Tribunals Ontario

Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario

Assessment Review Board

Commission de révision de l’évaluation foncière

ISSUE DATE: July 12, 2023

FILE NO.: RD 22-025

Assessed Person(s): Terry Evans

Appellant(s): Terry Evans

Respondent(s): Municipal Property Assessment Corporation Region 14

Respondent(s): Town of East Gwillimbury

Property Location(s): 1940 Warden Avenue

Municipality(ies): Town of East Gwillimbury

Roll Number(s): 1954-000-029-26000-0000

Taxation Year(s): 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019

Legislative Authority: Rules 101-103 of the Assessment Review Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure

APPEARANCES:

Parties Terry Evans

Counsel/Representative* Joe Jebreen* and Scott McAnsh*

Parties Municipal Property Assessment Corporation

Counsel/Representative* Allyson Amster and Matt Kanter

Parties Town of East Gwillimbury

Counsel/Representative* Submissions not received

REQUEST FOR: A review of the Board’s Decision DM 2022M12 issued on July 14, 2022

HEARD: October 11, 2022 in writing

ADJUDICATOR(S): Dirk VanderBent, Vice-Chair

DECISION

OVERVIEW

1The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) has filed a written Request for Review with the Assessment Review Board (the “Board”) respecting Evans v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 14, 2022 CanLII 64342 (ON ARB), a decision issued on July 14, 2022 (the “Decision”).

2Upon receipt of this Request for Review, the Assessment Review Board (“Board”) invited submissions from both the property owner, Terry Evans, and the Municipality. Only Mr. Evans has provided submissions.

THE DECISION

Background

3The Decision addresses an application made by Mr. Evans, pursuant to s. 40.1(b) of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31 (the “Act”), to correct a palpable error in the assessment rolls for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years (the “Application”). Section 40.1 states:

Correction of errors

40.1 If it appears that there are palpable errors in the assessment roll,

a) if no alteration of assessed values or classification of land is involved, the Board may correct the roll; and

b) if alteration of assessed values or classification of land is involved, the Board may extend the time for bringing appeals and direct the assessment corporation to be the appellant.

4It is not disputed that the property, known municipally as 19420 Warden Avenue, Town of East Gwillimbury (the “Subject Property”), is farm land used only for farm purposes, and that it has been valued pursuant to s. 19(5) of the Act.

5Some further background information is required to understand the issues raised in this review proceeding. Municipal tax rates are based on property classification. The qualification criteria for property classification are set out in Ontario Regulation 282/98 (the “General Regulation”). Prior to 2016, the Subject Property had been classified in the Farm Property Class, which is one of the eligibility criteria to qualify the Subject Property for the Farm Property Class Tax Rebate Program. Under this rebate program, municipal taxes for properties in the Farm Property Class are levied at a significantly lower tax rate as compared to properties classified in the Residential Property Class. Under the provisions of the General Regulation, a farm property that does not qualify for the Farm Property Class, by default, falls under the Residential Property Class.

6In 2016, the Subject Property’s property classification changed from the Farm Property Class to the Residential Property Class, resulting in a significant increase in the municipal taxes levied for this property. Paragraph 19 of the Decision indicates that Mr. Evans provided “uncontroverted evidence” that all of the qualification criteria for the Farm Property Class had been met for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years, and that there was no evidence before the Board to explain why the Subject Property’s property classification changed in 2016.

7The reason the Hearing Member stated that the evidence was uncontroverted, is because neither MPAC nor the Municipality participated in the hearing, which was held in writing, i.e. they did not serve and file evidence or submissions in the proceeding. However, in this review proceeding, MPAC maintains that it never received notice of Mr. Evans’ palpable error application, because his counsel used inactive email addresses when emailing both his request that the Board hear his palpable error application, as well other subsequent correspondence related to his application. Mr. Evans takes the position that the email addresses were not inactive, MPAC is deemed to have received notice of his application, and, if MPAC did not receive his emails, it was due to circumstances entirely within MPAC's control.

