is “clearly displaying a valid yellow visitor parking tag,” (emphasis added by me) and, consistent with that, the rule provides that ticketing or towing of a vehicle will only occur if,
the tag is not displayed, or
the license plate on the vehicle does not match the license plate on the registry associated with the tag, which would cause it not to be valid.
35Mr. Provenzano’s second concern refers to something the Settlement Agreement does not actually say. There is no provision of the Settlement Agreement that permits, prevents, restricts, or otherwise addresses the allocation or designation of visitor parking spaces for use by owners desiring space for a second vehicle for a fee. The rule cannot be considered to be in contravention of the agreement for having proposed to make that allowance.
36Based on the foregoing facts and considerations, I find that the rule proposed by the condominium in its July 4, 2025, notice was not contrary to, nor did it represent a contravention of, the Settlement Agreement for any of the reasons stated by the Applicant.
37As a result, it is not necessary for me to also consider the claim that the proposed rule constituted an attempted unilateral amendment to the Settlement Agreement, as it clearly was not.
Issue No. 3: Did the Respondent contravene the Settlement Agreement by reimbursing owners later than July 5, 2025?
38Mr. Provenzano stated that, “As President and authorized signing officer of the Corporation, I personally review and approve all invoices,” and therefore he had personal knowledge that the reimbursements to owners required to be paid under the Settlement Agreement “were still being processed and paid by the Corporation into the end of August 2025.”
39I have no reason to doubt Mr. Provenzano’s evidence. Presuming it to be a truthful report, it would appear that the Respondent was in contravention of the Settlement Agreement in this regard. However, Mr. Provenzano’s statements also indicate that, as president of the condominium, he was in a position to oversee, influence, and potentially help ensure the timeliness of such reimbursements. Whether he sought to do so, or why he did not or could not, are not facts addressed by either party. In any event, I find this of interest only and I do not consider it to be a significant factor in this analysis.
40Given that the Settlement Agreement was only entered into on June 24, 2025, I find that the expectation that reimbursements would be issued by July 5, 2025 – just 11 days later – to be unreasonable. Further, Mr. Provenzano’s evidence demonstrates that the Respondent was actively working at issuing such reimbursements in what seems to be a reasonably timely manner. Mr. Provenzano made no allegation that any of the reimbursements remained unpaid by the conclusion of this hearing.
41Based on the foregoing, I find that the Respondent was not willfully or deliberately seeking to contravene the Settlement Agreement. I further find that the contravention is neither ongoing nor significant; that is, it is both moot and minor, such that no order need flow from it.
Issue No. 4: Costs
42The Applicant has not requested costs other than reimbursement of the application filing fee. The Respondent has not requested costs at all.
43The Applicant has been primarily unsuccessful in this case. An unsuccessful Applicant is typically not awarded any costs. The question is whether he may be entitled to costs on account of partial success.
44I have found that the Respondent’s one apparent contravention relating to the delayed reimbursements is minor and moot. It is also an issue that the Applicant’s representative in this case appears to have been in a position to be able to oversee, influence, and/or affect. As such, I find no fair basis for any award of costs in favour of the Applicant.
45Although the Respondent requested no costs, it did raise the issue of whether the Applicant, or its representative, might have pursued the case for an improper purpose, i.e., to help ensure that Mr. Provenzano himself could make use of the visitor parking spaces without penalty or cost. Though a reasonable seeming inference, the proposition is merely speculative, and in so far as it pertains to the motivations of the Applicant’s agent rather than the Applicant himself, it is not relevant.
D. ORDER
46The Tribunal orders that the application is dismissed without costs.
Michael Clifton
Vice-Chair, Condominium Authority Tribunal
Released on: March 3, 2026