8Finally, there is one remaining piece of the puzzle which, as discussed below, is of considerable importance in this review proceeding, namely: The Board does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an issue as to whether land should be classified as land in the Farm Property Class. In this regard, s. 31 of the General Regulation states:

Appeals under Section 40 of the Act

31. The following apply with respect to an appeal under subsection 40 (1) of the Act that raises an issue as to whether land should be classified as land in the farm property class:

32. If the applicability of subsection 19 (5) of the Act to the land is in issue, the Assessment Review Board shall determine that issue …

33. If, after the determination under paragraph 1, there is still an issue as to whether the land should be classified as land in the farm property class, the Assessment Review Board shall refer the issue to the Tribunal. [Emphasis added.]

The General Regulation defines “Tribunal” as the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal (“AFRAAT”).

The Hearing Member’s Order

9At paragraph 19 of the Decision, the Hearing Member concluded that, in the absence of responding evidence supporting a rationale for the change in property class, the classification in the Residential Property Class is an error in the assessment roll. She further found this error is inadvertent, unintentional, plain, obvious, and easy to understand. As such, the Hearing Member concluded that this error is a palpable error.

10The Hearing Member then proceeded to conduct her analysis as to whether she should exercise the discretion granted under s. 40.1 to correct the palpable error, finding that she should. As the correction would require an alteration of classification, she further found that s. 40.1(b) applies. Consequently, at paragraph 28 of the Decision, she ordered that the time for filing appeals for each of the taxation years in question should be extended, directing that MPAC be the appellant in these proceedings. She imposes no other conditions in her Order. In its Request for Review, MPAC does not challenge either of these findings. However, it follows that, if there are no palpable errors, neither of these findings would be required.

11In the Decision, the Hearing Member did not address the issue of whether the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate an issue as to whether land should be classified as land in the Farm Property Class.

RELEVANT RULES

12A request for review is authorized by Rule 101 of the Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”) which states:

Request for Review

101. A party may request a review of any final decision or order of the Board by filing a request in writing no more than 30 days after the decision was issued, [Emphasis added.]

13In considering whether to grant a request for review submitted pursuant to Rule 101, the test to be applied is whether the requester has established any of the grounds set out in Rule 102 which states:

Grounds for Review

102. A request for review will not be granted unless the Board is satisfied that:

a) the Board acted outside its jurisdiction or violated the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness;

b) the Board made a significant error of law or fact such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision;

c) the Board heard false or misleading evidence from a party or witness, which was discovered only after the hearing and would have affected the result; or

d) there is new evidence that could not have reasonably been obtained earlier and have affected the result.

14The Board’ powers in considering a request for review are set out in Rule 103 which states:

Review Order

103. Upon considering a request for review, or on its own initiative, the Board may:

a) dismiss the request; or

b) after providing all parties an opportunity to make submissions:

i. confirm, vary, or cancel the decision; or

ii. order a rehearing on all or part of the matter.

ISSUES

15In its Request for Review, MPAC challenges each of the findings made by the Hearing Member, as described above. Based on the parties’ submissions summarized below, there are four questions the Board must address:

1. Did the Decision make a final order? If not, does the Board have jurisdiction to hear MPAC's Request for Review?

2. Did the Hearing Member breach procedural fairness by not providing MPAC with notice of Mr. Evans’ palpable error application or an opportunity to make submissions prior to issuing the Decision?

3. Did the Hearing Member make a significant error of law or fact, such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision?

4. Did the Hearing Member act outside her jurisdiction by determining that the Subject Property should have been classified in the Farm Property Class for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years?

5. If the Board has jurisdiction to hear MPAC's review, and the answer to either questions 1 or 2 is yes, should the Board vary the Decision or, alternatively, order a rehearing of Mr. Evans’ palpable error application?

RESULT

16The Decision did make a final order. As such, the Board has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Evans’ Request for Review. The Hearing Member did not breach procedural fairness, as MPAC is deemed to have received the correspondence sent to MPAC by Mr. Evans and the Board to email addresses Manager1 or Manager2. The Hearing Member did make an error in law in finding, at paragraph 27 of the Decision that “there are palpable errors” (emphasis added). Consequently, the Board varies the Decision: (i) to amend this finding to state “it appears that there are palpable errors in the assessment roll”; and (ii) to amend the Order by adding a condition that the only issue that may be raised in the appeals is whether the Subject Property qualifies as land in the Farm Property Class.

Issue 1: Did the Decision make a final order? If not, does the Board have jurisdiction to hear MPAC's Request for Review?

Submissions

MPAC

17MPAC first points to other Board Review Decisions which have reviewed decisions made in respect of palpable error applications, citing Hopper v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 15, 2016 CanLII 24421 (ON ARB) at paragraphs 2 - 3; and Piggott v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 28, 2019 CanLII 109527 (ON ARB) at paragraph 7, which indicates that a decision made on a palpable error is a final order.

18The Board also paraphrases a submission made by MPAC in support of its position that the Hearing Member acted outside her jurisdiction in finding that there is a palpable error. In essence, this submission points out that there are only two options for classification of the Subject Property – it must be either the Residential Property Class or the Farm Property Class. As the Hearing Member has found that the reported classification in the Residential Property Class is a palpable error, this, in effect means, that the Subject Property must be classified in the Farm Property Class, thereby either pre-empting AFRAAT’s jurisdiction to determine this classification issue, or conflicting with any subsequent finding made by AFRAAT that the Subject Property does not fall in the Farm Property Class. As such, MPAC argues that the Hearing Member made a final determination of the issue, and, therefore, the Hearing Member’s decision is a final order.

Mr. Evans

19Mr. Evans submits that the Decision only provides for an extension of time to file appeals, it did not determine the merits of the appeals. He maintains that the determination of the jurisdictional issues raised by MPAC in this Request for Review will addressed in these extended appeal proceedings. He, therefore, submits that the Decision does not make a final order, which is a prerequisite requirement under Rule 101.

Findings on Issue 1

20The Board finds that MPAC's submissions has merit. The Hearing Member’s finding that the Residential Property Class classification is an error in the assessment roll, does have the effect of making a final determination regarding property classification.

21Apart from this finding, the Board, more generally, observes that an application under s. 40.1 is a proceeding that is separate and distinct from the appeal proceeding that must be conducted if s. 40.1(b) applies. As such, a finding that there is a palpable error is a final decision, notwithstanding that, under s. 40.1(b), the correction of the errors will be made through an appeal proceeding.

22For these reasons, the Board concludes that the Hearing Member’s Decision does make a final order, and as such, the Board does have jurisdiction to hear MPAC's Request for Review pursuant to Rule 101.

Issue 2: Did the Hearing Member breach procedural fairness by not providing MPAC with notice of Mr. Evans’ palpable error application or an opportunity to make submissions prior to issuing the Decision?

Evidence

Background

23The genesis of this unfortunate circumstance turns on the email addresses used by Mr. Evans’ counsel when copying MPAC on his emails to the Board requesting that the Board hear Mr. Evans’ palpable error application. It is not disputed that Mr. Evans’ counsel used two email addresses when corresponding with MPAC regarding this review proceeding: (i) ‘managerofcasemanagement@mpac.ca’ (the “Manager1 Address”); and (ii) ‘casemanagement2@mpac.ca’ (the “Manager2 Address”). MPAC states that the correct address for service is ‘casemangement@mpac.ca’ (the “Correct Address”).

24The Board sent MPAC the Notice of Hearing for Mr. Evans’ palpable error application by email to the Manager2 Address. Once the Decision was issued, the Board emailed the Decision to MPAC using the Correct Address.

25Rules 33 and 34 state:

Deemed Receipt of Notice

33. A party is deemed to receive any notice that is sent by the Board to the most recent mail or email address which has been provided to the Board for either the party or the party’s representative.

Deemed Receipt Exception

34. Rule 33 does not apply if the person for whom the document was intended establishes, by filing affidavit evidence, that through absence, accident, illness, or other cause beyond that person’s control, the document was not received until a later date or not at all. [Emphasis added]

MPAC

26MPAC adduced affidavit evidence showing that, within its email system, when the mailbox for the Correct Address hits capacity, the records are diverted to the Manger1 Address email mailbox, and emails to the Manager1 Address are automatically forwarded to the Manager2 Address. However, MPAC states that both of these email addresses are inactive and unmonitored.

Mr. Evans

27In his response, Mr. Evans disputes MPAC's assertion that the Manager1 and Manager2 email addresses are inactive. He adduced affidavit evidence indicating that his lawyers have successfully used the Manager1 Address in several other appeal proceedings, attaching copies of emails to substantiate this claim. The affidavit evidence further confirms that, in none of these cases, did counsel’s email “bounce back or have an automated response”.

Submissions

MPAC

28MPAC submits that it was not at fault for the failure to receive notice. MPAC argues that Mr. Evans’ counsel knew, or ought to have known, that the Correct Address was to be used for email service. MPAC notes that the Board compounded the problem by sending the Notice of Hearing to the Manager2 Address, when the Board knew, or ought to have known that this was not the correct email address.

29MPAC submits that the Courts have confirmed that a breach of procedural fairness occurs where a party does not receive notice of a hearing because the notice was sent to an incorrect email address, citing Laptev v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 27, 2019 CanLII 55269 (ON ARB) at paragraphs 5 and 16.

30MPAC argues that its failure to receive notice was clearly beyond MPAC’s control because these critical documents were sent to an incorrect and unmonitored email address.

31In its reply, MPAC did not dispute the affidavit evidence adduced by Mr. Evans.

Mr. Evans

32Mr. Evans relies on the affidavit evidence describe above which demonstrates that the Manager1 Address is not inactive. He submits that, with this prior experience, it was reasonable to serve MPAC using the Manager1 Address. He further states that there is no way for the public to know that MPAC did not monitor the Manager1 Address. He notes that, MPAC's affidavit evidence confirms that, one week after MPAC received the Decision, MPAC did add an automated response to the Manager1 and Manager2 unmonitored email boxes.

33Mr. Evans submits that MPAC's website does not state that email service is to be effected using the Correct Address. Without such information, Mr. Evans submits that it was reasonable for his counsel to use an email that has proved effective in the past.

34Mr. Evans further argues that pursuant to Rule 33 of the Board’s Rules, MPAC is deemed to have received the correspondence that his counsel emailed to MPAC. Rule 34 provides for an exception to the s. 33 deeming provision, if the person did not receive the correspondence due to a cause beyond that person’s control. Mr. Evans argues that MPAC is at fault for setting up a mailbox that it knows is used by parties and then not monitoring that mailbox. In support of this submission, Mr. Evans relies on 10198447 Canada Inc. v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 03, 2022 CanLII 3379 (ON ARB), at paragraphs 53 to 58, emphasizing that the Board reiterated, at paragraph 55, that the cause by which a person does not receive a document may vary, but, whatever the cause, it must be beyond that person’s control.

Findings on Issue 2

35The Board begins by noting that Rule 33 states that a party is deemed to receive any notice that is sent by the Board to the most recent mail or email address which has been provided to the Board for either the party or the party’s representative (the “Deemed Receipt Rule”). Under Rule 34, there is an exception to the deemed receipt of a document where it is established that the person did not receive the document due to a cause beyond that person’s control. Rule 34 does not refer to fault. The Board also observes that the burden of proof rests with the person who seeks to rely on Rule 34.

36In this case, MPAC clearly controls its own email system, and Mr. Evans has adduced uncontradicted evidence that his lawyers have successfully corresponded with MPAC in the past using the Manager1 Address. As he used the Manager2 Address, this was the address used by the Board in corresponding with the parties. While the Board understands the operational complexity associated with receiving large volumes of emails, this does not change the fact that the management of the receipt of incoming email correspondence remains in MPAC's control. The evidence does not establish that Mr. Evans’ counsel or the Board inappropriately skirted an established protocol for communicating with MPAC, by not using the Correct Address. The Board reiterates that Mr. Evans has successfully used Manager1 and Manager2 email addresses in the past. The Board also finds that it is reasonable for the Board’s administrative staff to assume that the Board could use the Manager2 address provided in Mr. Even’s email correspondence copied to the Board. Consequently, on this ground, it cannot be said MPAC's failure to identify the receipt of the emails that were sent by Mr. Evans and the Board is due to circumstances beyond MPAC’s control. Consequently, the Board finds that MPAC has not established the Rule 34 exception to Deemed Receipt Rule applies in this case.

37Furthermore, there is no dispute that the emails were actually delivered to MPAC. Therefore, MPAC is deemed to have received notice of the hearing of Mr. Evans’ palpable error application. As such, the Board finds that there was no breach of procedural fairness in this case.

Issue 3: Did the Hearing Member make a significant error of law or fact, such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision?

Submissions

MPAC

38MPAC asserts that the Hearing Member made a significant error of law and fact by finding that there are palpable errors in the assessment roll. In support of this assertion, MPAC provides additional evidence in its submissions indicating that the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (“OMAFRA”), now replaced by AgriCorp, regularly advises MPAC as to which properties are to be classified in, or should be removed from, the Farm Property Class. MPAC states that Agricorp advised MPAC that, for the taxation years in question the Subject Property was ineligible because the property owner did not submit a required annual application for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years for the Subject Property to ensure that the Subject Property be included in the Farm Property Class. As such, MPAC maintains that the Subject Property was correctly classified in the Residential Property Class, and, therefore, there were no errors in the assessment rolls for the taxation years in question.

Mr. Evans

39In response, Mr. Evans points out that the criteria set out in the General Regulation for qualifying as land in the Farm Property Class, includes s. 8.1 (3.1) and (4). Based on his interpretation of these subsections, Mr. Evans maintains that, in applying these subsections to the circumstances of the Subject Property, an annual application is not required for the taxation years in question.

Findings on Issue 3

40The Board begins its analysis by first observing that the evidence MPAC seeks to adduce through its submissions in this review is evidence that existed at the time of the hearing, and therefore it does not meet the criteria in Rule 102(d) that the evidence “could not have reasonably been obtained earlier”. As such the Board will not consider this evidence in this review.

41As stated at paragraph 19 of the Decision, the Hearing Member found that, in the absence of responding evidence supporting a rationale for the change in property class, the classification in the Residential Property Class is an error in the assessment roll. Therefore, in terms of making a factual finding whether there was an error in the assessment roll, the evidence adduced at the hearing supported her finding. Therefore, on this ground, the Board does not find that the Hearing Member made an error of law.

42However, there remains the substantive legal dispute regarding the interpretation of the qualification criteria for the Farm Property Class set out in the General Regulation. In asking the Board to address this issue in this review proceeding, the Board must consider whether it has the jurisdiction to do so. This is the very question raised in Issue 4, and, consequently, the Board will provide its analysis under Issue 4, where the Board will make its finding in respect of Issue 3.

Issue 4: Did the Hearing Member act outside her jurisdiction by determining that the Subject Property should have been classified in the Farm Property Class for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years?

Submissions

MPAC

43MPAC submits that the Decision constitutes an error of law because the Board was without jurisdiction to render the Decision. More specifically, the error of law alleged by MPAC is that the Hearing Member acted outside her jurisdiction by making a determination that the Subject Property qualifies as land in the Farm Property Class.

44MPAC submits that the Board has no jurisdiction to determine this classification issue which must be referred to AFRAAT for adjudication. In support of this position, MPAC cites the Board’s Review Decision in Lortie v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 01, 2022 CanLII 25778 (ON ARB) at paragraph 94, which relies on the provisions of the General Regulation cited earlier in this Review Decision.

45MPAC maintains that, no matter how clear it may have been to the Hearing Member that the Subject Property should have been classified in the Farm Property Class, the Board acted outside its jurisdiction by finding that there were palpable errors, rather than referring the matter to the AFRAAT.

Mr. Evans

46Mr. Evans asserts that MPAC incorrectly states that the Board should have referred the matter to AFRAAT instead of creating appeals before the Board, arguing that s. 40.1 does not give the Board that power. Mr. Evans emphasizes that s. 40.1(b) only empowers the Board to extend the time for filing appeals.

47Mr. Evans also emphasizes that that there is no direct appeal to AFRAAT available to parties who wish to challenge the incorrect classification of farm land, noting that appeals relating to the classification of lands in the Farm Property Class can only be referred to AFRAAT by the Board.

48Mr. Evans acknowledges that a referral to AFRAAT may be required at some point in the appeals filed pursuant to the Hearing Member’s Order extending the time to file appeals.

49Alternatively, Mr. Evans argues that, even if the Board lacks the jurisdiction to make determinations as to whether farm lands can be classified in the Farm Property Class, that does not obviate the Board’s power to remedy palpable errors in assessment rolls pursuant to s. 40.1 of the Act.

Findings on Issue 4

50The Board begins its analysis by first referring to one of the submissions made by Mr. Evans in respect of Issue 1, namely, that the Hearing Member did not determine the merits of the appeals to be filed with the Board pursuant to the Hearing Member’s Order made pursuant to s. 40.1(b) of the Act. Mr. Evans acknowledges that the determination of any jurisdictional issue, as raised by MPAC in this review proceeding, will be made in the appeal proceedings.

51The Board finds that this ought to be the case, and it may well be that this was the underlying intention of the Hearing Member. However, the Board also refers to MPAC's earlier submission that, as the Hearing Member has found that the reported classification in the Residential Property Class is a palpable error, this, in effect, means that the Subject Property must be classified in the Farm Property Class, thereby either pre-empting AFRAAT’s jurisdiction to determine this classification issue, or conflicting with any subsequent finding made by AFRAAT that the Subject Property does not fall in the Farm Property Class.

52Because the Hearing Member found that there is a palpable error in the assessment roll, this raises the jurisdictional error cited by MPAC. Again, while this most probably was not the Hearing Member’s intention, the Board must base its decision on the wording of the Decision. Therefore, the Board must conclude that the Hearing Member’s finding that there is a palpable error does constitute an error of law.

53However, that does not end the matter. Under Rule 102(b) the error of law must be such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision. In addressing this aspect of the test, the Board reiterates that the problem with the Hearing Member’s finding is that it states that there is a palpable error. In doing so, the Hearing Member is finding that that the classification of the Subject Property is incorrect. This, in turn, means that the Hearing Member is making a determination that the Subject Property should be classified in the Farm Property Class. As noted above, the Board does not have the jurisdiction to make this determination. Consequently, the Board finds that the Hearing Member made a significant error of law, such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision.

Issue 5: Having found that there is an error in law should the Board vary the Decision or, alternatively, order a rehearing of Mr. Evans’ palpable error application?

54In addressing this issue, the Board notes that the wording of s. 40.1 is: “If it appears that there are palpable errors in the assessment roll…” (emphasis added). If the Hearing Member’s finding had been so worded, then this would clarify that no determination was being made in respect of classification which would leave this issue to be determined in the appeal process ordered pursuant to s. 40.1(b). As such, this would avoid the problem of exceeding the Board’s jurisdiction, thereby reinforcing Mr. Evans’ submission that the determination of any jurisdictional issue, as raised by MPAC in this review proceeding, would be made in the appeal proceedings. For this reason, the Board concludes that, in light of the error of law, the Board finds it is appropriate to vary the Decision as set out in the Order below.

55In this regard, the Board observes that the Board’s authority to limit the scope of an appeal filed pursuant to an order made under s. 40.1(b) has been confirmed by the Divisional Court in Municipal Property Assessment Corporation v. Montevallo Developments Limited, 2008 CanLII 69580 (ON SCDC) (“Montevallo – Div. Ct.”), at paragraphs 31 and 36. In the circumstances of this case, when addressing the apparent palpable error, the only issue to be considered is whether the Subject Property can be classified in the Farm Property Class. Therefore, this is the only issue that may be raised in the appeals.

ORDER

56The Decision is varied as follows:

1. The first sentence of paragraph 27 of the Decision is varied to state: “The Board finds that it appears that there are palpable errors in the assessment roll for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years.”

2. Paragraph 28 of the Decision is rescinded and replaced with the following paragraph:

“The Board grants the motion. The Board:

i. extends the time for filing appeals for the Subject Property for the 2016 to 2019 taxation years, and directs that MPAC be the appellant;

ii. the appeals must be filed with the Board within 30 days of the issuance of this Review Decision; and

iii. the only issue that may be raised in the appeals is whether the Subject Property qualifies as land in the Farm Property Class.”

"Dirk VanderBent"

DIRK VANDERBENT

VICE-CHAIR

Assessment Review Board

Website: www.tribunalsontario.ca/arb